Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. vs. NLRC

A preliminary injunction in a labor dispute may not issue absent strict compliance with all five findings of fact mandated by Article 218(e) of the Labor Code, including that the complainant has no adequate remedy at law and that public officers charged with protecting the complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.

Petitioner Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. (BIMCAI) was the union representing employees of private respondent Concrete Aggregates Corp., a company engaged in the business of supplying ready-mix concrete with plants and offices in Quezon City, Rizal, Pampanga, and Laguna. The 1987 Constitution, for the first time in Philippine constitutional history, accorded explicit recognition to the right to strike in Article XIII, Section 3, mandating the State to guarantee the right of workers to "peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law." Article 218(e) of the Labor Code governs the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, requiring five specific findings of fact before any temporary or permanent injunction may issue. Article 254 of the Labor Code prohibits injunctions in labor disputes except as provided in Articles 218 and 264. Article 264(d) prohibits public officials from escorting strikebreakers into struck establishments.

Petitioner Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. (BIMCAI) was the certified union of the employees of Concrete Aggregates Corp. The labor conflict between the parties erupted when the union struck on April 6, 1992, protesting alleged unfair labor practices and union busting committed by the company. The union picketed the company's premises at Bagumbayan and Longos in Quezon City, Angono and Antipolo in Rizal, San Fernando in Pampanga, and San Pedro in Laguna.

Two days later, on April 8, 1992, the company filed a petition for injunction with the NLRC, seeking to stop the strike and denouncing it as illegal. The company alleged that the union had staged a "wild-cat strike" without a valid notice of strike, without observing the cooling-off period, and during the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings. It further claimed that the union had set up obstructions impeding ingress and egress, and had resorted to threats, intimidation, and coercion against persons with lawful business with the company and against non-striking employees. The company asserted that it faced imminent and irreparable damage due to ongoing projects requiring completion on agreed schedules, and that the issuance of a temporary restraining order without notice was imperative. The petition was set for hearing on April 13, 1992 at 3:00 p.m. The union, however, claimed it was never furnished a copy of the petition, as the company had allegedly misrepresented the union's address as Rm. 205-206 Herald Bldg., Muralla St., Intramuros, Manila.

On April 13, 1992, the NLRC heard the company's evidence alone in an ex parte proceeding that began at 2:30 p.m. Testimonial and documentary evidence were presented. Approximately thirty minutes later, an ocular inspection report was submitted by an NLRC representative, observing that the passage to the company premises was obstructed with rocks, wood, and other hard objects approximately fifty meters from the main gate, and that business operations appeared completely paralyzed. Before the day ended, the NLRC First Division issued a temporary restraining order valid for twenty days, directing the union to remove man-made barricades and obstructions while preserving its right to conduct a lawful picket, and directing a Labor Arbiter to set the case for further hearing. No copy of the order was furnished the union; it learned of the TRO only when the order was posted at the company premises on April 15, 1992.

On April 21, 1992, the union filed its Opposition/Answer, denying the allegations of an illegal strike and contending that the question of strike legality was outside the NLRC's original jurisdiction unless the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration. It asserted that only illegal or unlawful acts may be enjoined, not the strike itself. On April 24, 1992, the union also filed its own petition for injunction under Article 264(d) of the Labor Code, seeking to enjoin the company from using police and military to escort scabs into the struck establishment. Hearings before Labor Arbiter Peñalosa were conducted on April 24 and 30, and May 4 and 5, 1992. On April 30, 1992, the company filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, alleging continuing illegal acts, threats, and intimidation by the strikers, and claiming that the union president had threatened to cement the company gates so that "even cockroaches could not pass through." The union opposed the motion on May 5, 1992, reiterating that it had never been furnished a copy of the original petition and suggesting the wrong address was deliberately used to prevent the union from opposing the ex parte proceedings.

On the same day, May 5, 1992, the NLRC issued its disputed Order granting the company's motion for preliminary injunction. The order recited that despite the TRO, the union had continued to commit illegal acts through human blockades, threats, and intimidation preventing non-striking employees and company vehicles from entering the premises, and that the company had lost approximately ₱10 million in contracted sales with expected losses of ₱14 million per month for the next three months. The NLRC enjoined the union from preventing free ingress and egress, directed it to desist from threatening non-striking employees, and deputized officers to enforce the order. The union then filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General, in his comment, took the position that the petition was impressed with merit, citing evidence showing that the company's own witnesses had contradicted the allegations of threats and intimidation, and that the company had never requested police assistance to protect its properties.

• Compliance with Article 218(e) Requisites: Petitioner argued that the NLRC issued the preliminary injunction without regard to the specific provisions of Article 218(e), paragraphs (4) and (5) of the Labor Code, as the Order contained no finding of fact that the complainant had no adequate remedy at law or that public officers charged with protecting the complainant's property were unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
• Jurisdiction over Strike Legality: Petitioner maintained that the question of strike legality was outside the original jurisdiction of the NLRC unless the labor dispute had been certified to it for compulsory arbitration, and that only illegal or unlawful acts may be enjoined, not the strike itself.
• Unlawful Neglect by Public Respondents: Petitioner argued that the NLRC and Labor Arbiter unlawfully neglected the performance of their duty by failing to act on the union's own petition for injunction filed on April 24, 1992, while expediting the company's petition, granting its ex parte TRO within hours and its preliminary injunction within days.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner alleged that the company deliberately misstated the union's address to prevent it from receiving copies of the petition and opposing the ex parte proceedings, resulting in the union being denied the opportunity to be heard.

• Validity of the Injunction Order: The private respondent company defended the validity of the Order dated May 5, 1992, maintaining that the preliminary injunction was properly issued.
• No Abuse of Discretion: The NLRC contended that it did not abuse its discretion in issuing the disputed Order.

• Validity of the Preliminary Injunction: Whether the NLRC validly issued a preliminary injunction after the lapse of the twenty-day TRO without complying with the specific requirements of Article 218(e), paragraphs (4) and (5) of the Labor Code, particularly the absence of findings that the complainant had no adequate remedy at law and that public officers were unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
• Unlawful Neglect of Duty: Whether the NLRC and Labor Arbiter unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty, considering the disparate treatment of the union's own petition for injunction under Article 264(d) versus the company's petition.

• Validity of the Preliminary Injunction: No. The NLRC failed to comply with the mandatory requisites of Article 218(e) of the Labor Code, as the evidence showed no concurrence of the five required findings of fact, particularly that the company had no adequate remedy at law and that public officers were unable or unwilling to protect the company's property.
• Unlawful Neglect of Duty: Yes. The NLRC and Labor Arbiter neglected to resolve with reasonable dispatch the union's own petition for injunction, having acted swiftly on the company's petition while leaving the union's petition unresolved, constituting inexplicable disparate treatment.

• Validity of the Preliminary Injunction: Article 218(e) of the Labor Code prescribes both procedural and substantive requirements that must be strictly complied with before any temporary or permanent injunction may issue in a labor dispute. The provision requires five findings of fact: (1) that prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained; (2) that substantial and irreparable injury to the complainant's property will follow; (3) that greater injury will be inflicted upon the complainant by denial of relief than upon defendants by granting relief; (4) that the complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and (5) that public officers charged with protecting the complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. The evidence on record demonstrated the absence of these requisites. The company's own witnesses—contract workers Joselito Concepcion, Renato Trambulo, and Armando Arcos—contradicted the allegations in their joint affidavit, admitting they had signed the prepared affidavit without reading it and testifying that no one had threatened them with bodily harm. Ronnie Mercado, the company's Assistant Manager for Operations, testified that after the TRO was issued, barricades blocking the gates were removed and people were able to enter freely without police escort. Atty. Elmer Jolo, the company's Personnel Manager, admitted that the company never requested police assistance, and that police regularly patrolled the area. These admissions negated findings (1), (4), and (5). The constitutional recognition of the right to strike in Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, which for the first time elevated the right to strike to constitutional status, demands that injunctions in labor disputes be reduced to the barest minimum. The ex parte TRO was issued without the union being heard, based on uncontested evidence, and the company's own witnesses undermined the factual basis for the injunction. Accordingly, there was no justification for the issuance of the preliminary injunction.

• Unlawful Neglect of Duty: The records revealed a stark disparity in the NLRC's treatment of the parties' competing petitions. The company's ex parte TRO was heard and granted on the same day, April 13, 1992; its motion for preliminary injunction was filed on April 30, 1992, and granted on May 5, 1992. In contrast, the union's petition for injunction under Article 264(d), filed on April 24, 1992, remained unresolved. Article 264(d) prohibits public officials from escorting strikebreakers into struck establishments and requires the police force to keep out of picket lines unless actual violence or other criminal acts occur. The disparate treatment was inexplicable given that the subject matters of both petitions were of similar importance to the parties and to the public. This unequal treatment constituted unlawful neglect of the duty to act on the union's petition with reasonable dispatch.

• Constitutional Status of the Right to Strike — The 1987 Constitution, in Article XIII, Section 3, for the first time in Philippine constitutional history, explicitly mandated the State to guarantee the right of workers to "peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law." This constitutional imprimatur distinguishes the Philippine right to strike from the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which did not accord it constitutional status, and from the US Federal Constitution, which likewise did not elevate it to a constitutional level. The Court applied this doctrine by reading the right to strike with a "libertarian latitude in favor of labor" and holding that injunctions against strikes should be reduced to the barest minimum.

• Five Requisites for Injunction in Labor Disputes (Article 218(e)) — Before any temporary or permanent injunction in a labor dispute may issue, the NLRC must make five findings of fact after hearing with opportunity for cross-examination: (1) that prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained; (2) that substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow; (3) that greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by denial of relief than upon defendants by granting relief; (4) that complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and (5) that public officers charged with protecting complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. All five must concur; the absence of any one vitiates the injunction. The Court found that requisites (4) and (5) were not satisfied because the company never requested police assistance and its own witnesses admitted free ingress and egress after the TRO.

• Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Orders in Labor Disputes — While the issuance of an ex parte TRO in a labor dispute is not per se prohibited, it must be characterized by care and caution and clearly justified by considerations of extreme necessity—when unlawful acts are causing substantial and irreparable injury and the company is bereft of an adequate remedy at law. Hearing officers receiving evidence in support of ex parte injunctions against striking employees must take a more active stance to ensure that labor's right to social justice is not violated despite its absence, as ex parte applications are often based on fabricated facts and concealed truths.

• "The restoration of the right to strike is the most valuable gain of labor after the EDSA revolution. It is the employees' sole weapon which can effectively protect their basic rights especially in a society where the levers of powers are nearly monopolized by the propertied few or their franchisees." — This opening passage frames the decision's doctrinal posture: the right to strike is a fundamental labor right that must be vigilantly protected against unnecessary injunctions.

• "In light of the genesis of the right to strike, it ought to be obvious that the right should be read with a libertarian latitude in favor of labor. In the wise words of Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a distinguished commissioner of the 1987 Constitutional Commission ' . . . the constitutional recognition of the right to strike does serve as a reminder that injunctions, should be reduced to the barest minimum'." — This passage articulates the interpretive principle that the constitutional recognition of the right to strike demands a pro-labor construction and minimal use of injunctions.

• "Verily, the factual circumstances proven by the evidence show that there was no concurrence of the five (5) prerequisites mandated by Art. 218 (e) of the Labor Code. Thus there is no justification for the issuance of the questioned Order of preliminary injunction." — This is the ratio decidendi: the injunction was void for failure to satisfy all mandatory statutory requisites.

• "A more becoming sense of fairness, therefore, demands that such ex parte applications should be more minutely examined by hearing officers, lest, our constitutional policy of protecting labor becomes nothing but a synthetic shibboleth." — This passage establishes the duty of hearing officers to scrutinize ex parte applications with heightened vigilance to protect labor's constitutional rights.

• RA 875 (Industrial Peace Act), June 17, 1953 — Cited as the first statutory recognition of the right to strike in the Philippines, providing historical context for the evolution of labor rights and serving as the precursor to RA 6715 and the provisions of the Labor Code on strikes and injunctions.

• Article XIII, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — Mandates the State to guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. This provision was cited as the constitutional foundation elevating the right to strike to constitutional status for the first time in Philippine history, requiring that the right be read with libertarian latitude in favor of labor.

• Article 218(e), Labor Code — Empowers the NLRC to enjoin or restrain unlawful acts in labor disputes, but prohibits issuance of any temporary or permanent injunction except after hearing with opportunity for cross-examination and only upon five specific findings of fact. Applied as the controlling provision: the NLRC's failure to establish requisites (4) (no adequate remedy at law) and (5) (public officers unable or unwilling to protect property) rendered the preliminary injunction void.

• Article 254, Labor Code — Prohibits any court or entity from issuing temporary or permanent injunctions or restraining orders in labor disputes except as provided in Articles 218 and 264. Cited to reinforce the general prohibition against injunctions in labor disputes and the narrow exceptions thereto.

• Article 264(d), Labor Code — Prohibits public officials or employees, including military and police personnel, from escorting individuals seeking to replace strikers, and requires the police force to keep out of picket lines unless actual violence or other criminal acts occur. Invoked by the union in its own petition for injunction, which the NLRC neglected to resolve, constituting unlawful neglect of duty.