Bernas vs. Reyes

A judge who renders a decision on the merits without waiting for a party’s explanation to a preceding show-cause order, and who characterises that party’s act in the decision as “truly devious,” displays manifest bias, partiality, and grave abuse of authority, thereby violating the standard that judges must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial. A judge’s previous dismissal from service does not extinguish administrative liability for distinct misconduct; a fine may still be imposed.

Atty. Jose A. Bernas acted as counsel for Oakridge Properties, Inc., which brought an eviction suit against tenant Atty. Joseph M. Alejandro in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, presided over by Judge Julia A. Reyes. During the proceedings, Oakridge padlocked the leased unit; the tenant applied for injunctive relief. Judge Reyes granted a Temporary Restraining Order and ordered the unit reopened. She later issued a show-cause order requiring Oakridge’s representatives to explain their alleged non-compliance. Before the deadline for that explanation expired, she rendered a final decision that resolved the show-cause matter and the merits of the eviction suit. Atty. Bernas filed an administrative complaint alleging gross ignorance of the law and manifest partiality. The Office of the Court Administrator investigated and recommended dismissal from service.

• The Underlying Eviction Suit: Complainant Atty. Jose A. Bernas served as counsel for Oakridge Properties, Inc. in an eviction action (Civil Case No. 9209) against Atty. Joseph M. Alejandro before the MeTC of Pasig City, Branch 69, presided over by respondent Judge Julia A. Reyes. The tenant had stopped paying rentals and common charges from August 15, 2001, claiming the air-conditioning unit provided was defective.

• Padlocking and Petition for Injunctive Relief: During the pendency of the eviction suit, on June 1, 2004, Oakridge padlocked the leased premises, relying on a provision of the Contract of Lease. Atty. Alejandro filed a Petition for Writ of Preliminary Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to compel the reopening of the unit.

• The June 11, 2004 Hearing and Written TRO: At the hearing on June 11, 2004, respondent Judge granted the TRO in open court, ordering Oakridge to remove the padlock by 5:00 p.m. that day, and permitted Oakridge to padlock the premises only if the proper bond was not posted by June 18, 2004. On June 18, 2004, after the defendant had posted an injunctive bond of ₱2,594,556.00, respondent Judge issued the corresponding written TRO, ordering Oakridge to remove the padlock and to discontinue any intended inventory of properties pending resolution.

• Show Cause Order and Precipitate Decision: On August 16, 2004, respondent Judge issued an Order directing Oakridge’s Sales and Marketing Manager and Atty. Bernas to explain in writing within 48 hours why they should not be cited for contempt for failing to comply with the June 11, 2004 order to remove the padlock. Less than 48 hours later, on August 17, 2004, without waiting for the explanation, respondent Judge rendered a Decision that not only resolved the show-cause matter but also disposed of the entire eviction case, even though a September 21, 2004 hearing remained scheduled and several motions were still pending. The Decision described the padlocking as a “truly devious” violation of the court’s order.

• Administrative Complaint: Atty. Bernas alleged gross ignorance of the law on the grounds that the TRO impermissibly extended beyond the 20-day lifetime, that respondent Judge granted a relief not prayed for, and that she awarded damages exceeding the MeTC’s jurisdiction. He also alleged manifest partiality, pointing to the cancellation of hearings, refusal to calendar Oakridge’s motions, delay in resolving the case, disregard of favourable evidence, issuance of the decision despite unresolved incidents, and undue haste in the August 16 and 17, 2004 orders.

• Respondent Judge’s Non-Participation: Respondent Judge submitted only a Manifestation and Motion requesting that complainant furnish her the complete records of the case, claiming they had been elevated to the RTC on appeal. She never filed a formal comment on the complaint. The Supreme Court’s June 14, 2005 Resolution gave her a final non-extendible period of fifteen days to comment, warning that failure would constitute waiver. She did not comply.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Complainant maintained that respondent Judge flagrantly violated the rules by extending the TRO beyond the 20-day lifetime, by granting a relief not specifically prayed for, and by awarding damages that exceeded the jurisdictional limits of a first-level court.

• Manifest Partiality: Complainant argued that respondent Judge displayed manifest partiality by cancelling scheduled hearings, refusing to calendar Oakridge’s motions, delaying resolution of the case, ignoring evidence favourable to Oakridge, rendering a decision that finally disposed of the merits while several motions remained unresolved, and issuing the August 16, 2004 show-cause order and the August 17, 2004 decision with unseemly haste.

• Procedural Defense: Respondent Judge requested that the complainant be directed to furnish her with a complete set of the records of the underlying case, contending that an intelligent comment was impossible without them because the records had been elevated to the RTC on appeal.

• Substantive Defense: Respondent Judge asserted that the complainant himself had requested early resolution and that, while seeking relief from the court, he simultaneously effected the padlocking himself, thereby disregarding the court’s authority.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Whether respondent Judge’s issuance of the TRO beyond the alleged 20-day lifetime, her grant of relief not specifically prayed for, and her award of damages purportedly beyond the MeTC’s jurisdiction constituted gross ignorance of the law.

• Manifest Partiality and Grave Abuse of Authority: Whether the totality of the circumstances—especially the precipitous issuance of the August 17, 2004 Decision without affording complainant the opportunity to explain the show-cause order—demonstrated manifest bias, partiality, and grave abuse of authority.

• Administrative Liability for Non-Compliance: Whether respondent Judge’s wilful failure to file the required comment despite the June 14, 2005 Resolution warranted a separate disciplinary sanction.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: The charge was not sustained. The factual premise—that the TRO was issued in open court on June 11, 2004—was inaccurate; the written TRO issued only on June 18, 2004, after the bond was posted, consistent with the procedural requirements for injunctive relief. The issue of excessive damages was a proper subject of a motion for reconsideration under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, and equity courts may grant reliefs not specifically prayed for if just, equitable, and within their jurisdiction. The contentious issues were thus amenable to judicial remedies, not administrative discipline.

• Manifest Partiality and Grave Abuse of Authority: The unseemly haste in rendering the August 17, 2004 Decision—before the expiry of the 48-hour period given for the explanation and incorporating a characterisation of the complainant’s act as “truly devious”—plainly prejudiced the complainant and evinced bias, partiality, and abuse of authority. Taken together with observed leniency and procedural delays, the precipitate judgment fell short of the standard that a judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial.

• Administrative Liability for Non-Compliance: Respondent Judge’s deliberate failure to file a comment, despite the non-extendible period and explicit warning of waiver, constituted a less serious charge under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Her indifference and defiance of the Court’s directive exposed her to administrative sanction.

• Standard of Judicial Impartiality — A judge must not only render just, correct, and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free from any suspicion as to her fairness, impartiality, and integrity. The appearance of impartiality is an indispensable element of due process. Applied here, the precipitate judgment and the one-sided characterisation of the complainant’s conduct violated that standard.

• Administrative Sanction for Precipitate Action — Rendering a decision that disposes of the merits and simultaneously imposes a finding of contemptuous conduct without affording the party the time granted to explain a show-cause order constitutes manifest bias, partiality, and grave abuse of authority.

• Non-Compliance with Supreme Court Directives — A judge’s wilful failure to file a required comment on an administrative complaint, despite a clear final order and warning of waiver, is a less serious offence under Section 9, Rule 140, demonstrating lack of respect for and defiance of the Court’s authority.

• Accountability Despite Prior Dismissal — A judge’s previous dismissal from service for other administrative offences does not render a separate administrative case moot; she remains accountable and may be fined, with the amount deductible from accrued leave credits.

• Judicial Errors and Administrative Liability — Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of official duties renders her administratively liable; absent fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, errors of judgment do not constitute misconduct. However, judges must always observe propriety, discreetness, and due care.

• “Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free from any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.” — The normative foundation for holding the judge liable for the appearance of partiality, drawn from earlier jurisprudence.

• “This precipitate judgment, taken together with the respondent’s observed leniency and procedural delays, evinces bias and partiality as well as abuse of authority.” — The core reasoning that the combination of procedural conduct and the hasty decision demonstrated actionable bias.

• “A resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an administrative complaint against officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from the Court. Nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.” — Underlines the mandatory character of the Court’s directives and justifies the additional sanction for non-compliance.

• “Respondent Judge must not be allowed to evade administrative liability by her previous dismissal from the service.” — Affirms the continuing accountability of judges even after separation from the judiciary.

• Wingarts v. Mejia, 312 Phil. 518 (1995) — Cited for the standard that a judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence and must administer justice impartially and without delay.

• Rallos v. Gako, Jr., 385 Phil. 4 (2000); Dacera, Jr. v. Dizon, Jr., 391 Phil. 835 (2000) — Applied for the principle that judges must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial.

• Meris v. Ofilada, 355 Phil. 353 (1998); Benjamin, Sr. v. Alaba, 330 Phil. 130 (1996); Sandoval v. Manalo, 329 Phil. 416 (1996); Santos v. De Gracia, 531 Phil. 204 (1982) — Cited to illustrate the wide range of penalties imposed for similar administrative offences.

• Office of the Court Administrator v. Cunting, A.M. No. P-04-1917, December 10, 2007, 539 SCRA 494; Sibulo v. San Jose, A.M. No. P-05-2088, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 464 — Applied for the rule that a prior dismissal from service does not moot an administrative case.

• Cañada v. Suerte, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1875, November 9, 2005, 474 SCRA 379 — Applied to support the imposition of a fine deductible from accrued leave credits.

• Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC) — Classifies less serious charges and provides for a penalty of suspension without salary for one to three months, or a fine of more than ₱10,000 but not exceeding ₱20,000. The Court used this as the framework for sanctioning the judge’s non-compliance, though it imposed a fine of ₱40,000 given the combined gravity of the offences.

• Section 1, last paragraph, Rule 37, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Identifies an award of excessive damages as a ground for a motion for reconsideration. The Court cited this to underscore that the proper remedy for the alleged judicial error was a judicial motion, not an administrative complaint.

Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chairperson), Justices Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Jose Portugal Perez concurred.

None. The decision was unanimous.