Bicol Medical Center vs. Botor

A writ of preliminary injunction requires proof of a clear legal right "clearly founded in or granted by law," and any hint of doubt or dispute regarding such right precludes its issuance; furthermore, prima facie evidence supporting the application must be weighed against the adverse party's rebuttal evidence presented during the mandatory hearing, rather than evaluated in isolation as in an ex parte temporary restraining order proceeding.

Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital was established in 1933 and eventually transferred to Concepcion Pequeña, Naga City. In 1982, the Camarines Sur Provincial Government donated approximately five hectares of land, including the hospital and Road Lot No. 3 (a service road stretching from Panganiban Road to J. Miranda Avenue), to the Ministry of Health (now the Department of Health), as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13693. The facility became the Bicol Medical Center (BMC) in 1995. In 2009, BMC constructed a steel gate along J. Miranda Avenue for traffic control and security.

• The Traffic Re-routing and Closure: On March 21, 2012, Dr. Efren SJ. Nerva, BMC Chief I, issued Hospital Memorandum No. 0310 ordering the rerouting of traffic inside the BMC Compound, closing the exit gate at the MCC Quarters and designating the OPD Exit Gate for all egress effective April 1, 2012. This closure relocated the gate from the eastern to the western side of the hospital for security reasons and to accommodate "massive development within the Complex."
• The Public Nuisance Complaint and Suit: The closure drew criticism from the community. On May 19, 2012, Atty. Noe Botor requested Naga City Mayor John Bongat to reopen or dismantle the gate as a public nuisance. The Sangguniang Panlungsod authorized the Mayor to dismantle the gate, but instead, the Mayor filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Preliminary Injunction against BMC (Civil Case No. 2012-0073). Atty. Botor, Celjun F. Yap, Ismael A. Albao, Augusto S. Quilon, Edgar F. Esplana II, and Josefina F. Esplana (Intervenors) were allowed to intervene.
• The Cancer Center Building Project: Ground-breaking ceremonies for the construction of the Cancer Center Building were conducted, with construction intended to begin January 2013. The building would occupy about three-fourths of the width of Road Lot No. 3. Petitioners claimed the closure was necessary for this government project, with a contract worth ₱51,999,475.26 awarded to OCM Steel Corporation and a Notice to Proceed dated February 3, 2014 issued.
• Lower Court Proceedings: On December 21, 2012, the Regional Trial Court (Branch 24, Naga City) denied Naga City's application for injunctive relief, ruling that the city failed to prove a clear and unmistakable right to the writ. On February 22, 2013, the RTC denied the Intervenors' motion for reconsideration.
• Court of Appeals Proceedings: Only the Intervenors filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. On February 28, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted the petition, holding that only a prima facie showing of right is required for injunctive relief. The CA found that the Intervenors proved the public character of Road Lot No. 3 based on public use "since time immemorial," Dr. Nerva's admission of using the road in his youth, and the 1970s Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and Identification Map showing the road in the name of the Province of Camarines Sur. The CA noted that whether the tax map should prevail over BMC's title was a factual matter for the trial court. On August 26, 2014, the CA denied motions for reconsideration, clarifying the injunction was against the road relocation/gate closure, not the Cancer Center Building construction.

• Nature of Road Lot No. 3: BMC and DOH maintained that Road Lot No. 3 was never intended for general public use and was not owned by Naga City, as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the City Engineer stating the road was not included in the inventory of City Roads of Naga City.
• Security and Development Rationale: Petitioners asserted that the gate closure was implemented for security reasons and for the welfare of patients and staff, and was necessary preparation for the construction of the Cancer Center Building.
• Prohibition on Injunctions in Government Projects: Petitioners argued that the preliminary mandatory injunction violated Presidential Decree No. 1818 and Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, which prohibit courts from issuing injunctions in cases involving government infrastructure projects, given that the Cancer Center Building would be constructed where the gate stands.
• Failure to Prove Requisites for Injunction: Petitioners contended that respondents failed to prove that Road Lot No. 3 was a public road, that they had a clear right to injunctive relief, that the invasion of such right was material and substantial, or that there was urgent necessity to prevent serious damage.

• Public Road Status: Respondents countered that Road Lot No. 3 existed as a public road long before the hospital was constructed and remains a public road to this day, disputing petitioners' claim that it was always a component or service road of BMC.
• Timing of the Construction Claim: Respondents argued that Dr. Nerva's memorandum was solely for traffic rerouting, not for the Cancer Center Building, and that when they filed their intervention and petition, there were still no plans for the Cancer Center Building.
• Legality of Construction: Respondents clarified they were not against the construction of the Cancer Center Building per se, but only against its being built illegally on a public road.

• Prima Facie Evidence and Clear Legal Right: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite respondents' failure to establish a prima facie clear legal right to use Road Lot No. 3.
• Evaluation of Evidence: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in limiting its evaluation of prima facie evidence to respondents' evidence alone while disregarding petitioners' rebuttal evidence.
• Customary Use as Legal Right: Whether customary public use of a road ripens into a legal right sufficient to support injunctive relief.

• Prima Facie Evidence and Clear Legal Right: The Court of Appeals erred in directing the issuance of the writ. To establish a right to preliminary injunction, the applicant must show a clear legal right "clearly founded in or granted by law," and any hint of doubt or dispute precludes the grant. Respondents failed to establish prima facie proof of their clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No. 3. Their evidence—the 1970s Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and claims of customary use—was rebutted by the Department of Health's certificate of title (TCT No. 13693) and the City Engineer's categorical certification that the road was not included in the list of city roads under Naga City's control. Absent a particular law or statute establishing Naga City's ownership or control, the Department of Health's title must prevail.
• Evaluation of Evidence: The Court of Appeals erred in limiting prima facie evidence merely to the evidence presented by respondents and in disregarding petitioners' evidence, which squarely rebutted respondents' assertions. The nature of a writ of preliminary injunction requires a full and comprehensive hearing where both parties present evidence, unlike a temporary restraining order which is ex parte. The trial court correctly weighed the evidence of both parties before denying the application.
• Customary Use as Legal Right: Customary use does not ripen into a legal right because it is not among the sources of legal obligations enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code (law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts).

• Prima Facie Evidence in Injunction Proceedings — While an applicant for preliminary injunction need only present prima facie evidence (evidence that is good and sufficient on its face and sufficient to establish a fact if not rebutted), such evidence must be evaluated in light of the opposing party's rebuttal evidence during the mandatory hearing. The trial court must weigh the evidence presented by both parties to determine if a clear legal right exists prima facie.
• Clear Legal Right Requirement for Injunctive Relief — The "clear legal right" required for preliminary injunction contemplates a right "clearly founded in or granted by law." Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief.
• Customary Use and Legal Rights — Customary use of property by the general public does not create a legal right or obligation because customary use is not one of the sources of legal obligations under Article 1157 of the Civil Code.
• Distinction Between Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order — A preliminary injunction requires prior notice to the adverse party and a full hearing where both parties present evidence. A temporary restraining order is issued ex parte (based only on the applicant's evidence) to preserve the status quo until the hearing for preliminary injunction can be conducted.

• "Prima facie evidence is evidence that is not rebutted or contradicted, making it good and sufficient on its face to establish a fact constituting a party's claim or defense." — Definition of prima facie evidence cited from Tan v. Hosana and Wa-acon v. People.
• "The 'clear legal right' which would entitle the applicant to an injunctive writ contemplates a right 'clearly founded in or granted by law.' Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief." — Citing Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc.
• "Customary use is not one (1) of the sources of legal obligation; hence, it does not ripen into a right." — Referring to Article 1157 of the Civil Code.
• "Writs of preliminary injunction are granted only upon prior notice to the party sought to be enjoined and upon their due hearing... Thus, Rule 58 requires 'a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,' giving the applicant an opportunity to prove that great or irreparable injury will result if no writ is issued and allowing the opposing party to comment on the application." — Distinguishing preliminary injunction from TRO.

• Tan v. Hosana, G.R. No. 190846, February 3, 2016 — Cited for the definition of prima facie evidence as evidence that is "good and sufficient on its face" and sufficient to establish a given fact if not rebutted or contradicted.
• Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, 545 Phil. 138 (2007) — Cited for the requisites of preliminary injunction: (1) clear legal right; (2) material and substantial invasion; (3) urgent need to prevent irreparable injury; and the principle that where the plaintiff's right is doubtful or disputed, preliminary injunction is not proper.
• Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., 701 Phil. 64 (2013) — Cited for the principle that a "clear legal right" for injunctive purposes must be clearly founded in or granted by law, and any doubt or dispute precludes the grant.
• Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corp., G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016 — Cited for the definition of a writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary order requiring an impartial determination of the context of both parties, and that the judge must assess whether the reliefs prayed for will be rendered moot by the delay of a full trial.
• Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431 (2000) — Cited for the distinction between preliminary injunction (requires hearing with both parties) and temporary restraining order (ex parte, to preserve status quo until preliminary injunction hearing).

• Rule 58, Section 3, Rules of Court — Provides the grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction, including that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, or that the acts complained of would probably work injustice to the applicant.
• Rule 58, Section 5, Rules of Court — Provides that no preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party sought to be enjoined, except for temporary restraining orders under specified conditions.
• Article 1157, Civil Code — Enumerates the sources of obligations (law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, quasi-delicts), implicitly excluding customary use.
• Presidential Decree No. 1818 — Prohibits courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure and natural resource development projects of the government.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Lucas P. Bersamin, Samuel R. Martires, and Alexander G. Gesmundo.