Bergonia vs. Court of Appeals

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy to assail a Court of Appeals resolution dismissing an appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief, such resolution being a final order reviewable via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Absent grave abuse of discretion, the CA's dismissal of an appeal under Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court will be sustained, and bare assertions of non-receipt of court notices will not overcome the presumption of regularity in postal and judicial records.

Spouses David Bergonia and Luzviminda Castillo were the plaintiffs in a civil case against Amado Bravo, Jr. before the RTC, Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela, docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 23-749-03. After the RTC rendered a decision adverse to them on January 21, 2008, the spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, the Law Firm of Lapeña & Associates substituted for the spouses' former counsel, Atty. Panfilo Soriano, entering its appearance in January 2009.

Spouses David Bergonia and Luzviminda Castillo filed Civil Case No. Br. 23-749-03 against Amado Bravo, Jr. before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela. On January 21, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision adverse to the spouses. Their motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April 25, 2008, which they received on May 6, 2008. The following day, May 7, 2008, the spouses filed a Notice of Appeal.

While the appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91665, the Law Firm of Lapeña & Associates entered its appearance as new counsel for the spouses, replacing former counsel Atty. Panfilo Soriano. The substitution was noted in a CA Resolution dated January 20, 2009, which also directed the appellants to remit a deficient amount of ₱20.00 within five days from notice. Thereafter, on January 30, 2009, the CA issued a Resolution requiring the filing of the Appellant's Brief within 45 days from receipt.

On April 8, 2009, respondent Amado Bravo, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, citing the petitioners' failure to file their Appellant's Brief within the 45-day period. The petitioners filed an Opposition/Comment on the same day, alleging that neither they nor their counsel had received any resolution from the CA requiring the filing of the brief. On May 18, 2009, the CA issued the assailed resolution dismissing the appeal as abandoned, pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, the period having expired on March 22, 2009.

On May 25, 2009, the CA issued a Resolution stating that the January 30, 2009 notice to file brief, addressed to petitioners' counsel, was received by a certain Ruel de Tomas on February 5, 2009. The petitioners filed a Compliance and Motion for Reconsideration on June 5, 2009, asserting they were never furnished a copy of the January 30, 2009 Resolution. In a Manifestation filed on June 16, 2009, the petitioners stated that their counsel's law firm had no employee named Ruel de Tomas, though an associate, Atty. Torenio C. Cabacungan, Jr., personally knew a person named "Ruel" who sometimes visited the office and may have accidentally received the resolution. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration on June 29, 2009, finding that the records clearly showed the resolution was received by Ruel de Tomas for petitioners' counsel and that mere denial of receipt could not be given weight absent proof that the person was neither an employee nor unknown to counsel.

• Improper Service: Petitioners argued that their failure to file the appellant's brief was due to the fact that they were never properly served with a copy of the January 30, 2009 Resolution of the CA directing them to file their brief.
• Unauthorized Receipt: Petitioners maintained that Ruel de Tomas, the person who apparently received the copy of the January 30, 2009 Resolution, was not an employee of their counsel's law firm and was not authorized to receive correspondence on counsel's behalf.
• Substantial Justice: Petitioners argued that the CA, in the interest of justice and equity, should have decided their appeal on the merits instead of dismissing it purely on technical grounds.

• Failure to File Brief: Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal citing Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, praying for dismissal of the petitioners' appeal for failure to file the Appellant's Brief within the 45-day period granted by the CA.

• Propriety of Remedy: Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail the CA's resolutions dismissing the appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal despite the petitioners' claim of non-receipt of the resolution requiring the filing of the appellant's brief.
• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: Whether the interest of substantial justice warrants the relaxation of procedural rules to set aside the dismissal of the appeal.

• Propriety of Remedy: No. The CA's resolutions dismissing the appeal are final orders, the proper remedy being a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion; the records, including the Judicial Records Division Report and the Postmaster's certification, showed that the January 30, 2009 Resolution was received at counsel's office, and the petitioners' bare denial was insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity.
• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: No. The bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that compels suspension of procedural rules; the petitioners' excuse was flimsy and discreditable, and no persuasive reason justified relaxation.

• Propriety of Remedy: The extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 is available only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The determination of the proper remedy depends on whether the assailed order is final or interlocutory. A final order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, leaving nothing but execution; an interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be adjudicated. The CA's May 18, 2009 and June 29, 2009 Resolutions completely disposed of the petitioners' appeal by considering it abandoned and dismissing it. Being final orders, the proper remedy was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not certiorari under Rule 65. The petitioners' resort to Rule 65 was therefore improper.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Grave abuse of discretion requires a showing that the power was exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner, amounting to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The CA's dismissal was pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes dismissal of an appeal for failure of the appellant to serve and file the required brief within the prescribed period. The CA was guided by the Report of its Judicial Records Division and the certification of the Postmaster of Quezon City, both of which indicated that the January 30, 2009 Resolution was received by Ruel de Tomas for petitioners' counsel on February 5, 2009. The CA found it highly implausible that any person in the building where counsel holds office would simply receive a correspondence delivered by a postman. The petitioners offered only bare assertions that Ruel de Tomas was not connected with their counsel, without adducing credible evidence. Their bare denial could not overcome the presumption of regularity in the preparation of postal and CA records. The CA's exercise of its discretionary authority to dismiss was therefore neither whimsical nor grossly abusive.

• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: While the Court has in some instances relaxed procedural rules to serve substantial justice, such liberality applies only in proper cases and under justifiable circumstances. The petitioners' excuse for non-compliance was flimsy and discreditable. They not only neglected to file their brief within the prescribed period but also failed to seek an extension before the period lapsed. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right, and must be exercised in accordance with the Rules. The bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" does not automatically compel suspension of procedural rules. Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases, and strict compliance is indispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition of justice. No cogent reason existed to exempt the petitioners from the effects of their non-compliance.

• Final Order vs. Interlocutory Order — A judgment or order is final if it disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The distinction determines the proper remedy: appeal (or petition for review under Rule 45) for final orders, and certiorari under Rule 65 for interlocutory orders issued with grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the CA's resolutions dismissing the appeal as abandoned were final orders, making Rule 45 — not Rule 65 — the proper remedy.

• Presumption of Regularity in Postal and Judicial Records — The records of the Post Office and those of the CA are presumed to have been regularly prepared in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Bare assertions of non-receipt by a party or counsel cannot overcome this presumption. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the CA's finding that the January 30, 2009 Resolution was duly received at counsel's office, the Judicial Records Division Report and the Postmaster's certification having established receipt by Ruel de Tomas on February 5, 2009.

• Right to Appeal as a Statutory Privilege — The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in accordance with the law and the Rules of Court. A party who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the requirements of the Rules; failing to do so, the right is lost. Strict compliance with the Rules is indispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition of justice.

• Liberality in Application of Procedural Rules — Procedural rules may be relaxed only for the most persuasive of reasons, to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. The bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that compels the Court to suspend procedural rules. Liberality applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances, and may not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of justice.

• "The bare invocation of 'the interest of substantial justice' is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights." — This passage articulates the controlling principle governing when procedural rules may be relaxed, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the tension between technical compliance and substantial justice.

• "A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved party's remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65." — This passage provides the canonical formulation distinguishing final from interlocutory orders and mapping the corresponding remedies, drawn from Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division).

• "The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost." — This passage states the fundamental nature of the right to appeal and the consequence of non-compliance with procedural rules, reiterated from Dimarucot vs. People of the Philippines.

• Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 152375, December 16, 2011 — Followed as the controlling authority for distinguishing final orders from interlocutory orders and identifying the corresponding remedies (appeal/Rule 45 for final orders; certiorari under Rule 65 for interlocutory orders).
• Asian Spirit Airlines vs. Spouses Bautista, 491 Phil 476 (2005) — Followed for the principle that procedural rules are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons, and that liberality in their application may not be invoked if it results in wanton disregard of the rules or needless delay.
• Dimarucot vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183975, September 20, 2010, 630 SCRA 659 — Followed for the principle that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right, and that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition of justice.
• Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil 733 (2002) — Cited for the proposition that the CA's authority to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief is a matter of judicial discretion, and that bare denial of receipt cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in postal and judicial records.
• Lazaro vs. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil 412 (2000) — Cited for the principle that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights.

• Section 1(e), Rule 50, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Authorizes the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal on its own motion or on that of the appellee for failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of the brief or memorandum within the time provided by the Rules. The CA invoked this provision to dismiss the petitioners' appeal as abandoned.
• Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case or a particular matter therein. The Court relied on this provision to establish that the proper remedy against the CA's final order of dismissal was a petition for review under Rule 45.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, available only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court held this remedy was unavailable because the CA's dismissal was a final order reviewable under Rule 45.

Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson, Second Division), Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, and Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per Special Order No. 1174 dated January 9, 2012).