Bernardez, Jr. vs. City Government of Baguio

A city government may create and appoint a Building Official separate and distinct from the City Engineer under the Local Government Code and the National Building Code and its IRR; Section 477(a) of the Local Government Code does not preclude such separate office. The validity of a local ordinance, however, cannot be attacked collaterally.

Leo Bernardez, Jr. was the City Engineer of Baguio. The City Government of Baguio undertook a partial reorganization or restructuring of local departments under Ordinance No. 01, series of 2004, which appropriated P713,579,000.00. The legal backdrop includes Section 477(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, which states that the city and municipal engineer shall also act as the local building official, and Presidential Decree No. 1096 and its IRR, which provide for a Building Official and the authority of the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways.

Leo C. Bernardez, Jr. was the City Engineer of the City Government of Baguio. On January 1, 2004, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Baguio enacted Ordinance No. 01, series of 2004, appropriating P713,579,000.00 for the reorganization or restructuring of local departments. Pursuant to Ordinance No. 01, Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon issued Administrative Order No. 171, Series of 2004, on September 9, 2004, designating Engineer Oscar V. Flores, City Government Department Head II, as Acting Building Official of Baguio pending his appointment as Building Official. AO 171 recited that the City Government was implementing a partial reorganization or restructuring involving five departments under Ordinance No. 01; that the functions of a Building Official previously assumed by the City Engineer had been transferred to the newly created Building and Architecture Office; that a Building Official was needed to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1096 and related rules pending appointment of the head of the new office; and that the designation was sought to meet exigencies of the service and ensure continuity in processing building permits.

On December 1, 2004, Bernardez filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of AO 171 with prayer for a temporary restraining order, writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, and mandamus before the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. 5935-R. On June 10, 2005, he amended the complaint to implead the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways. Bernardez alleged that AO 171 usurped and divested his functions as City Engineer; that it violated Article VII, Section 477(a) of the Local Government Code, under which the appointment of an engineer is mandatory and the city or municipal engineer shall also act as local building official; that it undermined his security of tenure under the Civil Service Rules; that Ordinance No. 01 was an appropriation bill that could not include reorganization or restructuring and did not embrace the Office of the City Engineer or the creation of the Office of a City Building Official; that AO 171 was illegal; that there existed a de jure officer exercising the functions of Building Official; that the position was not vacant; and that Flores' assumption of the office was a usurpation causing oppression, deprivation, confusion, and illegal disbursement of public funds.

Respondents averred that AO 171 was a valid act of Mayor Yaranon to give effect to the restructuring of local departments pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160, as approved by the Department of Budget and Management and the Civil Service Commission, and that its implementation did not result in termination or diminution of Bernardez's salary, benefits, and rank. The Department of Public Works and Highways argued that it had no participation in the enactment of AO 171 and that it had authority to enforce the National Building Code, including the power to appoint Building Officials who act as deputies in enforcing the National Building Code.

The Regional Trial Court found that Bernardez voluntarily turned over his functions to the City Buildings and Architecture Office and desisted from exercising the functions of a Building Official; that his security of tenure as City Engineer was respected and his salary, benefits, and privileges were retained; and that he had admitted conformity to the reorganization during the budget deliberation hearing. The Court of Appeals agreed that the appointment of a separate local Building Official did not adversely affect his salary, benefits, and rank. Following the issuance and implementation of AO 171, Flores was later appointed as Department Head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office.

• Reorganization Without Legislative Authority: Petitioner argued that AO 171 suffered irregularities in its implementation, particularly on the subject of reorganization, because there was no legislative act authorizing the City Mayor of Baguio to effect the same pursuant to Republic Act No. 6656 and the 1986 Constitution.
• Improper Appropriation Measure: Petitioner asserted that Ordinance No. 01, from which AO 171 emanates, was an appropriation measure containing a non-appropriation measure—the reorganizing or restructuring of the departments of the City Government of Baguio—in violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the 1986 Constitution.
• Violation of Section 477 of the Local Government Code: Petitioner argued that when the City Buildings and Architecture Office was created pursuant to AO 171 with all the powers and duties of the Building Official, the City Government overstepped its powers of local legislation by not making petitioner, as then City Engineer, the head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office, contrary to Section 477 of the Local Government Code; he was thereby divested of his powers and duties as City Engineer and local Building Official.
• Invalid Appointment of Flores: Petitioner argued that Flores' appointment as Building Official by the Department of Public Works and Highways Secretary was invalid because the powers of the Department Secretary under the National Building Code do not include the appointment of Building Officials, but are limited only to designation under certain conditions; moreover, the position was not vacant at that time.
• Usurpation and Deprivation: Petitioner insisted that Flores' assumption as Building Official deprived him of his official functions and duties and unlawfully excluded him from the use and enjoyment of the office.
• No Exhaustion Required: Petitioner asserted that he need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court because the case involved purely legal issues.

• No Prohibition on Separate Building Official: Respondents countered that Article VII, Section 477(a) of the Local Government Code does not prohibit the appointment of a separate Building Official from the City Engineer; the provision must be read in conjunction with Section 205 of the National Building Code, which provides that the designation of the City Engineer as Building Official is merely provisional until a regular position of Building Official has been created, and Section 203, Rule II of the National Building Code allows the appointment of a Building Official separate and distinct from the Office of the City Engineer in all cities.
• Validation by CSC and DBM: Respondents pointed out that the appointment of Flores as Acting Building Official under AO 171, and his subsequent regular appointment as Department Head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office, were validated and approved by the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Budget and Management; his designation by the Department of Public Works and Highways Secretary as acting Building Official was also validated.
• Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: Respondent Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways countered that petitioner's premature invocation of the court's intervention, or his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, rendered his complaint without cause of action and it should be dismissed on that ground.
• No Cause of Action Against DPWH Secretary: Respondent Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways argued that petitioner had no cause of action against him because he did not participate in the issuance of AO 171, and AO 171 concerned matters of administration of local departments under the City of Baguio, which was beyond the jurisdiction of his office.

• Validity of AO 171: Whether AO 171 should be nullified for being contrary to law.
• Mootness: Whether the issue of AO 171's validity became moot and academic due to Flores' subsequent appointment as Department Head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office.
• Collateral Attack on Ordinance No. 01: Whether the validity of Ordinance No. 01 may be collaterally attacked in a complaint seeking nullification of AO 171.
• Separate Building Official: Whether Section 477(a) of the Local Government Code prohibits the appointment of a Building Official separate and distinct from the City or Municipal Engineer.
• Authority of the DPWH Secretary: Whether the Department of Public Works and Highways Secretary has authority under the National Building Code and its IRR to appoint local Building Officials.

• Validity of AO 171: No. The petition lacks merit; AO 171 is no longer operative, and the issue of its validity has become moot due to Flores' subsequent appointment as Department Head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office. The validity of Ordinance No. 01 cannot be collaterally attacked.
• Mootness: Yes. A case becomes moot and academic when supervening events leave no actual controversy and no useful purpose can be served by passing upon the merits; Flores' appointment as Department Head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office rendered AO 171 no longer operative.
• Collateral Attack on Ordinance No. 01: No. The validity of laws, orders, or rules with the force of law cannot be attacked collaterally, and a local ordinance enjoys a legal presumption of validity unless annulled in a direct proceeding.
• Separate Building Official: Yes. The Local Government Code empowers city governments to design their organizational structure and create offices, and Section 203(6), Rule II of the National Building Code IRR authorizes the appointment of a Building Official separate and distinct from the Office of the City or Municipal Engineer in all cities and municipalities.
• Authority of the DPWH Secretary: Yes. Under Tapay vs. Cruz, the authority to administer and enforce the National Building Code and the power to appoint Building Officials throughout the country pertain to the Secretary of Public Works and Highways and to no other official.

• Validity of AO 171: AO 171's subject matter was the designation of Flores as acting Building Official pending appointment of a Department Head of the newly created City Buildings and Architecture Office. After its issuance and implementation, Flores was later appointed as Department Head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office. With that succeeding appointment, AO 171 was no longer operative as regards his designation as acting Building Official. The issues raised—whether AO 171 and Flores' designation as acting Building Official were valid or null and void—had become moot. Petitioner's arguments in his petition also broadened the issue to include the reorganization of local departments, the creation of the City Buildings and Architecture Office, and Flores' appointment as Department Head, matters not covered by AO 171 and not directly challenged before the trial court. It would be improper to rule on their validity. If petitioner sought to strike them down, he should have prayed for nullification of the ordinance or administrative orders from which they were based. At best, he implicitly questioned Ordinance No. 01. The Regional Trial Court correctly held that a collateral attack on Ordinance No. 01 was proscribed. The legal presumption of Ordinance No. 01's validity stands unless annulled in a direct proceeding. Thus, AO 171 should not be nullified.
• Mootness: The Court applied the rule that a case becomes moot and academic when supervening events leave no actual controversy and no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness. Because Flores was appointed as Department Head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office, the issue of whether AO 171 and his designation as acting Building Official were valid had become moot. It would be futile to pass upon the validity or invalidity of AO 171, which was no longer operative.
• Collateral Attack on Ordinance No. 01: The Court reiterated that the validity of laws, orders, or other rules with the force of law cannot be attacked collaterally because there is a legal presumption of validity. Ordinance No. 01's validity therefore stands unless annulled in a direct proceeding. Petitioner's complaint primarily sought nullification of AO 171 and only implicitly questioned Ordinance No. 01; a collateral attack on the ordinance was proscribed.
• Separate Building Official: While Section 477(a) of the Local Government Code states that the city or municipal engineer shall also act as the local building official, the appointment of a separate Building Official, vis-à-vis the creation of the City Buildings and Architecture Office, is not without legal basis. Sections 18, 76, and 454(c) of the Local Government Code empower local government units to establish an organization, design and implement their own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and create other offices or consolidate functions in the interest of efficiency and economy. Section 203(6), Rule II of the National Building Code IRR authorizes the Secretary to appoint a Building Official separate and distinct from the Office of the City or Municipal Engineers in all cities and municipalities. It is within the legislative discretion of the City Government of Baguio to create the City Buildings and Architecture Office with the powers and duties of the Building Official. The creation of a separate Office of the City Building Official is not novel; highly urbanized cities have done so to address operational difficulties from the dual positions of City Engineer and Building Official. The functions of the Building Official and City Engineer are distinct: the Building Official enforces the National Building Code, issues building permits, and is under the supervision and control of the Department of Public Works and Highways Secretary; the City Engineer is responsible for infrastructure, public works, and engineering matters within the local government unit. These are separate positions that can be independently exercised. The Court harmonized the Local Government Code and the National Building Code IRR, applying the principle that every statute must be construed and harmonized with other statutes to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, while city or municipal engineers shall also act as local building officials, it is still within the legislative discretion of city or municipal governments to create and organize the office of the local Building Official separate and distinct from the Office of the City Engineer pursuant to the Local Government Code and National Building Code, including their IRRs.
• Authority of the DPWH Secretary: Petitioner questioned the validity of provisions giving the Department of Public Works and Highways Secretary authority to appoint Building Officials, arguing that the Local Government Code repealed certain National Building Code provisions and that the IRR unduly increased the Department's powers. The Court relied on Tapay vs. Cruz, where the Court En Banc recognized the authority of the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to appoint Building Officials. The Court adopted the opinion of then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez that the power to appoint Building Officials is vested solely in the Secretary as a corollary to the power to enforce and administer Presidential Decree No. 1096; Building Officials are deputies of the Secretary in enforcing the National Building Code and are national officials notwithstanding that their salaries are paid from local funds; their appointment is the prerogative of the Secretary, who is also authorized to designate incumbent Public Works District Engineers, City Engineers, and Municipal Engineers to act as Building Officials in the meantime that regular positions have not been provided. The Court reiterated that the authority to administer and enforce the National Building Code and the power to appoint Building Officials throughout the country pertain to the Secretary of Public Works and Highways and to no other official. A collateral attack on a presumably valid law cannot be countenanced, and the laws must be harmonized.

• Moot and Academic Principle — A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, there is no more actual controversy between the parties and no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness. The Court applied this doctrine because Flores' subsequent appointment as Department Head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office rendered AO 171 no longer operative, making it futile to rule on its validity.
• Collateral Attack on Laws, Orders, and Rules with the Force of Law — The validity of laws, orders, or other rules with the force of law cannot be attacked collaterally because there is a legal presumption of validity; they must be assailed in a direct proceeding. The Court applied this to Ordinance No. 01, holding that petitioner's implicit challenge to it in a complaint seeking nullification of AO 171 was a proscribed collateral attack.
• Local Government Power to Create Offices and Design Organizational Structure — Under Sections 18, 76, and 454(c) of the Local Government Code, local government units may establish an organization, design and implement their own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod may create other offices or consolidate functions in the interest of efficiency and economy. The Court used these provisions to uphold the City Government of Baguio's creation of the City Buildings and Architecture Office.
• Separate Local Building Official — Section 477(a) of the Local Government Code, stating that the city or municipal engineer shall also act as local building official, does not preclude the creation and appointment of a Building Official separate and distinct from the City Engineer. Section 203(6), Rule II of the National Building Code IRR authorizes the Secretary to appoint a Building Official separate and distinct from the Office of the City or Municipal Engineers in all cities and municipalities. The Court held that the Local Government Code and National Building Code IRR permit such separate office, especially because the functions of the Building Official and City Engineer are distinct.
• DPWH Secretary's Authority to Appoint Building Officials — The authority to administer and enforce the National Building Code and the power to appoint Building Officials throughout the country pertain to the Secretary of Public Works and Highways and to no other official. Building Officials are deputies of the Secretary and are considered national officials even if paid from local funds. The Court reiterated this doctrine from Tapay vs. Cruz.
• Harmonization of Laws — Statutes should be construed not only to be consistent with themselves but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent, and intelligible system; interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. The Court applied this principle to harmonize Section 477(a) of the Local Government Code with the National Building Code IRR's provision allowing a separate Building Official.

• "A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, there is no more actual controversy between the parties and no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Since they are constituted to pass upon substantial rights, courts of justice will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness." — This passage states the mootness rule applied by the Court because Flores' subsequent appointment as Department Head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office rendered AO 171 no longer operative.
• "We have consistently held that the validity of laws, orders, or such other rules with the force of law cannot be attacked collaterally. This is because there is a legal presumption of validity of these laws." — This passage articulates the collateral-attack rule relied on to reject petitioner's implicit challenge to Ordinance No. 01.
• "Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, this Court holds that while city or municipal engineers shall also act as local building officials of their respective cities or municipalities, it is still within the legislative discretion of city or municipal governments to create and organize the office of the local Building Official separate and distinct from the Office of the City Engineer pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions and limitations set by law, particularly the LGC and NBC, including their respective IRRs." — This is the ratio decidendi on the core substantive issue: a separate local Building Official may be validly created and appointed despite Section 477(a) of the Local Government Code.
• "In view of the foregoing, we reiterate the view that the authority to administer and enforce the provisions of the National Building Code, and the power to appoint Building Officials, throughout the country, including Metro Manila, pertain to the Secretary of Public Works and Highways and to no other official." — This passage, drawn from Tapay vs. Cruz, is the Court's controlling statement on the Department of Public Works and Highways Secretary's authority to appoint Building Officials.

• Tapay vs. Cruz, 264 Phil. 850 (1990) — Controlling precedent; the Court relied on it to hold that the authority to administer and enforce the National Building Code and the power to appoint Building Officials throughout the country pertain to the Secretary of Public Works and Highways and to no other official.
• Stradcom Corp. vs. Laqui, 685 Phil. 37, 46 (2012) — Cited for the rule on moot and academic cases; the Court used it to conclude that AO 171's validity had become moot due to Flores' subsequent appointment.
• San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs. Francisco Magno, G.R. No. L-21879 — Cited in the Regional Trial Court ruling, which the Supreme Court agreed with, for the rule that the validity of a local ordinance is not subject to collateral attack.
• Dreamwork Construction, Inc. vs. Janiola, 609 Phil. 245, 254 (2009) — Cited for the principle that every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws, and only when harmonization is impossible should the Court choose which law to apply.
• Palencia vs. People, G.R. No. 219560, July 1, 2020, citing Tan vs. Bausch Lomb, Inc., 514 Phil. 307, 316 (2005) — Cited for the rule that the validity of laws, orders, or rules with the force of law cannot be attacked collaterally because of the legal presumption of validity.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The petition was filed as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution.
• Article VII, Section 477(a), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Provides that the appointment of an engineer shall be mandatory for provincial, city, and municipal governments and that the city and municipal engineer shall also act as the local building official. The Court held this does not preclude the appointment of a separate Building Official.
• Section 18, Republic Act No. 7160 — Grants local government units the power and authority to establish an organization responsible for the efficient and effective implementation of their development plans, program objectives, and priorities. The Court relied on it to uphold the City Government's organizational restructuring.
• Section 76, Republic Act No. 7160 — Requires every local government unit to design and implement its own organizational structure and staffing pattern taking into consideration its service requirements and financial capability, subject to minimum standards and guidelines prescribed by the Civil Service Commission. The Court cited it as authority for local organizational design.
• Section 454(c), Republic Act No. 7160 — Empowers the Sangguniang Panlungsod to maintain existing offices, create such other offices as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the city government, or consolidate the functions of any office with another in the interest of efficiency and economy. The Court relied on it to support the creation of the City Buildings and Architecture Office.
• Section 477(b), Republic Act No. 7160 — Enumerates the powers and duties of the city engineer, including taking charge of the engineering office, advising the mayor on infrastructure and public works, and administering construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, and other engineering projects. The Court used it to distinguish the City Engineer's functions from those of the Building Official.
• Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code of the Philippines) — The law governing building officials and enforcement of building regulations. The Court cited it, including Sections 201 and 205, in discussing the Secretary's authority to administer and enforce the National Building Code and the provisional designation of City Engineers as Building Officials.
• Section 203, Rule II, Implementing Rules and Regulations of the National Building Code — Authorizes the Secretary to appoint a Building Official separate and distinct from the Office of the City or Municipal Engineers in all cities and municipalities. The Court relied on this to uphold the separate Building Official.
• Section 207, Rule II, Implementing Rules and Regulations of the National Building Code — Enumerates the duties of the Building Official, including enforcement of the Code and its IRR, administrative control over buildings and structures, processing of permit applications, and inspections. The Court cited it to show the distinct functions of the Building Official.
• Republic Act No. 6656 — Petitioner invoked this law, which protects the security of tenure of civil service officers and employees in government reorganization, to argue that there was no legislative act authorizing the City Mayor to effect reorganization. The Court did not resolve this argument because the issue had become moot and the ordinance could not be collaterally attacked.
• Article VI, Section 26(1), 1986 Constitution — Petitioner invoked this provision to argue that Ordinance No. 01, an appropriation measure, improperly contained a non-appropriation measure on reorganization or restructuring. The Court did not resolve the constitutional challenge because the ordinance was not directly attacked.

Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concurred. Perlas-Bernabe, J., was on official leave.