Bienvenido vs. Court of Appeals

A subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is void for being bigamous, and the burden of proving any exception under Article 83 of the Civil Code rests on the party invoking such exception. The party who stands to benefit from a declaration of the second marriage's validity must prove that the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years without news of being alive, or that one of the other statutory exceptions applies; the Court will not presume these facts merely because the opposing party failed to disprove them.

Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. Without dissolving that marriage, Aurelio contracted a second marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho on February 6, 1962, in Tokyo, Japan, with whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he had a child, respondent Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito), born May 22, 1961. In 1967, Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, and from June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, Aurelio lived with petitioner. The legal backdrop includes Article 83 of the Civil Code governing the validity of subsequent marriages and Article 739 of the Civil Code declaring void donations between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage.

Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho, with whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito), born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan, where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958. There were instances during their marriage when, because of quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods, with Luisita staying at various times in Davao City, Hongkong, or Japan.

In 1967, Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her, and from June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout Delgado Street, Quezon City. Petitioner's daughter, Nanette, stayed with them, as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year in 1976. On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and lot on Delgado Street from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 was issued in his name, with Aurelio described as single.

On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioner's name on January 11, 1985. Between 1985 and 1987, Nenita and Luisita came to know each other under conflicting versions: Luisita claimed that Nenita called her residence several times looking for Aurelio and introduced herself as Mrs. Nenita Camacho, while petitioner claimed that Luisita had called their residence many times looking for Aurelio to urge him to file an application for American citizenship.

On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's account in the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the United States with respondent Chito, having gone there, according to her, at the instance of Aurelio to look for a house in San Francisco. Upon learning of Aurelio's death, she and Chito came home on May 30, 1988, had the remains transferred from Loyola Memorial Chapels to St. Ignatius Church and later to Arlington Memorial Chapels, and paid for the funeral services. Respondent Luisita was granted death benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the surviving spouse of Aurelio. She soon claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout Delgado Street, and the two met at a barangay conciliation meeting, but efforts to settle their dispute failed.

On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought the case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and payment of damages, alleging the deed of sale was a forgery and executed in fraud of Luisita as the legitimate wife of Aurelio. In her answer, petitioner claimed that she and Aurelio had purchased the property using their joint funds accumulated after living together for fourteen years, that the sale was with respondent Luisita's consent, and that she was a purchaser in good faith. The trial court upheld the sale, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that respondents' action was not barred by laches, that the property belonged to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and Luisita, and that the sale to Nenita was void under Article 739 of the Civil Code.

• Validity of the Marriage: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in presuming the validity of the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita, given that Aurelio's previous marriage to Consejo Velasco was still subsisting at the time of the second marriage.
• Application of Article 739: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 739 of the Civil Code and declaring invalid the deed of sale between Aurelio and Nenita, since an action for declaration of nullity of such donations can only be brought by the innocent spouse, not by Luisita whose marriage to Aurelio was itself void.
• Conjugal Property: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject property formed part of the conjugal properties of Aurelio and Luisita, since there was no valid conjugal partnership in the first place.
• Good Faith Purchaser: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that petitioner was a purchaser in good faith and lawful owner of the subject property, as there was nothing to show she knew Aurelio was married to Luisita.

N/A — The decision does not recount the respondents' specific arguments on appeal beyond their position that the deed of sale was a forgery and executed in fraud of Luisita as the legitimate wife of Aurelio, and the Court of Appeals' rulings which they successfully obtained.

• Validity of the Second Marriage: Whether the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita was valid despite Aurelio's prior subsisting marriage to Consejo Velasco.
• Application of Article 739: Whether the sale of the property to petitioner was void under Article 739 of the Civil Code as a donation between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage.
• Conjugal Property: Whether the subject property formed part of the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and Luisita.
• Good Faith Purchaser: Whether petitioner was a purchaser in good faith and lawful owner of the subject property.

• Validity of the Second Marriage: No. Aurelio's marriage to Luisita was void for being bigamous because his first marriage to Consejo Velasco was still subsisting, and respondents failed to prove any exception under Article 83 of the Civil Code.
• Application of Article 739: No. Article 739 of the Civil Code did not apply because an action for declaration of nullity of such donations can only be brought by the innocent spouse, not by Luisita whose marriage to Aurelio was itself void.
• Conjugal Property: No. The property did not form part of any conjugal partnership because there was no valid marriage between Aurelio and Luisita in the first place.
• Good Faith Purchaser: Yes. Petitioner was a purchaser in good faith, as there was nothing to show she knew Aurelio was married to Luisita, and Aurelio had represented himself to be single.

• Validity of the Second Marriage: The Court ruled that the resolution of the case hinged on the validity of Aurelio's marriage to respondent Luisita. If that marriage was valid, then the property was property of their conjugal partnership and Luisita was the proper party to question the validity of the sale to Nenita. Otherwise, if the marriage was not valid, Luisita could not bring the suit. The Court of Appeals had presumed the validity of the second marriage from petitioner's failure to prove that Aurelio's first wife had not been absent for at least seven years. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, holding that petitioner had shown that on February 6, 1962, when Aurelio married Luisita, Aurelio's previous marriage to Consejo Velasco was still subsisting, and therefore his second marriage was bigamous. The burden of proof was on respondents to show that the marriage fell under any of the exceptions in Article 83 of the Civil Code, and they failed to discharge this burden. The Court cited the general rule in Article 83: "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance," with the exceptions being those stated in paragraphs 1 and 2, and the burden being on the party invoking any of the exceptions. The Court further noted that the first exception refers to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse, not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, and since it was Aurelio who had left his first wife, this exception could not be invoked. Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velasco, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous.

• Application of Article 739: The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, which declares donations made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage to be void. The Court noted that an action for declaration of nullity of such donations can only be brought by the innocent spouse, perhaps in this case by the first wife, but certainly not by Luisita whose marriage to Aurelio was itself void. The last paragraph of Article 739 clearly provides: "In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action." Since Luisita's marriage to Aurelio was void, she had no standing to bring such an action.

• Conjugal Property: The Court held that there was no basis for holding that the property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first place, the marriage being void for bigamy.

• Good Faith Purchaser: The Court held that the property was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew respondent Chito to be Aurelio's son way back in 1976, there was nothing to show that she knew Aurelio was married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelio's child by a woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals' ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita. The Court also noted that until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be presumed valid, as petitioner's ownership was evidenced by a deed of absolute sale executed with all the solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name.

• Bigamous Marriage Doctrine — A marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void from its performance, unless the first marriage was annulled or dissolved, or the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years without the present spouse having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The burden of proving any of these exceptions rests on the party invoking them. In this case, the Court applied the general rule because Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velasco, making his subsequent marriage to Luisita void for being bigamous.

• Burden of Proof in Challenging Marriage Validity — The burden of proof on the legality of a second marriage rests on the party who stands to benefit from a declaration of its validity. The Court held that to assume the facts constituting an exception because the opposing party has not disproved them "would be to stand the principle on its head." The party invoking an exception to the general rule of invalidity must prove the exception.

• Standing to Question Void Donations — Under Article 739 of the Civil Code, an action for declaration of nullity of donations between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage can only be brought by the innocent spouse. A person whose own marriage to the donor is void has no standing to bring such an action.

• "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court." — This is the controlling statutory provision in Article 83 of the Civil Code, which the Court applied to determine the validity of Aurelio's second marriage to Luisita.

• "It was the burden of herein respondents to prove that, at the time of his second marriage to respondent Luisita, Aurelio's first wife, Consejo Velasco, had been absent for at least seven years and that Aurelio had no news that she was alive. To assume these facts because petitioner has not disproved them would be to stand the principle on its head." — This passage articulates the Court's core reasoning on the burden of proof, rejecting the Court of Appeals' presumption of validity.

• "In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action." — This passage from Article 739 of the Civil Code establishes who has standing to bring an action for declaration of nullity of void donations, which the Court used to bar Luisita's claim.

• Gomez vs. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615 (1970) — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that the general rule in Article 83 of the Civil Code is that a subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the first spouse is void, and the burden is on the party invoking any of the exceptions to prove them.
• Jackson vs. Jackson, 94 Cal. 446, 29 Pac. 957 — Cited to support the holding that the first exception in Article 83 refers to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse, not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the period of seven years had lapsed.

• Article 83, Civil Code — Provides that any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void, with exceptions for annulment or dissolution of the first marriage, absence of the first spouse for seven consecutive years, or presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391. The Court applied the general rule to declare Aurelio's second marriage to Luisita void for being bigamous.
• Article 739, Civil Code — Declares void donations made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, and provides that the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee. The Court held that Luisita, whose marriage to Aurelio was void, had no standing to invoke this provision.
• Article 391, Civil Code — Lists the circumstances under which persons are presumed dead for all purposes, including division of the estate among heirs, which the Court referenced as one of the exceptions to the general rule of invalidity of subsequent marriages.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Puno, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided text.