Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan

The preventive suspension of a public officer pending a criminal prosecution under a valid information for violation of RA 3019, or for fraud upon government, is mandatory and ministerial upon the court. The court's duty is limited to confirming the existence of a valid information; it has no authority to evaluate the necessity of suspension to prevent witness intimidation or further malfeasance, nor to reduce the suspension period below the ninety-day maximum.

Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig was the elected Governor of Samar. On August 31, 1989, an information was filed against him and two other provincial officials before the Sandiganbayan, charging them with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. The charge stemmed from the alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper purchased for the provincial government in June 1986, causing undue injury to the government in the amount of P49,500.00. Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the prosecution moved for his preventive suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019.

• Nature of the Charge: Petitioner Bolastig, along with the Provincial Treasurer and Property Officer of Samar, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019. The information alleged that in June 1986, they entered into a contract for the purchase of 100 reams of onion skin paper at P550.00 per ream, a price manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing price was only P55.00 per ream.
• Arraignment and Suspension Motion: Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, and pleaded not guilty. On January 25, 1993, the Special Prosecution Officer filed a motion for his preventive suspension pendente lite under Section 13 of RA 3019.
• Petitioner's Opposition: Petitioner opposed the motion, arguing that suspension should not be a "mindless and meaningless exercise" and that the court must first determine its necessity to serve the legislative intent of preventing the accused from using his office to influence witnesses or tamper with evidence.
• Sandiganbayan's Ruling: The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's argument, holding that suspension is mandatory upon the filing of a valid information. It ordered a 90-day preventive suspension, holding implementation in abeyance pending reconsideration, which was later denied.

• Discretion and Necessity: Petitioner argued that while the Sandiganbayan has the power to order preventive suspension, it must first determine the necessity of such suspension in accordance with the spirit and intent of the Anti-Graft Law. The suspension should only be ordered if it serves the legislative purpose of preventing the accused from using his office to influence witnesses or tamper with records.
• Injury to Constituents: Petitioner contended that his suspension would injure not only him but also the people of Samar, whose political rights would be infringed by the suspension of their duly elected governor for no valid reason.

• Mandatory Nature of Suspension: The Solicitor General, representing the People, countered that upon the filing of a valid information, suspension pendente lite is mandatory under settled jurisprudence, citing several Supreme Court decisions.
• Limited Judicial Role: Implicit in the Sandiganbayan's ruling was the argument that the court's role is confined to verifying the existence of a valid information; it has no duty to assess the factual necessity for suspension.

• Mandatory Preventive Suspension: Whether the preventive suspension of a public officer under Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory upon the filing of a valid information, or whether the court has discretion to determine its necessity.
• Duration of Suspension: Whether the court has the discretion to impose a preventive suspension for a period shorter than ninety (90) days.

• Mandatory Preventive Suspension: The preventive suspension is mandatory. The court's duty is limited to making a finding that the accused stands charged under a valid information for the specified offenses. The law presumes that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance. The court has no discretion to evaluate the probability of witness intimidation or continued malfeasance.
• Duration of Suspension: The ninety-day period is the maximum, not a fixed term. The suspension lasts until the case is decided, but not to exceed ninety days. The court has no discretion to impose a shorter period (e.g., 60 or 70 days), as this would effectively negate the mandatory command of the law. The period is derived by analogy from the Civil Service Decree (PD 807), which provides for automatic reinstatement after 90 days if an administrative case is not decided.

• Mandatory Preventive Suspension under RA 3019 — The filing of a valid information under RA 3019, or for fraud upon government, triggers the mandatory and ministerial duty of the court to order the preventive suspension of the accused public officer. The purpose is dual: to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or tamper with evidence, and to prevent the commission of further acts of malfeasance. The court has no discretion to refuse suspension or to inquire into its necessity.

• "The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both..."
• "Indeed, were the Sandiganbayan given the discretion to impose a shorter period of suspension, say, 80, 70 or 60 days, as petitioner asserts, it would lie in its power not to suspend the accused at all. That, of course, would be contrary to the command of sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019."

• Bunye v. Escareal, G.R. No. 110216, Sept. 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 332 — Cited as controlling precedent supporting the mandatory nature of preventive suspension.
• Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96131, Sept. 6, 1991, 201 SCRA 417 — Cited as controlling precedent supporting the mandatory nature of preventive suspension and as the source for adopting the 90-day period from the Civil Service Decree.
• People v. Albano, G.R. No. L-45376-77, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511 — Cited as controlling precedent supporting the mandatory nature of preventive suspension.
• Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85468, Sept. 7, 1989, 177 SCRA 354 — Distinguished; its use of the phrase "maximum period of ninety days" was clarified to emphasize that suspensions longer than 90 days are excessive, not that the court has discretion to impose less.

• Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Provides for the mandatory suspension from office of any incumbent public officer against whom a valid information under the Act, or for fraud upon government, is pending in court.
• Section 52, Administrative Code of 1987 (formerly Section 42, PD 807, Civil Service Decree) — Provides for the automatic reinstatement of a preventively suspended employee if the administrative case is not decided within 90 days. This provision was used by analogy to determine the maximum duration of preventive suspension in criminal cases under RA 3019.
• Article VI, Section 16(3), 1987 Constitution — Cited to reject the argument that suspension of an elected official impermissibly deprives constituents of representation, noting the Constitution itself authorizes the suspension of members of Congress for disorderly behavior.

Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Justice Florenz D. Regalado, and Justice Reynato S. Puno concurred with the decision penned by Justice Jose C. Mendoza.

N/A. The decision was unanimous.