Bogabong vs. Balindong

Judicial errors constitute gross ignorance of the law warranting administrative sanctions, not merely correctable errors of judgment, when they demonstrate patent disregard of elementary and established legal rules, such as the mandatory requirement of automatic succession for barangay chairmen under the Local Government Code, the necessity of filing bonds for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions under Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, and the strict requirement of "good reasons" for execution pending appeal under Section 2(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

AbdulSamad P. Bogabong served as elected First Kagawad of Barangay Bubonga Marawi, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur. Following the death of Barangay Chairman Dianisia P. Bacarat in 2007, Bogabong assumed the chairmanship in hold-over capacity by operation of law pursuant to automatic succession rules. However, on April 10, 2008, Marawi City Mayor Fahad U. Salic appointed Omera Hadji Isa-Ali as Barangay Chairman. After administrative proceedings, the Department of the Interior and Local Government-Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao eventually recognized Bogabong as the legitimate Chairman. Omera subsequently filed a quo warranto petition before the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City, Branch 8, then presided by Acting Judge Rasad G. Balindong, questioning Bogabong's authority and seeking injunctive reliefs to prevent Bogabong from accessing the barangay's Internal Revenue Allotment.

• The Barangay Leadership Dispute: Complainant AbdulSamad P. Bogabong was elected First Kagawad of Barangay Bubonga Marawi in the July 2002 Barangay Elections. Upon the death of Barangay Chairman Dianisia P. Bacarat in 2007, Bogabong assumed the chairmanship in hold-over capacity by operation of law. The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Provincial Director initially issued certifications attesting to Bogabong's assumption. However, on April 10, 2008, Marawi City Mayor Fahad U. Salic appointed Omera Hadji Isa-Ali as Barangay Chairman. Following a DILG-ARMM Resolution dated May 5, 2009 recognizing Bogabong as the legitimate Chairman, Bogabong withdrew the May 2009 Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of the barangay, prompting Omera to file the quo warranto case.

• The Quo Warranto Proceedings: In Special Civil Action No. 1879-09, Omera sought to oust Bogabong and prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction to prevent Bogabong from accessing the barangay funds. Respondent-judge granted the TRO on July 2, 2009, and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) on July 22, 2009, directing Bogabong and the Land Bank of the Philippines to cease and desist from disbursing the IRA.

• The Assailed Decision and Execution: In his Decision dated August 24, 2009, respondent-judge granted the quo warranto petition, holding that Bogabong's right to the position was deemed waived for failure to assume office within one year and two months after Bacarat's death, and recognizing Omera as the legitimate Chair. On August 28, 2009, respondent-judge granted Omera's urgent motion for execution pending appeal, stating that "the appeal seemed dilatory" and that "the lapse of time would make the ultimate judgment ineffective," and issued the writ directing the Land Bank to release the IRA to Omera.

• Prior Administrative Cases: This marked the third administrative complaint against respondent-judge for similar infractions. In Benito v. Balindong (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, February 23, 2009), the Court found him guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TRO and WPI in a case where the trial court had no jurisdiction to review the Ombudsman's decision. In Cabili v. Balindong (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2194, July 5, 2011), the Court again found him guilty of gross ignorance for issuing a TRO against a sheriff implementing a final and executory judgment of a co-equal court, violating the principle of judicial stability.

• Retirement: Respondent-judge's application for optional retirement was approved effective March 31, 2018, but the release of his retirement benefits was held in abeyance pending resolution of the instant administrative matter.

• Gross Ignorance of Basic Succession Rules: Complainant, adopting the Court of Appeals' findings, maintained that respondent-judge patently erred in ruling that a permanent vacancy in the barangay chairmanship is filled by appointment rather than automatic succession under the Local Government Code and Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 25, and in holding that obedience to the administrative authority that recognized Omera constituted waiver of Bogabong's right.

• Violation of Bond Requirements: Complainant argued that respondent-judge committed gross ignorance of the law in issuing the TRO and WPI without requiring Omera to post the bonds mandated by Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, and without stating any reason for exempting her from such requirement.

• Improper Execution Pending Appeal: Complainant asserted that respondent-judge gravely abused his discretion in granting execution pending appeal based on bare allegations and speculation that the appeal was dilatory, without evidence to support the "good reasons" required by Section 2(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

• Pattern of Misconduct: The Office of the Court Administrator emphasized that respondent-judge's repeated commission of similar acts—being his third offense involving improper issuance of injunctive reliefs—demonstrated a pattern of gross ignorance warranting severe sanctions.

• Mere Error of Judgment: Respondent-judge countered that any errors committed were mere errors of judgment, not gross ignorance of the law, and were subject to correction by appeal rather than administrative sanction. He argued that he acted reasonably, prudently, and impartially, giving both parties their day in court.

• Impartiality: Respondent-judge maintained that he could have decided in favor of Bogabong, who was represented by counsel who was respondent-judge's fraternity brother, but instead ruled against him, demonstrating impartiality.

• Failure to File Supersedeas Bond: Respondent-judge faulted Bogabong for not filing a supersedeas bond under Section 3, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to prevent the enforcement of the writ of execution pending appeal.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Whether respondent-judge committed gross ignorance of the law in ruling that permanent vacancies in elective barangay positions are filled by appointment rather than automatic succession, in issuing temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions without requiring the posting of bonds or stating reasons for exemption, and in granting execution pending appeal without evidence of "good reasons."

• Grave Abuse of Authority: Whether respondent-judge committed grave abuse of authority in issuing the assailed orders and writs.

• Imposable Penalty: Whether the penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from public office may be imposed despite respondent-judge's optional retirement and the fact that dismissal from service is no longer possible.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Respondent-judge committed gross ignorance of the law. The error in recognizing Omera as legitimate Chair based on mayoral appointment, contrary to the elementary rule that permanent vacancies in barangay elective positions are filled by automatic succession (not appointment), constituted patent disregard of established law. The issuance of TRO and WPI without requiring bonds, and without stating any reason for exemption as required by Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, demonstrated a clear ignorance of mandatory procedural safeguards. The grant of execution pending appeal based on the judge's belief that the appeal "seemed dilatory" and speculation about the lapse of time, without evidence of "good reasons" as required by Section 2(a), Rule 39, further evidenced gross ignorance, as the determination of whether an appeal is dilatory lies with the appellate court, not the trial court.

• Grave Abuse of Authority: Respondent-judge committed grave abuse of authority through the arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion in issuing injunctive reliefs and execution pending appeal without complying with statutory requirements, thereby becoming an instrument of oppression.

• Imposable Penalty: The penalty of forfeiture of all retirement benefits (except accrued leave credits) and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office is appropriate and reasonable. Under A.M. No. 01-8-SC (Rule 140), gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge punishable by dismissal, but since respondent-judge has retired, dismissal is no longer feasible. The Court may deviate from the prescribed fine ranges to impose forfeiture of benefits as an alternative sanction, considering the gravity of the infraction and the fact that this is respondent-judge's third similar offense.

• Error of Judgment vs. Gross Ignorance of the Law: Not every judicial error constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice warrant administrative sanctions. However, when a law or rule is so elementary and basic that every judge must be familiar with it, failure to apply it—or acting as if one does not know it—constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges owe the public proficiency in the law and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times.

• Automatic Succession in Barangay Offices: Permanent vacancies in elective barangay positions caused by death or permanent incapacity are filled by automatic succession, not by appointment. Under the Local Government Code and Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 25, the highest ranking sanggunian barangay member becomes the Barangay Chairman by operation of law.

• Bond Requirement for Injunctive Reliefs: Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court mandates that a bond be filed before granting a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, unless exempted by the court. Exemption is the exception, not the rule, and the order must state the reason for such exemption. The bond protects the enjoined party from damages sustained by reason of the injunction.

• Execution Pending Appeal: Execution of a judgment pending appeal is a mere exception to the general rule that only final and executory judgments may be executed. It may only issue upon "good reasons" to be stated in a special order after due hearing, strictly construed. The trial court may not deny execution pending appeal based on its conclusion that the appeal is dilatory; such determination belongs to the appellate court.

• Effect of Retirement on Administrative Liability: Optional retirement does not extinguish administrative liability for acts committed while in office. The Court may still impose sanctions such as forfeiture of retirement benefits (except accrued leave credits) and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office.

• "When a law or rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less is ignorance of the law, warranting administrative sanction."

• "Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of the rules, and that, when committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgement. When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court proficiency in the law, and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times."

• "Clearly, exemption from the posting of the bond is merely an exception. Hence, the reason for such exemption must be stated in the order... Thus, unless it is shown that the enjoined party will not suffer any damage, the presiding judge must require the applicant to post a bond, otherwise the courts could become instruments of oppression and harassment."

• "Except in cases where the appeal is patently or unquestionably intended to delay, it must not be made the basis of execution pending appeal if only to protect and preserve a duly exercised right to appeal."

• Benito v. Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, February 23, 2009 — Prior administrative case where respondent-judge was found guilty of gross ignorance for issuing TRO/WPI without jurisdiction to review Ombudsman rulings; cited to establish pattern of misconduct and prior warning.

• Cabili v. Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2194, July 5, 2011 — Prior administrative case where respondent-judge was found guilty of gross ignorance for issuing TRO against a sheriff implementing a final judgment of a co-equal court; cited to establish pattern of misconduct and prior warning.

• Universal Motors Corporation v. Judge Rojas, 498 Phil. 62 (2005) — Controlling precedent on the interpretation of Section 4, Rule 58 regarding the discretionary power to exempt from bond requirement; cited for the principle that exemption must not be exercised arbitrarily.

• Villamor v. National Power Corporation, 484 Phil. 298 (2004) — Controlling precedent on execution pending appeal; cited for the rule that the dilatory nature of an appeal is not a ground for execution pending appeal unless patently intended to delay.

• Section 4, Rule 58, Rules of Court — Mandates that a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction may be granted only when the applicant files a bond, unless exempted by the court, to answer for damages the enjoined party may sustain.

• Section 2(a), Rule 39, Rules of Court — Allows discretionary execution of a judgment pending appeal only upon "good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing."

• A.M. No. 01-8-SC (Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges) — Classifies gross ignorance of the law or procedure as a serious charge punishable by dismissal, suspension, or fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

• Local Government Code and Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 25 — Provide that permanent vacancies in elective barangay positions are filled through automatic succession by the highest ranking sanggunian member.

Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ.