Bernardo vs. People

An extension of time to file a pleading is reckoned from the expiration of the original reglementary period, not from the date of receipt of the order granting the extension, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, and failure to attach certified true copies or duplicate originals of both lower courts' judgments to a petition for review under Rule 42 is a mandatory ground for dismissal.

Petitioner Carmelo C. Bernardo was charged with six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila for issuing six postdated checks in the amount of ₱22,500 each to F.T. Ylang-Ylang Marketing Corporation, represented by Dennis Tan. The checks were drawn against Philippine Savings Bank and were subsequently dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." The case involves the interaction between procedural rules governing the perfection of appeals to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42 and the substantive penalties available under B.P. Blg. 22 as interpreted through administrative circulars of the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Carmelo C. Bernardo was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila with six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing on December 3, 1997 six postdated checks in equal amounts of ₱22,500, payable to F.T. Ylang-Ylang Marketing Corporation, represented by Dennis Tan. The checks were drawn against Philippine Savings Bank. Four of the Informations alleged that the checks, when presented for payment within ninety days from their dates, were dishonored for the reason "Account Closed," and that despite receipt of notice of dishonor, petitioner failed to pay or make arrangements for payment within five banking days. The remaining two Informations alleged that the account against which the checks were drawn had already been closed even before the dates of the checks, such that they would be dishonored if presented for payment.

Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. At the pre-trial conference on August 25, 1999, petitioner failed to appear despite notice, prompting the MeTC to issue a warrant of arrest and set the cases for trial in absentia. After the prosecution presented its first witness, petitioner filed a Waiver of Appearance, a Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest, and a Motion to Quash on the ground that the facts charged in two of the Informations did not constitute an offense. The trial court lifted the warrant of arrest by Order of April 5, 2000 but denied the Motion to Quash. At the next trial date, petitioner again failed to appear despite notice, and the trial court proceeded with trial in absentia and issued another warrant of arrest.

By Decision of October 23, 2001, promulgated in absentia on December 13, 2001, the MeTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. 22 in all six cases, sentencing him in each case to one year imprisonment, a fine of ₱22,500, and indemnity of ₱22,500 to the private complainant. Ten months after promulgation, petitioner posted a bond before another branch of the court. Because petitioner had already been convicted and no motion had been filed for provisional liberty pending appeal, the trial court cancelled the bond and issued an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for New Trial and/or to Set Aside Trial and Judgment, which was denied by Order of January 10, 2003 due to his and his counsel's failure to appear at the hearing and to comply with the rule on proper service of a motion. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by Order of May 26, 2003.

Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila, Branch 26, which by Decision of December 22, 2003 affirmed the MeTC judgment with modification: the penalty of imprisonment was set aside and a fine of ₱22,500 in each case was imposed, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed six months, and petitioner was ordered to pay private complainant the total amount of ₱113,500 as indemnity. The alias warrant of arrest was lifted. Petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration was denied. Petitioner then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, filing a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review seeking 30 days from June 1, 2004, the 15th day from his counsel's receipt of the RTC Order denying his Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The CA, by Resolution of June 21, 2004, granted only 15 days pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42, making the petition due on June 16, 2004. Petitioner, unaware of this resolution, filed his petition on July 1, 2004, having received the June 21, 2004 Resolution only on July 9, 2004. The CA dismissed the petition for being filed 15 days late and for failure to attach the MeTC Decision and other pertinent documents. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied, the CA noting that the MeTC Decision attached was a mere uncertified photocopy.

• Reckoning of Extension Period: Petitioner argued that the 15-day extension granted by the CA should be reckoned from his date of receipt of the June 21, 2004 Resolution granting the extension, not from the expiration of the original reglementary period.
• Liberal Application of Procedural Rules: Petitioner faulted the CA for applying the rules of procedure very strictly and in utter disregard of its internal rules which liberally allow completion of portions of records, and of settled jurisprudence applying the rules of procedure liberally.
• Merits of the Petition: Petitioner argued that the CA should have considered the merits of the petition for review rather than dismissing it on technical grounds.
• Compelling Reason for Further Extension: Petitioner claimed that his motion for extension presented a compelling reason justifying a 30-day period, explaining that he was implicitly seeking both a 15-day extension and a further extension of 15 days, anchored on his counsel's heavy workload involving preparation of pleadings and daily court appearances.
• Due Process and Right to Counsel: Petitioner asserted that he was denied due process of law and the right to counsel before the trial court.

• Reckoning of Extension Period: Whether the CA correctly reckoned the 15-day extension from the expiration of the original reglementary period rather than from the date of petitioner's receipt of the resolution granting the extension.
• Compelling Reason for Further Extension: Whether petitioner's counsel's heavy workload constituted a "most compelling reason" warranting a further extension of 15 days under Section 1 of Rule 42.
• Compliance with Documentary Requirements: Whether the CA correctly dismissed the petition for failure to comply with Section 2(d) of Rule 42 requiring the attachment of certified true copies or duplicate originals of both lower courts' judgments or final orders.
• Validity of Trial and Promulgation in Absentia: Whether the trial and promulgation of judgment in absentia were valid, and whether petitioner was denied due process and the right to counsel.
• Propriety of Penalty: Whether the RTC correctly deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violation of B.P. 22.

• Reckoning of Extension Period: Yes. The CA correctly reckoned the extension from the expiration of the original period, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, which provides that any extension of time should be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of whether the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
• Compelling Reason for Further Extension: No. Heavy workload of counsel does not constitute a "most compelling reason" for a further extension under Section 1 of Rule 42, the wording of which is couched in restrictive terms.
• Compliance with Documentary Requirements: Yes. The CA correctly dismissed the petition, petitioner having failed to attach the MeTC Decision and Orders in the required form — certified true copies or clearly legible duplicate originals — as mandated by Section 2(d) of Rule 42.
• Validity of Trial and Promulgation in Absentia: Yes. The requisites of a valid trial in absentia were present: petitioner had been arraigned, duly notified of the trial, and his failure to appear was unjustifiable. Promulgation in absentia was likewise valid under Section 6 of Rule 120.
• Propriety of Penalty: The non-imposition of imprisonment was sustained as proper, there being no showing of repeated violation or wanton bad faith, consistent with Administrative Circulars 12-2000 and 13-2001 which lay down a rule of preference in the application of penalties under B.P. 22 without removing imprisonment as an alternative penalty.

• Reckoning of Extension Period: A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, issued on February 29, 2000, expressly provides that "any extension of time to file the required pleading should . . . be counted from the expiration of the period." The extension is tacked to the original period and commences immediately after its expiration. The court has no discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension from a date later than the expiration of the original period, not even if the expiry date is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Petitioner's reliance on Vda. de Capulong vs. Workmen's Insurance Co., Inc. was misplaced because the factual milieus were dissimilar: in that case, the respondent specifically moved for an extension "from receipt of the order" and the court granted the extension without indicating when it would commence, whereas here petitioner himself prayed for the extension to be counted from the expiration of the original period or "from June 1, 2004," which the CA correctly used.

• Compelling Reason for Further Extension: Section 1 of Rule 42 provides that the CA may grant an additional period of 15 days only, and that "[n]o further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days." The wording is couched in restrictive terms. Petitioner's motion was anchored on a lone ground — his counsel's being preoccupied with preparation of pleadings and daily court appearances. Sustaining this ground would obliterate the distinguishing essence of a further extension by doing away with the necessity of presenting compelling grounds addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions would be granted or granted the length of time prayed for.

• Compliance with Documentary Requirements: Section 2(d) of Rule 42 specifically requires that both lower courts' judgments or final orders must be attached to the petition in the required form — clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies. Petitioner attached only the RTC Decision and its Order denying reconsideration. He did not attach the MeTC Orders dated January 10, 2003 and May 26, 2003, and the MeTC Decision dated October 23, 2001, which were appealed to the RTC and were likewise adverse to him. While he attached the October 23, 2001 Decision to his Motion for Reconsideration, it was a mere uncertified photocopy, and while he attached a duplicate original of the May 26, 2003 Order, he failed to submit the January 10, 2003 Order. The mandatory tenor of this requirement has been held to be discernible and well settled. Because petitioner failed to perfect his appeal, the RTC judgment had become final and executory.

• Validity of Trial and Promulgation in Absentia: The requisites of a valid trial in absentia — (1) the accused has already been arraigned, (2) he has been duly notified of the trial, and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable — were all present. Under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused after arraignment, provided he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for non-appearance. As for promulgation in absentia, Section 6 of Rule 120 provides that when the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, notice shall be served at his last known address, and if he fails to appear at the scheduled promulgation despite notice, promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy at his last known address or through his counsel.

• Propriety of Penalty: Contrary to the RTC's reasoning, the penalty of imprisonment in cases of violation of B.P. 22 was not deleted. As clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, the clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of penalties. Since the prosecution did not raise the matter as an issue and there was no showing of repeated violation or wanton bad faith on the part of petitioner, the non-imposition of imprisonment was in order.

• Reckoning of Extension Periods (A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC) — Any extension of time to file a required pleading must be counted from the expiration of the original reglementary period, regardless of whether the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. The extension is tacked to the original period and commences immediately after its expiration; the court has no discretion to reckon the commencement from a date later than the expiration of the original period. Applied to hold that petitioner's 15-day extension was properly reckoned from June 1, 2004, making the petition due on June 16, 2004, and his July 1, 2004 filing 15 days late.

• Further Extension Under Rule 42 — Under Section 1 of Rule 42, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of 15 days only within which to file a petition for review. A further extension not exceeding 15 days may be granted only "for the most compelling reason." Heavy workload of counsel does not constitute a most compelling reason. Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court.

• Mandatory Attachment of Lower Court Decisions (Section 2(d), Rule 42) — A petition for review before the Court of Appeals must be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts. This requirement is mandatory in tenor; non-compliance warrants dismissal. A mere photocopy or uncertified copy does not satisfy the requirement.

• Trial in Absentia — Trial in absentia is valid when three requisites concur: (1) the accused has been arraigned, (2) he has been duly notified of the trial, and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for non-appearance. The trial court has the duty to rule on the evidence presented and render judgment without waiting for the fugitive's reappearance or re-arrest.

• Promulgation of Judgment in Absentia (Section 6, Rule 120) — When the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, notice of promulgation shall be served at his last known address. If the accused fails to appear at the scheduled promulgation despite notice, promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy at his last known address or through counsel.

• Rule of Preference in B.P. 22 Penalties (Administrative Circulars 12-2000 and 13-2001) — Administrative Circular 12-2001 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violation of B.P. 22 but lays down a rule of preference in the application of penalties. Imprisonment may be dispensed with when there is no showing of repeated violation or wanton bad faith on the part of the accused.

• "Any extension of time to file the required pleading should . . . be counted from the expiration of the period . . . The extension should thus be tacked to the original period, to commence immediately after the expiration of such period. The court has no discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension from a date later than the expiration of such original period, not even if the expiry date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday." — This passage articulates the controlling rule on reckoning extension periods, derived from A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, and forms the ratio decidendi for the procedural dismissal of the petition.

• "Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement would be granted or that they would be granted the length of time they pray for." — This passage states the principle governing motions for extension, underscoring that counsel cannot assume favorable action and must file within the statutory period regardless of the pendency of a motion for extension.

• "Petitioner having failed to perfect his appeal, the RTC judgment had become final and executory." — This sentence states the consequence of non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of Rule 42, sealing the procedural disposition of the case and rendering unnecessary any discussion of the merits of the conviction.

• "[T]he clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. 22." — This passage clarifies the relationship between Administrative Circulars 12-2000 and 13-2001, a point of recurring significance in B.P. 22 sentencing jurisprudence.

• Vda. de Capulong vs. Workmen's Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 30960, October 5, 1989, 178 SCRA 314 — Distinguished. Petitioner relied on this case for the proposition that an extension should be reckoned from receipt of the order granting it, but the Court found the factual milieus dissimilar: in that case, the respondent specifically moved for an extension "from receipt of the order" and the court granted it without specifying a commencement date, whereas here petitioner himself prayed for the extension to be counted from the expiration of the original period.

• Estrada vs. People, G.R. No. 162371, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 233 — Followed. Cited to dispel doubts on the validity of trial in absentia, quoting extensively from the decision on the constitutional authorization for trial in absentia, the waiver of the right to be present by escaping or jumping bail, and the duty of the trial court to render judgment without waiting for the fugitive's reappearance.

• People vs. Salas, 227 Phil. 152 (1986) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that escape from custody constitutes a waiver of the right to be present at trial and that the inability of the court to notify the accused of subsequent hearings does not prevent continuation of the trial.

• People vs. Valeriano, G.R. Nos. 103604-605, September 23, 1993, 226 SCRA 694 — Followed. Cited for the rule that one who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for non-appearance during trial.

• Tan vs. Mendez, Jr., 432 Phil. 760 (2002) — Followed. Cited for the clarification that Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not delete imprisonment as an alternative penalty for B.P. 22 violations but establishes a rule of preference in the application of penalties.

• Section 1, Rule 42, Rules of Court — Governs the period for filing a petition for review before the Court of Appeals: 15 days from notice of the decision or denial of motion for new trial or reconsideration, with a possible additional extension of 15 days only, and a further extension of not more than 15 days only for the most compelling reason. Applied to hold that the CA properly granted only 15 days and that petitioner's 30-day request was not supported by a compelling reason.

• Section 2(d), Rule 42, Rules of Court — Requires that the petition for review be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts. Applied to dismiss the petition for failure to attach the MeTC Decision and Orders in the required form.

• A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC (February 29, 2000) — Declares that any extension of time to file a required pleading should be counted from the expiration of the original period, regardless of whether the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Applied to hold that the 15-day extension was properly reckoned from June 1, 2004, the expiration of the original period.

• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Authorizes trial in absentia after arraignment, provided the accused has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Applied to sustain the validity of the trial conducted in petitioner's absence.

• Section 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court — Governs promulgation of judgment, including promulgation in absentia when the accused was tried in absentia for jumping bail or escaping from prison. Applied to sustain the validity of the promulgation of the MeTC judgment in petitioner's absence.

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) — The substantive law penalizing the issuance of checks without sufficient funds. Applied as the basis for the six criminal charges against petitioner.

• Administrative Circulars 12-2000 and 13-2001 — Establish a rule of preference in the application of penalties under B.P. 22, without removing imprisonment as an alternative penalty. Applied to sustain the RTC's non-imposition of imprisonment given the absence of repeated violation or wanton bad faith.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Antonio T. Carpio, Dante O. Tinga, and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.