Bernardo vs. Mejia

Reinstatement to the Roll of Attorneys after disbarment may be granted where the disbarred lawyer demonstrates remorse, rehabilitation, and the absence of further transgressions over a sufficient period of time, the Court exercising its sound discretion to determine that the public interest in the orderly administration of justice will be preserved by the lawyer's reentry — penalties such as disbarment being imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.

Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. had retained Atty. Ismael F. Mejia as his counsel in matters involving real estate properties in subdivisions known as Valle Verde I and Valle Verde V. Mejia was disbarred by the Supreme Court En Banc on July 29, 1992, for misappropriation of client funds, falsification of documents, and issuance of unfunded checks. A first petition for reinstatement filed by Mejia on June 1, 1999 was denied by the Court En Banc on July 6, 1999. The present petition was filed on January 23, 2007.

Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. retained Atty. Ismael F. Mejia as his attorney for matters involving real estate properties situated in subdivisions known as Valle Verde I and Valle Verde V. On January 23, 1987, Bernardo accused Mejia of several administrative offenses arising from the attorney-client relationship. The charges included misappropriation of funds: part of ₱27,710.00 entrusted to Mejia for payment of real estate taxes on the Valle Verde I property, and part of ₱40,000.00 entrusted for payment of taxes and expenses in connection with the registration of title to the Valle Verde V property. Bernardo also charged Mejia with falsification of three documents — a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985 purportedly executed in Mejia's favor, a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982, and a deed of assignment purportedly executed by spouses Tomas and Remedios Pastor in Bernardo's favor. Finally, Bernardo accused Mejia of issuing a check knowing he had insufficient funds, in payment of a ₱50,000.00 loan obtained from Bernardo, and thereafter replacing that check with others likewise unfunded.

On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a per curiam decision finding Mejia guilty of all charges and imposing the penalty of disbarment, with immediate suspension pending finality. Mejia's name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed his first petition for reinstatement, which the Court En Banc denied on July 6, 1999.

On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for reinstatement. He was then seventy-one years old and had been barred from the practice of law for fifteen years. The Court En Banc issued a Resolution on February 13, 2007 requiring Bernardo to file a comment on the petition, but the notice was returned unserved with the notation "RTS-Unknown." Subsequent Resolutions dated February 20, 2007 and February 27, 2007 reiterating the requirement were likewise returned unserved with the notation "RTS-Refused to Receive; Unknown." The Court thus dispensed with the filing of the comment and gave due course to the petition. No opposition was filed.

• Acknowledgment of Misconduct: Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession, conceding the bases for his disbarment.
• Remorse and Rehabilitation: Mejia maintained that he had long repented and had suffered enough after fifteen years of disbarment, expressing a desire for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement.
• Legacy and Redemption: Mejia argued that through reinstatement he wanted to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity they had suffered due to his disbarment.
• Post-Disbarment Conduct: Mejia pointed to his post-disbarment activities — publishing the Mejia Law Journal containing his religious and social writings and organizing a religious organization called "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind" — as evidence of his rehabilitation.

• Reinstatement: Whether Atty. Ismael F. Mejia should be reinstated to the Roll of Attorneys after fifteen years of disbarment for misappropriation of client funds, falsification of documents, and issuance of unfunded checks.

• Reinstatement: Yes. The petition for reinstatement was granted, the Court finding that fifteen years of disbarment had served the corrective purpose of the penalty and that Mejia had demonstrated remorse and rehabilitation with no further transgressions.

• Reinstatement: Whether an applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court, depending on whether the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicant's reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character and a fit and proper person to practice law, as in the case of a candidate for admission to the bar. The Court takes into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charges for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time elapsed between the disbarment and the application. Applying these factors, the Court found that fifteen years had passed since Mejia was disbarred — a severe penalty — and no other transgression had been attributed to him since 1992. He had shown remorse and acknowledged his indiscretions. While the Court did not lightly take the bases for Mejia's disbarment, it could not close its eyes to his advanced age and demonstrated rehabilitation. His punishment had lasted long enough, and penalties such as disbarment are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. The Court was thus inclined to grant the petition, while reminding Mejia that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions, including adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession.

• Standards for Reinstatement to the Roll of Attorneys — Whether a disbarred lawyer shall be reinstated rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court, and depends on whether the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be preserved by the applicant's reentry. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character and a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court considers four factors: (1) the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment; (2) the nature and character of the charges for which he was disbarred; (3) his conduct subsequent to the disbarment; and (4) the time elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. In this case, all four factors weighed in favor of reinstatement: Mejia had no further transgressions in fifteen years, demonstrated remorse, and the penalty had served its corrective purpose.

• Corrective Purpose of Disbarment — Penalties such as disbarment are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. The Court, while ever mindful of its duty to discipline erring officers, also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. This principle guided the Court to grant reinstatement after fifteen years, notwithstanding the gravity of the original offenses.

• Practice of Law as a Privilege Burdened with Conditions — The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Court reiterated this doctrine as a reminder to the reinstated lawyer.

• "Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicant's reentry as a counselor at law." — This passage states the governing standard for reinstatement, articulating the Court's discretion and the public-interest test that controls all reinstatement petitions.

• "The Court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement." — This passage enumerates the four-factor test the Court applies in evaluating petitions for reinstatement, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent legal ethics jurisprudence.

• "While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders." — This passage articulates the corrective philosophy underlying disbarment and the Court's willingness to show compassion when rehabilitation is demonstrated.

• Cui vs. Cui, 120 Phil. 725 (1964) — Cited as the source of the governing standard for reinstatement, establishing that reinstatement rests on the sound discretion of the Court and that the applicant must satisfy the Court of his good moral character and fitness to practice law, with consideration of the four factors enumerated.

• Tolentino vs. Mendoza, Adm. Case No. 5151, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 519 — Cited in support of the proposition that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions, including adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession.

• Barrientos vs. Libiran-Meteoro, Adm. Case No. 6408, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 209 — Cited alongside Tolentino vs. Mendoza for the same proposition regarding the conditional nature of the privilege to practice law.

• Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 132 — Cited alongside the preceding two cases in support of the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, and Associate Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Dante O. Tinga, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Cancio C. Garcia, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., and Ruben T. Reyes. All concurred in full; no separate concurring opinions were written.