Bongato vs. Malvar

The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land; however, when entry is made through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the dispossessed party may no longer avail of the summary proceedings in the municipal trial court but must file either an accion publiciana (plenary action to recover the right of possession) or an accion reivindicatoria (action to recover ownership as well as possession) in the regional trial court.

The respondents, spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar, owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-16200. The petitioner, Teresita Bongato, occupied a house on property that the respondents claimed was theirs. The dispute involved three related cases: a criminal case for anti-squatting under PD No. 772, a civil case for forcible entry, and a criminal case for violation of PD No. 1096 (the National Building Code). The forcible entry action is a summary proceeding designed to recover physical possession, and the one-year prescriptive period complements its summary nature.

The spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry against Teresita Bongato before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Butuan City, alleging that Bongato unlawfully entered a parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-16200 belonging to the spouses and erected thereon a house of light materials. Bongato filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer, which the MTCC denied as proscribed under the Rule on Summary Procedure and for lacking notice of hearing. With new counsel, Bongato filed an answer, which the MTCC disregarded for being filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period. With still another counsel from the Public Attorney's Office, Bongato filed a motion to dismiss, which the MTCC denied as contrary to the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The MTCC rendered a decision ordering Bongato to vacate the land and to pay rentals, attorney's fees, and costs of suit. The RTC affirmed, but on March 4, 1994, the RTC judge granted Bongato's motion for reconsideration "only insofar as to determine the location of the houses involved in this civil case so that the Court will know whether they are located on one and the same lot or a lot different from that involved in the criminal case for Anti-Squatting." The RTC disallowed any extension and warned that if the survey was not made, the court might consider the same abandoned and the writ of execution would be issued. Bongato filed a motion for extension of the March 29, 1994 deadline for submission of the relocation survey, explaining that the engineer could not conduct the survey during Holy Week as he was a lay minister and parish council member. On April 7, 1994, the RTC noted that no survey report was submitted and ordered the record returned to the court of origin for disposal.

Respondents filed three cases against petitioner: (1) Criminal Case No. 4659 for violation of PD No. 772 (filed on October 2, 1991), in which petitioner was acquitted on the ground of good faith; (2) Civil Case No. 5681 for forcible entry (filed on July 10, 1992), which was resolved by the MTCC on October 26, 1992; and (3) Criminal Case No. 5734 for violation of PD No. 1096 (filed on July 15, 1993), wherein petitioner was again acquitted. The Court agreed with respondents that Lot 10-A, covered by TCT No. RT-16200, is different from Lot 1, covered by TCT No. RT-15993, both registered under the name of Severo Malvar. However, the Court noted that the property involved in the two criminal cases and in the instant forcible entry case is one and the same — petitioner's house.

The allegation that there is only one house involved in these three cases was not controverted by respondents, and no evidence was presented to prove that petitioner had constructed one house on Lot 1 and another on Lot 10-A. In his Sworn Statement in Criminal Case No. 4659, Severo Malvar stated that petitioner's house was "located in front of the Museum and just behind the City Hall." In the forcible entry complaint, the subject property was said to be "located along Doongan Road and right in front of the Regional National Museum and not far behind the City Hall of Butuan City." The Decision in Criminal Case No. 5734 stated that the building inspector had "responded to a verbal complaint involving a structure built near the Museum in Upper Doongan, Butuan City."

The sketch plan dated June 16, 1994, submitted by Engineer Regino A. Lomarda Jr., certified that "the hut of Teresita Bongato is not within Lot 10-A as shown in this plan as relocated by the undersigned based [o]n TCT No. RT-1576 of Benjamin Eva, et al. and [o]n TCT No. RT-16200 of Lot 10-A of Severo Malvar." According to the Decision in Criminal Case No. 4659, petitioner's house is actually located on Lot 1, the parcel of land previously covered by TCT No. RT-15993 and subject of the anti-squatting case. The RTC Judge in that case ruled that the lot on which the accused's house was standing was formerly covered by TCT No. RT-15993 dated January 24, 1983 in the name of Severo Malvar, and superseded by TCT No. RT-24589 dated December 3, 1991 in the name of Butuan Land Developers Group, Inc.

Petitioner's house had actually been in existence prior to February 1992, the alleged date of illegal entry. In Criminal Case No. 5734, the RTC Judge opined that the prosecution had not proven that the accused had constructed or was constructing the questioned house in February 1992, and that the house was completely erected or constructed before the complaint was filed. The Decision upheld that the house was not built by the accused but by her father, Jacinto Bongato, sometime in 1935, and that the accused merely lived in the house as a member of the family until the death of her parents, whereupon she continued to reside there and now claims to be its owner. Severo Malvar admitted in Criminal Case No. 4659 that he had knowledge of petitioner's house since January 1987, testifying that he discovered sometime in January 1987 that the accused was occupying his property, and that he told her to remove her house but was too busy with other squatters and only attended to the matter the following year.

• Lack of Jurisdiction Due to Prescription: Petitioner argued that the MTCC had no jurisdiction because the Complaint for forcible entry was filed only in 1992, or beyond the one-year period provided under the Rules of Civil Procedure. She averred that in Criminal Case No. 4659 for anti-squatting, Respondent Severo Malvar alleged in his Sworn Statement that petitioner had illegally entered his land "sometime in the first week of January 1987."
• Motion to Dismiss Not Prohibited: Petitioner argued that a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is not a prohibited pleading but is allowed under Section 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

• Different Properties: Respondents contended that the subject of the anti-squatting case is different from the parcel of land involved in the forcible entry case, arguing that Lot 10-A covered by TCT No. RT-16200 is different from Lot 1 covered by TCT No. RT-15993.

• MTCC Jurisdiction: Whether the MTCC lacked jurisdiction over the forcible entry case because the Complaint was filed beyond the one-year period from the date of alleged entry.
• Motion to Dismiss as Prohibited Pleading: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the Motion to Dismiss was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

• MTCC Jurisdiction: Yes. The MTCC lacked jurisdiction because the cause of action for forcible entry had already prescribed when respondents filed the Complaint for ejectment on July 10, 1992. The one-year period is counted from the date of actual entry, or from the time the plaintiff learned of the entry when made through stealth; here, respondents had knowledge of petitioner's possession since January 1987.
• Motion to Dismiss as Prohibited Pleading: No. A motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is expressly allowed as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings under Section 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue of jurisdiction instead of erroneously holding that the motion was prohibited.

• MTCC Jurisdiction: The Court restated three basic legal principles. First, in forcible entry, one employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of land or building; the plaintiff must allege and prove prior physical possession until deprived thereof by the defendant, and the sole question for resolution hinges on physical or material possession (possession de facto). Second, as a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge; however, courts have taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. Third, factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court, but this rule admits of exceptions, including when the findings fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion. The Court found that the property involved in the two criminal cases and in the instant case for forcible entry is one and the same — petitioner's house. The sketch plan certified that the hut of Teresita Bongato is not within Lot 10-A, and the Decision in Criminal Case No. 4659 stated that petitioner's house is actually located on Lot 1. Petitioner's house had been in existence prior to February 1992, the alleged date of illegal entry, having been built by her father in 1935. Severo Malvar admitted he had knowledge of petitioner's house since January 1987. The Court held that the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land, but when entry is made through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed may file either an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the RTC. Because respondents filed the Complaint on July 10, 1992, more than one year after they learned of petitioner's possession in January 1987, the cause of action had prescribed and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
• Motion to Dismiss as Prohibited Pleading: The Court noted that the Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated to achieve "an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases," and the speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy. However, Section 19(a) of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that a motion to dismiss the complaint is prohibited "except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section." The Court cited Bayog vs. Natino, which held that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be expunged from the records, and that a defense of lack of jurisdiction may be raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings. The Court further held that a court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence, or even express consent, and a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The MTCC should have taken into account petitioner's Answer, in which she averred that she had been "in constant occupation on said land in question since birth on March 17, 1941 up to the present, being an heir of the late Emiliana Eva-Bongato, who inherited said property from her father Raymundo Eva with considerable improvements thereon." The MTCC should have heard and received the evidence adduced by the parties for the precise purpose of determining whether it possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter, and after such hearing, it could have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

• Prescription of Forcible Entry Actions — The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land; however, when entry is made through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the dispossessed party may file either an accion publiciana (plenary action to recover the right of possession) or an accion reivindicatoria (action to recover ownership as well as possession) in the regional trial court. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the forcible entry complaint because respondents had knowledge of petitioner's possession since January 1987 but filed the complaint only on July 10, 1992.
• Nature of Forcible Entry as Summary Proceeding — Forcible entry is a quieting process that is summary in nature, designed to recover physical possession in speedy proceedings that are restrictive in nature, scope, and time limits. The one-year bar within which to bring the suit is prescribed to complement its summary nature. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that after the one-year period has lapsed, plaintiffs can no longer avail themselves of the summary proceedings in the municipal trial court but must litigate in the regional trial court in an ordinary action to recover possession, or to recover both ownership and possession.
• Judicial Notice of Closely Connected Proceedings — As a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. However, courts may take judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy, as these cases "may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke" a rule of judicial notice. The Court applied this doctrine to consider the decisions in Criminal Case No. 4659 and Criminal Case No. 5734, which involved the same house and property as the forcible entry case.
• Exception to Prohibited Pleadings Under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure — Under Section 19(a) of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, a motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information is prohibited "except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section." A court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence, or even express consent, and a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the MTCC erred in dismissing petitioner's motion to dismiss as a prohibited pleading.

• "An action for forcible entry is a quieting process that is summary in nature. It is designed to recover physical possession in speedy proceedings that are restrictive in nature, scope and time limits. The one-year bar within which to bring the suit is prescribed to complement its summary nature. Thus, after the one-year period has lapsed, plaintiffs can no longer avail themselves of the summary proceedings in the municipal trial court but must litigate, in the normal course, in the regional trial court in an ordinary action to recover possession, or to recover both ownership and possession." — This passage states the Court's opening ratio decidendi, defining the nature of forcible entry and the consequence of the lapse of the one-year prescriptive period.
• "It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it." — This passage articulates the controlling rule on the counting of the one-year prescriptive period for forcible entry actions, distinguishing between actual entry and entry through stealth.
• "The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do not provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default if a defendant fails to answer. It must likewise be pointed out that MAGDATO's defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even been raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) thereof, x x x." — This passage, quoted from Bayog v. Natino, supports the Court's ruling that a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction is an exception to the prohibited pleadings under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

• Bayog vs. Natino, 258 SCRA 378, July 5, 1996 — Cited as controlling precedent for the proposition that a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction is allowed as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, and that an answer filed after the reglementary period should not be expunged from the records.
• Spouses Ong vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143173, March 28, 2001 — Cited for the rule that the one-year period for forcible entry is counted from the date of actual entry, or from the time the plaintiff learned of the entry when made through stealth.
• Gener vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 130730, October 19, 2001 — Cited for the proposition that after the lapse of the one-year period, the dispossessed party may file either an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.
• De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 728, April 18, 1997 — Cited for the principle that forcible entry is a quieting process and the restrictive time bar complements its summary nature.
• Munoz vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 216, September 23, 1992 — Cited for the proposition that possession cannot be wrested through a summary action for ejectment when the occupant has been in possession for more than one year.
• Duero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002 — Cited for the rule that a court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence, or even express consent.
• De Leon vs. Court of Appeals (Special Second Division), 245 SCRA 166, June 19, 1995 — Cited for the proposition that a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal.
• Figueras vs. Serrano, 52 Phil. 28, September 3, 1928 — Cited for the exception to the general rule on judicial notice, allowing courts to take judicial notice of proceedings in other cases closely connected to the matter in controversy.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that a person deprived of possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth may bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court "at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession." The Court applied this provision to determine that the forcible entry complaint filed on July 10, 1992, was beyond the one-year period from respondents' knowledge of petitioner's entry in January 1987.
• Section 19(a), 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure — Provides that a motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information shall not be allowed in cases covered by the Rule "except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section." The Court applied this provision to hold that the MTCC erred in dismissing petitioner's motion to dismiss as a prohibited pleading.
• Section 36, BP 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) — Provides for summary procedure in special cases, authorizing the Supreme Court to adopt special rules or procedures applicable to forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical rules. The Court cited this provision as the statutory basis for the Rule on Summary Procedure.
• PD No. 772 (Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts, August 20, 1975) — The statute under which Criminal Case No. 4659 was filed against petitioner; she was acquitted on the ground of good faith.
• PD No. 1096 (Adopting a National Building Code of the Philippines, February 19, 1977) — The statute under which Criminal Case No. 5734 was filed against petitioner; she was again acquitted.

• Justice Puno (Chairman)
• Justice Carpio
• Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez (on leave)