Bismonte vs. Golden Sunset Resort and Spa

Technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in order to afford litigants the amplest opportunity to properly and justly determine their rights and obligations, especially where the appeal is ostensibly meritorious and the tribunal allowed the admission of the pleading. The failure to attach a written explanation for resorting to registered mail instead of personal filing, as required by Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, may be excused where substantial justice far outweighs procedural rules.

The petitioners were resort staff hired by respondents Golden Sunset Resort and Spa and Ricardo "Ricky" Reyes on different dates, working as housekeepers, maintenance personnel, waiters, spa and massage attendants, cooks, dishwashers, and concierges. The respondents maintained that the petitioners were not regular employees but merely seasonal employees, engaged in a relationship akin to "independent contractorship." The dispute arose from the petitioners' complaints for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits, which were governed by the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, with the Rules of Court applying in a suppletory manner pursuant to Section 3, Rule I thereof.

Petitioners were hired by respondents on different dates as resort staff, specifically as housekeepers, maintenance personnel, waiters, spa and massage attendants, cooks, dishwashers, and concierges. Three of the petitioners asserted that they were dismissed without just or authorized cause and without due process, while five claimed they were constructively dismissed when their work schedule was unjustifiably reduced from six to three working days a week, resulting in substantial income reduction. Petitioners also accused respondents of not paying their entitled benefits, such as holiday pay, overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, and their share from the service charge. Petitioners, along with several others, filed several complaints for illegal dismissal against respondents.

Respondents maintained that they did not hire petitioners as regular employees but merely as seasonal employees, explaining that during lean seasons, such as rainy seasons, they either reduced workers' duties to thrice a week or did not require them to report for work at all, allowing them to find employment elsewhere. Respondents further posited that their engagement with their staff was akin to an "independent contractorship" in that they neither had the power to dismiss nor control the performance of their staff, who were free to perform their assigned tasks as long as they accomplished them within the contracted time.

The LA dismissed petitioners' complaints on March 14, 2014, concluding that no employer-employee relationship existed because petitioners failed to prove that respondents had the power to control their work performances or were interested in the means and methods of performing their jobs. Petitioners received the LA Decision on March 21, 2014. On appeal, the NLRC set aside the LA ruling, deeming petitioners regular employees based on the issuance of company identification cards, certifications explicitly stating they were employees, and the nature of their work being necessary and desirable to respondents' business. The NLRC nonetheless ruled that three petitioners failed to establish actual dismissal, and the reduction of working days of the five others did not constitute constructive dismissal given the valid ground of the rainy season's onset. The NLRC ordered respondents to pay petitioners P1,076,833.50 in money claims, as respondents failed to show proof of payment.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, which was denied, and subsequently filed a Manifestation with Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment, contending that petitioners failed to file their appeal on time. This was denied, as was a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which annulled the NLRC ruling and reinstated the LA Decision, finding that petitioners' appeal memorandum was received by the NLRC only on April 2, 2014, beyond the ten-day reglementary period, and that petitioners' counsel, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), should have availed of personal filing given the proximity of the PAO Office to the NLRC-Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch IV, both in San Pablo City, Laguna.

• Timeliness of Appeal: Petitioners argued that their appeal to the NLRC was filed on time, as the envelope containing their Notice of Appeal with Appeal Memorandum bore a post office stamp dated March 31, 2014, which was the tenth day after they received the LA Decision on March 21, 2014.
• Excusable Technical Lapse: Petitioners maintained that the failure to attach a written explanation for filing via registered mail instead of personal filing was excusable, considering that the NLRC admitted the appeal and that the appeal was ostensibly meritorious, as evidenced by the NLRC's modification of the LA Decision.

• Late Filing of Appeal: Respondents contended that petitioners failed to file their appeal on time, as the NLRC only received the appeal memorandum on April 2, 2014, beyond the ten-day reglementary period under Section 1, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.
• Improper Mode of Filing: Respondents argued that petitioners' counsel, the PAO, should have availed of personal filing before the NLRC instead of registered mail, considering the proximity of the PAO Office in San Pablo City, Laguna to the NLRC-Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch IV, also in San Pablo City, Laguna, and that the appeal lacked the required written explanation for resorting to a non-personal mode of filing.

• Filing and Service Requirements: Whether the CA correctly ruled that petitioners failed to comply with the filing and service requirements in connection with their appeal to the NLRC.
• Timeliness of Appeal: Whether the CA correctly ruled that petitioners' appeal to the NLRC was filed out of time.

• Filing and Service Requirements: No. The failure to attach a written explanation for filing via registered mail was excusable, considering that the NLRC allowed the admission of the appeal and that the appeal was ostensibly meritorious, warranting the relaxation of technical rules of procedure in favor of substantial justice.
• Timeliness of Appeal: No. The appeal was filed on time, as the envelope bore a post office stamp dated March 31, 2014, which was the tenth day after receipt of the LA Decision, and this was supported by a Certification from the Postmaster stating that the registered letter was posted on March 31, 2014.

• Filing and Service Requirements: The Court noted that since the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure do not provide for specific rules on filing and service of pleadings, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court applies in a suppletory manner pursuant to Section 3, Rule I of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. Section 11, Rule 13 establishes a preference for personal filing and service, requiring a written explanation when resorting to other modes. However, the Court emphasized that this rule is not so rigid as to exclude exceptions, and that the discretionary power to consider a pleading as not filed must be exercised properly and reasonably, considering the practicability of personal service, the importance of the subject matter, and the prima facie merit of the pleading. The Court found that while the CA correctly pointed out the absence of a written explanation, the filing via registered mail sans written explanation may be excused because the NLRC allowed the admission of the appeal, and the appeal was ostensibly meritorious, as evidenced by the NLRC's modification of the LA Decision. Citing Peñoso vs. Dona, the Court held that dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits, and that it is better to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review on appeal to attain the ends of justice.

• Timeliness of Appeal: The Court applied Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, which provides that where pleadings are filed by registered mail, the date of mailing as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt shall be considered as the date of filing. The Court noted that the envelope containing petitioners' Notice of Appeal with Appeal Memorandum bore a post office stamp dated March 31, 2014, further supported by a Certification dated September 24, 2014, signed by Postmaster Gemma C. Medallon, stating that "Registered Letter No. 4297 posted on March 31, 2014 from [PAO], San Pablo City addressed to [NLRC], San Pablo City has been delivered to and received by Grace Espaldon on April 2, 2014." Thus, petitioners' counsel filed their appeal on March 31, 2014, exactly on the tenth day after receiving the LA Decision on March 21, 2014, making the appeal timely under Section 1, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. The Court concluded that the CA erred in setting aside the NLRC rulings purely on technical grounds, and since the appellate court did not tackle the substantial issues, the case was remanded to the CA for resolution on the merits.

• Preference for Personal Filing and Service — Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes is the exception, which must be accompanied by a written explanation why personal service or filing was not practicable. The Court applied this doctrine by acknowledging the CA's correct observation that the appeal lacked the required written explanation, but nonetheless excused the lapse given the NLRC's admission of the appeal and its ostensible merit.

• Relaxation of Technical Rules of Procedure — Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. The Court applied this doctrine to excuse the technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice.

• Date of Filing by Registered Mail — Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, where pleadings are filed by registered mail, the date of mailing as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt shall be considered as the date of filing; either source may suffice to prove timeliness. The Court applied this doctrine by relying on the post office stamp dated March 31, 2014, and the Postmaster's Certification, to conclude that the appeal was filed on time.

• "Thus, personal service is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service is the exception, so that where personal service is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place, and person, personal service is mandatory. Only when personal service is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with." — This passage articulates the general rule on modes of filing and service under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, and the exception requiring a written explanation, which is central to the Court's analysis of the first issue.

• "Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice." — This quotation from Peñoso vs. Dona states the policy basis for relaxing technical rules of procedure, which the Court applied to excuse the petitioners' failure to attach a written explanation.

• "It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice." — This passage from Peñoso vs. Dona underscores the rationale for the Court's decision to excuse the technical lapse and remand the case for resolution on the merits.

• Peñoso vs. Dona, 549 Phil. 39 (2007) — Cited as controlling authority for the principle that dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is disfavored and that rules of procedure should not be applied in a rigid, technical sense when substantial justice is at stake.
• Magsaysay Maritime Corp. vs. Enanor, G.R. No. 224115, June 20, 2018 — Cited for the proposition that the rule on personal filing is not so rigid as to exclude exceptions, and that the only condition for the exception is a written explanation; also cited for the factors guiding the exercise of discretion to expunge a pleading.
• Pagadora vs. Ilao, 678 Phil. 208 (2011) — Cited for the formulation that personal service is the general rule and resort to other modes is the exception, and for the factors in adjudging the plausibility of an explanation.
• Gahol vs. Cobarrubias, 743 Phil. 246 (2014) — Cited for the principle that in adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, the court shall consider the circumstances, time, place, importance of the subject matter, and the prima facie merit of the pleading.
• Quebral vs. Angbus Construction, Inc., 798 Phil. 179 (2016) — Cited for the rule that if the date stamped on the envelope is earlier than that on the registry receipt, the former may be accepted as the date of filing, presupposing authentication of the envelope or registry receipt.

• Section 1, Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure — Provides that decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. The Court applied this provision to determine that petitioners' appeal, filed on March 31, 2014, was within the ten-day period from receipt of the LA Decision on March 21, 2014.
• Section 3, Rule I, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure — Provides for the suppletory application of the Rules of Court in the absence of any applicable provision in the NLRC Rules. The Court relied on this provision to apply Rule 13 of the Rules of Court to the filing and service of pleadings before the NLRC.
• Section 11, Rule 13, Rules of Court — Establishes the preference for personal filing and service, requiring a written explanation when resorting to other modes, and authorizing the court or tribunal to consider a paper as not filed for violation of the rule. The Court applied this provision to assess the propriety of petitioners' filing via registered mail without a written explanation.
• Section 3, Rule 13, Rules of Court — Provides that where pleadings are filed by registered mail, the date of mailing as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt shall be considered as the date of filing. The Court applied this provision to determine the timeliness of petitioners' appeal.

Carpio (Chairperson), Caguioa, and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concurred. J. Reyes, Jr., J., was on official leave.