Berenguer-Landers vs. Florin

A lawyer who holds a quasi-judicial office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar when misconduct in the discharge of official duties also violates the lawyer’s oath; issuing a writ of execution or possession before the order has become final and executory, and despite a pending appeal, constitutes ignorance of the law and an obstinate disregard of applicable rules warranting suspension. A judge or quasi-judicial officer may not be disciplined for a mere error of judgment absent conscious and deliberate intent to cause injustice, but such protection does not cover obstinate disregard of the law.

Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer, together with other Berenguers, were registered owners of a 58.0649-hectare landholding in Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. The Department of Agrarian Reform issued a notice of coverage over the land under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, while the Berenguers sought exclusion on the ground that the land was used exclusively for livestock pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 09. Respondent Isabel E. Florin was the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator; Marcelino Jornales was Assistant Regional Director for DAR; and Pedro Vega was DAR Legal Officer V. The controversy concerns disciplinary liability of lawyers serving in the DAR’s quasi-judicial and administrative system.

Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer, together with Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, Carlo Berenguer, and Belinda Berenguer-Aguirre, were the registered owners of a 58.0649-hectare landholding in Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. In April 1998, the Department of Agrarian Reform issued a notice of coverage over the landholding pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. The Berenguers protested and applied for exclusion of their land and for a notice to lift coverage, asserting that the landholding had been used exclusively for livestock pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 09.

In October and November 1998, without acting on the application for exclusion, the DAR Secretary cancelled the Berenguers’ certificates of title and issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award in favor of members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (BARIBAG). DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug later denied the application for exclusion in an Order dated February 15, 1999, relying on the Investigation Report dated February 9, 1999 submitted by DAR Region V, which stated that the area sought to be excluded was principally devoted to coconuts and not to livestock. The Berenguers filed a notice of appeal with the DAR Secretary.

While the appeal was pending, BARIBAG filed a petition for implementation of the February 15, 1999 Order before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. Florin, as RARAD, granted the petition in an Order dated March 15, 1999 and directed the issuance and implementation of a Writ of Possession. The Berenguers moved for reconsideration on March 19, 1999, claiming denial of due process because they were not furnished a copy of BARIBAG’s petition; Florin denied the motion in an Order dated March 22, 1999. The Berenguers then appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board on March 25, 1999. BARIBAG filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the Berenguers opposed as premature because of the pending appeal; BARIBAG also filed a Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff.

On April 6, 1999, DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S. Navarro denied the Berenguers’ appeal. On April 8, 1999, Florin issued a Resolution granting BARIBAG’s Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff and ordering the issuance of the writ of possession. The Berenguers filed a motion to set aside the Resolution on April 13, 1999, arguing that the DARAB had acquired jurisdiction over the case when they seasonably appealed and that Florin should have waited for the DARAB’s decision. Florin denied the motion on April 21, 1999, prompting the Berenguers to move for her inhibition on the ground of partiality. The Berenguers elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through two petitions for certiorari, CA-G.R. SP No. 51858 and CA-G.R. SP No. 53174, both of which were denied—the first outright on procedural grounds and the second for lack of jurisdiction and wrong mode of appeal. Florin issued a Writ of Possession in favor of BARIBAG on April 21, 1999 and subsequently directed its full implementation despite the Berenguers’ protestations; on June 3, 1999, the Berenguers moved to quash the writ, to no avail.

On August 4, 1999, the complainants filed the instant complaint for disbarment against Florin, Jornales, and Vega, alleging that they conspired and confederated in rendering unjust orders and resolutions, issuing and implementing the writs without authority and without certification of finality, refusing to act on pleadings and to forward the appeal, interfering with the lawyer-client relationship, and assisting in the illegal implementation of the writ. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. In its Decision dated December 26, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 53174, the Court of Appeals observed that BARIBAG was not a party to the Berenguers’ application for exclusion filed with the DAR Regional Director, that Florin never acquired jurisdiction over BARIBAG, and that the order of the Regional Director was not yet final and executory when Florin issued the writs of execution and possession.

• Unjust Judgment and Orders: Complainants alleged that Florin, as Regional Adjudicator, knowingly rendered unjust judgment, orders, and resolutions adverse and prejudicial to their interests.
• Writ of Execution and Possession Without Authority: Complainants alleged that Florin issued an order and granted a writ of execution ex parte and subsequently issued and signed a writ of possession without a certification of finality from the proper officer, knowing she had no authority and disregarding the DARAB Rules; they also alleged that she hid the writ despite their request for a copy.
• Refusal to Act and Denial of Due Process: Complainants alleged that Florin refused to take action on pleadings filed through counsel, failed and refused to conduct a hearing as prayed for, and failed and refused to forward the appeal to the proper appellate board.
• Interference with Counsel and Contempt: Complainants alleged unwarranted interference in the lawyer-client relationship to their and their lawyer’s prejudice, and abuse of authority in citing their counsel for contempt and issuing an order of arrest without hearing contrary to the Rules of Court.
• Conspiracy of Jornales and Vega: Complainants alleged that Jornales and Vega, despite knowledge of the illegality of the writ of possession, persisted and assisted in its illegal implementation to the prejudice of legitimate farmers and the complainants.

• Florin — Validity and Basis of the Writ: Florin maintained that the writ of possession was anchored on the CLOAs issued by the Register of Deeds, not on a final and executory decision requiring a certification of finality under the DARAB rules.
• Florin — No Concealment and Regular Performance: Florin claimed that Atty. Federico De Jesus, the Berenguers’ counsel, was not furnished a copy of the writ because it was not yet issued when requested; there was no intent to hide the writ; when signed, it was delivered to the sheriff for service and enforcement; and it was unfair to impute illegal acts to Vega and Jornales given the DAR’s denial of the motion for a cease and desist order and the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of duty.
• Florin — Prior Petitions and Undisturbed Findings: Florin argued that the petitions for certiorari filed with the CA were both dismissed and that the DAR findings and issuance of the CLOAs remained undisturbed; she also claimed that it was Atty. De Jesus, not the Berenguers, who wanted her disbarred.
• Florin — Jurisdiction and Due Process (Opposition): In her opposition, Florin averred that jurisdiction was acquired over BARIBAG when it filed a petition for implementation of the February 15, 1999 Order; that the DARAB has jurisdiction to issue the CLOAs; that as RARAD she had concurrent jurisdiction with the DARAB; that the Berenguers were not denied due process; and that the Berenguers never questioned the regularity of the DAR’s acquisition of their landholding nor filed a petition for cancellation of the CLOAs issued to BARIBAG.
• Vega — No Illegal Act and No Participation: Vega denied the allegations, arguing that the writ of possession was not illegal absent a court order stating its invalidity; that he did not participate in the issuance of the writ because he did not appear as the farmers’ counsel; that the Legal Division he heads has no control or influence over the DARAB; and that his presence during the execution was to ascertain that no violations of law were committed by those executing the writ.
• Jornales — No Prima Facie Infirmity and No Authority: Jornales argued that the writ had no prima facie infirmity; that he was not privy to its issuance; that he had no supervision and control over the DAR which issued the writ; and that he had no authority to determine its validity or invalidity. He admitted being in a meeting presided by the PNP Provincial Director of Sorsogon prior to the writ’s implementation in his capacity as Regional Assistant Director for Operations of DAR Region V, not as a lawyer, and added that the disbarment complaint was malicious, lacked legal basis, and was meant to harass and intimidate DAR employees implementing the CARP.

• Discipline of a Quasi-Judicial Officer as a Lawyer: Whether a lawyer holding a quasi-judicial office, such as a Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, may be administratively disciplined as a member of the Bar for acts committed in the discharge of official functions.
• Validity of the Writs and Florin’s Liability: Whether Florin’s issuance of the writ of execution and writ of possession despite the pendency of the Berenguers’ appeal and before the order had become final and executory constituted a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility warranting disciplinary sanction.
• Liability of Jornales and Vega: Whether Jornales and Vega should be disciplined for allegedly conspiring and assisting in the illegal implementation of the writ of possession.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty recommended by the IBP should be imposed or modified.

• Discipline of a Quasi-Judicial Officer as a Lawyer: Yes. A lawyer in government service may be disciplined as a member of the Bar if misconduct in official duties also violates the lawyer’s oath; Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service.
• Validity of the Writs and Florin’s Liability: Yes. The appeal stayed the order, and only the DAR Secretary could order execution pending appeal; Florin’s issuance of the writs before finality and without such authority constituted ignorance of the law and obstinate disregard of applicable rules.
• Liability of Jornales and Vega: No. The complaint against them was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges.
• Penalty: The IBP’s recommended penalty was modified. Florin was suspended from the practice of law for three months, the Court finding no malice or bad faith but an obstinate disregard of the law.

• Discipline of a Quasi-Judicial Officer as a Lawyer: Rule 138, Section 27 allows disbarment or suspension for deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, violation of the lawyer’s oath, or willful disobedience. In Lahm III vs. Mayor, Jr., gross misconduct is defined as any inexcusable, shameful, or flagrant unlawful conduct by a person concerned with the administration of justice, prejudicial to the rights of parties or the right determination of the cause, generally with a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose. While a lawyer who holds a government office may not generally be disciplined as a Bar member for misconduct in the discharge of official duties, Atty. Vitriolo vs. Atty. Dasig holds that if the misconduct also violates the lawyer’s oath, the Court may discipline the lawyer as a member of the Bar. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Tadlip vs. Atty. Borres, Jr. likened an administrative case against a DARAB provincial adjudicator for acts in that capacity to administrative cases against judges. Florin, as RARAD, performed quasi-judicial functions akin to those of a judge, so the controversy was treated like an administrative complaint against a judge.
• Validity of the Writs and Florin’s Liability: Section 29 of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00 provides that an appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to the Secretary stays the order appealed from unless the Secretary directs execution pending appeal. The Berenguers’ appeal to the DAR Secretary stayed the implementation of Regional Director Dalugdug’s February 15, 1999 Order, and only the DAR Secretary had jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal. No order by the DAR Secretary directing execution during the pendency of the appeal appeared in the records. Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court allows execution only after a decision or order has become final and executory, or pending appeal only upon good reasons stated in a special order after due hearing, or for several, separate, or partial judgments. Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB similarly provides that execution shall issue upon an order, resolution, or decision that finally disposes of the action or proceeding and upon expiration of the period to appeal if no appeal has been perfected; execution pending appeal must be filed before the Board, which may grant it upon meritorious grounds and upon posting of a sufficient bond. The February 15, 1999 Order was not final and executory because it was seasonably appealed to the DAR Secretary, and nothing showed that BARIBAG posted a bond. While a judge may not be disciplined for an error of judgment absent proof of conscious and deliberate intent to cause injustice, the facts showed otherwise: Florin’s issuance of the writ of execution and writ of possession to implement the February 15, 1999 Order constituted ignorance of the law, since a writ of execution issues only after the subject judgment or order has become final and executory. As IBP Commissioner San Juan stated, Florin ordered the writs despite the pendency of the appeal with the DARAB. The Court thus found merit in the recommendation of suspension.
• Liability of Jornales and Vega: The Court agreed with and adopted the IBP’s finding that no sufficient evidence was adduced to substantiate the charges against Jornales and Vega. Their complaint was dismissed.
• Penalty: Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice are administratively sanctioned. It appeared that this was the first time Florin was made administratively liable. Although there was no showing that malice or bad faith attended the acts complained of, that did not negate the fact that Florin executed an act that would cause an injustice to the Berenguers. The act of issuing the writ of execution and writ of possession was not simply an honest error in judgment but an obstinate disregard of applicable laws and jurisprudence. The Court deemed it reasonable to reconsider the penalty recommended and instead imposed suspension for three months without pay. Rallos vs. Judge Gako, Jr. was cited, where three months suspension without pay was imposed against a judge after finding that the ignorance of law committed was not tainted with bad faith.

• Discipline of Lawyers in Government Service — A lawyer who holds a government office may not generally be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of official duties. However, if the misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of the lawyer’s oath, the lawyer may be disciplined by the Supreme Court as a member of the Bar. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. The Court applied this to Florin, a RARAD performing quasi-judicial functions akin to a judge.
• Quasi-Judicial Officers and Judicial Discipline — An administrative case against a lawyer for acts committed as a provincial adjudicator of the DARAB may be likened to administrative cases against judges because the adjudicator is part of the quasi-judicial system. The Court treated Florin’s case similarly, examining whether her official acts warranted disciplinary sanction.
• Gross Misconduct — Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful, or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; it is conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause, generally with a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose. The Court found Florin’s issuance of the writs to be an obstinate disregard of applicable laws and jurisprudence.
• Error of Judgment vs. Sanctionable Judicial Error — A judge may not be disciplined for an error of judgment absent proof that the error was made with conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice are administratively sanctioned. The Court found Florin’s acts were not a mere honest error but an obstinate disregard of the law.
• Execution Before Finality and Effect of Appeal — Under Section 29 of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00, an appeal to the Secretary stays the order appealed from unless the Secretary directs execution pending appeal. Under Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court, execution may issue only after a decision or order has become final and executory, or pending appeal only upon good reasons stated in a special order after due hearing, or for several, separate, or partial judgments. Under Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB, execution shall issue upon an order, resolution, or decision that finally disposes of the action or proceeding, and execution pending appeal must be filed before the Board upon meritorious grounds and posting of a sufficient bond. The Court applied these rules to hold that Florin issued the writs prematurely.
• Penalty for Ignorance of Law Without Bad Faith — Where ignorance of the law is not tainted with bad faith, a penalty of three months suspension without pay may be imposed. The Court cited Rallos vs. Judge Gako, Jr. and imposed three months suspension without pay on Florin, considering it was her first administrative liability.

• "Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar." — This states the exception allowing discipline of government lawyers and is central to the Court’s jurisdiction over Florin.
• "A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose." — This defines gross misconduct, the standard applied to Florin.
• "Based on the foregoing provision, the appeal of the Berenguers to the DAR Secretary clearly stayed the implementation of Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999. Moreover, it is the DAR Secretary who has jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal. Records reveal that there was no order by the DAR Secretary directing execution of the Order dated February 15, 1999 during the pendency of the Berenguers’ appeal." — This is the ratio for why the writs were premature and Florin acted without authority.
• "Florin’s issuance of the writ of execution and writ of possession in order to fully implement Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999 clearly constitutes ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of execution is issued only after the subject judgment or order has already become final and executory." — This states the Court’s conclusion on Florin’s liability.

• Lahm III vs. Mayor, Jr., A.C. 7430, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 1 — Cited for the definition of gross misconduct and the standard for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer for misconduct showing fault or deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor.
• Atty. Vitriolo vs. Atty. Dasig, 448 Phil. 199 (2003) — Cited for the rule that a lawyer in government service may be disciplined as a member of the Bar if the misconduct in the discharge of official duties also violates the lawyer’s oath; also cited for Canon 6’s application to government lawyers.
• Tadlip vs. Atty. Borres, Jr., 511 Phil. 56 (2005) — Cited for the rule that an administrative case against a lawyer for acts committed as a provincial adjudicator of the DARAB may be likened to administrative cases against judges because he is part of the quasi-judicial system.
• Dipatuan vs. Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 48 — Cited for the rule that a judge may not be disciplined for an error of judgment absent proof that the error was made with conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice.
• Cabang vs. Basay, G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 172 — Cited for the rule that a writ of execution is issued only after the subject judgment or order has already become final and executory.
• Atty. Claro vs. Judge Efondo, 494 Phil. 220 (2005) — Cited for the rule that judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice are administratively sanctioned.
• Rallos vs. Judge Gako, Jr., 398 Phil. 60 (2000) — Cited for the penalty of three months suspension without pay imposed against a judge where the ignorance of law committed was not tainted with bad faith.

• Rule 138, Section 27, Rules of Court — Provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension of attorneys, including deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, violation of the lawyer’s oath, and willful disobedience. The Court cited it as the basis for disciplinary sanction and found Florin guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
• Canon 6, Code of Professional Responsibility — States that the Canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. The Court cited it to reject the notion that government lawyers are exempt from professional discipline for official misconduct.
• Section 29, DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00 — Provides that an appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to the Secretary shall stay the order appealed from unless the Secretary directs execution pending appeal. The Court applied it to hold that the Berenguers’ appeal stayed the February 15, 1999 Order and that only the DAR Secretary could order execution pending appeal.
• Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Court — Provides the instances when execution may issue: after a decision or order has become final and executory; pending appeal, only upon good reasons stated in a special order after due hearing; and execution of several, separate, or partial judgments. The Court cited it to show that the writs were issued without legal basis because the order was not final and no special order or hearing authorized execution pending appeal.
• Rule XX, Sections 1 and 2, 2009 Rules of DARAB — Section 1 provides that execution shall issue upon an order, resolution, or decision that finally disposes of the action or proceeding and upon expiration of the period to appeal if no appeal has been perfected. Section 2 provides that a motion for execution pending appeal shall be filed before the Board, which may grant it upon meritorious grounds and upon posting of a sufficient bond. The Court applied these provisions to find that the February 15, 1999 Order was not final and executory and that no bond was shown.
• Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program) — The law pursuant to which the DAR issued the notice of coverage over the Berenguers’ landholding. It provides the statutory backdrop for the agrarian dispute that led to the disciplinary complaint.
• DAR Administrative Order No. 09 — Cited as the basis for the Berenguers’ application for exclusion of their landholding from CARP coverage on the ground that it was used exclusively for livestock. The Court mentioned it in the factual antecedents.

Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chief Justice and Chairperson), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Martin S. Villarama, Jr.