Bernardo vs. Fernando

A claim of legitimate filiation is strictly personal to the child under Article 173 of the Family Code and passes to the child’s heirs only in the three instances specified by law. A birth certificate proves paternity only when the putative father had a hand in its preparation; the father’s signature is not indispensable if participation is otherwise shown, but a baptismal certificate proves only the administration of the sacrament, not parentage.

The consolidated cases concern five parcels of land left by the late Jose Chiong, originally titled in the collective name of the Heirs of Jose Chiong. Petitioner Mario Chiong Bernardo and petitioners Josefina L. Bernardo, Leticia L. Bernardo, Felix Bernardo, and Marcelo San Juan trace their claim to Jose Chiong through Barbara Chiong, while respondents Jose C. Fernando, Lilia C. Fernando, Noemi Fernando Molina, Cynthia C. Fernando, Aida Fernando Pointdexter, and Elsa Fernando are the Fernandos impleaded in both actions. The Family Code’s provisions on legitimate filiation, particularly Articles 172 and 173, and the Rules of Court on evidence and judicial notice provide the statutory and procedural backdrop.

The controversy centers on five parcels of land left by the late Jose Chiong, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. RT-26575, RT-26580, RT-26578, RT-26577, and RT-26576. On May 18, 1925, Jose Chiong executed a Deed of Donation over the subject properties in favor of Jose Chiong Fernando, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents. On June 18, 2002, respondents executed an “Affidavit of Identity [of] Heirs” in which they claimed to be the legal heirs of Jose Chiong. On the sole basis of that Affidavit, respondents caused the cancellation of the titles under the original collective name “Heirs of Jose Chiong” and had the properties transferred to their names under TCT Nos. T-165083 to T-165087.

On September 25, 2003, Mario, on behalf of the heirs of Jose Chiong, filed a complaint for Annulment, Reconveyance and Accounting with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84, docketed as Civil Case No. 194-M-2003. On November 17, 2003, Josefina, et al. and the heirs of Gregorio Domingo as unwilling co-plaintiffs filed a separate complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Declaration of Heirship and Partition before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 82 against the same respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 853-M-2003. The complaints were consolidated by Presiding Judge Wilfredo T. Nieves of Branch 84.

Mario alleged that his mother, Barbara Chiong, was born on December 4, 1912 in Manila to spouses Jose Chiong and Ambrosia Domingo, as shown by a certified photocopy of her certificate of birth issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and by a Certificate of Baptism dated January 13, 2006 showing that Barbara was baptized on March 2, 1913 at Our Lady of Most Holy Rosary in Binondo, Manila. Mario claimed that he and his siblings Eduardo Bernardo, Felix, and Josefina are the children of Barbara and, as grandchildren of Jose Chiong, are entitled to the subject properties. He asserted that respondents were not true heirs of Jose Chiong but only collateral relatives descended from Jose Chiong’s cousin through their maternal grandfather, and he assailed the Affidavit for irregularities, including that Lilia, one of the affiants, had already passed away when it was executed. On cross-examination, Mario acknowledged that he caused the correction of the spelling of his mother’s surname from “Chong” to “Chiong” through a request with the Local Civil Registrar of Valenzuela City after the complaint was filed; that in his marriage contract with Sevilla Delino he indicated the names “Mario Bernardo” and “Barbara Domingo” and explained he merely erred; and that Eduardo, Josefina, and Felix are his half-siblings by Jose Chiong and Leticia is his sister-in-law.

Josefina, et al. presented Edwin Flor Barroga, Deputy Register of Deeds of Bulacan, Tabang, Guiguinto Branch, who testified that the cancellation of the titles under the names of Heirs of Jose Chiong and the transfer to respondents were effected by virtue of the Affidavit, and that publication and presentation of the affiants before the court were not then deemed necessary under LRC Consulta Ruling No. 463 of the Land Registration Authority; he added that issuance of the titles in respondents’ names was ministerial upon presentation of the Affidavit. Atty. Ramon C. Sampana, then Register of Deeds of Bulacan, corroborated this and added that he was not required to examine beyond the face of the instrument submitted for registration, and that non-publication was in accordance with LRC Consulta Ruling No. 453 and a decision dated October 5, 1964 of the LRA in Consolacion Chikano, et al. vs. Register of Deeds of Samar. Candelaria delos Santos, Statistical Coordination I of the National Statistics Office, Provincial Branch, Malolos City, Bulacan, testified that her office had no birth records for Felix D. Bernardo, Josefina Bernardo, Eduardo Bernardo, Gregorio Chiong, Azucena P. Chiong, Apolonia D. Chiong, and Jose Antonio Fernando, Jr. Arlene Rosales, then City Civil Registrar of Valenzuela City, testified that the National Archives also had no records of the birth certificates of the above Bernardos and Chiongs, apart from Gregorio Domingo and Gregorio Chiong, and that persons born before 1945 could apply for registration at the LCR but the Bernardos and Chiongs never applied.

Respondents, in their Answer with Counterclaim, disputed Mario’s assertions and argued that their predecessor-in-interest, Jose Chiong Fernando, legally acquired the subject properties from Jose Chiong through the Deed of Donation executed on May 18, 1925; that the authenticity and enforceability of the donation were sustained by a CFI Decision dated November 24, 1969, which was not found in the records; and they prayed for dismissal and a counterclaim for damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. The RTC, in its Consolidated Decision dated November 10, 2008, found that Mario proved by preponderance of evidence that Barbara was the daughter of Jose Chiong, crediting Barbara’s birth certificate registered on December 7, 1912 and her baptismal certificate dated March 2, 1913, and holding that the absence of the dorsal portion containing acknowledgment did not remove the birth certificate’s authenticity. It explained the use of the surname “Domingo” by Ambrosia’s anger toward Jose Chiong and her refusal to let her children use “Chiong”; it held the correction of Mario’s surname spelling to be presumed proper; and it found that Mario’s open-court admission that Apolonia and Gregorio were legitimate and full-blooded siblings of Barbara sufficiently proved Josefina, et al.’s claim. The RTC dismissed respondents’ donation allegations for lack of documentary evidence, discredited the Affidavit as invalid for misrepresentation and lack of notarization, and ruled that even a legitimate donation would be subordinate to petitioners’ claim as legitimate heirs. The CA, on appeal, found no proof of a marriage between Jose Chiong and Ambrosia Domingo, no showing that Jose Chiong had a hand in Barbara’s birth certificate, no final judgment or written admission of legitimate filiation, and no probative value in the baptismal certificate for parentage; it also found no evidence of the legitimate filiation of Apolonia and Gregorio and held that Mario’s testimony was not a mode of proof under Article 172 of the Family Code.

• Inconsistent Claim of Respondents: Josefina, et al. argued that respondents cannot simultaneously claim entitlement to the subject properties as heirs of Jose Chiong through the Affidavit and, alternatively, as donees through a deed of donation in favor of Jose Fernando, because both bases cannot be true.
• Probative Value of Barbara’s Birth Certificate: Josefina, et al. maintained that Barbara’s birth certificate still holds probative value despite the lack of Jose Chiong’s signature, and that the Court must take judicial notice that during Barbara’s birth, prior to Commonwealth Act No. 3753, only the attending physician or midwife was required to sign birth certificates, without a similar requirement for the parents.
• Failure to Prove Bloodline and Invalid Affidavit: Mario argued that respondents failed to prove that they come from the bloodline of Jose Chiong and should not be entitled to own the subject properties; he also assailed the Affidavit as perjured and containing various misrepresentations.
• Documentary Evidence of Filiation: Mario contended that, contrary to the CA’s findings, he was able to offer documentary evidence to prove the legitimate filiation of his mother, Barbara, to Jose Chiong.
• Baptismal Certificate as Proof of Legitimacy: Mario argued by analogy that because the Catholic religion strictly prohibited baptism of children born out of wedlock at the time of Barbara’s baptism, the baptismal certificate could further prove a legitimate marriage between Jose Chiong and Ambrosia.

• Validity of the Donation: Respondents countered that their predecessor-in-interest, Jose Chiong Fernando, legally acquired the subject properties through a Deed of Donation executed by Jose Chiong on May 18, 1925, and that the validity of the donation was upheld by a November 24, 1969 decision of the CFI of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 1092, which found Jose Chiong missing for 10 years, declared presumptively dead, and without any issue.
• No Proof of Marriage: Respondents echoed the CA’s findings that none of the documents petitioners offered proved that Ambrosia was legally married to Jose Chiong.
• Documents Contrary to Petitioners’ Claim: Respondents argued that other documents submitted by petitioners even supported the contrary, in that the names of Barbara, Apolonia, and Gregorio were surnamed Domingo, not Chiong.
• Dismissal and Counterclaim: Respondents prayed for dismissal of the complaints and asserted a compulsory counterclaim for damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

• Standing to Claim Legitimate Filiation: Whether petitioners have standing to establish the legitimate filiation of Barbara to Jose Chiong when the action to claim legitimate filiation is strictly personal to the child under Article 173 of the Family Code and none of the statutory exceptions are shown.
• Proof of Barbara’s Legitimate Filiation: Whether petitioners sufficiently proved Barbara’s legitimate filiation to Jose Chiong through her birth certificate, baptismal certificate, and other evidence.
• Proof of Filiation of Apolonia and Gregorio: Whether petitioners sufficiently proved the legitimate filiation of Apolonia and Gregorio to Jose Chiong to support Josefina, et al.’s claim.
• Judicial Notice: Whether the Court may take judicial notice of the alleged pre-Commonwealth Act No. 3753 protocol on birth certificate signatures and the Catholic baptism practice invoked by petitioners.
• Entitlement to the Subject Properties: Whether petitioners have a cause of action for annulment of the Affidavit, reconveyance, accounting, and partition given their failure to prove legitimate filiation.

• Standing to Claim Legitimate Filiation: No. Under Article 173 of the Family Code, the action to claim legitimate filiation is strictly personal to the child and passes to the child’s heirs only when the child dies during minority, in a state of insanity, or after commencement of the action; none of these circumstances was shown.
• Proof of Barbara’s Legitimate Filiation: No. No valid marriage between Jose Chiong and Ambrosia was proved, so no presumption of legitimacy arose; Barbara’s birth certificate did not show Jose Chiong’s participation in its preparation, and her baptismal certificate proved only the administration of the sacrament.
• Proof of Filiation of Apolonia and Gregorio: No. No evidence was offered to prove their legitimate filiation to Jose Chiong; the certifications showed no birth records, and Mario’s testimony was not a mode of proof under Article 172.
• Judicial Notice: No. The alleged registry protocol is not among the matters subject to mandatory judicial notice under Rule 129, Section 1, and the Court declined to take discretionary judicial notice under Rule 129, Section 2.
• Entitlement to the Subject Properties: No. Without proof of legitimate filiation, petitioners had no right to demand reconveyance, annulment of the Affidavit, accounting, or partition; the CA correctly dismissed the complaints for lack of cause of action.

• Standing to Claim Legitimate Filiation: Article 173 of the Family Code makes the action to claim legitimate filiation strictly personal to the child whose filiation is in question, exercisable anytime within the child’s lifetime. The right passes to the child’s heirs only in three instances: when the child dies during minority, when the child dies in a state of insanity, or when the child dies after the commencement of the action. Although the records mention Barbara’s passing, nothing showed that she died under any of these circumstances. Petitioners therefore had no standing to prove Barbara’s legitimate filiation to Jose Chiong.

• Proof of Barbara’s Legitimate Filiation: Article 172 of the Family Code establishes legitimate filiation by the record of birth in the civil register or a final judgment, or by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned; absent these, by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The law leans toward legitimacy, but the presumption of legitimacy requires a valid marriage. No marriage certificate, marriage contract, or testimony established a marriage between Jose Chiong and Ambrosia, and no proof showed they held themselves out as man and wife. Thus, no presumption of legitimacy arose in Barbara’s favor. A birth certificate is a public document and prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, but for it to prove paternity, the putative father must have had a hand in its preparation. The Court cited Jison vs. Court of Appeals: a certificate of live birth identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father participated in its preparation, and the local civil registrar has no authority to record paternity upon the information of a third person. Contrary to the CA, the father’s signature is not indispensable; probative weight may be ascribed if it is shown that the putative father provided information for the entries or otherwise caused the registration of the birth. Here, however, there was neither Jose Chiong’s signature nor any other proof that he participated in preparing Barbara’s birth certificate. The baptismal certificate, as the CA correctly held, is evidence only of the administration of the sacrament on the dates specified, not of the veracity of the declarations concerning parentage. The judicial affidavits of Daniel S. Dionido and Ma. Julieta S. Dionido merely confirmed the relationship between Barbara and Mario as mother and child, not Barbara’s legitimate filiation to Jose Chiong. Petitioners therefore failed to discharge their burden.

• Proof of Filiation of Apolonia and Gregorio: The CA found no evidence to prove the legitimate filiation of Apolonia and Gregorio to Jose Chiong. The certifications of the Civil Registrar of Valenzuela City showed no records of their birth. The RTC relied solely on Mario’s testimony that Apolonia and Gregorio were full-blood siblings of Barbara, but such testimony is not among the modes of establishing legitimate filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code. No legitimate filiation was therefore established for Apolonia and Gregorio.

• Judicial Notice: Rule 129, Section 1 of the Rules of Court enumerates the matters a court must take judicial notice of without proof, and the alleged prescriptions governing the preparation and accomplishment of birth certificates in the system of registry do not fall under any of those categories. At best, the alleged past protocol may fall under Rule 129, Section 2, which allows discretionary judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known by judges because of their judicial functions. The Court was not convinced that the matter met these requisites. The additional claim that the baptismal certificate should be considered a certificate of birth because it was executed prior to an established system of registry, and the analogy based on the Catholic prohibition against baptizing children born out of wedlock, were belated and unsubstantiated.

• Entitlement to the Subject Properties: Having failed to establish Barbara’s legitimate status, petitioners could not recognize any legitimate filiation between Barbara and Jose Chiong. With no legitimate status upon which to ground their entitlement, no ancillary right arose for petitioners, and no right to demand reconveyance and annulment of the subject TCTs could be adjudged in their favor. The CA correctly dismissed the complaints for lack of cause of action.

• Legitimate Filiation Under Article 172 of the Family Code — Legitimate filiation is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of these, it may be proved by (1) open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The Court applied this provision and found that petitioners failed to present any of the primary modes or sufficient secondary evidence.

• Strictly Personal Action to Claim Legitimate Filiation Under Article 173 — The action to claim legitimate filiation is strictly personal to the child whose filiation is in question and may be exercised anytime within the child’s lifetime. The right passes to the child’s heirs only when the child dies during minority, when the child dies in a state of insanity, or when the child dies after the commencement of the action. The Court applied this rule to hold that petitioners lacked standing because none of the three exceptions was shown.

• Presumption of Legitimacy Requires a Valid Marriage — Every reasonable presumption leans toward legitimacy, and the status of a child is established from birth. However, the presumption of legitimacy applies only if the child was born in wedlock; without proof of a valid marriage between the parents, no presumption of legitimate filiation arises. The Court applied this rule because no marriage between Jose Chiong and Ambrosia was proved.

• Birth Certificate as Prima Facie Evidence of Filiation; Requirement of Putative Father’s Participation — A birth certificate, being a public document, is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. For a birth certificate to prove paternity, however, it must be shown that the putative father had a hand in its preparation. The putative father’s signature is not indispensable if it is shown that he provided information for the entries or otherwise caused the registration of the birth. The Court applied this rule and found no proof of Jose Chiong’s participation in Barbara’s birth certificate.

• Baptismal Certificate’s Limited Probative Value — A baptismal certificate is evidence only of the administration of the sacrament of baptism on the dates specified. It is not proof of the veracity of the declarations concerning the parentage of the person baptized. The Court applied this rule and held that Barbara’s baptismal certificate did not establish her legitimate filiation to Jose Chiong.

• Judicial Notice, Mandatory and Discretionary — Rule 129, Section 1 of the Rules of Court lists matters that courts must take judicial notice of without proof, while Rule 129, Section 2 allows discretionary judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known by judges because of their judicial functions. The Court applied these provisions and declined to take judicial notice of the alleged birth certificate protocol and Catholic baptism practice.

• "The law requires that every reasonable presumption leans towards legitimacy, and establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. Proof of filiation becomes necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought to be established." — This passage states the general rule on legitimacy and the circumstances that make proof of filiation necessary, framing the Court’s analysis of petitioners’ burden.
• "Relatedly, as provided by Article 173 of the Family Code, an action to claim legitimate filiation is strictly personal to the child whose filiation is in question, and he or she may exercise such anytime within his lifetime. The only three instances when such right passes to the child's heirs are: (1) when the child dies during minority; (2) when the child dies in a state of insanity; or (3) when the child dies after the commencement of the action." — This is the Court’s canonical statement of the standing rule under Article 173, which it applied to hold that petitioners could not claim Barbara’s legitimate filiation.
• "However, as the Court has held in several cases, for a birth certificate to prove paternity, it must be shown that the putative father had a hand in its preparation." — This passage articulates the key evidentiary requirement for using a birth certificate to prove paternity, which petitioners failed to satisfy.
• "To be sure, and contrary to the finding of the CA, the putative father's signature on the face of the birth certificate is not indispensable in ascribing probative weight to the same. For as long as it can be shown that the putative father participated in the preparation of the certificate of birth, e.g. when the putative father provided the information for the entries to the certificate, or otherwise caused the registration of the birth, probative weight can be ascribed." — This passage clarifies the Court’s rule on birth certificates, correcting the CA’s apparent requirement of the father’s signature while still requiring proof of participation.

• Jison vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998, 286 SCRA 495 — Quoted for the rule that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in its preparation; the local civil registrar has no authority to record paternity upon the information of a third person, and baptismal certificates are competent only to prove the administration of the sacrament.
• Perla vs. Baring, G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 101, citing Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals, 484 Phil. 42, 50 (2004) — Cited for the requirement that a birth certificate must be shown to have been prepared with the putative father’s participation before it can prove paternity.
• Ilano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994, 230 SCRA 242, 257 — Cited for the principle that probative weight may be ascribed to a birth certificate when the putative father provided the information for the entries.
• Arado vs. Alcoran, G.R. No. 163362, July 8, 2015, 762 SCRA 37, 52; Castro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-50974-75, May 31, 1989, 173 SCRA 656, 659 — Cited for the principle that probative weight may be ascribed when the putative father otherwise caused the registration of the birth.
• Sayson vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89224-25, January 23, 1992, 205 SCRA 321, 328 — Cited for the rule that a birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of filiation.
• Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 438 — Cited for the principles that every reasonable presumption leans toward legitimacy, that the status of a child is established from birth, and that proof of filiation becomes necessary when legitimacy is questioned.
• Geronimo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 197009, September 28, 2015, 771 SCRA 508, 521 — Cited for the rule that the need to prove filiation may only be raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of the child.
• Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 550 (1997) — Cited by the CA for the rule that the presumption of legitimacy, which may not be attacked collaterally, applies only if the child whose legitimacy is in question was born in wedlock.
• Angeles vs. Maglaya, 506 Phil. 347 (2005) — Cited by the CA for the view that the signature of the alleged father is necessary for a birth certificate to be validating proof of paternity; the Supreme Court clarified that the signature is not indispensable if participation is otherwise shown.
• Fernandez vs. Fernandez, 416 Phil. 322 (2001); Heirs of Pedro Cabais vs. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 681 (1999) — Cited for the rule that a baptismal certificate is evidence only of the administration of the sacrament on the dates specified, not proof of the veracity of declarations concerning parentage.

• Article 172, Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) — Outlines the modes of proving legitimate filiation: record of birth in the civil register or final judgment; admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument signed by the parent; and, in the absence of these, open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The Court applied this provision and found that petitioners failed to present sufficient proof under any mode.
• Article 173, Family Code — Provides that the action to claim legitimate filiation is strictly personal to the child and may be exercised anytime within the child’s lifetime; the right passes to the child’s heirs only when the child dies during minority, in a state of insanity, or after the commencement of the action. The Court applied this provision to hold that petitioners lacked standing.
• Rule 130, Section 44, Rules of Court — Provides that entries in official records made in the performance of official duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The Court recognized that Barbara’s birth certificate was a public document and prima facie evidence, but held that it did not prove paternity absent proof of Jose Chiong’s participation.
• Rule 129, Section 1, Rules of Court — Enumerates matters subject to mandatory judicial notice, including the existence and territorial extent of states, the law of nations, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and geographical divisions. The Court held that the alleged birth certificate protocol is not among these matters.
• Rule 129, Section 2, Rules of Court — Allows discretionary judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known by judges because of their judicial functions. The Court declined to take judicial notice of the alleged registry protocol and Catholic baptism practice under this provision.
• Commonwealth Act No. 3753 — Referenced by petitioners in arguing that, prior to its passage, only the attending physician or midwife was required to sign birth certificates, without a similar requirement for parents. The Court held that this claim was not a proper subject of judicial notice and was not proved.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The consolidated petitions were filed under Rule 45, providing the procedural vehicle for the Supreme Court’s review of the CA Decision.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson); Zalameda, J.; and Delos Santos, J., concurred. Carandang, J., was on official leave.