Bokingo vs. Court of Appeals

The nature of an action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over it is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. An action for injunction to prevent the obstruction of a survey of land, where the principal relief sought is not the recovery of possession or ownership, is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and is cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Court.

The respondents are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Baan (Buhangin), Butuan City, containing an area of 2.1600 hectares, which they inherited from their father, the late Celestino Busa. The petitioner, Alfredo Bokingo, is one of the heirs of Miguel Bokingo and a defendant in the underlying civil case. The dispute arose from a prior administrative proceeding before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), where the petitioner and his co-claimants filed an application for titling of the same parcel of land, which the respondents opposed.

The respondents, as co-owners of a 2.1600-hectare parcel of land in Baan (Buhangin), Butuan City, inherited from their father Celestino Busa, filed a complaint for injunction and damages against the petitioner and his co-defendants before the RTC of Butuan City. The complaint alleged that the defendants had filed an application for titling of the same land before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Office of the CENRO, Butuan City. The respondents filed a protest against the application on February 5, 1996, and on November 24, 1998, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) resolved the protest in their favor, declaring that the respondents, if qualified, may file an appropriate public land application covering the same land. The order became final and executory on January 6, 1999, and an Order of Execution was issued on September 9, 1999.

On June 23, 1999, the respondents requested a Survey Authority to survey the land, which was issued by the CENRO on July 30, 1999, authorizing respondent Engr. Ernesto M. Campos, Jr. to conduct the survey. On November 18, 1999, when the survey team, accompanied by personnel of the Butuan PNP, went to the area, the petitioner and his co-defendant SPO3 Ferdinand B. Dacillo told the survey group to stop and not to enter the area. The respondents then availed of the Barangay Justice System, but the petitioner still refused to allow the survey, resulting in the issuance of a Certificate to File Action by the Lupong Tagapamayapa.

The petitioner, as one of the defendants, filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, contending that the issue involved possession of the land and that the assessed value of ₱14,410.00, based on his father's tax declaration, placed jurisdiction with the MTC under Section 19(2) or 33(3) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7691. The RTC denied the motion, holding that the complaint sought injunctive relief to protect the respondents' right to survey the land. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which was dismissed for lack of merit. The CA ruled that the remedy of certiorari was unavailing because an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, that the petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration, and that no grave abuse of discretion was alleged or shown.

• Jurisdiction over Subject Matter: Petitioner argued that the complaint filed by the respondents was a possessory action, and that to determine which court has primary jurisdiction, the assessed value of the land must be alleged in the initiatory complaint. He contended that the assessed value of the subject land was only ₱14,410.00, hence, jurisdiction properly belonged to the MTC in accordance with Section 19(2) or 33(3) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7691.

• Procedural Requirement for Certiorari: Petitioner insisted that the CA erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari, maintaining that the RTC's denial of his motion to dismiss constituted grave abuse of discretion.

N/A — The decision does not recount the respondents' specific arguments before the Supreme Court.

• Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter: Whether the respondents' complaint for injunction and damages is a possessory action that should be cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court based on the assessed value of the land, or an action incapable of pecuniary estimation properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for reconsideration and for failure to allege grave abuse of discretion.

• Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter: No. The respondents' complaint is not a possessory action; it is principally an action to enjoin the petitioner from preventing the survey of the subject land. The subject matter of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and properly cognizable exclusively by the RTC under Section 19(1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7691.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Yes. The CA correctly dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari. The petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the RTC was sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the petition, and he failed to even allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in rendering the order denying his motion to dismiss.

• Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter: The Court applied the axiomatic rule that the nature of an action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over it is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action, nor does jurisdiction depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties. A careful perusal of the respondents' complaint shows that it alleges that the petitioner's application for titling was rejected by the PENRO, that the respondents were authorized by the CENRO to conduct a survey, and that the petitioner unjustly prevented the conduct of the survey. The principal relief sought is to permanently enjoin the petitioner from preventing the survey of the subject land. The Court distinguished the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession of real property — unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), accion publiciana, and accion reinvindicatoria — and found that the respondents' complaint did not seek to recover possession or ownership of the subject land. Rather, it is principally an action to enjoin the petitioner from committing acts that would prevent the survey. To be entitled to the injunctive relief sought, the respondents need to establish: (1) the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of the said right. As such, the subject matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and properly cognizable exclusively by the RTC under Section 19(1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7691.

• Propriety of Certiorari: The Court found no reversible error in the CA's dismissal of the petitioner's certiorari petition. The Court reiterated the rule that certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors, if any. The petitioner did not proffer any compelling reason to warrant deviation from this salutary rule. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to even allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in rendering the order denying his motion to dismiss. The issue raised by the petitioner was proper for an appeal, not a petition for certiorari.

• Determination of Jurisdiction by Material Allegations — The nature of an action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over it is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action, nor does jurisdiction depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties, or the waiver or acquiescence of the parties. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the respondents' complaint for injunction was not a possessory action but an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

• Actions to Recover Possession of Real Property Distinguished — There are three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession of real property: (1) unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), together with forcible entry, which are the two forms of ejectment suits limited to the question of possession de facto; (2) accion publiciana, the plenary action to recover the right of possession; and (3) accion reinvindicatoria, the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession. The Court applied this distinction to find that the respondents' complaint, which sought to enjoin the prevention of a survey, did not seek to recover possession or ownership of the subject land.

• Actions Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation — In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction will depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the respondents' complaint for injunction, where the money claims for attorney's fees and damages were purely incidental, was incapable of pecuniary estimation.

• Certiorari Requires Prior Motion for Reconsideration — Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors, if any. The Court applied this rule to affirm the CA's dismissal of the petitioner's certiorari petition, as the petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC's order denying his motion to dismiss.

• "It is axiomatic that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein." — This passage states the controlling doctrine for determining jurisdiction, which the Court applied to reject the petitioner's claim that the complaint was a possessory action.

• "Contrary to the view posited by petitioner Bokingo, the cause of action of the respondents' complaint is not, as yet, to recover the possession of the subject land." — This passage articulates the Court's finding that the complaint for injunction to prevent the obstruction of a survey is not a possessory action, which is central to the Court's ruling on jurisdiction.

• "Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors, if any." — This passage states the procedural rule on the requirement of a motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari, which the Court applied to affirm the CA's dismissal of the petitioner's petition.

• Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals, 395 Phil. 701 (2000) — Cited by the CA for the proposition that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus; the Supreme Court implicitly affirmed this ruling.

• Yao vs. Perello, G.R. No. 153828, October 24, 2003, 414 SCRA 474, 480 — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that certiorari will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court.

• Hilario vs. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815, 824 — Cited as controlling precedent for the doctrine that the nature of an action and jurisdiction are determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for, and the law in effect when the action is filed.

• Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136109, August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA 67, 70 — Cited as controlling precedent for the doctrine distinguishing actions capable of pecuniary estimation from those where the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money.

• Ganila vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150755, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 435, 445 — Cited as controlling precedent for the distinction among the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession of real property: unlawful detainer, accion publiciana, and accion reinvindicatoria.

• Section 19(1), Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 — The provision granting Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Court applied this provision to hold that the respondents' complaint for injunction was properly cognizable by the RTC.

• Section 19(2), Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 — The provision granting Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds ₱20,000.00 (or ₱50,000.00 in Metro Manila). The petitioner invoked this provision in his motion to dismiss, but the Court found it inapplicable because the complaint was not a possessory action.

• Section 33(3), Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 — The provision granting Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property where the assessed value does not exceed ₱20,000.00 (or ₱50,000.00 in Metro Manila). The petitioner invoked this provision in his motion to dismiss, but the Court found it inapplicable.

• Section 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court — The provision stating that a preliminary injunction may be granted by the court where the action or proceeding is pending. The RTC relied on this provision in denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss, holding that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter.

• Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (Chairperson)
• Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago
• Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez
• Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the provided case text.