Bernardo vs. People of the Philippines

Presidential Decree No. 772 penalizes squatting only in urban communities, not on agricultural lands, its preamble confining its application to illegal constructions in squatter areas within urban settings.

Isidro Bernardo was a tenant on the riceland of Ledda Sta. Rosa in Plaridel, Bulacan, from October 1972 to August 1974, during which time he constructed a dwelling house on the land. His son, co-petitioner Cayetano Bernardo, resided with him as his helper. The dispute arose from the interplay of agricultural tenancy relations and the subsequent invocation of the anti-squatting decree after Isidro abandoned the landholding and transferred his tenancy rights to Cayetano without the landowner's knowledge.

Isidro Bernardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa on her riceland in Plaridel, Bulacan from October 1972 to August 1974. During that period, he constructed a house on the land for his family's dwelling. His son, co-petitioner Cayetano Bernardo, resided with him in the house and served as his helper in tilling the land. Subsequently, Isidro left the landholding and transferred to San Nicolas, Bulacan, without the knowledge of the landowner. Before leaving, however, he transferred his tenancy rights to Cayetano, who continued to reside in the house on the property.

Eventually, Ledda Sta. Rosa took possession of the entire riceland through her overseer, Dr. Patricio E. Cruz. She filed a forcible entry case against both petitioners before the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan. Petitioners lost before the inferior court and again in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Their petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals was likewise denied.

Thereafter, Ledda Sta. Rosa sent a letter of demand requiring petitioners to vacate the house and the land. When they failed to leave, a criminal complaint was filed against them for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 with the fiscal's office. After preliminary investigation, the provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch VI, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3022-M, charging that on or about April 22, 1974, in Plaridel, Bulacan, the accused willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, without the knowledge and taking advantage of the tolerance of the owner, succeeded in possessing and squatting on her parcel of land by erecting a residential house thereon and failing to remove it despite demand.

Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits and submission by both parties, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, arguing that PD 772 applies only to squatters in urban communities and not to agricultural lands, citing People vs. Echaves. The motion was denied, and the trial court rendered judgment convicting petitioners of the crime charged, sentencing each to pay a fine of ₱2,500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioners argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the criminal case for violation of PD 772, because the decree applies only to squatters in urban communities and not to agricultural lands.
• Reliance on Precedent: Petitioners invoked People vs. Echaves, which held that PD 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities, particularly to illegal construction in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.

• Concession by the Solicitor General: The Solicitor General manifested that the intent and purpose of PD 772 is to prohibit and penalize squatting or similar acts on public and private lands located in urban communities, conceding that no person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is not clearly within them, and that the lower court's decision was therefore null and void.

• Applicability of PD 772: Whether Presidential Decree No. 772 applies to squatting on agricultural lands, or is limited to urban communities.

• Applicability of PD 772: No. PD 772 applies only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas, and does not cover squatting on agricultural lands. The trial court thus lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged.

• Applicability of PD 772: The Court relied on the preamble of PD 772, which expressly states that "squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the country" and identifies the target as persons or entities of the "affluent class" unlawfully occupying public and private lands. The intent of the decree was unmistakably confined to urban communities and illegal constructions therein. This interpretation was reinforced by the prior ruling in People vs. Echaves, which held that PD 772 does not apply to pasture lands. Applying the principle that no person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is not clearly within them, as articulated in US vs. Abad Santos, the Court concluded that the facts obtaining in the case—squatting on a riceland, an agricultural land—did not constitute an offense under PD 772. The Solicitor General concurred in this interpretation, rendering the lower court's conviction null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

• Strict Construction of Penal Statutes — No person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute. The Court applied this principle to hold that PD 772, being a penal decree, must be strictly construed in light of its preamble, which confined its application to urban communities. Since the land in question was agricultural, petitioners' conduct did not fall within the decree's coverage.

• Use of Preamble in Statutory Construction — The preamble of a statute may be consulted to ascertain the legislative intent, particularly where the body of the law is ambiguous. The Court examined the preamble of PD 772 to determine that the decree was intended to apply only to squatting in urban communities, not to agricultural lands.

• "The intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions." — This passage states the ratio decidendi, defining the scope of PD 772 by reference to its preamble and confirming that agricultural lands fall outside its coverage.

• "no person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute" — Quoted from US vs. Abad Santos via the Solicitor General's comment, this formulation of the strict construction principle underpins the Court's refusal to extend PD 772 beyond urban communities.

• People vs. Echaves, 95 SCRA 663 — Controlling precedent. The Court held that PD 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities. The Court followed this ruling directly in dismissing the conviction of petitioners for squatting on a riceland.

• US vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243 — Cited for the principle of strict construction of penal statutes, invoked by the Solicitor General and adopted by the Court in support of its conclusion that the lower court's judgment was null and void.

• Presidential Decree No. 772 — The anti-squatting law penalizing unlawful occupation of public and private lands. The Court construed its scope through its preamble, limiting application to urban communities and excluding agricultural lands. Petitioners' conviction under this decree was set aside for lack of jurisdiction.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Escolin, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concurred. Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., were on leave.