Bernaldes vs. Bohol Land Transportation, Inc.

A civil action for damages against a common carrier based on breach of contract of carriage (culpa contractual) may proceed independently of a criminal action against the carrier's driver, regardless of the result of the latter, and the aggrieved party's failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil action does not bar such action against the carrier.

The plaintiffs are the spouses Nicasio Bernaldes, Sr. and Perpetua Besas de Bernaldes, and their minor son Jovito, who sued through Nicasio, Sr. as guardian-ad-litem. The defendant, Bohol Land Transportation, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in business as a common carrier in the province of Bohol. The dispute stems from a bus accident that occurred on one of the carrier's passenger trucks, resulting in the death of one of the Bernaldes sons and serious injuries to another. The driver of the bus had been separately charged with double homicide thru reckless imprudence and acquitted, and the plaintiffs had participated in that criminal prosecution as private prosecutors without reserving the right to file a separate civil action for damages.

On November 27, 1958, Jovito Bernaldes and his brother Nicasio boarded one of Bohol Land Transportation, Inc.'s passenger trucks (B.L.T. Co. No. 322, plate No. 1470) in the town of Guindulman, Bohol, bound for Tagbilaran in the same province. On the way, the bus fell off a deep precipice in barrio Balitbiton, municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, resulting in the death of Nicasio and serious physical injuries to Jovito.

The driver of the bus, Leonardo Balabag, was subsequently charged with double homicide thru reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 2775 before the Court of First Instance of Bohol. The plaintiffs, through Attys. Amora and Tirol, intervened in the prosecution of the criminal case as private prosecutors but did not reserve the right to file a separate action for damages. The driver was acquitted on the ground that his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a separate civil action for damages against the carrier, alleging breach of contract of carriage. The defendant moved to dismiss on two grounds: that the cause of action was barred by a prior judgment, and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. The lower court, relying on Roa vs. de la Cruz, G.R. No. L-13134, promulgated February 13, 1960, sustained the motion on the ground of bar by prior judgment and dismissed the case. The record, however, contains no showing that the plaintiffs made any claim for damages against the driver or his employer during the criminal proceedings, nor that they attempted to prove such damages; the criminal court made no pronouncement concerning the civil liability of the driver or his employer.

• Independence of Civil Action: Petitioner maintained that a civil action for damages against the owner of a public vehicle, based on breach of contract of carriage, may be filed after the criminal action against the driver has been disposed of, even if the aggrieved party did not reserve the right to enforce civil liability in a separate action.
• Intervention Does Not Bar Separate Action: Petitioner argued that intervention through private prosecutors in the criminal case against the driver — who was acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence — does not bar a separate action against the driver's employer for damages based on breach of contract.

• Bar by Prior Judgment: Respondent argued that the civil action was barred by the prior judgment in the criminal case against the driver, given the plaintiffs' intervention as private prosecutors and their failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil action.
• Failure to State Cause of Action: Respondent maintained that the complaint did not state a cause of action.
• Claim Already Made in Criminal Case: Respondent asserted in its brief that the plaintiffs had made a claim for damages during the criminal proceedings, a contention the Court found unsupported by the record.

• Independence of Civil Action: Whether a civil action for damages against the owner of a public vehicle, based on breach of contract of carriage, may be filed after the criminal action instituted against the driver has been disposed of, if the aggrieved party did not reserve the right to enforce civil liability in a separate action.
• Effect of Intervention in Criminal Case: Whether the intervention of the aggrieved party, through private prosecutors, in the prosecution of the criminal case against the driver — who was acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence — will bar him from suing the latter's employer for damages for breach of contract in an independent and separate action.

• Independence of Civil Action: Yes. A civil action based on the contractual liability of a common carrier is distinct from the criminal action against the driver and may be instituted and prosecuted independently of, and regardless of the result of, the latter, pursuant to Article 31 of the New Civil Code.
• Effect of Intervention in Criminal Case: No. The intervention did not bar the separate action, as any claim in the criminal case could have been only against the driver and not against the carrier, which was not a party therein; moreover, the record showed no claim for damages was actually made or proved in the criminal case.

• Independence of Civil Action: Article 31 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that when the civil action is based upon an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. This provision refers to a civil action based on an obligation arising from other sources, such as law or contract, rather than on the act or omission charged as a felony. A civil action based on the contractual liability of a common carrier (culpa contractual) is governed by the Civil Code, not the Revised Penal Code, and is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action against the driver based on criminal negligence. The failure to reserve the right to recover civil indemnity against the carrier cannot be deemed a waiver of the right to institute a separate action against the carrier based on its contractual liability or on culpa aquiliana under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code, because such reservation is already implied in the law declaring the action independent. Furthermore, the duty to make such reservation applies only to the defendant in the criminal action, not to persons secondarily liable.
• Effect of Intervention in Criminal Case: Even if the plaintiffs' intervention as private prosecutors amounted inferentially to submitting a claim for civil indemnity in the criminal case, such claim could have been only against the driver and not against the carrier, which was not a party to the criminal proceedings. Moreover, contrary to the appellee's assertions in its brief, the record contains no showing that the plaintiffs made of record their claim for damages against the driver or his employer, nor that they attempted to prove such damages. The failure of the criminal court to make any pronouncement on civil liability was therefore due to the fact that the criminal action did not involve any claim for civil indemnity. Finally, because the driver was acquitted only on reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages against him may still be instituted for the same act or omission under Rule 107, par. (d) and Article 29 of the New Civil Code; a fortiori, the same must hold for his employer.

• Independence of Civil Action Based on Contract — A civil action based on the contractual liability of a common carrier (culpa contractual) is entirely separate and distinct from a criminal action against the carrier's driver based on criminal negligence. The former is governed by the Civil Code and may be instituted and prosecuted independently of, and regardless of the result of, the criminal action. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the plaintiffs' civil action for damages against the carrier was not barred by the prior acquittal of the driver in the criminal case.

• Reservation Requirement Limited to Criminal Defendant — The duty of the offended party to reserve the right to file a separate civil action applies only to the defendant in the criminal action, not to persons secondarily liable such as the employer-carrier. The Court relied on this principle to hold that the plaintiffs' failure to reserve did not bar their separate action against the carrier.

• Acquittal on Reasonable Doubt Does Not Bar Civil Action — An acquittal in a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence does not preclude a civil action for damages for the same act or omission, pursuant to Rule 107, par. (d) and Article 29 of the New Civil Code. The Court applied this rule to the driver and, by extension (a fortiori), to his employer.

• "Article 31 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that when the civil action is based upon an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." — This passage states the statutory basis for the independence of the civil action based on contract from the criminal proceedings, forming the core of the Court's ratio decidendi.

• "the failure, on the part of the appellants, to reserve their right to recover civil indemnity against the carrier can not in any way be deemed as a waiver, on their part, to institute a separate action against the latter based on its contractual liability, or on culpa aquiliana, under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code." — This passage defines the doctrine that the reservation requirement does not apply to actions against persons secondarily liable and does not constitute a waiver of the right to sue the carrier on contractual or quasi-delictual grounds.

• "the duty of the offended party to make such reservation applies only to defendant in the criminal action, not to persons secondarily liable" — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the rule limiting the reservation requirement to the criminal defendant, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the independence of civil actions.

• Roa vs. de la Cruz, G.R. No. L-13134 — Relied upon by the lower court to sustain the dismissal; effectively distinguished and limited, as the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal premised on this citation.

• Visayan Land Transportation Co. vs. Mejia, G.R. Nos. L-8830, L-8837-39 — Followed as controlling authority for the proposition that a civil action based on the contractual liability of a common carrier is separate and distinct from the criminal action and may proceed independently regardless of the result of the latter.

• Parker vs. Panlilio, G.R. No. L-4961 — Followed for the holding that failure to reserve the right to recover civil indemnity does not bar a separate action against the carrier based on contractual liability or culpa aquiliana.

• Chaves vs. Manila Electric, 31 Phil. 47 — Followed for the rule that the duty to reserve the right to file a separate civil action applies only to the defendant in the criminal action, not to persons secondarily liable.

• Article 31, New Civil Code — Provides that when the civil action is based upon an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Applied to hold that the civil action against the carrier based on contract of carriage was independent of the criminal case against the driver.

• Articles 1902-1910, Civil Code — Govern culpa aquiliana (quasi-delict). Cited to confirm that the failure to reserve does not bar a separate action against the carrier based on either contractual liability or quasi-delict.

• Article 29, New Civil Code — Provides that acquittal in a criminal case does not bar a civil action for damages for the same act or omission. Applied to hold that the driver's acquittal on reasonable doubt did not preclude a civil action against him or, a fortiori, his employer.

• Rule 107, par. (d), Rules of Court — Procedural counterpart of Article 29, allowing a civil action for damages despite acquittal in the criminal case. Cited in conjunction with Article 29 to support the remand.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.