Binga Hydroelectric Plant, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit and National Power Corporation

The authority to compromise a settled claim or liability exceeding ₱100,000.00 involving a government agency, including a government-owned or controlled corporation, is vested exclusively in Congress under Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292; a compromise agreement entered into without congressional approval is void. The COA retains primary jurisdiction to examine, audit, and settle money claims against the government even after a final and executory court judgment, and its approval is a condition sine qua non before payment.

BHEPI is a duly organized corporation under Philippine laws; NPC is a government-owned and controlled corporation; PSALM is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by Republic Act No. 9136, the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001. BHEPI and NPC were parties to a Rehabilitate-Operate-Leaseback Contract for the Binga Hydroelectric Power Plant located at Tinongdan, Itogon, Benguet. EPIRA, which took effect on June 26, 2001, expressly created PSALM as a corporate entity separate and distinct from NPC and transferred to PSALM all existing NPC generation assets, liabilities, independent power producer contracts, real estate, and other disposable assets; Section 56 provides that NPC liabilities transferred to PSALM constitute claims against PSALM. The COA has general jurisdiction under PD No. 1445 to examine, audit, and settle all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities.

In March 2003, BHEPI, NPC, and PSALM entered into a Settlement Framework Agreement (SFA) for the complete resolution and settlement of all claims and disputes between BHEPI and NPC in connection with the Rehabilitate-Operate-Leaseback (ROL) Contract of the Binga Hydroelectric Power Plant located at Tinongdan, Itogon, Benguet. The SFA provided that NPC shall pay BHEPI an amount equivalent to $5,000,000.00. Payment was preconditioned on the complete settlement of the unpaid claims of BHEPI's subcontractors and employees in the amount of $6,812,552.55 and upon their execution of absolute quitclaims and waivers of rights and claims against NPC. BHEPI and NPC also agreed that BHEPI would exert its best efforts to negotiate with its subcontractors and employees to further reduce their claims on record, and that any savings generated from the reduction would be equally shared between NPC and BHEPI. The SFA was endorsed by the Department of Justice and approved by the Secretary of the Department of Energy; it was adopted in toto by the Boards of NPC and PSALM in their resolutions.

In May 2005, due to the alleged failure of NPC to comply with the conditions of the SFA, BHEPI filed a case for specific performance with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. BHEPI demanded payment of $5,000,000.00, plus $1,700,000.00 representing 50% of generated savings realized from the reduction of the claims of its subcontractors and employees. The RTC dismissed the case, prompting BHEPI to appeal before the Court of Appeals.

During the pendency of the appeal, BHEPI and NPC filed a joint motion to approve a compromise agreement. Assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General, NPC agreed to pay BHEPI $5,000,000.00, representing complete settlement of the unpaid claims of subcontractors and employees, and ₱40,118,442.79 as savings realized from the reduction of the claims of subcontractors and employees, subject to certain conditions: (a) execution by BHEPI of all corresponding quitclaims and waivers of claims and rights against NPC for any other claims based on the SFA; (b) submission and approval of the Compromise Agreement by the appropriate court, and the dismissal of the case filed by BHEPI for payment based on the SFA; and (c) withdrawal, settlement, or dismissal with prejudice of all other claims and cases filed by BHEPI in relation to the SFA to which NPC is a defendant. The CA approved the Compromise Agreement and, accordingly, dismissed the appeal. An Entry of Judgment was subsequently issued.

BHEPI moved for the execution of the judgment of the CA before the RTC, but the trial court noted that execution of money claims against the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, should be lodged before the COA. BHEPI thus filed its petition for money claim before the COA, praying that the COA take cognizance of the CA's judgment award on the Compromise Agreement.

The COA denied BHEPI's money claim. It ruled that the power to compromise claims is vested exclusively in the Commission or Congress under Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292; because the Compromise Agreement was not submitted to the COA for approval, it was null and void. The COA also ruled that PSALM, an indispensable party, was not a signatory to the Compromise Agreement; even assuming PSALM had assented, the Compromise Agreement had to be denied because it was not supported with the necessary documents, and the claim against NPC's liability to BHEPI was unsubstantiated and its reasonableness could not be ascertained. BHEPI moved for reconsideration, but the COA denied it and reiterated that Congress, upon the recommendation of the Commission and the President, has the authority to compromise the claims; the COA found uncertainty in the reasonableness and validity of the compromised claims of unnamed subcontractors and employees and the alleged savings in the absence of substantial supporting documents, such as vouchers, invoices, receipts, statement of accounts, and other related papers within reach of accounting officers. The COA likewise found BHEPI's claim to the savings in the amount of ₱40,118,442.79 improper and highly doubtful, and recommended to Congress, through the President, the denial of the claim embodied in the Compromise Agreement. The COA also concluded that the claims remained unsubstantiated and that the manner by which BHEPI succeeded the original party to the ROL Contract, China Chang Jiang Energy Corporation Group, remained dubious, noting the lack of records or documents showing details of actual accomplishments or services rendered by BHEPI or the subcontractors and employees under the ROL Contract of the 100 MW Binga Hydroelectric Power Plant.

• Final and Immutable Judgment: BHEPI argued that the Judgment on the Compromise Agreement is already final and immutable; thus, the COA cannot anymore rule on the validity of the Compromise Agreement, as well as on the veracity of the money claim.
• Good Faith and Prior Evaluation: BHEPI stressed that the Compromise Agreement, as approved by the OSG, was reached in good faith by the parties after the liability of the NPC had been thoroughly evaluated as early as the execution of the SFA; the SFA had been reached by the parties, together with PSALM, DOE, and DOJ.
• Evidence Already Presented: BHEPI claimed that, contrary to the COA's assertion that the NPC's liability is unsubstantiated, evidence had been duly presented before the courts when it filed its action for specific performance.
• NPC's Power to Compromise: BHEPI contended that the NPC has the power and authority, through its Board, to settle claims against it in furtherance of its interests for as long as the settlement is not disadvantageous to the interests of the government; BHEPI pointed out that the NPC, under its charter, has the power to sue and be sued, which means it has the power to compromise claims. It also argued, together with NPC, that as a GOCC the NPC has power to compromise under Section 36(2) of PD No. 1445.
• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: In its reply, BHEPI invoked the relaxation of the strict application of procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice, alleging that the COA grievously erred in overturning a final and executory decision of the CA.

• COA — Exclusive Power to Compromise: The COA ruled that the power to compromise claims is vested exclusively in the Commission or Congress, pursuant to Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of EO No. 292; thus, the Compromise Agreement not having been submitted to the COA for approval, as required by law, is null and void.
• COA — PSALM as Indispensable Party: The COA ruled that PSALM, an indispensable party, was not a signatory to the Compromise Agreement; even on the assumption that PSALM had assented, the Compromise Agreement must still be denied.
• COA — Lack of Supporting Documents: The COA held that the Compromise Agreement was not supported with the necessary documents, and hence, the claim against the NPC's liability to BHEPI was unsubstantiated, and its reasonableness cannot be ascertained.
• COA — Recommendation to Congress: On reconsideration, the COA reiterated that Congress, upon the recommendation of the Commission and the President, has authority to compromise the claims; it was mandated to confirm the veracity and validity of the claims before recommending approval; it found uncertainty in the reasonableness and validity of the compromised claims and the alleged savings, and recommended denial to Congress through the President.
• NPC — Inherent Power to Compromise: The NPC, through the OSG, contended that even if its charter does not expressly state that it has the power to compromise claims, such is inherent in its mandated powers to do things as may be reasonably necessary to carry out its business and purpose as enshrined in its charter. It also argued, together with BHEPI, that as a GOCC it has the power to compromise claims under Section 36(2) of PD No. 1445.

• Timeliness: Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 was filed within the reglementary period.
• Validity of the Compromise Agreement: Whether the COA correctly ruled that the Compromise Agreement is null and void for lack of congressional approval under Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of EO No. 292.
• Finality of the CA Judgment: Whether the final and executory judgment of the CA approving the Compromise Agreement precluded the COA from ruling on the validity of the Compromise Agreement and the veracity of the money claim.
• PSALM's Participation: Whether PSALM's non-participation and non-assent to the Compromise Agreement rendered the claims of BHEPI doubtful and unsettled.
• Substantiation of the Claims: Whether the COA gravely abused its discretion in finding that BHEPI's claims remain unsubstantiated and dubious.
• Savings Claim: Whether the claim for ₱40,118,442.79 representing savings generated from the reduction of the claims of BHEPI's subcontractors and employees is improper.
• NPC's Power to Compromise: Whether the NPC, as a GOCC, may compromise claims under Section 36(2) of PD No. 1445 or its charter despite Section 20(1) of EO No. 292.

• Timeliness: No. The petition was filed out of time; BHEPI received the COA Decision on March 5, 2013, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 20, 2013, leaving 15 days from notice of denial, but filed the petition only on July 8, 2015, after the June 26, 2015 deadline. Belated filing is fatal absent compelling reasons.
• Validity of the Compromise Agreement: No. The Compromise Agreement is null and void because the power to compromise claims exceeding ₱100,000.00 involving a government agency is vested exclusively in Congress under Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of EO No. 292; Section 36 of PD No. 1445 has been superseded.
• Finality of the CA Judgment: No. The finality of the CA's judgment does not preclude the COA from ruling on the validity and veracity of the claims; the COA retains primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim even after issuance of a writ of execution, and filing with the COA is a condition sine qua non before payment.
• PSALM's Participation: Yes. PSALM's non-participation and non-assent to the Compromise Agreement render the claims doubtful and unsettled; PSALM was not a party and there was no proof of a Board Resolution confirming or approving the Compromise Agreement.
• Substantiation of the Claims: No. The COA did not gravely abuse its discretion; BHEPI failed to present records or documents establishing the assignment of rights from CCJEC or details of actual accomplishments or services, and its bare assertions, negotiations, and OSG approval do not guarantee validity.
• Savings Claim: Yes. The claim for ₱40,118,442.79 is improper because BHEPI would receive a 50% commission on the waived portion of its subcontractors' and employees' claims, amounting to unjust enrichment at their expense and defeating the purpose of the NPC's negotiation.
• NPC's Power to Compromise: No. Section 36(2) of PD No. 1445 has been superseded by Section 20(1) of EO No. 292; a GOCC cannot validly invoke its autonomy to enter into a compromise agreement in violation of that provision, and Congress alone has the power to compromise claims exceeding ₱100,000.00.

• Timeliness: Rule 64, Section 3 requires the petition to be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts this period; if the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but not less than five days from notice of denial. BHEPI received the COA Decision on March 5, 2013 and filed a motion for reconsideration on March 20, 2013. The filing interrupted the 30-day period, leaving BHEPI a remaining 15-day period. Having received notice of the denial on June 11, 2015, BHEPI had until June 26, 2015 to file a petition for certiorari; it filed only on July 8, 2015. The Court has recognized exceptions to procedural rules only for the most compelling reasons, where stubborn obedience to the rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice. Every plea for liberal construction must be accompanied by an explanation of why the party failed to comply and by a justification for the requested liberal construction. BHEPI did not advance any explanation in its petition; it invoked relaxation only in its reply after the COA pointed out the matter. No compelling reason existed to relax the rules, and the belated filing was fatal.
• Validity of the Compromise Agreement: Section 36(2) of PD No. 1445 provides that the governing bodies of GOCCs have the exclusive power to compromise or release claims when expressly authorized by their charters, and if the charters do not so provide, the power is exercised by the Commission. However, Section 36 of PD No. 1445, enacted on June 11, 1978, was superseded by Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of EO No. 292. Under Section 20(1), the COA may compromise or release a settled claim or liability not exceeding ₱10,000.00; with the written approval of the President, it may compromise or release a similar claim or liability not exceeding ₱100,000.00; but if the claim or liability exceeds ₱100,000.00, the application for relief must be submitted, through the COA and the President, with their recommendations, to Congress. The authority to compromise a settled claim or liability exceeding ₱100,000.00 involving a government agency is vested exclusively in Congress. An agency of the Government includes a GOCC, so the provision applies to all GOCCs, with or without original charters. A GOCC cannot validly invoke its autonomy to enter into a compromise agreement in violation of the provision. In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs. Radstock Securities Limited, the liabilities of PNCC to Radstock amounted to more than ₱6 Billion, and the Court held that Congress had the exclusive power to compromise the claim; without congressional approval, the compromise agreement was void. Here, NPC's liabilities in the amounts of $5,000,000.00 and ₱40,118,442.79 far exceed ₱100,000.00. Congress alone has the power to compromise them. The participation of the COA, in conjunction with the President, is merely to recommend whether to grant the application for relief. The COA recommended denial, and no grave abuse of discretion was shown.
• Finality of the CA Judgment: EO No. 292 and PD No. 1445 give the COA authority to rule on the validity and veracity of claims, apart from its role to recommend the compromise of claims before Congress. This is consistent with the general jurisdiction of the COA to examine, audit, and settle all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. This authority may still be exercised even if a court's decision has already become final and executory. The COA retains primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim even after the issuance of a writ of execution. The claimant must first seek the COA's approval of the monetary claim despite a final and executory judgment validating the money claim against a government agency or instrumentality. Filing with the COA is a condition sine qua non before payment can be effected. The duty to examine, audit, and settle claims means deciding whether to allow or disallow the same; it involves more than simply affirming or granting the claim on the basis that it has already been validated by the courts. To limit it would render the power and duty of the COA meaningless. This rationale applies to the Compromise Agreement, which needed not only the recommendation of the COA and the President but also the approval of Congress under EO No. 292.
• PSALM's Participation: The word "settled" in Section 20(1) means that mandatory congressional approval of the compromise is only for claims that are already settled. This is in harmony with the scope of the COA's authority to take cognizance only of money claims that are liquidated and uncontested. Claims must be determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers; the claim must no longer present a justiciable question ripe for judicial determination; the liability or non-liability of the government must no longer be in issue and must no longer require the examination of evidence and the use of judicial discretion. In Strategic, the liabilities of PNCC were considered settled in light of the admission of its Board through a formal Board Resolution of PNCC's liability for the Marubeni loans; the compromise agreement merely reduced the settled liability from ₱17 billion to ₱6.185 billion. Here, it may appear that the liabilities of NPC were rendered settled as early as the NPC's and PSALM's approval of the SFA through their respective Board Resolutions. However, PSALM was not a party to the Compromise Agreement. There was no proof that PSALM issued a Board Resolution confirming or approving the Compromise Agreement. PSALM's non-participation and non-assent rendered the claims of BHEPI against the liabilities of NPC doubtful and therefore unsettled. PSALM should have been made a party to the Compromise Agreement. EPIRA, which took effect on June 26, 2001, expressly created PSALM as a corporate entity separate and distinct from NPC. Section 49 of EPIRA provides for the creation of PSALM and its take-over of all existing NPC generation assets, liabilities, independent power producer contracts, real estate, and all other disposable assets. Section 56 of EPIRA expressly provides that NPC liabilities transferred to PSALM shall constitute claims against PSALM. Since PSALM assumed the outstanding liabilities of NPC upon the effectivity of EPIRA in mid-2001, BHEPI should have negotiated with PSALM instead. NPC no longer had the personality, interest, and right to do so. This is buttressed by BHEPI's own contention that communications between NPC and PSALM would show that PSALM acknowledges the liabilities of NPC to BHEPI as among those transferred to it pursuant to EPIRA.
• Substantiation of the Claims: The COA concluded that the claims of BHEPI remain unsubstantiated and that the manner by which BHEPI succeeded the original party to the ROL Contract, China Chang Jiang Energy Corporation Group, remains dubious. Other than its bare assertions, BHEPI did not present any record or document establishing how the rights and obligations of CCJEC were assigned to it, which would have proven its contractual relationship with NPC under the ROL Contract. The COA also noted the lack of records or documents showing details of actual accomplishments or services rendered by BHEPI or the subcontractors and employees under the ROL Contract of the 100 MW Binga Hydroelectric Power Plant. BHEPI instead relied on the years the liabilities had supposedly been negotiated, the number of government agencies involved, the good faith it exercised together with NPC, and the approval of the OSG. These hardly guarantee that a compromise agreement borne out of the negotiations would be free from any infirmity.
• Savings Claim: The claim for ₱40,118,442.79 representing savings generated from the reduction of the claims of BHEPI's subcontractors and employees is improper. BHEPI would, in effect, get a commission of 50% on the waived portion of the original claims of its subcontractors and employees. This is a clear form of unjust enrichment at the expense of the subcontractors and employees. It diminishes BHEPI's obligation to negotiate with its employees under the Compromise Agreement and practically defeats the purpose of why NPC even negotiated in the first place. In the end, the government would still end up paying substantially when it could have managed otherwise.
• NPC's Power to Compromise: Both BHEPI and NPC argued that NPC, as a GOCC, has the power to compromise claims under Section 36(2) of PD No. 1445. The only requirement under the second paragraph is that the government agency be authorized by its charter to compromise a particular claim; it does not state that the COA must approve the same. BHEPI contended that NPC has the power and authority, through its Board, to settle claims against it in furtherance of its interests for as long as the settlement is not disadvantageous to the government, and that NPC's power to sue and be sued means it has the power to compromise claims. NPC, through the OSG, contended that even if its charter does not expressly state that it has the power to compromise claims, such is inherent in its mandated powers to do things as may be reasonably necessary to carry out its business and purpose. These arguments do not persuade. Strategic held that Section 36 of PD No. 1445 has been superseded by Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of EO No. 292. Under Section 20(1), the authority to compromise a settled claim or liability exceeding ₱100,000.00 involving a government agency is vested exclusively in Congress. An agency of the Government includes a GOCC, so the provision applies to all GOCCs, with or without original charters. A GOCC cannot validly invoke its autonomy to enter into a compromise agreement in violation of the provision. Thus, NPC cannot rely on Section 36(2) of PD No. 1445 or on its charter to validate the Compromise Agreement.

• Exclusive Congressional Power to Compromise Government Claims Exceeding ₱100,000.00 — Under Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of EO No. 292, the COA may compromise or release a settled claim or liability not exceeding ₱10,000.00; with the President's written approval, not exceeding ₱100,000.00; but if the claim or liability exceeds ₱100,000.00, the application for relief must be submitted through the COA and the President, with their recommendations, to Congress. This provision superseded Section 36 of PD No. 1445 and applies to all government agencies, including GOCCs with or without original charters. A GOCC cannot invoke its autonomy to enter into a compromise agreement violating this provision. Applied: NPC's liabilities of $5,000,000.00 and ₱40,118,442.79 exceed ₱100,000.00; Congress alone could compromise them, and the Compromise Agreement without congressional approval was void.
• COA Primary Jurisdiction Over Money Claims Against the Government — The COA has general jurisdiction to examine, audit, and settle all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. This authority may be exercised even after a court decision has become final and executory; the COA retains primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim even after issuance of a writ of execution, and the claimant must first seek COA approval before payment. Applied: the COA could rule on the validity and veracity of BHEPI's claim despite the final and executory CA judgment on the Compromise Agreement.
• "Settled" Claim Requirement — The mandatory congressional approval of a compromise under Section 20(1) of EO No. 292 applies only to claims that are already settled. The COA's authority covers only liquidated and uncontested money claims, determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and similar papers, and no longer presenting a justiciable question ripe for judicial determination. Applied: although NPC and PSALM Board Resolutions may have approved the SFA, PSALM was not a party to the Compromise Agreement and no Board Resolution confirmed or approved it, rendering BHEPI's claims doubtful and unsettled.
• PSALM as Separate Entity and Transferee of NPC Liabilities Under EPIRA — EPIRA created PSALM as a corporate entity separate and distinct from NPC. Section 49 transferred to PSALM all existing NPC generation assets, liabilities, independent power producer contracts, real estate, and other disposable assets, and Section 56 provides that NPC liabilities transferred to PSALM constitute claims against PSALM. Applied: because PSALM assumed NPC's outstanding liabilities upon EPIRA's effectivity in mid-2001, BHEPI should have negotiated with PSALM; NPC no longer had personality, interest, and right to compromise the claims.
• Unjust Enrichment in Savings-Sharing Arrangement — A claim for 50% of the savings generated from the reduction of subcontractors' and employees' claims is improper when it amounts to a commission on the waived portion of those claims. It constitutes unjust enrichment at the expense of the subcontractors and employees, diminishes BHEPI's obligation to negotiate with them, and defeats the purpose of the government's negotiation. Applied: the COA correctly denied BHEPI's claim for ₱40,118,442.79.
• Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules — Procedural rules must be respected; exceptions are recognized only for the most compelling reasons, where strict obedience would defeat the ends of justice. Every plea for liberal construction must be accompanied by an explanation of why the party failed to comply and a justification for the requested relaxation. Applied: BHEPI offered no explanation in its petition for its late filing and invoked relaxation only in its reply; no compelling reason existed to excuse the belated petition.

• "In case the claim or liability exceeds one hundred thousand pesos, the application for relief therefrom shall be submitted, through the Commission and the President, with their recommendations, to the Congress x x x." — This is the operative text of Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of EO No. 292, which the Court applied to hold that Congress alone has authority to compromise NPC's liabilities exceeding ₱100,000.00.
• "Without congressional approval, the Compromise Agreement between Radstock and PNCC is void for being contrary to Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of EO No. 292." — This passage, drawn from Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs. Radstock Securities Limited, states the controlling rule that a compromise agreement involving a GOCC liability exceeding ₱100,000.00 is void absent congressional approval.
• "The COA still retains its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim even after the issuance of a writ of execution." — This passage defines the COA's continuing authority over money claims against the government and supports the holding that the final CA judgment did not bar the COA from examining BHEPI's claim.
• "PSALM's non-participation and non-assent to the Compromise Agreement render the claims of BHEPI against the liabilities of the NPC doubtful and therefore, unsettled." — This passage is the ratio for holding that the claims were not "settled" within the meaning of Section 20(1) of EO No. 292 and that PSALM should have been a party to the Compromise Agreement.
• "BHEPI would, in effect, get a commission of 50% on the waived portion of the original claims of its subcontractors and employees. This is a clear form of unjust enrichment at the expense of the subcontractors and employees." — This passage explains why the claim for ₱40,118,442.79 in savings was improper and correctly denied by the COA.

• Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs. Radstock Securities Limited, G.R. No. 178158, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 413 — Controlling precedent; held that Section 36 of PD No. 1445 was superseded by Section 20(1) of EO No. 292 and that a compromise agreement involving a GOCC liability exceeding ₱100,000.00 without congressional approval is void.
• Benedicto vs. The Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN, BBC and IBC, G.R. No. 87710, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 659 — Cited in Strategic for the rule that mandatory congressional approval of a compromise applies only to claims that are already settled.
• Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc. vs. Puerto Princesa City, G.R. No. 181792, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 66 — Followed for the COA's primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim even after the issuance of a writ of execution.
• Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. vs. The Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 301 — Cited for the rule that the COA takes cognizance only of liquidated and uncontested money claims, determined from vouchers, invoices, and similar papers.
• FF. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122196, January 15, 1997, 266 SCRA 235 — Cited for the proposition that a settled claim no longer presents a justiciable question ripe for judicial determination.
• Philippine Operations, Inc. vs. Auditor General of the Philippines, 94 Phil. 868 (1954) — Cited for the rule that when a claim is settled, the government's liability or non-liability is no longer in issue and no longer requires examination of evidence and judicial discretion.
• Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) vs. Court of Appeals (21st Division), G.R. No. 194226, February 15, 2017, 817 SCRA 551 — Followed for the holding that PSALM is a corporate entity separate and distinct from NPC under EPIRA.
• The Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185544, January 13, 2015, 745 SCRA 269 — Cited on the fatal effect of belated filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
• Osmeña vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 18881, May 31, 2011, 649 SCRA 654 — Cited on the standards for relaxing procedural rules, requiring compelling reasons and explanation.
• Ratios vs. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 202651, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 378 — Cited for the requirement that the claimant first seek COA approval of the monetary claim before payment.

• Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) — Vests in Congress the authority to compromise a settled claim or liability exceeding ₱100,000.00 involving a government agency, upon recommendation of the COA and the President. Applied because NPC's liabilities of $5,000,000.00 and ₱40,118,442.79 exceed ₱100,000.00, making congressional approval necessary and the Compromise Agreement void without it.
• Section 36(2), Presidential Decree No. 1445 (Government Auditing Code of the Philippines) — Provides that governing bodies of GOCCs have exclusive power to compromise or release claims when expressly authorized by their charters, and if not so provided, the power is exercised by the Commission. Held superseded by Section 20(1) of EO No. 292 and unavailable to validate the NPC's compromise.
• Section 26, Presidential Decree No. 1445 — Confers on the COA general jurisdiction to examine, audit, and settle all debts and claims due from or owing to the Government or its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Applied to uphold the COA's authority to rule on the validity and veracity of BHEPI's claim despite the final CA judgment.
• Section 49, Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001) — Created PSALM and transferred to it all existing NPC generation assets, liabilities, independent power producer contracts, real estate, and other disposable assets. Applied to show PSALM's assumption of NPC's liabilities.
• Section 56, Republic Act No. 9136 — Provides that NPC liabilities transferred to PSALM constitute claims against PSALM. Applied to hold that BHEPI should have negotiated with PSALM and that NPC no longer had personality, interest, and right to compromise the claims.
• Section 3, Rule 64, Rules of Court — Requires a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution, interrupted by a motion for reconsideration, with the remaining period not less than five days from notice of denial. Applied to find BHEPI's July 8, 2015 petition late.
• Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 — Requires money claims against the Government to be filed first with the COA, which must act within 60 days, and authorizes elevation to the Supreme Court on certiorari after rejection. Applied to support the COA's primary jurisdiction over BHEPI's money claim.
• Section 2, Introductory Provisions, Administrative Code of 1987 — Defines an agency of the Government to include a government-owned or controlled corporation. Applied to hold that Section 20(1) of EO No. 292 applies to all GOCCs, with or without original charters.

Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Samuel R. Martires, Noel Gimenez Tijam, Andres B. Reyes, Jr., and Alexander G. Gesmundo concurred. No separate concurring opinion is included in the text.