Benito Estrella y Gili vs. People of the Philippines

Mere possession of any article that has been the subject of robbery or theft constitutes prima facie evidence of fencing under Section 5 of PD 1612, and the accused bears the burden of overthrowing this presumption with sufficient and convincing evidence of lawful acquisition. The offense is malum prohibitum; intent is immaterial, and the only inquiry is whether the law was violated.

Philippine Airlines (PAL), the exclusive five-gallon-pail importer of Skydrol hydraulic fluid from Solutia, Inc., noticed an unusual upward trend in Skydrol consumption in 1998 despite downsizing its fleet from 52 to 21 aircraft. An internal investigation led by Elvis Yao, PAL’s Vice President for Fuel Management, uncovered that Aerojam Supply and Trading — a sole proprietorship owned by petitioner Benito Estrella and his wife — was selling five-gallon pails of Skydrol to Air Philippines at low prices. Yao then sought police assistance to investigate possible theft and fencing of PAL’s hydraulic fluid.

• Nature: Petitioner Benito Estrella y Gili, proprietor of Aerojam Supply and Trading, was charged with fencing under Section 2 of PD 1612 for possessing and disposing of three pails of Skydrol LD 4 hydraulic fluid worth approximately P27,000.00, knowing or should have known it was stolen from Philippine Airlines (PAL).

• Prosecution’s Evidence and Apprehension: PAL, the exclusive importer of five-gallon pails of Skydrol from manufacturer Solutia, Inc., noticed unusually high consumption of the fluid in 1998 despite a reduced fleet. Elvis Yao, PAL’s Vice President for Fuel Management, investigated and found Aerojam selling Skydrol to Air Philippines. PNP-CIDG conducted surveillance on June 19 and 22, 1999. On June 22, 1999, PO3 Raul Bolido observed petitioner carrying three pails of hydraulic fluid into Air Philippines’ hangar. When accosted, petitioner could not present documents of ownership and claimed a certain Jupel had them; Jupel never appeared. Yao confirmed the pails bore the manufacturer lot number assigned exclusively to PAL: Lot Number QK31001 under Manufacturer Lot Number IAI/Y2.4/300/98USA/M-4122. Solutia’s Letter/Certification dated June 17, 1999, certified that only PAL purchased Skydrol LD-4 in five-gallon pails, that it never authorized Aerojam as a stocklist or reseller, and that the specific lot was sold to PAL. Additional documents — Certificate of Analysis, Bill of Lading, and Sales Invoice — linked the confiscated pails to PAL’s shipment received on January 27, 1999.

• Defense’s Version: Petitioner testified he was a salesman of aircraft spare parts, lubricants, and chemicals for 23 years through Aerojam, dealing with several airlines. He claimed that at 9:00 a.m. on June 22, 1999, a certain Janet asked him to visit Air Philippines for needed parts but he could not go until 4:00 p.m. He stated he arrived only to pick up a list of requirements, not to deliver supplies, and was accosted by PNP-CIDG personnel. He denied stealing Skydrol, asserting other airlines also used the fluid. He identified his supplier as International Business Aviation, Inc. (IBAI), a now‑closed company, from which he bought 20 pails at P8,000 to P9,000 and resold them at P10,000 each. Alvin Ygona, a former sales manager of a global distributor, testified that lot numbers were not airline-specific because multiple customers could receive the same lot number. Petitioner raised the defense of frame-up.

• Trial Court Findings: The RTC gave full credence to the prosecution’s evidence, finding that the predicate crime of theft was established, petitioner was caught in possession of the stolen Skydrol, he knew or should have known the items were derived from theft, and he possessed them with intent to gain. Petitioner’s defenses were deemed uncorroborated and self-serving.

• Appellate Court Affirmance: The CA affirmed the RTC’s factual findings and conclusions, holding that petitioner’s unexplained possession of the valuable items could only be interpreted as an intent to profit and that his appeal raised matters of credibility properly left to the trial court.

• Falsification of Evidence: Petitioner maintained that PAL concocted documentary evidence on several occasions to establish its case against him.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He disputed the factual findings and the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
• Coerced Documents: Petitioner claimed he was forced to sign documents at Camp Crame and that he and his wife were harassed during investigation, thereby defeating the authenticity of those documents.

• Established Elements: Respondent countered that the evidence presented proved all the elements of fencing under PD 1612 beyond reasonable doubt.
• Baseless Defenses: Respondent argued that petitioner’s defenses of denial and frame-up were baseless and unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.
• Limited Review: Respondent maintained that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and petitioner raised purely factual issues.

• Proof of Predicate Theft: Whether the prosecution sufficiently established that a crime of robbery or theft of the Skydrol hydraulic fluid had been committed.
• Knowledge of Illegal Source: Whether petitioner knew or should have known that the three pails of Skydrol were derived from the proceeds of theft.
• Presumption of Fencing: Whether the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of PD 1612 applied and whether petitioner adduced sufficient evidence to rebut it.
• Defense of Denial and Frame-up: Whether petitioner’s uncorroborated defenses could overcome the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the presumption of fencing.
• Penalty: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty, and whether Republic Act No. 10951 adjusted the penalty for fencing.

• Proof of Predicate Theft: The occurrence of theft was duly established. Yao testified that despite PAL’s reduced fleet, there was an unusual upward movement of Skydrol consumption, leading management to conclude that someone was stealing the fluid and to involve the PNP-CIDG. The manufacturer lot numbers on the confiscated pails and Solutia’s certification confirmed that the specific lot was sold exclusively to PAL.
• Knowledge of Illegal Source: The prosecution proved petitioner knew or should have known that the pails were illegally sourced. When apprehended, he could not produce any document proving lawful ownership and invoked a certain Jupel who never appeared with the documents. Petitioner’s unexplained failure to present either the supplier or the supporting paperwork led to the conclusion that he was aware the goods derived from theft.
• Presumption of Fencing: Section 5 of PD 1612 provides that mere possession of any article that has been the subject of robbery or theft is prima facie evidence of fencing. This presumption applied upon proof that the Skydrol belonged to PAL and was stolen. As fencing is malum prohibitum, the intent of the offender is immaterial; the only inquiry is whether the law was violated. Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption by sufficient and convincing evidence. His assertion that he obtained the supply from IBAI was unsubstantiated, and the documentation deficiency remained.
• Defense of Denial and Frame-up: The defenses of denial and frame-up were uncorroborated. Petitioner did not present his wife or file any complaint against the police officers. The trial court’s assessment of witness credibility — including the positive, straightforward testimonies of PO3 Bolido and Yao — was entitled to great respect and finality, absent any showing of grave misapprehension of facts. The defense could not prevail over affirmative evidence of guilt.
• Penalty: Under Section 3(a) of PD 1612, when the value of the property exceeds P22,000.00 (here, P27,000.00), the penalty is prision mayor in its maximum period. With no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the medium period of that range — 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 11 years and 4 months — applies. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty was an indeterminate sentence of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 11 years and 4 months as maximum. Republic Act No. 10951, which adjusted penalties for theft under the Revised Penal Code, did not amend PD 1612; therefore the penalty for fencing remained unchanged, notwithstanding the resulting incongruence.

• Fencing defined (Sec. 2, PD 1612): The act of any person who, with intent to gain, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells, disposes of, or deals in any article of value which he knows or should know to have been derived from robbery or theft. Four elements: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, not being a principal or accomplice, buys, receives, possesses, etc., the property derived from the crime; (3) the accused knows or should have known the property’s illegal source; and (4) intent to gain for himself or another.

• Presumption of Fencing (Sec. 5, PD 1612): Mere possession of any good that has been the subject of robbery or theft is prima facie evidence of fencing. The accused must present sufficient and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption. Applied here, petitioner’s unexplained possession of PAL’s Skydrol triggered the presumption, and his uncorroborated denial failed to overcome it.

• Fencing as malum prohibitum: The Anti-Fencing Law creates a regulatory offense where criminal intent is immaterial; violation of the statute alone suffices for conviction. The distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita determines that in the latter, the inquiry is limited to whether the law was violated, not the offender’s subjective intent.

• Application of Indeterminate Sentence Law to special penal laws using RPC penalties: When a special penal law defines an offense but adopts the penalty nomenclature of the Revised Penal Code, the rules for determining an indeterminate sentence under Act No. 4103 apply. Since PD 1612 uses prision mayor, the minimum and maximum terms were computed based on the RPC.

• Factual findings and credibility: The trial court’s factual findings, especially those on witness credibility, are accorded great weight and finality on appeal when affirmed by the CA, absent recognized exceptions such as grave abuse of discretion or manifest misinterpretation of facts. No such exception was present.

• “Fencing is defined as the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.” — The statutory definition, reiterated as the framework for assessing guilt.

• “Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.” — The crucial statutory presumption applied to petitioner’s unexplained possession.

• “Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of Fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft. … When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.” — The rationale why lack of criminal intent or knowledge cannot exculpate the accused once the elements are established.

• “The Court remains mindful of the fact that the determination of penalties is a policy matter that belongs to the legislative branch of the government which is beyond the ambit of judicial powers. Thus, this Court cannot adjust the penalty to be imposed against the petitioner based on RA 10951 considering that the offense of Fencing is defined under PD 1612, a special penal law.” — The Court’s acknowledgment of the legislative penalty incongruence and its institutional limitation.

• Tan v. People, 372 Phil. 93 (1999) — Cited for the definition and elements of fencing and the principle that the accused need not have participated in the predicate crime.
• People v. Judge De Guzman, 297 Phil. 993 (1993) — Reinforced that fencing does not require involvement in the robbery or theft.
• Ong v. People, 708 Phil. 565 (2013) — Affirmed the prima facie presumption of fencing from possession of stolen goods.
• Cahulogan v. People, G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018 — Applied the presumption of fencing and noted the penalty incongruence with RA 10951; the Court had previously alerted Congress to this issue.
• Peralta v. People, 817 Phil. 554 (2017) — Clarified the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to special penal laws that borrow penalty nomenclature from the Revised Penal Code.
• Dungo v. People, 762 Phil. 630 (2015) — Distinguished mala in se from mala prohibita and explained the irrelevance of intent in the latter.
• People v. Aspa, Jr., G.R. No. 229507, August 6, 2018 — Reiterated the rule that trial court credibility findings are generally controlling on appeal.

• Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) — Defined fencing; the prosecution’s evidence was measured against each element, all of which were found present.
• Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 1612 — Establishes the prima facie presumption of fencing from mere possession of stolen goods; shifted the burden to petitioner to prove lawful acquisition, which he failed to do.
• Section 3(a), Presidential Decree No. 1612 — Prescribes the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period where the property value exceeds P22,000.00 but not more than P32,000.00, adding one year per additional P10,000.00; applied to fix the base penalty.
• Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), Section 1 — Applied to determine the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate sentence because PD 1612 uses RPC penalty nomenclature.
• Republic Act No. 10951 — Adjusted theft penalties under the Revised Penal Code; held inapplicable to PD 1612, which is a special penal law, resulting in a recognized but judicially uncorrectable penalty disparity.

Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe (Chairperson), Justice Hernando, Justice Delos Santos, and Justice Gaerlan (designated additional member).

N/A — The decision was unanimous; no dissenting opinion was recorded.