Board of Commissioners vs. Dela Rosa

The Bureau of Immigration's primary jurisdiction over deportation proceedings admits of an exception where the alleged deportee's claim to citizenship is substantial, permitting judicial intervention to enjoin deportation; deportation or exclusion proceedings based on violations of the Immigration Act prescribe in eight years under Act No. 3326 when the special law itself does not provide a prescriptive period for criminal prosecution; and foreign marriages are presumed valid under Philippine law in the absence of proof of the foreign law governing their celebration.

Santiago Gatchalian, the grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native-born Filipino citizen on July 12, 1960, following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian. William Gatchalian arrived in the Philippines from Hong Kong on June 27, 1961, at age twelve, together with relatives surnamed Gatchalian, seeking admission as Filipino citizens on the basis of Santiago's citizenship. The Immigration Act of 1940 (Commonwealth Act No. 613) governs the entry, exclusion, and deportation of aliens, with the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry serving as the primary administrative bodies for immigration proceedings. The jurisdictional framework for judicial review of administrative agency decisions was reshaped by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and further modified by the 1987 Administrative Code, which provides that agency decisions are subject to judicial review by the court specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, by any court of competent jurisdiction.

Santiago Gatchalian, the grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native-born Filipino citizen on July 12, 1960, following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian. Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago testified that he had five children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely Jose, Gloria, Francisco, Elena, and Benjamin, all surnamed Gatchalian.

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year-old minor, arrived in Manila from Hong Kong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They carried Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son of Santiago Gatchalian, while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco. After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting William and his companions as Filipino citizens, and William was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 on August 16, 1961.

On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on motu proprio review of BSI decisions, and directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and others. On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a motu proprio review, reversed the BSI decision and ordered the exclusion of, among others, William Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was issued, alleging that the BOC decision had become final and executory. The actual date of rendition of the BOC decision became the subject of controversy in the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo, where the Supreme Court sustained the validity of the BOC decision having been promulgated on July 6, 1962, within the reglementary period for review.

Sometime in 1973, William Gatchalian and others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion filed a motion for rehearing with the Board of Special Inquiry. On March 14, 1973, the BSI recommended to Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 BOC decision and the recall of the warrants of arrest. On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 BSI decision, admitting Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen, recalling the warrant of arrest, and revalidating his Identification Certificate. This was the last official act of the government on the basis of which Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen.

On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the NBI wrote the Secretary of Justice recommending that Gatchalian and others be charged with violation of Sec. 37(a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45(c), (d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613. On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation to the Commissioner of Immigration. On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo issued a mission order commanding the arrest of Gatchalian, who appeared on August 20, 1990 and was released upon posting ₱200,000.00 cash bond. On August 29, 1990, Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the RTC of Manila, Branch 29, which was denied dismissal by Judge dela Rosa on September 7, 1990, who also issued a TRO. Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed a separate injunction complaint before the RTC of Valenzuela, Branch 172, where Judge Capulong issued a TRO the same day. The Solicitor General then filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, and Gatchalian filed a counter-petition seeking to be declared a Filipino citizen.

• Jurisdiction of RTC: Petitioners argued that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 129, the Court of Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards, or commissions, such as the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry, and that respondent judges therefore lacked jurisdiction over petitioners and the subject matter.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners maintained that assuming the RTC judges had jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of their authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case against Gatchalian, and in the process determine his citizenship.
• Finality of Alienage via Arocha: Petitioners argued that Judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings were beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca, which petitioners claimed put finality to the July 6, 1962 BOC decision that Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen.
• Forum-Shopping: Petitioners contended that Judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for forum-shopping, as it was filed by Gatchalian's wife and minor children while a related case was pending before Judge dela Rosa.
• Validity of Arrest: Petitioners argued that Gatchalian's arrest follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with the rulings in Arocha and Vivo.
• Invalidity of Foreign Marriages: Petitioners asserted that the marriages of Santiago Gatchalian to Chu Gim Tee in China and of Francisco Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok in China were not supported by evidence other than self-serving testimony, and that no proof of Chinese law was presented; accordingly, the marriages could not be considered valid, and Santiago's children followed their mother's citizenship, as did William.

• Jurisdiction to Deport Conditioned on Citizenship: Respondent Gatchalian alleged that assuming the evidence on record is insufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts shall have finally resolved the question of his citizenship.
• Bias and Prejudice: Respondent maintained that petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly resolve the question of his citizenship in the deportation case because of their bias, pre-judgment, and prejudice against him.
• Prescription: Respondent argued that the ground for which he is sought to be deported has already prescribed.
• Not Quasi-Judicial Co-Equal with RTC: Respondent contended that petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not in equal rank with Regional Trial Courts, such that the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition under Sec. 21(1) of BP 129.

• Jurisdiction of RTC: Whether the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction to entertain petitions for certiorari and prohibition against the Board of Commissioners and Board of Special Inquiry, or whether such jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the Court of Appeals under Sec. 9(3) of BP 129.
• Primary Jurisdiction Exception: Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction of the Bureau of Immigration over deportation proceedings admits of an exception where the alleged deportee's claim to citizenship is substantial, justifying judicial intervention to enjoin the proceedings.
• Res Judicata and Arocha: Whether the citizenship of William Gatchalian was conclusively settled by the 1962 BOC decision and the Supreme Court's ruling in Arocha vs. Vivo, such that res judicata applies.
• Validity of Warrant of Arrest: Whether the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by Commissioner Domingo on August 15, 1990 is valid.
• Prescription: Whether the deportation or exclusion proceedings against Gatchalian have prescribed.
• Foreign Marriages and Citizenship: Whether the foreign marriages of Santiago and Francisco Gatchalian are valid under Philippine law, and whether William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen.

• Jurisdiction of RTC: Yes. The RTC has jurisdiction. The Bureau of Immigration is not among the quasi-judicial agencies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals under RA No. 5434 or its enabling act; under Sec. 21(1) of BP 129 and the 1987 Administrative Code, its decisions are subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction.
• Primary Jurisdiction Exception: Yes. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction over deportation proceedings admits of an exception where the claim to citizenship is substantial, permitting judicial intervention to enjoin the proceedings.
• Res Judicata and Arocha: No. Arocha vs. Vivo did not squarely pass upon the citizenship of William Gatchalian, who was not a party thereto; the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship except under the narrow conditions laid down in Burca vs. Republic, which are absent here.
• Validity of Warrant of Arrest: No. The mission order was issued for purposes of investigation only, not for executing a final order of deportation, rendering it null and void for being unconstitutional under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
• Prescription: Yes. The deportation proceedings have prescribed, 28 years having elapsed since the 1962 BOC decision, far beyond the five-year period under Sec. 37(b) of the Immigration Act and the eight-year prescriptive period under Act No. 3326.
• Foreign Marriages and Citizenship: Yes. The foreign marriages are presumed valid under the processual presumption doctrine, and William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen as the legitimate son of Francisco, who is in turn the legitimate son of Santiago, an admittedly Filipino citizen.

• Jurisdiction of RTC: While Sec. 9(3) of BP 129 vests the Court of Appeals with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of quasi-judicial agencies, it does not provide that said jurisdiction extends to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are those specifically identified under RA No. 5434 or their enabling acts as appealable to the Court of Appeals, such as the Land Registration Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Patent Office, and the Agricultural Inventions Board. The Bureau of Immigration is not among those specified. Under Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code, which is subsequent to and modifies BP 129, agency decisions are subject to judicial review by the court specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, by any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the Rules of Court on venue. Accordingly, the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, and its decisions may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by the RTC under Sec. 21(1) of BP 129.

• Primary Jurisdiction Exception: While it is settled that the Bureau of Immigration has exclusive authority to try and hear cases against alleged aliens and determine their citizenship, and that a mere claim of citizenship cannot divest the Board of Commissioners of jurisdiction, this rule admits of an exception in deportation proceedings. Under Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, when the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, courts should promptly enjoin deportation proceedings, as there is no sense in allowing the proceedings to continue and granting the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation. Judicial intervention should be granted where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe the claim is correct, as held in Chua Hiong and Co vs. Deportation Board. Gatchalian's claim being substantial, judicial intervention was warranted. The competent court is the RTC, not the Court of Appeals, under Sec. 21(1) of BP 129. Rather than remanding, the Court deemed it proper to decide the controversy based on the voluminous pleadings and evidence submitted, consistent with the policy of settling entire controversies in a single proceeding.

• Res Judicata and Arocha: The sole issue in Arocha vs. Vivo was the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 BOC decision — whether it was rendered on July 6 or July 20, 1962 — to determine whether it fell within the one-year reglementary period for review. The Court did not squarely pass upon any question of citizenship, much less that of William Gatchalian, who was not a party in those cases. A person not party to a case cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein. Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship, as held in Labo vs. COMELEC, Soria vs. Commissioner of Immigration, Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, and Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board. An exception was laid down in Burca vs. Republic, requiring that: (1) citizenship was raised as a material issue in a controversy where the person was a party; (2) the Solicitor General or his representative took active part; and (3) the finding on citizenship was affirmed by the Supreme Court. None of these preconditions exist in the Arocha and Vivo cases, as Gatchalian was not even a party. The 1962 BOC decision also did not make any categorical statement that Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen.

• Validity of Warrant of Arrest: Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act provides that aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner for purposes of investigation only is null and void for being unconstitutional, as held in Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, and other cases. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in criminal cases and administrative proceedings. The mission order dated August 15, 1990 directed intelligence agents to make a warrantless arrest, deliver the suspect for custodial interrogation, and conduct investigation — clearly indicating it was issued for purposes of investigation, not for executing a final order of deportation. It made no mention of the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion. Furthermore, the 1973 order of Acting Commissioner Nituda had recalled the 1962 warrant and revalidated Gatchalian's Identification Certificate, further undermining petitioners' position.

• Prescription: Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act provides that deportation shall not be effected unless the arrest is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises, except for deportation under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12 of Sec. 37(a), which may be effected at any time after entry. However, Section 45 of the Immigration Act provides penal sanctions for violations enumerated therein, including fines and imprisonment of not more than two years. Under Act No. 3326, violations penalized by special acts prescribe after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more but less than six years. The Immigration Act being a special legislation, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violations enumerated therein can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period. Additionally, under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after five years from its entry, and thereafter only by a separate action subject to the statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144(3) of the Civil Code, an action based on judgment must be brought within ten years. The Court held that deportation or exclusion proceedings are not imprescriptible: (1) proceedings under clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12 of Sec. 37(a) must be initiated within five years; and (2) proceedings under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12 prescribe in eight years. In this case, 28 years had elapsed since the 1962 BOC decision before deportation proceedings were commenced in 1990, clearly beyond any applicable prescriptive period.

• Foreign Marriages and Citizenship: Petitioners argued that the marriages of Santiago to Chu Gim Tee and of Francisco to Ong Chiu Kiok in China were not proven valid under Chinese law, and that without valid marriages, the children followed their mothers' Chinese citizenship. The Court rejected this argument. Under the processual presumption doctrine, as held in Miciano vs. Brimo, Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, and Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of Customs, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. There being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, the presumption applies that it is the same as Philippine law. The testimonies of Santiago and Francisco regarding their marriages, birth, and relationship are not self-serving but admissible as declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree under Sec. 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, and competent proof of filiation under Art. 172(2) of the Family Code. Philippine law follows the lex loci celebrationis rule under Art. 26 of the Family Code, and Art. 220 of the Civil Code provides that every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage and the legitimacy of children. The burden of proving invalidity rests on the party asserting it. Having declared the marriages valid, William follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child. Francisco in turn is a Filipino being the legitimate son of Santiago, whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration on July 12, 1960. Finally, William belongs to the class of citizens under Sec. 1, Art. IV of the Constitution — those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo, relied upon by petitioners, was distinguished because the parties therein were married by a village leader, not among those authorized to solemnize marriage.

• Primary Jurisdiction Exception in Deportation — While the Bureau of Immigration has exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against alleged aliens and determine their citizenship, this doctrine admits of an exception: when the evidence submitted by the respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, or when the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe the claim is correct, courts should promptly enjoin deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace without molestation, and if disturbed by a deportation proceeding, has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for protection. The Court applied this exception to Gatchalian, finding his citizenship claim substantial given the 1960 recognition of Santiago's citizenship, the 1961 BSI admission, the 1973 Nituda order revalidating his status, and his continuous exercise of Filipino citizenship rights for 30 years.

• Res Judicata Inapplicability to Citizenship — Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, and must be threshed out again as the occasion demands. An exception exists under Burca vs. Republic where: (1) a person's citizenship is raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; (2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and (3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Court found none of these preconditions present in the Arocha and Vivo cases, as Gatchalian was not even a party.

• Processual Presumption — In the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. The Court applied this to presume Chinese marriage law to be the same as Philippine marriage law, since no proof of Chinese law was presented. The burden of proving foreign law rests on the party asserting a difference from Philippine law.

• Prescription of Deportation Proceedings — Deportation or exclusion proceedings are not imprescriptible. The rule is: (1) proceedings under clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12 of Sec. 37(a) of the Immigration Act must be initiated within five years after the cause arises; and (2) proceedings under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12 prescribe in eight years under Act No. 3326. Additionally, a final judgment may not be executed after five years from entry under Rule 39, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court, and an action to revive a judgment prescribes in ten years under Art. 1144(3) of the Civil Code.

• Presumption of Validity of Marriage and Legitimacy — Under Art. 220 of the Civil Code, every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, and the legitimacy of children. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. The Court applied this presumption to uphold the validity of the foreign marriages of Santiago and Francisco Gatchalian.

• Invalidity of Investigation-Only Warrants in Deportation — A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, rather than for executing a final order of deportation, is null and void for being unconstitutional. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in criminal cases and administrative proceedings; only judges may issue warrants for determining probable cause.

• "When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction." — This passage, quoted from Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, articulates the exception to the primary jurisdiction doctrine that the Court applied to justify judicial intervention in Gatchalian's deportation proceedings.

• "everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand." — This formulation, quoted from Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration and Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, states the general rule on the non-applicability of res judicata to citizenship determinations, which the Court applied to reject petitioners' reliance on Arocha vs. Vivo.

• "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines." — This states the processual presumption doctrine, which the Court applied to presume Chinese marriage law identical to Philippine law, thereby upholding the validity of the Gatchalian foreign marriages.

• "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children." — This quotation from Art. 220 of the Civil Code was applied to resolve doubts in favor of the validity of the foreign marriages and the legitimacy of the Gatchalian descendants, ultimately establishing William's Filipino citizenship.

• Arocha vs. Vivo, 21 SCRA 532 (1967) — Distinguished. The Court held that this case only resolved the date of rendition of the 1962 BOC decision and did not squarely pass upon Gatchalian's citizenship, as Gatchalian was not a party thereto. The dissent argued this case bound all Gatchalian co-applicants including William.

• Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, 96 Phil. 665 (1955) — Followed. Established the exception to the primary jurisdiction doctrine, holding that when evidence of citizenship is conclusive or substantial, courts should enjoin deportation proceedings.

• Co vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 (1977) — Followed. Refined the exception by requiring that the claim of citizenship be so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe the claim is correct.

• Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248 (1973) — Discussed. Laid down the exception to the rule that res judicata does not apply to citizenship, requiring three preconditions: citizenship as a material issue, active participation of the Solicitor General, and affirmance by the Supreme Court. The Court found these absent in the case at bar.

• Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867 (1924) — Followed. Established the processual presumption that foreign laws are presumed the same as Philippine law in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

• Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963) — Followed. Held that warrants of arrest for investigation purposes in administrative proceedings are unconstitutional, as the Constitution does not distinguish between criminal and administrative warrants.

• Lam Shee vs. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953) — Followed. Laid down the consequences of inaction by immigration authorities, holding that deportation cannot be effected after the prescriptive period has elapsed, and that equity favors the individual when the government's oversight created the anomalous situation.

• Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 (1989) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.

• Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988) — Distinguished by the dissent. The majority did not rely on this case, which requires proof of both the fact of foreign marriage and compliance with foreign law. The dissent invoked it to argue that the Gatchalian foreign marriages were not adequately proven.

• Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo, 13 SCRA 552 (1965) — Distinguished. Petitioners relied on this case, but the Court found it inapplicable because the marriage therein was solemnized by a village leader not authorized to solemnize marriages, unlike the Gatchalian marriages.

• Section 9(3), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Vests the Court of Appeals with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions. The Court held this does not extend to all quasi-judicial agencies but only those specifically identified under RA No. 5434 or their enabling acts, excluding the Bureau of Immigration.

• Section 21(1), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Vests RTCs with concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction. Applied to uphold RTC jurisdiction over certiorari petitions against the Bureau of Immigration.

• Section 25, Chapter 4, Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code — Provides that agency decisions are subject to judicial review by the court specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, by any court of competent jurisdiction. Applied to confirm that the Bureau of Immigration's decisions are reviewable by the RTC, as the Immigration Act does not specify a particular court for review.

• Section 37(a) and (b), Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940) — Section 37(a) enumerates the grounds for deportation and provides that warrants of arrest may be issued only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation. Section 37(b) provides that deportation under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12 may be effected at any time after entry, while deportation under other clauses requires arrest within five years after the cause arises. Applied to determine the validity of the warrant of arrest and the prescription of the proceedings.

• Section 45, Commonwealth Act No. 613 — Enumerates penal provisions for immigration violations, with penalties of fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00 and imprisonment not exceeding two years, plus deportation if the offender is an alien. Applied to determine the prescriptive period under Act No. 3326.

• Section 1, Act No. 3326 (1926) — Establishes prescriptive periods for violations penalized by special acts, providing eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more but less than six years. Applied to hold that immigration offenses prescribe in eight years.

• Article 1144(3), Civil Code — Provides that an action based on a judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Applied to hold that an action to revive the 1962 BOC decision is time-barred.

• Article 26, Family Code (formerly Art. 71, Civil Code) — Provides that all marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where performed, and valid there, shall also be valid in the Philippines. Applied to uphold the validity of the Gatchalian foreign marriages.

• Article 220, Civil Code — Provides that in case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family, including the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, and the legitimacy of children. Applied to resolve doubts in favor of the validity of the foreign marriages and the legitimacy of the Gatchalian descendants.

• Article 172(2), Family Code — Provides that legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws in the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment, or possession of status. Applied to hold that the testimonies and affidavits of Santiago and Francisco Gatchalian constitute competent proof of filiation.

• Section 34, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Admissibility of declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree. Applied to hold that the testimonies of Santiago and Francisco Gatchalian regarding their marriages, birth, and relationship are admissible and not self-serving.

• Section 2, Article III, Constitution — Requires a determination of probable cause by a judge for the issuance of a warrant. Applied to hold that the Commissioner of Immigration cannot issue a warrant of arrest for purposes of investigation, as only judges may issue such warrants.

• Section 1, Article IV, Constitution — Defines Philippine citizenship, including those who are citizens at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Applied to hold that William Gatchalian belongs to this class of Filipino citizens.

Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Grino-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, JJ., concur in the result.

• Feliciano, J. — Dissented on all major points. He argued that the 1962 BOC Decision and Warrant of Exclusion remain valid and enforceable against William Gatchalian, who was a party to the 1961-1962 proceedings. He maintained that Arocha vs. Vivo upheld the BOC decision not only against Pedro Gatchalian but against all co-applicants including William, since their claims were jointly resolved on the same basis. He contended that the 1973 Nituda order was void ab initio because an Acting Commissioner acting alone cannot reverse a final BOC decision; only the Board of Commissioners, acting collectively, has such authority, and even the BOC itself could not lawfully reverse a final decision rendered ten years earlier. He argued that Sec. 37(b)'s "at any time after entry" language applies to exclusion under clause (2), rendering prescription inapplicable. He further argued that Act No. 3326, which governs prescription of criminal prosecutions under special acts, does not apply to deportation proceedings, which are not criminal in nature. On the merits of citizenship, he conducted a detailed examination of the evidence and found that Santiago Gatchalian's claim to Filipino citizenship rested on questionable evidence — a baptismal certificate (not a birth certificate), self-serving testimony, and disregard of a 1902 parental consent document suggesting marriage between Santiago's parents. He noted Santiago's lifelong self-identification as Chinese until age 55, the absence of any documentary proof of the Chinese marriages of Santiago and Francisco, and the lack of proof of Chinese law. He concluded that the claim to Philippine citizenship was not proven and voted to grant the petition and reaffirm that Gatchalian is not a Philippine citizen.

• Davide, Jr., J. (concurring and dissenting) — Agreed with the summary of facts and the doctrine on the Bureau of Immigration's primary jurisdiction, but disagreed with applying the exception to Gatchalian. He argued that the Boards are quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Sec. 9(3) of BP 129, and that the RTC judges acted without jurisdiction. He characterized the separate filings by Gatchalian and his family as forum-shopping. He found the Chua Hiong exception inapplicable because Gatchalian's evidence was not conclusive or substantial, noting that his initial entry was based on a forged cablegram and that the 1962 BOC decision found the citizenship claim unsubstantiated. He argued that the 1973 Nituda order was void because only the BOC acting collectively can reverse a BOC decision, and that all of Gatchalian's subsequent acts as a Filipino citizen were rooted in that void order. On prescription, he argued that Sec. 37(b)'s five-year limitation applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, and that Gatchalian is covered by clause (2) — an alien not lawfully admissible at the time of entry — for which no time limitation applies. He voted to grant the petition, set aside the RTC orders, and dismiss the counter-petition.

• Melencio-Herrera, J. — Concurred in the dissent of Justice Feliciano.

• Cruz, Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ. — Joined Justice Feliciano in his dissenting opinion.