Betoy vs. The Board of Directors, National Power Corporation

The EPIRA and its IRR are constitutional, and Section 63's separation pay is distinct from GSIS retirement benefits; Cabinet secretaries may serve as ex-officio members of the National Power Board without violating the prohibition on multiple offices, and the challenged NPB resolutions are moot because they were already voided and prospectively superseded by NPB Resolution No. 2007-55.

Enrique U. Betoy was an employee of the National Power Corporation. Congress enacted R.A. No. 9136, the EPIRA, to restructure the electric power industry and privatize NPC assets. The statute created a new National Power Board under Section 48, provided separation benefits under Section 63, and authorized the DOE to promulgate implementing rules under Section 77; Rule 33 of the IRR governed separation benefits. The EPIRA's declared policy included ensuring quality, reliability, security, and affordability of electric power, enhancing private capital inflow, and providing for an orderly and transparent privatization of NPC assets.

On June 8, 2001, Congress enacted R.A. No. 9136, the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), to restructure the electric power industry and privatize the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC). Pursuant to Section 48 of the EPIRA, a new National Power Board of Directors (NPB) was created. On February 27, 2002, pursuant to Section 77 of the EPIRA, the Secretary of the Department of Energy promulgated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). Section 63 of the EPIRA provided separation benefits to officials and employees displaced or separated as a result of the restructuring of the electricity industry and the privatization of NPC assets, while Rule 33 of the IRR provided the coverage and guidelines for those separation benefits.

On November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124, which resolved that all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003 and shall be entitled to separation benefits. On the same day, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-125, which created a transition team to manage and implement the separation program. As a result of these resolutions, petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with thousands of his co-employees from the NPC, were terminated.

Subsequently, NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 was promulgated on September 14, 2007, confirming and adopting the principles and guidelines enunciated in NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125. NPC Circular No. 2003-09 set the legal termination dates of the affected NPC personnel: key officials appointed under NPB Resolution No. 2003-12 at the close of office hours of January 31, 2003; personnel who availed of the early leavers' scheme on the last day of service but not beyond January 15, 2003; personnel no longer employed in NPC after June 26, 2001 on the date of actual separation; and all other NPC personnel at the close of office hours or shift schedule of February 28, 2003.

Betoy filed the present petition for certiorari and a supplemental petition for mandamus, seeking to nullify NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 and Annex "B," to strike down Sections 11, 34, 38, 48, 52, and 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR as unconstitutional, and to secure his reinstatement. The petition was filed directly with the Supreme Court; no lower court factual findings are recounted in the decision.

• Nullity of NPB Resolutions: Petitioner argued that NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 and Annex "B" were null and void because they were done with extraordinary haste and in secrecy without NECU participation, violating due process, equity, security of tenure, social benefits, and the disclosure of public transactions provisions of the 1987 Constitution; the NPB acted with grave abuse of discretion.
• Constitutionality of Sections 11, 48, and 52: Petitioner argued that these provisions violated Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
• Constitutionality of Section 34: Petitioner argued that Section 34 was an exorbitant display of State power not premised on the welfare of the Filipino people or salus populi est suprema lex; the universal charge burdened electricity consumers for errors of those in power.
• Constitutionality of Section 38: Petitioner argued that the abolition of the ERB and creation of the ERC was a prelude to Charter Change without a valid referendum; only the CSC, COA, and COMELEC are constitutionally recognized commissions.
• Constitutionality of Section 63: Petitioner argued that Section 63 violated the equal protection clause by classifying it with Proclamation No. 50 used against MWSS employees and by failing to classify whether restructuring or privatization comes first, resulting in arbitrary removal.
• Validity of Rule 33: Petitioner argued that Rule 33 disregarded constitutional and statutory injunctions against arbitrary removal of career civil service employees.
• Impairment of Vested Rights: Petitioner argued that Section 63 impaired vested rights of NPC personnel to benefits under existing laws.
• Bad Faith in Reorganization: Petitioner argued that bad faith was manifested because the reorganization aimed to replace current employees with favorite less competent appointees and set aside qualifications and behavioral aspects.
• Reinstatement/Mandamus: Petitioner prayed for reinstatement through a supplemental petition for mandamus.
• Other Provisions/IRR: Petitioner sought to strike down all other EPIRA provisions and IRR provisions repugnant to the 1987 Constitution.

• Bad Faith in Reorganization: The Solicitor General argued that petitioner had not shown any circumstance to prove the restructuring of NPC was done in bad faith.
• Rehiring and Reinstatement: The Solicitor General observed that selection of employees for rehiring entails the exercise of discretion or judgment and that there was no evidence the selection committee acted with grave abuse of discretion or accommodated unqualified employees.
• Ex-Officio Designations: The Solicitor General contended that the constitutional prohibition was not violated because the concerned Cabinet secretaries were merely imposed additional duties and their NPB posts did not constitute "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition.

• Procedural Propriety/Direct Resort: Whether petitioner properly invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to directly challenge the constitutionality of the EPIRA and its IRR.
• Validity of NPB Resolutions: Whether NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are valid and effective.
• Constitutionality of Section 63 and Rule 33: Whether Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR are unconstitutional for impairing security of tenure, vested rights, equal protection, and prohibiting arbitrary removal.
• Constitutionality of Sections 11, 48, and 52: Whether Sections 11, 48, and 52 of the EPIRA violate Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
• Constitutionality of Section 34: Whether Section 34 of the EPIRA, imposing the universal charge, is unconstitutional as excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory.
• Constitutionality of Section 38: Whether Section 38 of the EPIRA, abolishing the ERB and creating the ERC, is unconstitutional or a prelude to Charter Change.
• Reinstatement/Mandamus: Whether petitioner has a legal right to reinstatement or may compel his rehiring through mandamus.
• Retirement Benefits under Section 63: Whether Section 63 of the EPIRA precludes separated NPC employees from receiving retirement benefits under GSIS laws in addition to separation pay.
• Other Provisions/IRR: Whether other EPIRA provisions and IRR provisions are unconstitutional.

• Procedural Propriety/Direct Resort: No. Direct resort was improper because constitutionality may be raised in regular courts; however, the Court disregarded the procedural defect because similar petitions had already been resolved.
• Validity of NPB Resolutions: Moot and academic. NPC Drivers had already declared them void; NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 prospectively terminated NPC services as of September 14, 2007.
• Constitutionality of Section 63 and Rule 33: Valid. The reorganization was in good faith; bad faith was not proved; the law granted only preference in hiring, not a legal right to reinstatement.
• Constitutionality of Sections 11, 48, and 52: Valid. The Cabinet secretaries' designation to the NPB was an ex-officio imposition of additional duties, not "any other office" under Section 13, Article VII; they cannot receive additional compensation.
• Constitutionality of Section 34: Valid. The Universal Charge is an exaction under police power, not a tax; Gerochi settled the issue.
• Constitutionality of Section 38: Valid. The abolition of the ERB and creation of the ERC were settled in Kapisanan; the argument that it is a prelude to Charter Change is flimsy.
• Reinstatement/Mandamus: No. Petitioner had no legal or vested right to reinstatement; the law only granted preference in hiring, and mandamus was moot.
• Retirement Benefits under Section 63: Yes. Separated, displaced, retiring, and retired NPC employees are entitled to GSIS retirement benefits; Herrera referred only to R.A. No. 1616 gratuity benefits.
• Other Provisions/IRR: No. The presumption of constitutionality was not overcome; no clear and unequivocal breach was shown.

• Procedural Propriety/Direct Resort: Section 5(1) and (2), Article VIII vests the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, but this does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum. The constitutionality of a law and its IRR is within the jurisdiction of regular courts. Direct resort is allowed only if the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify it. The petition should have been dismissed at the outset; however, because similar petitions had already been resolved by the Court tackling the validity of the NPB resolutions and the constitutionality of EPIRA provisions, the procedural defect was disregarded.

• Validity of NPB Resolutions: In NPC Drivers, the Court ruled that NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void and of no legal effect for failure to comply with Section 48 of the EPIRA. Only three valid votes out of nine board members were cast because representatives, not the department secretaries themselves, exercised judgment and voted. Thus, the resolution of the validity of these resolutions is moot and academic. A supervening event occurred when NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 was promulgated on September 14, 2007, confirming and adopting the principles and guidelines of the earlier resolutions. In its December 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court clarified the legal termination dates under NPC Circular No. 2003-09 and held that NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 has prospective effect, not retroactive effect; it cannot ratify and validate the void resolutions. The services of all NPC employees were legally terminated on September 14, 2007; separation pay and other benefits are deemed cut on that date; computation runs from the date of illegal termination up to September 14, 2007. NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 enjoys the presumption of regularity of official acts until rebutted.

• Constitutionality of Section 63 and Rule 33: A reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It may result in the loss of one's position through removal or abolition of an office, but to be valid it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio. NPC was in financial distress, and Congress pursued privatization, which necessarily demanded restructuring of operations. There was a need to terminate employees and rehire some depending on the manpower requirements of the privatized companies. The privatization and restructuring were done in good faith for economy and to make the bureaucracy more efficient. Petitioner's allegation that the reorganization was undertaken to accommodate new appointees is speculative and bereft of evidence. Bad faith must be duly proved by clear and convincing evidence, not presumed. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656 lists circumstances showing bad faith, but none was shown. Petitioner has no legal or vested right to reinstatement. Section 63 of the EPIRA and Section 5, Rule 33 of the IRR grant only preference in hiring to displaced or separated personnel if qualified. Preference does not amount to a legal right to the position. Selection entails the exercise of discretion or judgment, and there was no evidence of grave abuse of discretion or that rehired employees were merely accommodated and not qualified.

• Constitutionality of Sections 11, 48, and 52: Section 13, Article VII prohibits the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure unless otherwise provided in the Constitution. Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary held that the prohibition does not apply to posts occupied by the specified Executive officials without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office. Such posts are additional duties and functions, not "any other office." Designation connotes the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service; it does not entail additional benefits or salary. Congress intended the NPB membership to be ex-officio or automatically attached to the respective offices. Although Section 48 is not categorical in proclaiming the ex-officio capacity, Section 52 designates PSALM members as ex-officio, and the designation by Congress of additional functions and duties to the officials concerned supports the same interpretation. The concerned Cabinet secretaries cannot receive per diems and allowances under Section 14; any amount received must be reimbursed. The three members appointed by the President may receive such honorarium or allowance if not covered by the constitutional prohibition. These interpretations breathe life into the statute and resolve doubts in favor of constitutionality.

• Constitutionality of Section 34: The constitutionality of Section 34 of the EPIRA has already been passed upon in Gerochi vs. Department of Energy. The Universal Charge is not a tax but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry. Petitioner's argument that the universal charge burdens electricity consumers for errors of those in power is a policy argument. The determination of whether a tax is excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory is an issue involving a question of fact, and the Court is precluded from reviewing the same.

• Constitutionality of Section 38: Petitioner's argument that the creation of the ERC seems to be a prelude to Charter Change is flimsy and finds no support in law. The constitutionality of the abolition of the ERB and the creation of the ERC has already been settled in Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board vs. Commissioner Fe Barin. All laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality; to justify nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach. The power to create an office carries with it the power to abolish. The ERB was created by Executive Order No. 172, and Section 38 of R.A. No. 9136 explicitly abolished it. Because of the expansion of the ERC's functions and concerns, there was a valid abolition of the ERB.

• Reinstatement/Mandamus: The prayer for reinstatement has been rendered moot by the Decision and Resolutions in NPC Drivers and by the disquisitions in this case. Petitioner has no legal or vested right to reinstatement; the law grants only preference in hiring. Mandamus cannot compel the selection committee to include petitioner, especially absent evidence that the committee acted with grave abuse of discretion or that rehired employees were merely accommodated and not qualified.

• Retirement Benefits under Section 63: Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 did not impair vested rights of NPC personnel to claim benefits under existing laws, nor did they cut short the years of service of the employees concerned. If an employee availed of separation pay and other benefits under existing laws or the superior separation pay under the NPC restructuring plan, it is logical that those who availed of such privilege will start their government service anew if later employed by a government-owned successor company. Herrera vs. National Power Corporation held that Section 63 precluded the receipt by the terminated employee of both separation and retirement benefits under the GSIS organic law, or C.A. No. 186. However, that pronouncement referred only to the gratuity benefits granted by R.A. No. 1616, which was to be paid by NPC as the last employer. It did not proscribe the payment of retirement benefits to qualified retirees under R.A. No. 660, P.D. No. 1146, R.A. No. 8291, and other GSIS and social security laws. Herrera arose from a case between NPC and several separated employees asking additional benefits under R.A. No. 1616 after receiving separation benefits under Section 63. Under R.A. No. 1616, the gratuity benefit is payable by the last employer, while under C.A. No. 186, as amended, it is the GSIS who pays the qualified employees their retirement benefits. Santos vs. Servier Philippines, Inc., citing Aquino vs. National Labor Relations Commission, declared that receipt of retirement benefits does not bar the retiree from receiving separation pay; separation pay is given during one's employable years, while retirement benefits are given during one's unemployable years. They are not mutually exclusive. Congressional deliberations show that it was not the intention of the law to infringe upon the vested rights of NPC personnel to claim benefits under existing laws; Congress assured them of retirement benefits, separation pay, and all rights provided by law. Separation pay and retirement benefits are two separate and distinct entitlements; a retirement plan is a different program from a separation package. R.A. No. 1616 and C.A. No. 186 have different legal bases, sources of funds, and intents. Section 8, Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution provides that pensions or gratuities shall not be considered additional, double, or indirect compensation. Section 2(e) of C.A. No. 186 states that benefits granted by the Act by virtue of life or retirement insurance shall not be considered compensation or emolument. Under the GSIS law, retired employees earned their vested right under their contract of insurance after paying premiums; GSIS is bound to pay the retirement benefits. Marasigan vs. Cruz held that a retirement law is in the nature of a contract between the government and its employees; upon compliance with statutory requirements, the right to retire and receive benefits becomes vested and may not be revoked or impaired. GSIS vs. Montesclaros held that a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits protected by due process. Section 63, if misinterpreted as proscribing payment of retirement benefits under the GSIS law, would be unconstitutional as violative of Section 10, Article III on non-impairment of contracts. The exclusiveness of benefits rule under R.A. No. 8291 is not applicable because separation pay and retirement benefits have different legal bases, sources of funds, and intents. The Court reiterated that the dispositive portion in Herrera referred only to gratuity benefits under R.A. No. 1616; it did not proscribe payment of retirement benefits under R.A. No. 660, P.D. No. 1146, R.A. No. 8291, and other GSIS and social security laws; and separated, rehired, retiring, and retired employees should receive and continue to receive the retirement benefits to which they are legally entitled.

• Other Provisions/IRR: The wisdom of the privatization of the NPC cannot be looked into by the Court without violating the principle of separation of powers. The formulation of State policy is a legislative concern; the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of any law is the legislature. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. As held in National Power Corporation Employees Consolidated Union (NECU) vs. National Power Corporation (NPC), whether the State's policy of privatizing the electric power industry is wise, just, or expedient is not for the Court to decide.

• Presumption of Constitutionality — Every law is presumed constitutional; to nullify it, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful, speculative, or argumentative one; all reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality. The Court applied this to uphold the assailed EPIRA provisions and Rule 33.
• Hierarchy of Courts / Direct Resort — The Supreme Court's concurrent jurisdiction over certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum; direct resort is allowed only when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify it. The Court disregarded the procedural defect because similar petitions had already been resolved.
• Reorganization in Good Faith — A reorganization for economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient is valid if it passes the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio. Bad faith must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, not presumed; the circumstances in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656 may evidence bad faith. The Court found the NPC privatization and restructuring to be in good faith and petitioner's bad-faith allegations speculative.
• Ex-Officio Designation and Section 13, Article VII — The prohibition against holding any other office or employment does not apply to posts occupied by the specified Executive officials without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by their primary functions; such posts are additional duties, not "any other office." The Court applied this to the Cabinet secretaries' membership in the NPB and held they cannot receive per diems or allowances.
• Universal Charge as Police Power Exaction — The Universal Charge under Section 34 of the EPIRA is not a tax but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power to ensure the viability of the electric power industry. The Court applied this to uphold Section 34.
• Abolition of Office — The power to create an office carries with it the power to abolish; the question of whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative intent, and an explicit declaration of abolition in the law itself settles the matter. The Court applied this to Section 38's abolition of the ERB and creation of the ERC.
• Separation Pay vs. Retirement Benefits — Separation pay and retirement benefits are separate and distinct entitlements; separation pay is a statutory right designed to provide the employee with support while looking for another employment, while retirement benefits are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of life and reward loyalty and service. They are not mutually exclusive. The Court applied this to allow NPC employees to receive both.
• Vested Rights in Retirement / Non-Impairment — A retirement law is in the nature of a contract between the government and its employees; when an employee complies with the statutory requirements, the right to retire and receive benefits becomes vested and may not be revoked or impaired. Pensions or gratuities are not considered additional, double, or indirect compensation. The Court applied this to GSIS retirement benefits and held that Section 63, if interpreted to proscribe them, would violate the non-impairment clause.
• Exclusiveness of Benefits Rule Not Applicable — Section 55 of R.A. No. 8291 provides that whenever other laws provide similar benefits for the same contingencies, the member who qualifies shall have the option to choose which benefits will be paid. The Court held this rule inapplicable because separation pay and retirement benefits have different legal bases, sources of funds, and intents.
• Separation of Powers / Wisdom of Legislation — Courts do not pass upon the wisdom, propriety, or expediency of legislation; policy formulation is a legislative concern. The Court applied this to decline review of the wisdom of NPC privatization.

• "NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void and are of no legal effect." — Quoted from NPC Drivers in the decision; it establishes the nullity of the resolutions and the basis for treating Betoy's challenge to their validity as moot.
• "The approval of NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 on 14 September 2007 means that the services of all NPC employees have been legally terminated on this date. All separation pay and other benefits to be received by said employees will be deemed cut on this date." — States the prospective effect of NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 and fixes the cut-off for computing separation pay and benefits.
• "The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office." — Canonical formulation of the ex-officio exception, quoted from Civil Liberties Union and applied to the Cabinet secretaries' NPB membership.
• "Thus, it is clear that a separation pay at the time of the reorganization of the NPC and retirement benefits at the appropriate future time are two separate and distinct entitlements. Stated otherwise, a retirement plan is a different program from a separation package." — Ratio for holding that Section 63 does not bar GSIS retirement benefits in addition to separation pay.

• NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) vs. National Power Corporation (NPC), G.R. No. 156208, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 138 — Controlling precedent; declared NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 void for failure to comply with Section 48 of the EPIRA.
• NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association vs. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 156208, December 2, 2009, 606 SCRA 409 — Clarified the legal termination dates of NPC employees and ruled that NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 has prospective effect.
• Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317 — Followed; held that Section 13, Article VII does not apply to ex-officio posts without additional compensation and that no additional compensation is allowed.
• Gerochi vs. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 696 — Controlling; upheld Section 34 and held that the Universal Charge is a police power exaction, not a tax.
• Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board vs. Commissioner Fe Barin, G.R. No. 150974, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 1 — Controlling; upheld the abolition of the ERB and creation of the ERC.
• Herrera vs. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 166570, December 18, 2009, 608 SCRA 475 — Clarified and limited; its statement on non-entitlement to C.A. No. 186 retirement benefits referred only to R.A. No. 1616 gratuity benefits.
• Santos vs. Servier Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 166377, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 487 — Cited; receipt of retirement benefits does not bar separation pay; they are not mutually exclusive.
• Aquino vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 87653, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 118 — Cited in Santos; separation pay and retirement benefits serve different purposes.
• Marasigan vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-40648, May 20, 1987, 150 SCRA 1 — Cited; retirement law is a contract between the government and its employees, and the right vests upon compliance.
• GSIS vs. Montesclaros, G.R. No. 146494, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 441 — Cited; a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits protected by due process.
• National Power Corporation Employees Consolidated Union (NECU) vs. National Power Corporation (NPC), G.R. No. 144158, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 12 — Cited; the wisdom of privatization is a legislative policy not for the Court to decide.
• Freedom from Debt Coalition vs. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 161113, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 157 — Cited; explained the need for privatization and restructuring of the electric power industry.
• Fernando vs. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 112309, July 28, 1994, 234 SCRA 546 — Cited; bad faith must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
• Canonizado vs. Aguirre, 380 Phil. 280 (2000) — Cited; defined reorganization as reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition by reason of economy or redundancy.
• Dario vs. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989, 176 SCRA 84 — Cited; reorganization must pass the test of good faith.

• Section 5(1) and (2), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Vests the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, and review of cases involving constitutionality; used to discuss direct resort and hierarchy of courts.
• Section 13, Article VII, 1987 Constitution — Prohibits the President, Vice-President, Cabinet members, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment during tenure unless otherwise provided; held not to apply to ex-officio NPB posts without additional compensation.
• Section 8, Article IX(B), 1987 Constitution — Prohibits additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law; pensions or gratuities are not considered additional, double, or indirect compensation; used to allow separation pay and retirement benefits.
• Section 10, Article III, 1987 Constitution — No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed; Section 63, if interpreted to proscribe GSIS retirement benefits, would violate this provision.
• Section 48, R.A. No. 9136 (EPIRA) — Composition of the National Power Board; basis for the NPC Drivers ruling that NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 were void for lack of valid votes.
• Section 63, R.A. No. 9136 — Separation benefits for displaced or separated employees; one and one-half month salary for every year of service; preference in hiring; upheld and construed not to bar GSIS retirement benefits.
• Section 11, R.A. No. 9136 — TRANSCO Board composition; DOF Secretary as ex-officio Chairman; used in the ex-officio discussion.
• Section 52, R.A. No. 9136 — PSALM Board composition; Cabinet secretaries as ex-officio members; used to support the ex-officio designations.
• Section 34, R.A. No. 9136 — Universal Charge; upheld as a police power exaction, not a tax.
• Section 38, R.A. No. 9136 — Creation of the ERC and abolition of the ERB; upheld.
• Section 14, R.A. No. 9136 — Board per diems and allowances; Cabinet secretaries cannot receive such additional compensation.
• Section 2, R.A. No. 6656 — Circumstances evidencing bad faith in reorganization; petitioner failed to prove any.
• Rule 33, IRR of EPIRA — Coverage and guidelines for separation benefits; upheld; preference in hiring is not a legal right.
• Section 55, R.A. No. 8291 — Exclusiveness of benefits rule; held not applicable because separation pay and retirement benefits are different entitlements.
• C.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 8291 — GSIS retirement benefits; benefits not considered compensation; vested right.
• R.A. No. 1616 — Gratuity benefits payable by the last employer; Herrera's ruling limited to this.
• R.A. No. 660, P.D. No. 1146, R.A. No. 8291 — GSIS retirement laws under which qualified NPC retirees may receive benefits; not proscribed by Section 63.
• Section 2, R.A. No. 9136 — Declaration of policy; restructuring involves various government agencies; used to justify Cabinet participation.
• Section 77, R.A. No. 9136 — DOE to promulgate the IRR; basis for Rule 33.

Chief Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe concurred.