Binay vs. Office of the Ombudsman

The Office of the Ombudsman possesses the discretionary power to revoke, repeal, or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in office, and may conduct reinvestigations motu proprio or upon motion without requiring new matters or evidence, provided the determination of probable cause is not attended by grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the right to due process in preliminary investigations is satisfied when a respondent is afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and move for reconsideration, and does not extend to receiving copies of pleadings filed by co-respondents.

From September 2001 to February 2002, the Commission on Audit's Special Task Force audited financial transactions of local government units in Metro Manila regarding purchases of supplies and equipment exceeding ₱1 million. The audit focused on a March 14, 2001 contract entered into by the City of Makati, through Mayor Elenita S. Binay and General Services Department Head Ernesto A. Aspillaga, with Apollo Medical Equipment and Supplies for the purchase of hospital beds and bedside cabinets worth ₱38,799,700.00 for the Ospital ng Makati. The audit revealed that the contract was awarded without public bidding and that the beds delivered were manufactured by a Taiwanese company rather than by the U.S. firm Apollo claimed to represent. The manufacturer's invoice indicated an actual total cost of ₱2,447,376.14, significantly below the ₱36,431,700.00 paid to Apollo.

• The Anomalous Procurement: On March 14, 2001, the City of Makati, represented by Mayor Elenita S. Binay and General Services Department Head Ernesto A. Aspillaga, entered into a contract with Apollo Medical Equipment and Supplies (represented by Apollo B. Carreon) for the purchase of hospital beds and bedside cabinets worth ₱38,799,700.00 for the Ospital ng Makati. The contract was executed without public bidding, allegedly based on Apollo's representation that it was the sole and exclusive Philippine distributor of UGM-Medysis of New Jersey, USA.

• Audit Findings: Commission on Audit investigations revealed that the delivered beds were not manufactured by UGM-Medysis but by Juhng Mei Medical Instruments Co., Ltd. (Chya Hung Medical Treatment Instruments Factory Co., Ltd.), a Taiwanese company. The manufacturer's invoice showed an actual total cost of merely ₱2,447,376.14, significantly less than the ₱36,431,700.00 paid to Apollo. Payment was facilitated through Check No. 06279 issued on April 30, 2001 for ₱35,106,910.91.

• The Initial Resolution (2011): In its May 9, 2011 Resolution, the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman found no probable cause against Mayor Binay, applying the Arias doctrine. The resolution held that Binay, as final approving authority, relied in good faith on the representations of Aspillaga and City Administrator Nicanor Santiago that the transaction was regular on its face, and that the Purchase Requests and Purchase Orders were crafted so well that nothing would have behooved her to examine the purchase further.

• The Reversal (2013): In its August 29, 2013 Consolidated Resolution, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended Binay's inclusion as an accused, finding the Arias doctrine inapplicable. The resolution noted her extensive and active participation in the procurement process, the unusual haste in awarding the contract (only 30 days from February 12, 2001 to March 14, 2001), and the magnitude of the amount involved (₱36 million), which should have put her on guard to verify Apollo's credentials. The resolution emphasized that as local chief executive, it was her bounden duty to ensure faithful compliance with laws.

• Finality of the May 9, 2011 Resolution: Petitioner maintained that the May 9, 2011 Resolution became final and executory when neither the Commission on Audit nor Roberto Brillante moved for reconsideration; the doctrine of finality of judgment applies to preliminary investigations, rendering the resolution immutable and beyond review.

• Violation of Due Process: Petitioner argued that her right to due process was violated when she was not served with copies of her co-accused's Motions for Reconsideration, effectively depriving her of the right to be notified of the allegations therein and to be heard regarding their contents.

• Violation of the Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases: Petitioner contended that the failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to immediately resolve the complaints from 2003 to 2013 constituted a violation of her constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.

• Non-finality of the Initial Resolution: Respondents countered that the filing of Motions for Reconsideration by petitioner's co-accused prevented the May 9, 2011 Resolution from attaining finality, as the filing of such motions is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper.

• Authority to Revoke Predecessor's Ruling: Respondents argued that a sitting Ombudsman has the authority to abrogate a predecessor's ruling within the bounds of law, and that reinvestigation does not require new matters or evidence but is simply a chance to review and re-evaluate findings already submitted.

• Sufficiency of Due Process: Respondents maintained that due process in preliminary investigation is satisfied when parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side, which petitioner was given when she filed her Counter-Affidavit and Motion for Reconsideration; procedural law does not require service of co-accused's pleadings.

• Absence of Inordinate Delay: Respondents argued that the delay was justified by the complexity of the case involving 23 respondents, voluminous evidence, and multiple fact-finding investigations by various bureaus; petitioner contributed to the delay by submitting her Counter-Affidavit only in 2008, three years after the Supplemental Complaints were filed.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the August 29, 2013 Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner and the June 16, 2014 Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.

• Due Process: Whether petitioner's right to due process was violated when she was not served with a copy of her co-accused's Motions for Reconsideration.

• Speedy Disposition: Whether petitioner's right to speedy disposition of cases was violated when the Office of the Ombudsman failed to immediately resolve the complaints against her.

• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion. The filing of motions for reconsideration by co-accused is an integral part of preliminary investigation, preventing the May 9, 2011 Resolution from attaining finality. Pursuant to Roxas v. Hon. Vasquez and Alvarez v. People, a sitting Ombudsman has the power to revoke, repeal, or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in office, and may conduct reinvestigations motu proprio without requiring new evidence. The determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter within the Ombudsman's discretionary powers, and courts will not interfere absent a clear and convincing showing of grave abuse of discretion.

• No Due Process Violation: Petitioner's right to due process was not violated. Preliminary investigation is not part of trial and is not subject to the same due process requirements; it is conducted only to establish whether probable cause exists. Under Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a respondent's rights are limited to examining the complainant's evidence and submitting counter-affidavits. Due process is satisfied when parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side or move for reconsideration, which petitioner was given when she filed her Motion for Reconsideration of the August 29, 2013 Resolution.

• No Violation of Speedy Disposition: The right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated. Following Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, delay is not determined through mere mathematical reckoning but through examination of the facts and circumstances. The delay was justified by the complexity of the case (23 respondents, voluminous evidence of numerous fraudulent transactions over 24 months, and investigations by multiple bureaus). Petitioner contributed to the delay by submitting her Counter-Affidavit only in 2008. Moreover, petitioner invoked the right only after the adverse August 29, 2013 Resolution, constituting a waiver.

• Arias Doctrine — Public officers who are merely approving authorities and who rely in good faith on the representations of subordinates regarding the regularity of transactions are not liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. In this case, the Court noted that the doctrine was inapplicable to Binay because of her extensive participation in the procurement process and the unusual haste in the transaction.

• Ombudsman's Power to Revoke or Alter Predecessor's Rulings — A sitting Ombudsman possesses the authority to revoke, repeal, or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in office within the bounds of law. This power is consistent with the Ombudsman's independence as protector of the people and prosecutor to ensure accountability of public officers.

• Reinvestigation Without New Evidence — New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation. Reinvestigation is simply a chance for the prosecutor or the Office of the Ombudsman to review and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted. It renders the entire case open for review regardless of whether the complainants sought the reinvestigation.

• Non-Interference with Ombudsman's Determination of Probable Cause — Courts will not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause except when there is a clear and convincing showing of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

• Due Process in Preliminary Investigation — The rights of a respondent during preliminary investigation are limited to those provided by procedural law: the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant and to submit counter-affidavits. Preliminary investigation is not part of trial and need not be subjected to the same due process requirements mandated during trial.

• Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases — The determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated is not mechanical but requires examination of the entire context, including the complexity of issues, volume of evidence, and conduct of the parties. If the right is invoked only after an adverse ruling, it is deemed waived.

• "Generally, this Court will not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause, unless there is a clear and convincing showing of grave abuse of discretion."

• "The Ombudsman is not precluded from ordering another review of a complaint, for he or she may revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in office."

• "New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor, or in this case the Office of the Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted."

• "Preliminary investigation is not part of trial and is conducted only to establish whether probable cause exists. Consequently, it is not subject to the same due process requirements that must be present during trial."

• "The delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation is not determined through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case."

• Roxas v. Hon. Vasquez, 411 Phil. 276 (2001) — Established that reinvestigation does not require new evidence and that the Ombudsman may conduct reinvestigations motu proprio; followed and applied.

• Alvarez v. People, 668 Phil. 216 (2011) — Held that a sitting Ombudsman may revoke or alter the rulings of a predecessor in office; followed and applied.

• Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 718 Phil. 455 (2013) — Defined grave abuse of discretion as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction; cited for the definition of grave abuse.

• Reyes v. The Office of the Ombudsman, 810 Phil. 106 (2017) — Clarified that preliminary investigation is not part of trial and is not subject to the same due process requirements; followed.

• Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458, and 210141-42, July 31, 2018 — Established guidelines for determining violations of the right to speedy disposition of cases, emphasizing that delay is not determined by mere mathematical reckoning; followed and applied.

• Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman, 802 Phil. 564 (2016) — Reiterated the rule of non-interference with the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause; cited.

• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for certiorari and prohibition; cited as the procedural basis for the petition.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Penalizes causing undue injury to any party or giving unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; cited as the offense charged.

• Section 15, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Grants the Ombudsman the power to investigate and prosecute; cited regarding the Ombudsman's authority to conduct reinvestigations motu proprio.

• Rule 112, Section 3, Rules of Court — Prescribes the procedure for preliminary investigation, including the respondent's right to examine evidence and submit counter-affidavits; cited regarding the scope of due process in preliminary investigations.

Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Inting, JJ.