Bernardo vs. Mendoza

A prosecutor and a judge gravely abuse discretion when they treat as estafa a transaction shown by receipts titled “Promissory Note” and by the complainant’s acceptance of payment plus interest to be a civil loan obligation, not a criminal entrustment; the judge likewise abuses discretion in issuing a warrant without bail where the charge does not fall under General Order No. 2 as amended by General Order No. 29.

Petitioners Jose Bernardo and Rosario Guico Bernardo are common barrio people; the private complainant is Anacleto Q. Olvis. The statutory backdrop includes General Order No. 2 dated September 30, 1972, as amended by General Order No. 29 dated April 13, 1973, which ordered the arrest and detention without bail of persons accused of swindling in large scale.

On July 17, 1973, on the basis of an affidavit of Anacleto Q. Olvis, the Chief of Police of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte filed with the Municipal Court of Manukan a complaint for estafa in the amount of P9,008.13 against spouses Jose Bernardo and Rosario Guico Bernardo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1345. After the preliminary examination, the Municipal Court issued an order for the arrest of petitioners and fixed the bail bond at P3,000. Jose Bernardo was arrested and detained at the Manukan municipal jail; he posted a bail bond and was released. On July 23, 1973, the Municipal Court recalled its previous order of arrest, granted bail, and ordered the arrest of the accused without bail pursuant to General Order No. 29 dated April 13, 1973, amending General Order No. 2 dated September 30, 1972, which ordered the arrest and detention of persons accused of swindling in large scale.

On July 26, 1973, spouses Anacleto Q. Olvis and Iniega Olvis appeared before the Municipal Court and filed a joint affidavit of desistance, withdrawing the case because their witnesses had turned hostile and they could not prove the case. On the same date, petitioners’ counsel filed a motion to quash the case and recall the warrant of arrest on the ground that the complaint was civil in nature and the complainants had lost interest in the case; the Chief of Police Serafin Lorenzo and Special Counsel Crisostomo C. Empaynado signed the motion. The sum of P9,008.13 was deposited in the Municipal Court as payment of the amount alleged in the complaint, while interest of P1,080.00 was paid directly to Anacleto Olvis; Olvis accepted the sum on July 26, 1973 and signed a receipt on July 27, 1973. With no objection from the fiscal and the Chief of Police, the Municipal Court in its order of July 26, 1973 provisionally quashed or recalled the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 1345, subject to the final approval of the provincial fiscal and/or his assistants.

After the record of Criminal Case No. 1345 was sent to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal on August 6, 1973, Anacleto Olvis requested a reinvestigation on the ground that witnesses who had turned hostile were willing to testify for the prosecution. Special Counsel Crisostomo Empaynado was relieved and replaced by the Provincial Fiscal, who assigned Special Counsel Wilfredo G. Guantero to conduct the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 1345. Guantero required petitioners to file counter-affidavits; petitioners, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint was civil and not criminal and that the offended parties had agreed to dismissal after receiving payment of the amount claimed plus interest. On September 25, 1973, petitioners informed the investigating fiscal in writing that the case was purely civil in nature and provided him copies of the promissory notes voluntarily returned by Olvis when he received payment. On October 23, 1973, the investigating fiscal denied the motion to dismiss; petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on October 31, 1973 with the counter-affidavit of Rosario Guico Bernardo explaining the civil nature of the transactions. The investigating fiscal denied the motion for reconsideration and filed an information for simple estafa under Article 315-1-B of the Revised Penal Code against petitioners on October 31, 1973 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1103, with a motion to admit the information and to issue a warrant of arrest without any bail bond recommended.

On November 7, 1973, respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza issued an order and a warrant of arrest against petitioners without fixing any bail bond; Jose Bernardo was arrested at midnight of the same day and detained from November 10, 1973 at the Office of the National Bureau of Investigation at Dipolog City. Also on November 7, 1973, petitioners, through counsel, filed an urgent motion to quash the admission of the information and the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 1103, questioning the jurisdiction of the court to admit the information because the prosecuting fiscal had no authority to file it, the case being civil in nature and previously dismissed after complainant Olvis accepted payment of his claims plus interest. On November 8, 1973, the respondent judge denied the urgent motion to quash; petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration on November 10, 1973, reiterating the grounds and alleging clear abuse of discretion because the acts complained of were merely civil and did not constitute an offense. On November 10, 1973, the respondent judge issued an order denying the urgent motion for reconsideration.

On November 19, 1973, petitioners filed an urgent motion to admit to bail and fix bail, alleging that under Section 18, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution they were entitled to bail as a matter of right because they were charged with simple estafa and their case did not fall under General Order No. 29 dated April 13, 1973, amending General Order No. 2 dated September 30, 1972, which denied bail to persons charged with swindling and other deceits in large scale. On November 20, 1973, the respondent judge issued an order commanding that a copy of the motion be sent to the Fifth RECAD Zamboanga City through the Provincial Commander, 463rd PC, in accordance with Defense Order No. 739 dated January 25, 1973, and set the hearing for December 12, 1973. On December 12, 1973, the respondent judge acted favorably on the urgent motion and fixed the bail bond for provisional release of petitioners at P3,000 each. The documentary record included receipts signed by petitioners when they received sums of money from Olvis, bearing the title “Promissory Note” and showing that petitioners received loans.

• Civil Nature of the Transaction: Petitioners argued that the complaint was civil in nature, not criminal, because the sums received were loans evidenced by promissory notes and the complainant accepted payment of the claimed amount plus interest.
• Desistance and Payment: Petitioners maintained that the offended parties filed a spontaneous affidavit of desistance during the preliminary investigation and accepted payment, including interest, which removed any basis for estafa.
• Lack of Authority of the Prosecuting Fiscal: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the respondent judge to admit the information because the prosecuting fiscal had no authority to file it, the case being civil and already dismissed after complainant Olvis accepted payment.
• Right to Bail: Petitioners argued that under Section 18, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution they were entitled to bail as a matter of right because they were charged with simple estafa and their case did not fall under General Order No. 29, which denied bail only to persons charged with swindling in large scale.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Filing of Information: Whether the respondent fiscal acted in grave abuse of discretion in filing the information for estafa against petitioners in Criminal Case No. 1103 notwithstanding his awareness of the circumstances that resulted in the dismissal of the same case during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 1345.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Admission of Information: Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting and giving due course to the information for estafa in Criminal Case No. 1103 although he was made aware of the circumstances leading to its filing.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Filing of Information: Yes. The fiscal gravely abused discretion in filing the information because the transaction was civil, not criminal, as shown by the promissory notes and Olvis’s acceptance of payment plus interest.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Admission of Information: Yes. The judge gravely abused discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the information despite knowledge of the civil nature and prior dismissal; his issuance of a warrant without bail was a graver error because the charge did not fall under General Order No. 2 as amended.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Filing of Information: The original complaint and affidavit raised a doubt whether the P9,008.13 was given as loans to be paid by the copra produce of petitioners’ lands or entrusted by complainants to petitioners for buying copra to be delivered to complainants. That doubt disappeared after Olvis accepted payment of P9,008.13 plus P1,080.00 interest. The relationship between complainant and petitioners was that of creditor and debtors, and the transaction was civil in nature, not criminal. The receipts signed by petitioners when they received the sums were titled “Promissory Note” and clearly showed that petitioners received loans. The respondent fiscal erred in filing Criminal Case No. 1103 considering the antecedents of the case and the documentary evidence. Prosecutors have ample powers, but they must weigh the evidence carefully and deliberate to determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing the information; anything less is a dereliction of duty. By his official acts, the fiscal caused grave prejudice and injustice to petitioners.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Admission of Information: The respondent judge erred in admitting and giving due course to the information considering that he was made aware of the circumstances leading to its filing. His graver error was issuing a warrant of arrest without a recommendation for bail because the charges in Criminal Case No. 1103 did not fall within the purview of General Order No. 2 dated September 30, 1972, as amended by General Order No. 29 dated April 13, 1973. The right to bail is a constitutional right; its denial to an accused is allowed only in rare cases, and the respondent judge should have examined more carefully the laws and jurisprudence on the right to bail before denying it. The bail issue was rendered moot by the SC’s resolution ordering bail and the respondent judge’s December 12, 1973 order, but the judge’s error in issuing the warrant without bail was identified.

• Grave abuse of discretion in filing an information — A prosecutor must weigh the evidence carefully and deliberate to determine whether a prima facie case exists before filing an information; filing an estafa charge despite documentary evidence that the obligation is civil and the complainant accepted payment plus interest is grave abuse of discretion.
• Civil obligation is not estafa — Where the receipts are titled “Promissory Note” and show that the accused received loans, and the complainant accepts payment of the principal plus interest, the relationship is creditor-debtor and the transaction is civil, not criminal estafa.
• Right to bail — The right to bail is constitutional; its denial is allowed only in rare cases. A warrant without bail is improper where the charge of simple estafa does not fall under General Order No. 2 as amended by General Order No. 29.
• Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction — A judge commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting an information despite being aware of circumstances showing the case is civil and was previously dismissed after payment, and in issuing a warrant without bail outside the General Orders.

• “Clearly the relationship between complainant and petitioner was that of creditor and debtors and the transaction was civil in nature, not criminal.” — The SC’s conclusion after Olvis accepted payment plus interest and the receipts showed loans; it is the core ruling that the obligation was civil, not estafa.
• “Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing the information in court. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty.” — The SC’s statement of the prosecutor’s duty before filing an information, which the respondent fiscal failed to observe.
• “The right to bail is a constitutional right. Its denial to an accused is allowed only in rare cases.” — The SC’s statement on bail, used to fault the respondent judge for issuing a warrant without bail despite the charge not falling under the General Orders.
• “Respondent fiscal erred in filing Criminal Case No.1103, considering the antecedents of the case and the documentary evidence involved.” — The SC’s direct conclusion that the fiscal’s filing of the information was erroneous given the prior dismissal, payment, and promissory notes.

• Article 315-1-B, Revised Penal Code — The information charged petitioners with simple estafa under this provision; the SC found the transaction civil and not criminal, so the charge could not stand.
• General Order No. 2 dated September 30, 1972, as amended by General Order No. 29 dated April 13, 1973 — These orders authorized arrest and detention without bail of persons accused of swindling in large scale; the SC held the charge of simple estafa did not fall within their purview, so the warrant without bail was improper.
• Section 18, Article IV, 1973 Constitution — This provision guarantees the right to bail; the SC invoked it to hold that denial of bail is allowed only in rare cases and that the respondent judge should have examined the laws and jurisprudence on bail.