Bengzon vs. The Secretary of Justice

The Governor-General may validly veto a particular item of an appropriation bill, and a section of a law that extends benefits to a specific class of persons constitutes such an item when the law appropriates funds for its implementation. The veto of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was constitutional because the Act was an appropriation bill and the vetoed section was a distinct and severable item thereof.

The case arose under the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, which established the practice for the enactment of laws in the Philippines, including the Governor-General's power to veto particular items of appropriation bills. The Constitution of the Philippines, article VI, section 11(2), contains an exactly similar provision, substituting "The President" for "The Governor-General" and prescribing a more explicit procedure for vetoing items of appropriation bills. Act No. 4051, the Retirement Gratuity Law, was enacted to provide retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired due to reorganization or reduction of personnel, including justices of the peace who had to relinquish office under Act No. 3899.

Juan Bengzon was appointed justice of the peace for the municipality of Lingayen, Pangasinan, on March 7, 1912. Having reached the age of sixty-five, he ceased to hold this position on January 14, 1933, by reason of the provisions of Act No. 3899. On that date, acting pursuant to instructions received from the Judge of First Instance for the district, he turned over the office of justice of the peace to the auxiliary justice of the peace of the municipality.

Subsequently, Bengzon addressed communications to the Secretary of Justice, the Governor-General, and the Insular Auditor applying for gratuity under Act No. 4051, but all of these officials advised him that he was not entitled to the benefits of the Act. Accordingly, on March 7, 1934, he filed the instant complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Act No. 4051 is entitled "An Act to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired from the service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel thereof, including the justice of the peace who must relinquish office in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes." The body of the Act provides in several sections for the officers and employees who may be granted gratuities thereunder, the rates of gratuities to be paid, and other matters. Among these sections, as the bill passed the Philippine Legislature, was section 7, reading: "The justices of the peace who must relinquish office during the year nineteen hundred and thirty-three in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, shall also be entitled to the gratuities provided for in this Act." Section 10 appropriated the necessary sum to carry out the purposes of the Act out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and section 12 provided that if any section or provision of the Act is disapproved by the Governor-General or held unconstitutional, the other sections shall continue to govern. The Act was "approved" by the Governor-General, section 7 excepted, on February 21, 1933, and the Philippine Legislature accepted the veto.

The Court noted that Bengzon had not shown himself to be a justice of the peace who was forced to relinquish office during the year 1933, as he did not take steps to vindicate an alleged right as did the justices of the peace of the municipality of Malinao, Albay, and the municipality of Alabat, Tayabas. However, this point was not advanced by the Government either in the lower court or on appeal.

• Validity of the Veto: The petitioner argued that the Governor-General's veto of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was invalid, and that the section should be restored to the law by the judiciary.
• Appropriation Bill: The petitioner contended that Act No. 4051 was not an appropriation bill within the meaning of section 19 of the Organic Act, and that section 7 was not a particular item thereof which could be constitutionally vetoed.

• No Cause of Action: The respondents argued that the petition for mandamus should be dismissed because the duty which the petitioner claimed was enjoined by law upon the respondents did not exist and would require the intervention of the Governor-General, who was not a party to the case.
• Validity of the Veto: The respondents maintained that the Governor-General's veto of section 7 was valid and in conformity with the provisions of the Organic Act, as Act No. 4051 was an appropriation bill and section 7 was a particular item thereof.

• Appropriation Bill: Whether Act No. 4051 is an appropriation bill within the meaning of section 19 of the Organic Act.
• Item Veto: Whether section 7 of Act No. 4051 is a particular item thereof which the Governor-General could constitutionally veto.

• Appropriation Bill: Yes. Act No. 4051 is an appropriation bill, as manifest from its provisions, particularly section 10, which appropriated the necessary sum to carry out the purposes of the Act out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated.
• Item Veto: Yes. Section 7 of Act No. 4051 is a particular item which the Governor-General could validly veto, as it was a distinct and severable part of the appropriation, and the accounting officers would have experienced no difficulty in setting up the different items provided for under the Act.

• Appropriation Bill: The Court defined an appropriation as the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a specified purpose, and an item as the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. No set form of words is needed to make out an appropriation or an item. The Court found that Act No. 4051 was an appropriation bill, manifest from its provisions and particularly from section 10, which appropriated the necessary sum to carry out the purposes of the Act. The Court rejected the faint suggestion that by an appropriation bill is meant a general appropriation bill, noting that the word "general" was omitted, presumably intentionally, from the Organic Act and the Constitution, and the courts would not be authorized to insert a word and by so doing amend the law.

• Item Veto: The Court held that the Governor-General had the right to object to the expenditure of money for a specified purpose and amount without being under the necessity of at the same time refusing to agree to other expenditures which met with his entire approval. The Court found that the Philippine Legislature intended Act No. 4051 to be an appropriation measure with various items, as apparent from section 12, whereby the Legislature anticipated the possibility of a partial veto of the bill by the Chief Executive. After the Chief Executive took action, the Legislature made no attempt to override the veto or to amend the law to bring into being the section which the Governor-General had eliminated. The Court emphasized that while contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, where a construction of statutes has been adopted by the legislative department and accepted by the various agencies of the executive department, it is entitled to great respect. The Court noted that it has been the practice of the Chief Executive to veto separate items in bills analogous to that before the Court, and that this practice has been acquiesced in previously without objection, so that it would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality for the courts to declare against it.

The Court further reasoned that the former Organic Act and the present Constitution make the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power, and his disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. The Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution, but in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise inference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto the same as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature.

The Court concluded that there was no conflict between the legislative and executive departments, but unison between the two, and the judiciary was asked to take the initiative and restore a section to a law against the explicit confirmation of executive authority by the Legislature and against explicit action taken by the Chief Executive. The Court held that it was never intended by a mere process of reasoning, however plausible, for the courts to breathe life into a portion of an Act which has not been given life by the other departments of the government acting in conformity with the Constitution.

• Item Veto of Appropriation Bills — The Chief Executive may veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill. An appropriation is the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a specified purpose, and an item is the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that Act No. 4051 was an appropriation bill and that section 7, which extended gratuity benefits to justices of the peace, was a particular item thereof that the Governor-General could validly veto.

• Presumption of Constitutionality of a Veto — Courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto the same as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. The Court applied this doctrine by giving deference to the construction placed on the Governor-General's action by both the legislative and executive departments, particularly the Legislature's acceptance of the veto and its failure to override it.

• Contemporaneous Construction — While contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, where a construction of statutes has been adopted by the legislative department and accepted by the various agencies of the executive department, it is entitled to great respect. The Court applied this doctrine by noting the practice of the Chief Executive to veto separate items in bills analogous to that before the Court, which practice had been acquiesced in previously without objection.

• "An appropriation in the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a specified purpose. An item is the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. No set from of words is needed to make out an appropriation or an item." — This passage defines the key terms "appropriation" and "item" that are central to the Court's analysis of the Governor-General's veto power under the Organic Act.

• "The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature." — This passage articulates the constitutional framework for the veto power, characterizing it as a grant of power to the executive and a limitation on the legislature.

• "The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto the same as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature." — This passage establishes the presumption of constitutionality applied to executive vetoes, which the Court relied upon in upholding the Governor-General's action.

• "In our opinion, it was never intended by a mere process of reasoning, however plausible, for the courts to breathe life into a portion of an Act which has not been given life by the other departments of the government acting in conformity with the Constitution." — This passage states the Court's conclusion that the judiciary should not restore a vetoed section of a law when both the legislative and executive departments have confirmed the veto.

• Regalado vs. Yulo (1935), 61 Phil., 173 — Cited to illustrate that other justices of the peace took steps to vindicate their alleged rights under Act No. 4051, unlike the petitioner in this case.
• Tañada vs. Yulo (1935), 61 Phil., 515 — Cited for the same proposition as Regalado vs. Yulo, regarding justices of the peace who sought to enforce their rights under the Retirement Gratuity Law.
• State vs. Moore (1896), 50 Neb., 88 — Cited for the proposition that no set form of words is needed to make out an appropriation or an item.
• Callaghan vs. Boyce (1915), 17 Ariz., 433 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the definition of appropriation and item.
• Commonwealth vs. Barnett (1901), 199 Pa., 161 — Cited for the proposition that courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto.
• People vs. Board of Councilmen (1892), 20 N.Y.S., 52 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the presumption of constitutionality of a veto.
• Fulmore vs. Lane (1911), 104 Texas — Cited for the same proposition regarding the presumption of constitutionality of a veto.
• Texas Co. vs. State (1927), 53 A.L.R., 258 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the presumption of constitutionality of a veto.

• Section 19, Organic Act (Act of Congress of August 29, 1916) — Established the practice for the enactment of a law, including the Governor-General's power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill. The Court applied this provision in upholding the Governor-General's veto of section 7 of Act No. 4051.
• Article VI, Section 11(2), Constitution of the Philippines — Contains an exactly similar provision to section 19 of the Organic Act, substituting "The President" for "The Governor-General" and prescribing a more explicit procedure for vetoing items of appropriation bills. The Court noted this provision as the constitutional counterpart of the Organic Act provision.
• Act No. 4051, Retirement Gratuity Law — The statute at issue in the case, which provided for retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government, including section 7 extending benefits to justices of the peace, section 10 appropriating funds, and section 12 providing for severability.
• Act No. 3899 — The law by reason of which the petitioner ceased to hold his position as justice of the peace upon reaching the age of sixty-five.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concurred in the majority opinion.

• Justice Villa-Real — Dissented on the ground that the phrase "any particular item or items of an appropriation bill" used in section 19 of the Jones Law refers to an appropriation bill composed of several items of appropriation, not one which contains only an item of appropriation. Act No. 4051, being a gratuity law, contained only one appropriation in section 10, and section 7, which extended the gratuity payment to justices of the peace, contained no appropriation of money but a mere designation of the officers to whom the money appropriated may be paid. The veto of section 7 was therefore unauthorized and null and void as in excess of the power granted by section 19 of the Jones Law. Justice Villa-Real also argued that section 12 of Act No. 4051 could not have rendered valid an unconstitutional disapproval by the Governor-General, as the only power the legislature has in case a bill is vetoed is to override the veto by a two-thirds vote, and it cannot ratify or validate an invalid veto. He further argued that if the doctrine of implied approval of the veto were to prevail, the executive may encroach upon the powers of the legislature, and the judicial branch would become an accomplice to the violation of the Constitution rather than its guardian. Vickers, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concurred in the dissent.