Berces vs. Guingona, Jr.

Section 68 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) does not repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18; the two provisions must be read together, and the reviewing authority retains discretion to stay execution of an appealed administrative decision when such stay is just and reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to public interest.

Petitioner Achilles C. Berces, Sr. had served as a municipal councilor of Tiwi, Albay. After his term, he initiated two administrative complaints before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay against the incumbent mayor, Naomi C. Corral, for non-payment of accrued leave benefits and for using municipal resources to service a private water pipeline. The provincial board imposed successive suspensions totaling five months. Mayor Corral appealed to the Office of the President and simultaneously moved to stay execution of the suspension orders.

• Nature of the Administrative Cases: Petitioner Achilles C. Berces, Sr., a former municipal councilor of Tiwi, Albay, lodged two administrative cases with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay against respondent Mayor Naomi C. Corral. Administrative Case No. 02-92 charged abuse of authority and oppression for non-payment of accrued leave benefits in the sum of ₱36,779.02. Administrative Case No. 05-92 charged dishonesty and abuse of authority for installing a water pipeline, operated and maintained at municipal expense, to service the mayor’s private residence and medical clinic.

• Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan: In Administrative Case No. 02-92, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ordered respondent mayor to pay petitioner ₱36,779.02 plus legal interest from the time of audit approval, and imposed a two-month suspension for “blatant abuse of authority coupled with oppression.” In Administrative Case No. 05-92, a three-month suspension was imposed, to commence after service of the first suspension, and respondent mayor was ordered to reimburse the municipality one-half of electric and water bills paid from July to December 1992.

• Appeal and Stay Order: Respondent mayor appealed both decisions to the Office of the President pursuant to Section 67(b) of the Local Government Code and concurrently moved to stay execution. Citing Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, the Office of the President found that a stay would be “just and reasonable” to prevent undue prejudice to public interest, and on July 28, 1993, ordered the suspension or stay of execution of both suspension orders. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the present petition.

• Repeal of Administrative Order No. 18: Petitioner argued that Section 68 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), which provides that an appeal “shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory,” is a mandatory provision that impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (dated February 12, 1987), thereby stripping the Office of the President of authority to stay execution of administrative decisions against local elective officials.

• Mandatory Character of Section 68: Petitioner maintained that the word “shall” in Section 68 is mandatory, leaving no room for discretion, and that the stay order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Harmonious Construction of Statutes: The Office of the President, in defense of its order, contended that Section 68 of the Local Government Code and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcilably inconsistent; rather, they must be read together, with the latter supplying the procedural authority to stay execution when public interest warrants.

• Prevention of Public Prejudice: Respondents maintained that the stay was justified because immediate execution of the suspension would disrupt public service and cause undue prejudice to the public interest.

• Authority to Stay Execution: Whether the Office of the President gravely abused its discretion in staying execution of the suspension orders pending appeal, on the ground that Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 is mandatory and impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.

• Authority to Stay Execution: The stay order was upheld, the Supreme Court finding no grave abuse of discretion. Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 does not expressly repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, as its repealing clause—Section 530(f)—does not specifically identify or designate the executive order intended to be repealed. Implied repeal is not favored; there is a presumption against it, and it may be found only where an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between the new and prior laws, such that they cannot stand together. Here, the two provisions can be harmonized. The first sentence of Section 68 merely states that an “appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory,” which, as worded, leaves room to construe the provision as giving discretion to the reviewing official to stay execution. Nothing in the provision expressly deprives the reviewing official of that authority. The term “shall” may be read as directory, not mandatory, depending on the entire provision, its object, and the consequences of either construction. In this case, construing “shall” as mandatory would effectively remove a procedural mechanism that exists to prevent disruption of public service. The Office of the President made a factual finding that immediate execution might prejudice public interest; therefore, the stay was a just and reasonable measure to avoid disrupting the mayor’s service to the public.

• Implied Repeal — Implied repeal is not favored; there is a presumption against it. For an implied repeal to be given effect, there must be an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy between the new and prior laws, such that they cannot be made to stand together. A substantial conflict must exist, not merely a possible disharmony. This doctrine was applied to hold that Section 68 of the Local Government Code had not impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.

• Directory versus Mandatory “Shall” — The word “shall” in a statute may be construed as either mandatory or directory depending on a consideration of the entire provision, its object, and the consequences that would flow from either construction. In the context of Section 68 of the Local Government Code, “shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory” was read as directory, preserving the reviewing authority’s discretion to stay execution where public interest so requires.

• “An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible. There must be such a repugnancy between the laws that they cannot be made to stand together.” — This passage expresses the stringent test for implied repeal applied by the Court.

• “The term ‘shall’ may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the entire provisions in which it is found, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other.” — The Court relied on this principle to treat Section 68 as directory rather than mandatory.

• Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. Philippine American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 (1973) — Cited for the rule that implied repeal is not favored and that a presumption against implied repeal exists.

• Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965) — Applied as authority that an irreconcilable inconsistency must exist before a prior law may be considered impliedly repealed.

• Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8 (1924) — Cited for the standard that the two laws must be absolutely incompatible.

• De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 (1966) — Relied upon for the principle that “shall” may be construed as directory or mandatory depending on the entire provision, its object, and consequences.

• Section 67(b), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Prescribes that decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan in administrative cases may be appealed to the Office of the President within thirty days from receipt.

• Section 68, Republic Act No. 7160 — States: “An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.” The provision was interpreted as directory, preserving the reviewing authority’s power to stay execution.

• Section 6, Administrative Order No. 18 (12 February 1987) — Provides that, except as otherwise provided by special laws, execution of the decision appealed from is stayed upon filing of the appeal, and that at any time during the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the President may direct or stay execution upon such terms and conditions as it may deem just and reasonable. Applied to justify the stay order.

• Section 530(f), Republic Act No. 7160 — The general repealing clause; the Court held that it did not operate as an express repeal of Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 because it did not specifically identify or designate the executive order.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Francisco, JJ., concurred.