Bonifacio vs. Dizon

A judgment in an agrarian ejectment case based on personal cultivation under Section 36(1) of R.A. 3844 survives the death of the landowner-lessor and may be enforced by his heirs and successors-in-interest, because the right of cultivation is not a purely personal right of the landowner but extends to the members of his immediate family.

Olimpio Bonifacio was the registered owner of a two-hectare agricultural land situated at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27298. Private respondent Pastora San Miguel was the agricultural lessee occupying the landholding. The ejectment action was grounded on Section 36(1) of R.A. 3844 (the Agricultural Land Reform Code), which authorized the dispossession of an agricultural lessee when the lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family would personally cultivate the landholding. The statutory framework governing agrarian relations was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6389, which eliminated personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment, and supplemented by P.D. No. 27, which decreed tenant emancipation and transfer of land ownership to tillers.

Olimpio Bonifacio was the registered owner of a two-hectare agricultural land situated at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27298. Private respondent Pastora San Miguel was the agricultural lessee occupying the landholding. On July 1, 1968, Bonifacio filed a complaint before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Fifth Regional District, Branch I-A of Baliwag, Bulacan, docketed as CAR Case No. 2160-B'68, seeking San Miguel's ejectment on the ground of personal cultivation under Section 36(1) of R.A. 3844. After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered on September 18, 1970 by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, granting Bonifacio authority to eject San Miguel and ordering the latter to vacate the landholding and deliver possession to Bonifacio for personal cultivation, subject to the provisions of Section 25 of R.A. 3844.

San Miguel appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on March 6, 1973 modified the judgment with respect to her counterclaim by ordering Bonifacio to pay ₱1,376.00, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Still dissatisfied, San Miguel elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. During the pendency of her petition, on August 7, 1983, Olimpio Bonifacio died. No notice of his death was given to the Court, and consequently no order for the substitution of his heirs was issued. On July 31, 1985, the Court En Banc resolved to deny San Miguel's petition for lack of merit and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision.

Thereafter, Bonifacio's surviving spouse Rosalina and his children — Gabriel, Ponciano, Tiburcio, Beatriz, Generosa, Silveria, Leonardo, Felomena, Encarnacion, and Leonila, all surnamed Bonifacio — moved for the execution of the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. A writ of execution was issued on February 20, 1986. On March 6, 1986, the Deputy Sheriff submitted a report of partial delivery of possession, stating that except for the portion occupied by San Miguel's house, which she refused to vacate, he had delivered the land to Rosalina Bonifacio as surviving wife. San Miguel then moved to quash the writ of execution, while petitioners sought a writ of demolition and an order declaring San Miguel in contempt for allegedly re-entering the subject land.

After hearing, respondent Judge Natividad G. Dizon issued a resolution on July 15, 1986 declaring the implementation of the writ of execution null and void, denying the motion for demolition, and denying the petition for contempt. Petitioners assailed this resolution via a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court as involving a pure question of law.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners contended that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in ruling that the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 could no longer be executed because the action was purely personal in character and could not be inherited by the heirs upon Olimpio Bonifacio's death.
• Survival of Action: Petitioners asserted that CAR Case No. 2160-B'68, being an ejectment case and not one of those specifically provided by law to be purely personal, survives the death of a party.
• Binding Effect on Successors-in-Interest: Petitioners argued that under Rule 39, Section 49(b) of the Rules of Court, a judgment is binding not only upon the parties but also on their successors-in-interest, and that they were therefore entitled to enforce the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68.

• Personal Character of the Right: Private respondent stressed that the action was not an ordinary ejectment case but an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee, and theorized that the right being asserted was personal to Olimpio Bonifacio, which necessarily died with him.
• Non-Substitution of Deceased Party: Private respondent contended that the non-substitution of Olimpio Bonifacio by his heirs rendered the proceedings taken after his death null and void.
• Supervening Events: Private respondent pointed to two supervening events allegedly prohibiting execution of the judgment: (1) the amendment of Section 36(1) of R.A. 3844 by R.A. No. 6389, which eliminated personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment, and (2) the promulgation of P.D. No. 27, which decreed tenant emancipation and transfer of land ownership to tillers.

• Survival of Judgment: Whether the favorable judgment obtained by the decedent in an agrarian ejectment case is inherited by his compulsory heirs, thereby vesting in the latter all the rights conferred by the judgment to the decedent.
• Effect of Non-Substitution: Whether the failure to substitute the deceased party rendered the proceedings taken after his death null and void.
• Effect of Supervening Legislation: Whether the amendment of Section 36(1) of R.A. 3844 by R.A. No. 6389 and the promulgation of P.D. No. 27 bar the execution of the judgment.

• Survival of Judgment: Yes. The right of cultivation under Section 36(1) of R.A. 3844 was not a purely personal right of the landowner-lessor but extended to the members of his immediate family, and the favorable judgment survived the death of the decedent and was transmitted to his heirs and successors-in-interest.
• Effect of Non-Substitution: No. The failure to inform the court of the decedent's death and the consequent non-substitution of heirs did not render the proceedings null and void, the action being one that survives the death of a party.
• Effect of Supervening Legislation: No. Both R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied retroactively under the general rule that statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided.

• Survival of Judgment: The Court characterized CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 as an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee, more closely and strictly regulated by the State than an ordinary ejectment case, but held that this factor did not bar the application of the general rule that an ejectment case survives the death of a party. The term "personal cultivation" in Section 36(1) of R.A. 3844 was clarified: the provision authorized ejectment not only when the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the landholding but also when a member of his immediate family so desired. The law thus did not intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but to extend its exercise to the members of his immediate family. To hold otherwise would nullify the right of cultivation likewise conferred upon the landowner's immediate family members. The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's immediate family members to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee, who was allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. Since petitioners were not only the heirs and successors-in-interest but also the immediate family members of the deceased landowner-lessor, the right to cultivate the landholding was transmitted to them.

• Effect of Non-Substitution: The Court applied the rule from Florendo, Jr. vs. Coloma, which involved substantially the same facts and issue. In that case, the Court held that an ejectment case survives the death of a party and that the supervening death did not extinguish the decedent's civil personality. Where counsel failed to inform the court of the client's death, the appellate court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death without proper manifestation, and was well within its jurisdiction to proceed with the case. The Court found no showing that the proceedings were tainted with irregularities. Private respondent's challenge against the proceedings held after Olimpio Bonifacio's death was therefore rejected.

• Effect of Supervening Legislation: The Court relied on Nilo vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-34586, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 519), where it had categorically ruled that both R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied retroactively under the general rule that statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein. Since the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 had become final and executory prior to the amendment and the promulgation of P.D. No. 27, these supervening legislative acts could not bar its execution.

• Survival of Ejectment Actions Upon Death of Party — An ejectment case, including an agrarian ejectment case, survives the death of a party. The supervening death of a party does not extinguish civil personality, and the action may be continued by or against the deceased party's heirs or legal representatives. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 survived Olimpio Bonifacio's death and could be enforced by his heirs.

• Right of Cultivation Under Section 36(1) of R.A. 3844 — The right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment of an agricultural lessee was not a right exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. Section 36(1) authorized ejectment when the landowner-lessor or a member of his immediate family would personally cultivate the landholding, thereby extending the exercise of the right to the landowner's immediate family members. The term "personal cultivation" could not be given a restricted connotation meaning a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee; in either case, the right extended to the members of the lessor's or lessee's immediate family. The Court applied this interpretation to hold that the right asserted in the ejectment case was transmissible to the deceased landowner's heirs, who were also his immediate family members.

• Non-Substitution Due to Failure to Notify Court of Death — Where a party's counsel fails to inform the court of the client's death, the court cannot be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death without proper manifestation. In such a case, and considering that the supervening death did not extinguish the decedent's civil personality, the court remains within its jurisdiction to proceed with the case. The proceedings are not rendered null and void by the absence of substitution. The Court applied this rule from Florendo, Jr. vs. Coloma to reject private respondent's challenge to the proceedings conducted after Olimpio Bonifacio's death.

• Prospective Application of Agrarian Legislation — Statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein. Both R.A. No. 6389 (which eliminated personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment) and P.D. No. 27 (which decreed tenant emancipation) cannot be applied retroactively to bar execution of a judgment that had already become final and executory. The Court relied on Nilo vs. Court of Appeals for this proposition.

• "Clearly then, the right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. To say otherwise would be to put to naught the right of cultivation likewise conferred upon the landowner's immediate family members." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the right of cultivation under Section 36(1) of R.A. 3844 extends to immediate family members and is therefore not extinguished upon the landowner's death, making the judgment transmissible to the heirs.

• "The right to cultivate the landholding asserted in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 not being a purely personal right of the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-interest." — This is the operative conclusion applying the doctrine of transmissibility to the heirs, who were both successors-in-interest and immediate family members of the deceased.

• "In such a case and considering that the supervening death of appellant did not extinguish her civil personality, the appellate court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case." — Quoted from Florendo, Jr. vs. Coloma, this passage establishes the rule that non-substitution due to counsel's failure to notify the court of death does not void the proceedings, because the action survives and civil personality is not extinguished by death.

• Florendo, Jr. vs. Coloma, G.R. No. 60544, May 19, 1984, 129 SCRA 304 — Controlling precedent followed. The Court applied its holding that an ejectment case survives the death of a party and that failure to substitute the deceased party due to counsel's non-notification of death does not render subsequent proceedings null and void, as the court remains within its jurisdiction to proceed.
• Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34586, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 519 — Followed. The Court relied on its categorical ruling therein that both R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied retroactively, to reject private respondent's argument that supervening legislation barred execution of the judgment.
• Republic vs. Bagtas, 6 SCRA 242 — Cited within the Florendo quotation for the proposition that the supervening death of a party does not extinguish civil personality.
• Vda. de Haberes vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 534 — Cited within the Florendo quotation for the same proposition that death does not extinguish civil personality.

• Section 36(1), Republic Act No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code) — Authorized the dispossession of an agricultural lessee when the lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family would personally cultivate the landholding or convert it to non-agricultural purposes. The Court interpreted this provision as extending the right of cultivation beyond the landowner personally to his immediate family members, thereby making the right transmissible to the heirs.
• Section 7, Republic Act No. 6389 — Amended Section 36(1) of R.A. 3844 by eliminating personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment of a tenant/lessee, replacing it with declaration of the landholding as suited for residential, commercial, industrial, or urban purposes. The Court held this amendment could not be applied retroactively to bar execution of the already final judgment.
• Presidential Decree No. 27 — Decreed the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferred ownership of the land tilled to the tenant, and provided mechanisms for such transfer. The Court held P.D. No. 27 likewise could not be applied retroactively.
• Section 49(b), Rule 39, Rules of Court — Provides that a judgment is binding not only upon the parties but also upon their successors-in-interest. Petitioners invoked this provision to support their entitlement to enforce the judgment; the Court sustained their position.
• Section 16, Rule 16, Rules of Court — Imposes the duty on an attorney to inform the court promptly of the client's death, incapacity, or incompetency during the pendency of the action and to give the name and residence of the legal representative.
• Section 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Provides that in case of a party's death, if the action survives, the court shall order the legal representatives of the deceased to appear and be substituted within 30 days or within such time as may be granted.
• Section 9(3), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; Section 5(2)(e), Article X, 1973 Constitution; Rule 50, Section 3, Revised Rules of Court — Procedural bases for the Court of Appeals' certification of the petition to the Supreme Court as involving a pure question of law.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concurred. Feliciano, J., was on leave.