Bermudo vs. Tayag-Roxas

An administrator of an estate who also serves as counsel for the sole heir in a suit contesting the latter's right to inherit is entitled to collect attorney's fees separate from his compensation as administrator, since acting as counsel in such suit is not part of his duties as administrator. An order of execution implementing a final judgment is not appealable; the proper remedy to contest the court's exercise of discretion in ascertaining the value on which the judgment is based is a special civil action of certiorari.

Atty. Ricardo Bermudo was appointed administrator of the estate of Artemio Hilario, who instituted Fermina Tayag-Roxas as his only heir. Several persons claiming to be Hilario's relatives opposed the petition for probate and administration. The Rules of Court, particularly Section 7, Rule 85, provides for the compensation of executors and administrators, while Section 1, Rule 109 enumerates the orders or judgments in special proceedings from which parties may appeal, including an order or judgment settling the account of an executor or administrator.

On October 19, 1979, Atty. Ricardo Bermudo, as executor, filed a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of Artemio Hilario and for the allowance and probate of the latter's will before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City. The testator instituted Fermina Tayag-Roxas as his only heir, but several persons who claimed to be Hilario's relatives opposed the petition. On October 28, 1987, the RTC rendered a decision allowing the will and recognizing Roxas as Hilario's sole heir. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision, and this Court sustained the CA decision on December 7, 1992.

When the decision constituting Roxas as the sole heir became final, Atty. Bermudo, who also served as counsel for her in the actions concerning her inheritance, filed a motion to fix his legal fees and to constitute a charging lien against the estate for the legal services he rendered. On August 16, 1995, the RTC granted him fees equivalent to 20% of the estate and constituted the same as a lien on the estate's property. Roxas appealed the order to the CA in CA-G.R. CV 53143.

On July 27, 2000, the CA rendered a decision modifying the RTC Order, limiting Atty. Bermudo's compensation as administrator to what Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court provides and making his lawyer's fees 20% of the value of the land belonging to the estate. Atty. Bermudo subsequently filed a motion with the RTC for execution and appraisal of the estate on which his 20% compensation would be based. On October 1, 2004, the RTC granted the motion and ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo ₱12,644,300.00 as attorney's fees with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Roxas challenged the order before the CA through a petition for certiorari.

On December 19, 2005, using a different valuation of the land of the estate, the CA ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo a reduced amount of ₱4,234,770.00 as attorney's fees with interest at 6% per annum. Atty. Bermudo's motion for reconsideration was denied, and he filed a petition for review before this Court in G.R. 172879. Roxas also filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the CA decision, and when this was denied, she filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. 173364.

• Appeal vs. Certiorari: Atty. Bermudo argued that Roxas' remedy for contesting the RTC order of execution against her should be an ordinary appeal to the CA, invoking Section 1, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court, which enumerates the orders or judgments in special proceedings from which parties may appeal, including an order or judgment which settles the account of an executor or administrator.
• Reduction of Attorney's Fees: Atty. Bermudo assailed the CA's reduction of his attorney's fees from ₱12,644,300.00 to ₱4,234,770.00, arguing that the RTC's higher amount was based on the advice of an amicus curiae regarding the value of the lands belonging to the estate.

• Entitlement to Attorney's Fees: Roxas asserted that Atty. Bermudo is not entitled to attorney's fees but only to compensation as administrator in accordance with Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court.

• Procedural Remedy: Whether the CA erred in not dismissing Roxas' special civil action of certiorari when her remedy should have been an appeal from the settlement of his account as administrator.
• Entitlement to Attorney's Fees: Whether the CA erred in holding that Atty. Bermudo, as administrator, is entitled to collect attorney's fees.
• Reduction of Attorney's Fees: Whether the CA erred in reducing Atty. Bermudo's attorney's fees from ₱12,644,300.00 to ₱4,234,770.00.

• Procedural Remedy: No. The earlier award in Atty. Bermudo's favor did not settle his account as administrator but fixed his attorney's fees for legal services rendered in the suit contesting Roxas' right as sole heir. Consequently, Section 1(d) of Rule 109 does not apply. The fixing of the value of the estate's lands at ₱12,644,300.00 was not appealable since it did not constitute a new judgment but an implementation of a final one; an order of execution is not appealable under Section 1(f), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
• Entitlement to Attorney's Fees: Yes. Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate; he also served as Roxas' counsel in the suit that assailed her right as sole heir, bringing the contest all the way up to this Court. Acting as counsel in that suit was not part of his duties as administrator, so it was just that he be paid his attorney's fees. Moreover, his right to attorney's fees had been settled with finality in CA-G.R. CV 53143.
• Reduction of Attorney's Fees: No. The CA found the RTC's reliance on the advice of an amicus curiae unwarranted and instead used the values established by the Angeles City Assessor. Given their wide experience and the official nature of their work, the city assessors' opinions deserve great weight and reliability, so the Court sustained the CA's computation.

• Procedural Remedy: The Court reasoned that Section 1, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the orders or judgments in special proceedings from which parties may appeal, including an order or judgment which settles the account of an executor or administrator. The rationale behind this multi-appeal mode is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. However, the earlier award in Atty. Bermudo's favor did not settle his account as administrator; rather, it fixed his attorney's fees for the legal services he rendered in the suit contesting Roxas' right as sole heir. The CA decided with finality the award of attorney's fees in CA-G.R. CV 53143 when it fixed such fees at 20% of the value of the estate's lands. On remand, Atty. Bermudo filed a motion for execution of the award, which could be carried out only after the RTC determined what represented 20% of the value of the estate's lands. The fixing of such value was not appealable since it did not constitute a new judgment but an implementation of a final one. An order of execution is not appealable under Section 1(f), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, Roxas' remedy in contesting the RTC's exercise of discretion in ascertaining what constitutes 20% of the value of the estate's lands is a special civil action of certiorari.
• Entitlement to Attorney's Fees: The Court held that Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate; he also served as Roxas' counsel in the suit that assailed her right as sole heir. He brought the contest all the way up to this Court to defend her rights to her uncle's estate, and he succeeded. Acting as counsel in that suit for Roxas was not part of his duties as administrator of the estate. Consequently, it was but just that he be paid his attorney's fees. Furthermore, Atty. Bermudo's right to attorney's fees had been settled with finality in CA-G.R. CV 53143, and the Court could no longer entertain Roxas' lament that he is not entitled to those fees.
• Reduction of Attorney's Fees: The Court noted that in fixing the higher amount of ₱12,644,300.00, the RTC relied on the advice of an amicus curiae regarding the value of the lands belonging to the estate. The CA found such procedure unwarranted, set aside the RTC's valuation, and used the values established by the Angeles City Assessor for computing the lawyer's fees of Atty. Bermudo. The Court found no compelling reason to deviate from the CA's ruling, holding that given their wide experience and the official nature of their work, the city assessors' opinions deserve great weight and reliability. Thus, the Court sustained the CA's computation based on the market values reflected on the schedule proposed by the Angeles City Assessor.

• Non-appealability of orders of execution — An order of execution is not appealable under Section 1(f), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the RTC's fixing of the value of the estate's lands at ₱12,644,300.00 was not appealable since it did not constitute a new judgment but an implementation of a final one; the proper remedy was a special civil action of certiorari.
• Administrator's right to attorney's fees separate from compensation — An administrator who also serves as counsel for the sole heir in a suit contesting the latter's right to inherit is entitled to attorney's fees separate from his compensation as administrator, since acting as counsel in such suit is not part of his duties as administrator. The Court applied this principle in affirming Atty. Bermudo's entitlement to attorney's fees.
• Weight given to city assessors' valuations — The opinions of city assessors deserve great weight and reliability given their wide experience and the official nature of their work. The Court applied this principle in sustaining the CA's computation of attorney's fees based on the market values reflected on the schedule proposed by the Angeles City Assessor.

• "But the earlier award in Atty. Bermudo's favor did not settle his account as administrator. Rather, it fixed his attorney's fees for the legal services he rendered in the suit contesting Roxas' right as sole heir. Consequently, Section 1 (d) of Rule 109 does not apply." — This passage defines the scope of Rule 109, Section 1(d) and establishes that the award of attorney's fees is distinct from the settlement of an administrator's account.
• "The fixing of such value at ₱12,644,300.00 was not appealable since it did not constitute a new judgment but an implementation of a final one. Indeed, an order of execution is not appealable." — This passage articulates the doctrine that orders of execution implementing a final judgment are not appealable, making certiorari the proper remedy.
• "But Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate. He also served as Roxas' counsel in the suit that assailed her right as sole heir. Atty. Bermudo brought the contest all the way up to this Court to defend her rights to her uncle's estate. And Atty. Bermudo succeeded. Acting as counsel in that suit for Roxas was not part of his duties as administrator of the estate. Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his attorney's fees." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for the Court's holding that an administrator-lawyer is entitled to attorney's fees separate from administrator's compensation.
• "Given their wide experience and the official nature of their work, the city assessors' opinions deserve great weight and reliability." — This passage establishes the evidentiary weight given to city assessors' valuations in computing attorney's fees.

• Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 810, 819 (1996) — Cited to support the rationale behind the multi-appeal mode in special proceedings, which is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.
• Francisco vs. Matias, 119 Phil. 351, 360 (1964) — Cited to support the principle that city assessors' opinions deserve great weight and reliability given their wide experience and the official nature of their work.

• Section 1, Rule 109, Revised Rules of Court — Enumerates the orders or judgments in special proceedings from which parties may appeal, including an order or judgment which settles the account of an executor or administrator. The Court held that this provision did not apply because the award of attorney's fees did not settle Atty. Bermudo's account as administrator.
• Section 1(f), Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that an order of execution is not appealable. The Court applied this provision in holding that Roxas' remedy was a special civil action of certiorari, not an appeal.
• Section 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court — Provides for the compensation of executors and administrators. The CA limited Atty. Bermudo's compensation as administrator to what this provision provides, while separately allowing his lawyer's fees.

• Justice Antonio T. Carpio
• Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
• Justice Diosdado M. Peralta
• Justice Jose Catral Mendoza