Bengzon vs. Drilon

The President's line-item veto power under Article VI, Section 27(2) of the Constitution applies only to distinct and severable "items" of appropriation, not to "provisions" that prescribe conditions or methods for the use of funds. A veto that strikes down provisions rather than items, and which seeks to nullify a final judicial decision and an existing statute, violates the separation of powers and the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary.

Retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals received pensions under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 1797, which provided for the automatic adjustment of pensions whenever the salaries of incumbent Justices were increased. In 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 644, which purported to repeal the automatic adjustment feature. However, PD 644 was not published until 1983, years after its issuance. In a 1991 Administrative Matter, the Supreme Court ruled that PD 644 never became effective law due to invalid publication, and thus RA 1797 remained in force. Consequently, Congress included provisions in the 1992 General Appropriations Act (GAA) to fund the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Court's resolution. The President vetoed these specific provisions, citing the need for standardized compensation and objecting to distinct privileges for a select group.

• Nature of the Action: This was a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of the President's line-item veto of specific provisions in the 1992 GAA.
• Statutory Background: RA 910 (1953) granted retirement pensions to Justices. RA 1797 (1957) amended it to include an automatic pension adjustment feature tied to salary increases of incumbent Justices. Similar benefits were extended to Constitutional Commissions (RA 3595) and the Armed Forces (PD 578, later PD 1638 and 1909).
• The Purported Repeal: PD 644, issued in 1975, repealed the automatic adjustment provisions of RA 1797 and RA 3595. However, it was not published until 1983.
• Judicial Declaration: In A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA (1991), the Supreme Court ruled that PD 644 never became effective law due to lack of timely publication. Consequently, RA 1797 remained in force, and the requesting retired Justices were entitled to pension adjustments.
• Congressional Response: Congress included provisions in the 1992 GAA to fund the adjusted pensions, explicitly referencing the Court's resolution.
• The Challenged Veto: The President vetoed the underlined portions of the Special Provisions for the Judiciary and the General Fund Adjustment that authorized the use of savings and specific funds for the pension payments. The veto message stated these provisions would erode compensation standardization and grant distinct privileges.
• Petitioners' Claim: The retired Justices argued the veto was unconstitutional because it vetoed provisions, not items; violated separation of powers by nullifying a judicial decision; impaired their vested rights; and breached the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary.

• Nature of the Veto: Petitioners argued that the President vetoed "provisions" (methods or systems for using funds) rather than specific "items" (indivisible sums of money), which is beyond the scope of the line-item veto power.
• Separation of Powers: Petitioners maintained that the veto effectively set aside a final and executory Supreme Court resolution (A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA) and attempted to repeal an existing statute (RA 1797), thereby encroaching on judicial and legislative powers.
• Vested Rights: Petitioners contended that the right to pension adjustments under RA 1797 had vested and could not be impaired by executive action.
• Fiscal Autonomy: Petitioners argued that vetoing provisions that authorize the Chief Justice to use savings to augment pension appropriations violates the constitutional guarantee of fiscal autonomy for the Judiciary.

• Scope of Veto Power: Respondents, through the Solicitor General, contended that the President acted within her constitutional authority to veto specific items in an appropriations bill.
• Policy Justification: Respondents argued that the veto was justified to uphold the government's policy on standardized compensation (RA 6758) and to prevent the grant of distinct privileges to a select group of officials.
• No Impairment of Judicial Function: Respondents asserted that the veto did not interfere with the Judiciary's adjudicative function but merely addressed the funding mechanism.

• Item Veto Power: Whether the President's veto of the subject provisions constituted a valid exercise of the line-item veto power under Article VI, Section 27(2) of the Constitution.
• Separation of Powers: Whether the veto violated the principle of separation of powers by effectively nullifying a final judicial decision and an existing statute.
• Fiscal Autonomy: Whether the veto impaired the fiscal autonomy guaranteed to the Judiciary under Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution.

• Item Veto Power: The veto was invalid because it struck down "provisions," not "items." An "item" is an indivisible sum of money for a specific purpose. The vetoed portions were conditions or methods for the use of savings (e.g., authority to augment items) and not specific appropriations. Thus, the President exceeded her constitutional authority.
• Separation of Powers: The veto violated the separation of powers. The President cannot, through the veto power, set aside a final judgment of the Supreme Court (A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA) or impliedly repeal an existing statute (RA 1797). Such action usurps judicial and legislative powers.
• Fiscal Autonomy: The veto breached the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy. The vetoed provisions were designed to implement the Court's resolution and ensure the availability of funds for a lawful obligation. By disapproving them, the Executive dictated how the Judiciary should utilize its appropriated funds, contravening the constitutional mandate of automatic and regular release and the flexibility to allocate resources.

• Item vs. Provision in Appropriations Bills — An "item" is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. A "provision" is a clause prescribing conditions, methods, or restrictions on the use of funds. The line-item veto power extends only to items, not provisions.
• Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary — This constitutional guarantee (Art. VIII, Sec. 3) means freedom from outside control. It contemplates full flexibility for the Judiciary to allocate and utilize its resources, including the authority to use savings to augment other items, without executive interference.
• Separation of Powers — The Executive cannot encroach on the functions of the other branches. The veto power cannot be used to nullify a judicial decision or repeal a statute, as this would aggrandize executive power at the expense of coordinate branches.

• "The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriation bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item." — This clarifies the indivisible nature of an "item" for veto purposes.
• "The Executive has no authority to set aside and overrule a decision of the Supreme Court." — This underscores the finality of judicial judgments and the limits of executive power.
• "Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control." — This succinctly defines the core of the constitutional guarantee for the Judiciary and other independent constitutional bodies.
• "The vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting items... are clearly in consonance with the abovestated pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on 'fiscal autonomy.'" — This directly links the veto to the violation of fiscal autonomy.

• Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) — Cited for the doctrine that the judiciary has the duty to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to delineate constitutional boundaries.
• Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990) — Followed for the distinction between an item and a provision and for upholding the authority of government heads to augment items from savings.
• Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) & 146 SCRA 446 (1986) — Applied for the rule that laws must be published to be effective, which was the basis for invalidating PD 644.
• De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982) — Cited to explain the significance of judicial independence as a cornerstone of the constitutional system.

• Article VI, Section 27(2), 1987 Constitution — Grants the President the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. The Court interpreted this to mean only distinct, severable items of appropriation may be vetoed.
• Article VIII, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — Mandates that "The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released."
• Article VI, Section 25(5), 1987 Constitution — Authorizes the Chief Justice, among other officials, to augment any item in the general appropriations law from savings in other items of their respective offices. The vetoed provisions implemented this authority.
• Republic Act No. 1797 — Amended RA 910 to provide for the automatic adjustment of retirement pensions of Justices. The Court held this law remained in force.
• Presidential Decree No. 644 — Purported to repeal the automatic adjustment feature of RA 1797. Declared ineffective due to lack of publication.

Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Justices Edgardo L. Paras, Isagani A. Cruz (Ponente), Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, Florenz D. Regalado, Abdulwahid A. Bidin, Rodolfo A. Nocon, Jose C. Campos, Jr., Santiago M. Kapunan, and Jose A.R. Melo. (Note: The decision lists Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concurring. Bellosillo, J., was on leave.)

N/A — The decision was unanimous.