Beroña vs. Sandiganbayan

Preventive suspension pendente lite under Section 13 of RA 3019 applies to any public office the accused might currently be holding, not merely the particular office in relation to which the charged offense was committed.

Petitioners were public officers and employees of the Provincial Health Office of Bangued, Abra, charged with violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for conspiring to release public funds to a non-contractor, resulting in the non-payment of salaries to actual laborers. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, all petitioners vacated the specific positions they held at the time of the charged transaction: Dr. Beroña resigned and was elected Municipal Mayor of Pilar, Abra; Dr. Gaerlan resigned, entered private practice, and later rejoined government service elsewhere; Viado-Adriano became a resident auditor at the Land Bank of the Philippines; and Labios obtained an appointment as an accounting clerk in the Provincial Government of Abra.

• Charged Offense: Petitioners, then officers of the Provincial Health Office of Bangued, Abra, were charged with violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The Information alleged that they conspired to release P99,987.77 to Alexander Siddayao for the improvement of the Main Health Center in Malibcong, Abra, despite Siddayao not being the labor contractor, thereby causing undue injury to the actual laborers who remained unpaid.
• Change in Positions: While the case was pending, petitioners vacated the positions they held during the commission of the offense. Dr. Beroña resigned as Provincial Health Officer II and was elected Municipal Mayor of Pilar, Abra. Dr. Gaerlan resigned as Provincial Health Officer I, briefly engaged in private practice, and subsequently rejoined government service in a different capacity. Viado-Adriano left her post as resident auditor of the Health Office to become resident auditor of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Bangued, Abra. Labios transferred from her accountant position to become an accounting clerk in the Provincial Government of Abra.
• Suspension Order: The prosecution moved to suspend the accused pendente lite. After a pre-suspension hearing, the Sandiganbayan determined the Information was valid and ordered the petitioners suspended from their current offices for 90 days, pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019.

• Applicability of Section 13 RA 3019: Petitioners contended that the Sandiganbayan lacked legal basis to suspend them because they were no longer occupying the positions they held when the charged transactions occurred, arguing that Section 13 applies only to the specific office under which they were indicted.
• Lack of Danger of Intimidation: Petitioners maintained that there was no longer any danger of intimidating prosecution witnesses because two of the prosecution's witnesses had already completed their testimonies.
• Prejudice to Public Service: Petitioners argued that suspending Dr. Beroña as Municipal Mayor would deprive his constituents of the services and leadership of their highest elected official to the greater detriment of public service.
• Weak Evidence: Petitioners asserted that the prosecution evidence was weak, implying this negated the necessity for suspension.

• Mandatory Nature of Suspension: Respondent maintained that preventive suspension under Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory upon the filing of a valid Information charging an offense under the Act, irrespective of whether the accused still occupies the specific office involved in the charged transaction.

• Applicability of Suspension: Whether Section 13 of RA 3019, which qualifies the public officer as "incumbent," applies to petitioners who are no longer occupying the positions they held when they were charged under the law.

• Applicability of Suspension: Preventive suspension under Section 13 of RA 3019 was affirmed as applicable to any public office the accused might currently be holding, not merely the particular office in relation to which the charged offense was committed. The term "office" in Section 13 encompasses any current public office, as the law aims to prevent the accused from hampering prosecution or committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.
• Purpose of Suspension: The possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses is merely one ground for preventive suspension; another is to prevent further acts of malfeasance. Depriving constituents of an elected official's services does not override the mandatory character of the statute, as other elected officials (e.g., the vice-governor) are legally designated to assume the vacated duties temporarily.
• Evidentiary Weight: The strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence is irrelevant to the propriety of a preventive suspension, as suspension is not a penalty and the accused retains the constitutional presumption of innocence; the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is passed upon after a full-blown trial.

• Preventive Suspension Pendente Lite under RA 3019 — Suspension under Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory upon the filing of a valid Information charging an offense under the Act. The pre-suspension hearing is limited solely to determining the validity of the Information. The suspension applies to any public office the accused currently holds, regardless of whether it is the same office held when the offense was committed. Preventive suspension is not a penalty and does not impair the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• "The term 'office' in Section 13 of the law applies to any office which the officer might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office in relation to which he is charged."
• "Section 13 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution under RA 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving public funds or property or fraud on government. This Court has repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory, and there are no 'ifs' and 'buts' about it."
• "The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature which the court will pass on after a full-blown trial on the merits."

• Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112386 — Followed. Held that suspension pendente lite applies to whatever office the accused currently holds, not just the office implicated in the charge.
• Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86899-903 — Followed. Rejected the argument that suspension cannot attach to a new office (Governor) when the accused was charged for acts committed in a former office (Mayor).
• Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 213 Phil. 344 — Followed. Sustained the suspension of a Mayor charged for acts committed as a government auditor.
• Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, 351 Phil. 569 — Followed. Enumerated the types of officials covered by suspension pendente lite, encompassing appointive, elective, career, and non-career officials.
• Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503 — Followed. Held that depriving constituents of an elected official's services is not a sufficient basis to reduce the mandatory period of suspension prescribed by law.
• Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151 — Followed. Defined the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing as determining the validity of the information, akin to a challenge via motion to quash.
• Juan v. People, 379 Phil. 125 — Followed. Stated that preventive suspension is not a penalty and the accused retains the presumption of innocence.

• Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019 — Mandates the suspension of any incumbent public officer against whom a criminal prosecution under a valid Information under the Act is pending in court. Applied to mandate the suspension of petitioners from their current offices, not merely the offices they previously held during the commission of the offense.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — Defines the offense of causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Petitioners were charged under this provision.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ.