Benitez vs. Concepcion, Jr.

A civil action does not constitute a prejudicial question warranting suspension of a criminal proceeding where both cases arise from the same facts and involve the same principal issue; the prejudicial-question doctrine requires that the civil case involve facts distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that resolution of the civil issue necessarily determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Where the issues in both cases are identical, the general rule that the criminal case takes precedence applies.

Petitioners Yu Bon Chiong (alias Mariano Benitez) and Rufino Ibañez, together with Ong Ho (alias Uy Liam Chiu) and Ching Siok Eng (wife of Yu Bon Chiong), were co-mortgagors of real estate mortgages executed in favor of the Philippine National Bank to secure Yu Bon Chiong's indebtedness. Ong Ho, one of the mortgagors, later disclaimed the signatures appearing on the mortgage deeds as forgeries and initiated both a civil action for annulment of the mortgages and a criminal complaint for falsification against the petitioners. The City Fiscal of Manila, respondent Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., undertook preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint over petitioners' objection that the pending civil case posed a prejudicial question.

On May 4, 1946, petitioner Yu Bon Chiong, as debtor, and petitioners Rufino Ibañez and respondent Ong Ho, as mortgagors, together with Ching Siok Eng (wife of Yu Bon Chiong), also as mortgagor, executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the Philippine National Bank to secure Yu Bon Chiong's indebtedness of ₱50,000.00. The mortgage was amended on March 26, 1957, to secure payment of the increased indebtedness, which had risen to ₱170,000.00. Yu Bon Chiong failed to pay the indebtedness, prompting the Philippine National Bank to file, on December 17, 1949, Civil Case No. 449 in the CFI of Rizal against both petitioners, Ching Siok Eng, and respondent Ong Ho, seeking foreclosure of the mortgages. A decision was rendered in favor of the bank, and the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court as G.R. No. L-14214.

On July 24, 1957, respondent Ong Ho filed Civil Case No. 33251 in the CFI of Manila against the Philippine National Bank, petitioners Yu Bon Chiong (alias Mariano Benitez) and Rufino Ibañez, and the heirs of Ching Siok Eng, seeking annulment of the two deeds of mortgage on the ground that the signatures purporting to be his on the documents were forgeries. The defendants in Civil Case No. 33251 raised the special defense of the pendency of another action between the same parties involving the same subject matter. During the hearing on that special defense, Ong Ho raised the issue that he was not the same Ong Ho involved in Civil Case No. 994.

Thereafter, on June 16, 1958, Ong Ho filed a criminal complaint before the respondent City Fiscal of Manila, docketed as O.S. No. 15190, charging the petitioners with falsification of the deeds of mortgage involved in Civil Case No. 994. On July 2, 1958, the petitioners moved before the City Fiscal for dismissal or suspension of the criminal proceedings, asserting that civil prejudicial questions should first be resolved. The City Fiscal denied the motion on September 24, 1958, and set the case for hearing; the motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Petitioners then filed the present action for prohibition with preliminary injunction, contending that the City Fiscal acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and that no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was available.

• Prejudicial Question: Petitioners maintained that civil prejudicial questions were involved in the pending civil case (Civil Case No. 33251) for annulment of the mortgage deeds, which should first be resolved before the criminal investigation could proceed.
• Excess of Jurisdiction / Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners argued that the respondent City Fiscal, in denying the motion to dismiss or suspend the proceedings in O.S. No. 15190 and the motion for reconsideration filed thereto, acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
• Absence of Adequate Remedy: Petitioners contended that there was no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, warranting the resort to prohibition with preliminary injunction.

• Special and/or Affirmative Defenses: Respondent City Fiscal interposed Special and/or Affirmative Defenses, which were adopted in substance by respondent Ong Ho, opposing the petition for prohibition.

• Prejudicial Question: Whether the issue in the civil case for annulment of the mortgage deeds constitutes a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the criminal investigation before the City Fiscal's office.

• Prejudicial Question: No. The civil case did not present a prejudicial question because both the civil and criminal cases arose from the same facts and involved the same principal issue—the alleged forgery of Ong Ho's signatures on the mortgage deeds—such that the situation was reduced to a matter of preference, under which the criminal case takes precedence.

• Prejudicial Question: The general rule is that where both a civil and a criminal case arising from the same facts are filed in court, the criminal case takes precedence (Rule 107, Sec. 1[b]). An exception exists when a prejudicial question must first be resolved before the criminal case can proceed. A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues in the civil action would necessarily determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. In Civil Case No. 33251, the issue was whether Ong Ho's signatures on the mortgage deeds were forged; in the criminal case (O.S. No. 15190), the issue was likewise the falsification of the same deeds. Because the principal issues in both cases were the same and arose from the same facts, it was not necessary that the civil case be determined first before the criminal case could proceed. The matter was simply one of preference, and under the rule, the criminal case takes precedence. This conclusion was reinforced by Pisalbon vs. Tesoro, where the Court held that where both civil and criminal cases involve the same questions and one must precede the other, it is the civil case which should be suspended to await the result of the criminal case.

• Prejudicial Question Doctrine — A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a civil case to suspend a criminal action, two requisites must concur: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based, and (2) the resolution of the issues in the civil action would necessarily determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Where both cases arise from the same facts and involve the same principal issue, the civil case does not constitute a prejudicial question; the general rule that the criminal case takes precedence applies.
• Rule of Preference — Criminal Case Takes Precedence — Where both a civil and a criminal case arising from the same facts are filed in court, the criminal case takes precedence over the civil case. Even if both involve the same questions and one must precede the other, it is the civil case which should be suspended to await the result of the criminal case, not the reverse.

• "One based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused." — This is the canonical definition of a prejudicial question as adopted by the Court, drawn from Padilla's Civil Code Annotated and De Leon vs. Mabanag, and applied to determine whether the civil case warranted suspension of the criminal investigation.

• "It appearing that the principal issues in both cases are the same, and/or arise from the same facts, it stands to reason that it is not necessary that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case. This being the case, the proposition is simply reduced to a matter of preferences." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: when the civil and criminal cases share the same principal issues arising from the same facts, the prejudicial-question doctrine does not apply, and the criminal case takes precedence.

• "But, even supposing that both the civil and the criminal case involve the same questions and one must precede the other, it should be the civil which should be suspended rather than the criminal, to await the result of the latter." — Quoted from Pisalbon vs. Tesoro, this formulation of the rule of preference has been consistently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on prejudicial questions.

• Pisalbon vs. Tesoro, G.R. No. L-5065, April 20, 1953 — Controlling precedent followed. The Court quoted its ruling that where both civil and criminal cases involve the same questions and one must precede the other, the civil case should be suspended rather than the criminal, to await the result of the latter.
• De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202 — Cited as authority for the definition of a prejudicial question.
• D.S. Mendiola vs. Hon. H. Macadaeg, G.R. No. L-16874, Feb. 27, 1961 — Cited for the two-pronged test: a civil case is prejudicial only if it involves facts intimately related to the criminal prosecution and its resolution necessarily determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
• Almeda vs. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178 — Cited in support of the rule that the criminal case takes precedence over the civil case arising from the same facts.

• Rule 107, Section 1(b), Rules of Court — Provides the general rule that where both a civil and a criminal case arising from the same facts are filed in court, the criminal case takes precedence. Applied to hold that the criminal investigation before the City Fiscal should not be suspended in favor of the pending civil annulment case.
• Article 33, New Civil Code — Cited as an exception to the general rule, providing that when the law allows both civil and criminal cases to be instituted simultaneously, the prejudicial-question doctrine may apply. Found inapplicable because the cases involved the same issues.
• Article 35, paragraph 2, New Civil Code — Referenced in Pisalbon vs. Tesoro in connection with the rule of preference favoring the criminal case.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concurred.