Bernardo vs. Soriano

A party's right to appeal is not made dependent or contingent on the opposing party's motion for reconsideration; each party has a different period within which to appeal, and the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other party's period of appeal. However, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if the aggrieved party has no plain, adequate, and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law, and the extraordinary writ will not issue to cure mere errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.

The case involves a custody dispute between Iluminada C. Bernardo, the grandmother of minor Stephanie Verniese B. Soriano, and Ana Marie B. Soriano, the child's surviving parent. Bernardo initially filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 209, praying that the Head Social Worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development in Mandaluyong City be ordered to produce Stephanie, who was allegedly being deprived and restrained of her liberty while under DSWD custody. The RTC converted the habeas corpus petition into a case for custody, and Soriano filed a Complaint-in-Intervention seeking custody of her child.

Iluminada C. Bernardo filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 209, praying that Evangeline Lawas, Head Social Worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development in Mandaluyong City, be ordered to produce the person of her minor granddaughter, Stephanie Verniese B. Soriano. Bernardo alleged that Stephanie was being deprived and restrained of her liberty while under DSWD custody, and that despite demand, the DSWD refused to release the minor to her custody and care. The RTC issued an Order dated October 23, 2009, converting the petition into a case for custody, considering Bernardo's failure to prove that the DSWD's custody over the minor was illegal.

Soriano, the surviving parent of Stephanie, filed a Complaint-in-Intervention seeking to be granted custody of her child, and the battle for permanent custody between Bernardo and Soriano ensued. In its Decision dated August 5, 2010, the RTC, through Presiding Judge Monique A. Quisumbing-Ignacio, upheld Soriano's right to parental custody and parental authority, but ruled that it would be for the best interest of the minor to stay with Bernardo for school year 2009-2010 while studying at Notre Dame of Greater Manila, granting temporary custody to Bernardo.

Bernardo filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Soriano was unfit to take care of her child, who allegedly verbally maltreated Stephanie. The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration on August 31, 2010. On the very same day, Soriano timely filed through registered mail her Comment (With Motion for Partial Reconsideration) dated August 27, 2010, asserting that custody of Stephanie should be granted in her favor immediately and not only after school year 2009-2010. Bernardo filed a Notice of Appeal on September 8, 2010. However, the RTC, through its Order dated September 9, 2010, denied due course to the Notice of Appeal, ruling that the assailed Decision and the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration had not yet attained finality and thus may not be the subject of an appeal, because Soriano had timely filed her own Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

The RTC rendered a second Order dated October 22, 2010, granting Soriano's partial reconsideration and allowing her to take immediate custody of the minor. Bernardo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the September 9, 2010 and October 22, 2010 Orders, which was denied through a third Order dated January 31, 2011. On March 15, 2011, Bernardo filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment and setting aside of the RTC's Orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Bernardo argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied due course to her Notice of Appeal, because the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010 was a judgment on the merits that was already appealable, and her right to appeal should not have been made contingent on Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

• Procedural Error: Bernardo maintained that the RTC erred in treating its own Decision as an interlocutory order merely because of the pendency of Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration, and that the CA erred in affirming this erroneous ruling.

• Prematurity of Appeal: Soriano countered that Bernardo's Notice of Appeal was premature owing to the pendency of Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration, and that the RTC's Decision could not yet be considered a judgment that may be appealed because there was still something left for the court to do.

• Final Order Requirement: Soriano argued that a final order contemplates one in which there is nothing more for the court to do in order to resolve the case, and that the pendency of her Motion for Partial Reconsideration meant the RTC's Decision was not yet final and appealable.

• Denial of Notice of Appeal: Whether the RTC erred in denying due course to Bernardo's Notice of Appeal on the ground of the pendency of Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether the CA erred in denying Bernardo's Certiorari Petition under Rule 65, holding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

• Denial of Notice of Appeal: Yes. The RTC erred in denying due course to Bernardo's seasonably filed Notice of Appeal. Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, and the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010 was a judgment on the merits. Each party has a different period within which to appeal, and the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other party's period of appeal.

• Propriety of Certiorari: No. The CA did not err in denying Bernardo's Certiorari Petition. The extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure mere errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact, and it will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. Bernardo still had the plain, adequate, and speedy remedy of filing another Notice of Appeal after the RTC modified its Decision on October 22, 2010.

• Denial of Notice of Appeal: The Court applied Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which provides that an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case. The RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010, having delved into the merits of the custody case and having fully disposed of the respective issues and causes of action raised by the parties, was undoubtedly a judgment on the merits and not a mere interlocutory order. It did not merely rule on incidental matters; it decided on the subject matter of the case, i.e., the custody of Stephanie. Being an appealable judgment on the merits, Bernardo had the right to appeal under Rule 41 by filing a notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Order dated August 31, 2010 denying her timely-filed Motion for Reconsideration. Bernardo timely filed her Notice of Appeal on September 8, 2010, containing all the required contents under Section 5, Rule 41, and paid the corresponding appeal fees. Assuming the notice of appeal satisfies the content requirements, the approval of a notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the lower court, provided the appeal is filed on time. The Court held that the RTC and CA confused the right of a party to appeal and the right of another party to file a motion for reconsideration. There is nothing in the Rules which makes a party's right to appeal dependent or contingent on the opposing party's motion for reconsideration. Jurisprudence holds that each party has a different period within which to appeal, and the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other or another party's period of appeal. Furthermore, under Section 9, Rule 41, in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case only upon the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. Thus, if the RTC granted due course to Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, it would not have been divested of jurisdiction to decide Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration, and Soriano's right to file her own Motion for Reconsideration would not have been defeated. The CA's concern about multiplicity of appeals was unfounded, as the respective appeals could have been consolidated by the appellate court.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Despite the RTC's procedural error, the CA was not in error to deny Bernardo's Certiorari Petition. The extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure mere errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The RTC's act of denying due course to Bernardo's Notice of Appeal was not borne out of a capricious, whimsical, and arbitrary exercise of judgment. The records reveal that the RTC was motivated, albeit erroneously, by practicality, wanting to first decide Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and avoid a multiplicity of appeals before the CA. More importantly, it is elementary that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if the aggrieved party has no plain, adequate, and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. The RTC's Order dated September 9, 2010 did not completely preclude Bernardo from appealing; it merely denied due course to the Notice of Appeal in the meantime and ordered Bernardo to file her comment on Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Subsequently, the RTC issued its Order dated October 22, 2010 granting Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration, modifying the Decision dated August 5, 2010. Bernardo could have, at that time, appealed yet again by filing another notice of appeal assailing the RTC's Decision. As a clear indication that Bernardo had an adequate and available remedy, she was able to question the modification of the RTC's Decision and file a Motion for Reconsideration on November 22, 2010, prior to the filing of the Certiorari Petition on March 15, 2011. When such Motion for Reconsideration was denied on January 31, 2011, Bernardo had 15 days from receipt of the said Order to appeal the RTC's Decision before the CA. Despite the remedy of assailing the RTC's judgment on the merits via an ordinary appeal being readily available, Bernardo chose instead to focus on ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's Order denying due course to her Notice of Appeal.

• Final Judgment vs. Interlocutory Order — A final judgment or order is one that adjudicates the parties' contentions and determines their rights and liabilities as regards each other, disposing of the whole subject matter of the case. An interlocutory order, by contrast, may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010, which resolved the merits of the custody case, was a judgment on the merits and not a mere interlocutory order, notwithstanding the pendency of Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

• Independence of Each Party's Right to Appeal — Each party has a different period within which to appeal, and the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other or another party's period of appeal. A party's right to appeal is not made dependent or contingent on the opposing party's motion for reconsideration. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that Bernardo's right to appeal was not affected by Soriano's filing of her own Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

• Certiorari as Extraordinary Remedy — A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper only if the aggrieved party has no plain, adequate, and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. The extraordinary writ will not be issued to cure mere errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the CA did not err in denying Bernardo's Certiorari Petition, as she still had the available remedy of filing another Notice of Appeal.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the RTC's denial of Bernardo's Notice of Appeal was not attended by grave abuse of discretion, as it was motivated by practicality rather than caprice or whimsy.

• "There is nothing in the Rules which makes a party's right to appeal dependent or contingent on the opposing party's motion for reconsideration. Similarly, a party's undertaking to file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment is not hindered by the other party's filing of a notice of appeal." — This passage articulates the core ratio decidendi on the independence of each party's right to appeal, which is the central legal principle established in this case.

• "Jurisprudence holds that 'each party has a different period within which to appeal' and that '[s]ince each party has a different period within which to appeal, the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other or another party's period of appeal.'" — This passage states the controlling rule on the effect of one party's motion for reconsideration on another party's period to appeal, which the Court applied to find the RTC's denial of Bernardo's Notice of Appeal erroneous.

• "The extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure mere errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact." — This passage states the fundamental limitation on the writ of certiorari, which formed the basis for affirming the CA's denial of Bernardo's Certiorari Petition despite the RTC's procedural error.

• "A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper only if the aggrieved party has no plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law." — This passage states the canonical requirement for the availability of certiorari, which the Court applied in holding that Bernardo's Certiorari Petition was improperly filed given the availability of an ordinary appeal.

• Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, 506 Phil. 613 (2005) — Cited as the source of the fresh period rule, providing that when a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed and subsequently denied, there is a fresh period of fifteen days within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order denying the motion.

• Denso (Phils.), Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 232 Phil. 256 (1987) — Cited for the definition of an appealable judgment or final order as one that adjudicates the parties' contentions and determines their rights and liabilities as regards each other.

• Marcelo vs. Hon. De Guzman, 200 Phil. 137 (1982) — Cited for the proposition that a final order disposes of the whole subject matter of the case.

• Oro vs. Judge Diaz, 413 Phil. 416 (2001) — Cited for the rule that the approval of a notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the lower court, provided the appeal is filed on time.

• BPI vs. Far East Molasses Corporation, 275 Phil. 756 (1991) — Cited for the doctrine that each party has a different period within which to appeal.

• Franco-Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 587 Phil. 307 (2008) — Cited for the doctrine that the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other or another party's period of appeal.

• Leviste vs. Court of Appeals, 629 Phil. 587 (2010) — Cited for the rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure mere errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.

• Cathay Pacific Steel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 531 Phil. 620 (2006) — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion and for the rule that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.

• Belonio vs. Rodriguez, 504 Phil. 126 (2005) — Cited for the rule that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if the aggrieved party has no plain, adequate, and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.

• Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. The Court applied this provision in determining that the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010 was an appealable judgment on the merits.

• Section 2(a), Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that the appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. The Court applied this provision in evaluating the propriety of Bernardo's Notice of Appeal.

• Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from, and that the period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. The Court applied this provision in determining the timeliness of Bernardo's Notice of Appeal.

• Section 5, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that the notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal, specify the judgment or final order or part thereof appealed from, specify the court to which the appeal is being taken, and state the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal. The Court noted that Bernardo's Notice of Appeal contained all the required contents.

• Section 9, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that a party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time, and that the court loses jurisdiction over the case only upon the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. The Court applied this provision in holding that the RTC would not have been divested of jurisdiction to decide Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration had it granted due course to Bernardo's Notice of Appeal.

Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concurred.