Bonifacio vs. Gimenez

The place where an offended party first accessed a defamatory internet article cannot serve as the venue for a libel prosecution, as "access" does not equate to "printed and first published" under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363.

Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI) was formed by disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI)—a subsidiary of the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC)—after PPI filed for corporate rehabilitation. To air grievances against the Yuchengcos and Malayan Insurance Co., PEPCI maintained a website, a blogspot, and a yahoo e-group. Private respondent Jessie John Gimenez, acting on behalf of the Yuchengco family and Malayan, filed a criminal complaint for thirteen counts of libel against PEPCI officers and trustees over articles posted on the PEPCI website.

• The Defamatory Publications: Gimenez accessed the PEPCI website in Makati on various dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005, and found 13 articles containing derogatory statements against the Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance. One article posted on August 25, 2005, accused the Yuchengcos of deceiving planholders and called for a boycott of YGC investments and deposits.
• The Original Information: The Makati City Prosecutor filed 13 separate Informations for libel. The accusatory portion of Criminal Case No. 06-876 alleged that the accused, as trustees of PEPCI holding legal title to the website, published the defamatory article. It failed, however, to allege that the offended parties actually resided in Makati at the time of the offense or that the libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.
• The Amended Information: After the RTC initially quashed the original Information, the prosecution amended it to state that the website was "accessible in Makati City" and the article "was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City." Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information, arguing it still failed to vest jurisdiction because it erroneously equated the place where the offended party accessed the article with the place of printing and first publication.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Direct recourse to the Supreme Court was justified because the petition raised a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in libel cases under Article 360 of the RPC.
• Jurisdictional Defect: The Amended Information failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it did not allege that the libelous articles were "printed and first published" by the accused in Makati; the prosecution erroneously laid venue based on where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.
• Illegality of Amendment: An amendment to cure a jurisdictional defect in an information for libel is illegal, as venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases and cannot be cured by a mere formal amendment.

• Sufficiency of Allegations: Citing Banal III v. Panganiban, the Information need not allege verbatim that the publication was "printed and first published" in the appropriate venue; the allegation that the website was accessible and the article was first accessed in Makati was sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
• Amendment as Cure: Any deficiency in the original Information was merely a matter of form that could be cured by amendment.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts, rendering the petition dismissible.
• Venue in Internet Libel: Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the Amended Information which laid venue based on where the offended party first accessed the internet-published article, rather than where it was printed and first published.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts is unnecessary when cases involve purely legal questions. Because the petition raised a pure question of law regarding jurisdiction under Article 360 of the RPC, direct recourse to the Supreme Court was justified to abbreviate the review process.
• Venue in Internet Libel: Grave abuse of discretion attended the admission of the Amended Information. Under Article 360, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, the venue for libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to either where the complainant actually resides or where the defamatory article was printed and first published. "First accessed by the private complainant" is not equivalent to "printed and first published." To equate access with publication would spawn the very harassment RA 4363 sought to prevent, as it would allow libel suits anywhere a website is accessible. If venue is based on printing and first publication, the Information must allege with particularity where the article was printed and first published—a pre-condition that cannot be reasonably satisfied for internet publications.

• Hierarchy of Courts — The established policy requires that recourse must first be made to lower-ranked courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction. However, strict application is unnecessary when cases involve purely legal questions, allowing direct resort to the Supreme Court by way of exception to abbreviate the review process.
• Venue in Written Defamation (Article 360, RPC, as amended by RA 4363) — The venue of the criminal action for written defamation where the offended party is a private individual is limited to either (1) where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense, or (2) where the libelous article is printed and first published. If the basis of the venue is the place of printing and first publication, the complaint or information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published (e.g., the address of editorial or business offices). This rule was established to forestall the harassment of accused through out-of-town libel suits filed in remote or distant places.

• "To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners’ website in Makati with 'printing and first publication' would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website."
• "The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication."

• Agbayani v. Sayo, G.R. No. L-47880, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 699 — Followed. Laid down the rule that if venue in libel cases is based on where the libelous matter was printed and first published, the complaint or information must allege such fact as a sine qua non.
• Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125813, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 279 — Followed. Explained the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA 4363, which was to prevent the offended party from harassing the accused by laying venue in remote or distant places.
• Macasaet v. People, G.R. No. 156747, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 255 — Followed. Reiterated the Agbayani rule on the necessity of alleging the place of printing and first publication in libel informations.
• Banal III v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 167474, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 164 — Distinguished. While the trial court relied on this case to rule that the Information need not allege verbatim the phrase "printed and first published," the Supreme Court clarified that while verbatim words are unnecessary, the substance of the venue requirement must still be met, which the phrase "first accessed" fails to satisfy.
• Agustin v. Pamintuan, G.R. No. 164938, August 22, 2005, 467 SCRA 601 — Followed. Cited by the RTC in initially quashing the original Information for lack of venue allegations.

• Article 360, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363 — Defines the persons responsible for written defamation and prescribes the specific venues for the institution of criminal and civil actions: either where the offended party actually resides or where the libelous article is printed and first published. The Court applied this provision to rule that "first accessed" does not fall within the statutory venues for libel.

Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas Bersamin, Martin S. Villarama, Jr.