Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

Repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630 restores a former natural-born Filipino citizen to his original status as a natural-born citizen; the reacquisition of citizenship through a repatriation statute does not operate as naturalization. Consequently, a repatriated former natural-born citizen meets the constitutional requirement that a Member of the House of Representatives be a natural-born citizen.

Teodoro C. Cruz was born in San Clemente, Tarlac on April 27, 1960, to Filipino parents. Under the 1935 Constitution, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen. On November 5, 1985, without Philippine government consent, he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the United States. This caused him to lose Philippine citizenship pursuant to Section 1(4) of Commonwealth Act No. 63. While in the service, he became a naturalized United States citizen on June 5, 1990. Upon discharge, he returned to the Philippines and, on March 17, 1994, reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630 by taking an oath of allegiance and registering the oath with the local civil registrar. In the 1998 elections, he ran for and won the position of Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan, defeating petitioner Antonio Bengson III by a substantial margin.

• Birth and Original Citizenship: Teodoro C. Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente, Tarlac, to Filipino parents Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. By virtue of being born to Filipino parents, he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution.

• Loss of Philippine Citizenship: On November 5, 1985, without obtaining the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the United States. This act fell squarely within Section 1(4) of Commonwealth Act No. 63, which causes the loss of Philippine citizenship by “rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country.” On June 5, 1990, while in the service, he became a naturalized citizen of the United States.

• Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship: After his honorable discharge from the U.S. Marine Corps on October 27, 1993, Cruz returned to the Philippines. On March 17, 1994, he invoked Republic Act No. 2630, entitled “An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service to, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States.” On that day, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registered the oath with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. He also executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation cancelled his Alien Certificate of Residence and issued an Identification Certificate; the United States Embassy subsequently issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality.

• Political Career and the 1998 Congressional Elections: In the 1995 local elections, Cruz ran for mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, declaring himself a naturalized Filipino citizen and winning the race. In the May 11, 1998 elections, he filed a certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan, this time declaring himself a natural-born Filipino. He obtained 80,119 votes against petitioner Antonio Bengson III’s 53,448 votes (with other candidates receiving fewer votes), and was proclaimed the winner on September 3, 1998.

• HRET Quo Warranto Case: Petitioner Bengson filed a quo warranto petition before the HRET, arguing that Cruz was ineligible because he was not a natural-born citizen as required by Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The HRET determined that Cruz’s repatriation restored his original status as a natural-born Filipino and dismissed the petition.

• Interruption of Natural-Born Status: Petitioner argued that the constitutional definition of natural-born citizens—“those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship”—was not met, because respondent Cruz lost his citizenship by his own affirmative acts and later had to perform the positive act of repatriation to reacquire it. Petitioner maintained that natural-born status requires continuous, uninterrupted citizenship from birth, and Cruz’s loss and subsequent reacquisition broke that continuity, rendering him no longer natural-born.

• Invalid Restoration of Natural-Born Status: Petitioner insisted that repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630 could not legally or constitutionally restore the quality of being natural-born. At most, the reacquisition of citizenship conferred a naturalized status, which disqualified Cruz from holding a seat in the House of Representatives.

• Repatriation Restores Original Status: Respondent Cruz contended that repatriation under R.A. No. 2630 results in the recovery of the original nationality. Because he was a natural-born Filipino at birth—an innate and inherent characteristic—his reacquisition of citizenship returned him to that same natural-born status. The phrase “from birth” in Article IV, Section 2 referred to the origin of citizenship, not to an unbroken chain of possession.

• Not a Naturalized Citizen: Respondent emphasized that he did not undergo the judicial naturalization process under Commonwealth Act No. 473 to regain Filipino citizenship. The repatriation statute required only the taking of an oath and its registration. Since the 1987 Constitution only excludes naturalized citizens from the natural-born class, and he was never naturalized, he remained a natural-born citizen.

• Proper Exercise of the HRET’s Mandate: The HRET defended its decision as a valid exercise of its constitutional authority as the “sole judge” of the qualifications of its members. No grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to its interpretation that repatriation restored Cruz’s natural-born status.

• Natural-Born Status After Repatriation: Whether a natural-born Filipino who lost Philippine citizenship by rendering service in the armed forces of a foreign country and subsequently becoming a naturalized citizen of that country, and who later reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630, is deemed a natural-born citizen within the meaning of Article IV, Section 2 in relation to Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, qualifying him for election to the House of Representatives.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the HRET: Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen and dismissed the quo warranto petition.

• Natural-Born Status After Repatriation: Repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630 restored respondent Cruz to his original status as a natural-born citizen. The 1987 Constitution recognizes only two classes of citizens: natural-born and naturalized. A citizen who reacquires Philippine citizenship through repatriation does not thereby become a naturalized citizen; repatriation involves merely the taking of an oath of allegiance and its registration, not the exacting judicial proceeding required for naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473. Since Cruz was a natural-born Filipino by birth and regained citizenship through a mode that is not naturalization, he must be considered natural-born. The definition in Article IV, Section 2 requires that the person be a citizen “from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.” Cruz’s original citizenship was acquired at birth without any act, and his reacquisition did not constitute a new grant but a recovery of what he originally possessed. The 1987 Constitution’s expansion of natural-born status to include those who elect Philippine citizenship under Section 1(3) confirms that the only class excluded are those naturalized in accordance with law. Respondent Cruz never went through naturalization; consequently, he is a natural-born citizen qualified to serve in the House.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the HRET: No grave abuse of discretion was committed. The Constitution vests in the HRET the sole and exclusive authority to judge the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House. Judicial review through certiorari is confined to whether the Tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; it does not extend to correcting mere errors of judgment. The HRET’s conclusion that repatriation restored Cruz’s natural-born status was supported by the legal meaning of repatriation, established doctrines on citizenship, and a tenable construction of the Constitution. There was no capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary exercise of power that would warrant the Court’s intervention.

• Repatriation as Recovery of Original Nationality — Repatriation is the recovery of one’s original nationality upon the fulfillment of certain conditions; it is not a mode of acquiring new citizenship. A former natural-born Filipino who reacquires citizenship under a repatriation statute resumes his prior status as a natural-born citizen, not as a naturalized citizen. (Applied to Cruz, who lost citizenship by foreign military service and naturalization, then reacquired it under R.A. No. 2630.)

• Two-Classes-Only Doctrine under the 1987 Constitution — Article IV of the 1987 Constitution contemplates only two classes of citizens: natural-born and naturalized. A Filipino citizen who did not have to undergo the naturalization process under the Revised Naturalization Law or similar legislation is necessarily a natural-born citizen. Repatriated individuals fall within the natural-born category if they were natural-born before losing citizenship.

• Exclusive Judging Power of the House Electoral Tribunal — The HRET is the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction is limited to determining whether the Tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Absent such grave abuse, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Tribunal.

• “Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.” (majority opinion, citing Angat v. Republic)

• “It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.”

• “Repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. … It is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one’s former or original citizenship.” (Panganiban, J., concurring)

• Angat v. Republic, 314 SCRA 438 (1999) — Applied for the principle that under repatriation statutes a person reacquiring citizenship need not file a petition in court; the simple act of oath-taking and registration suffices. This underscored that repatriation does not approximate the rigorous process of naturalization.

• Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315 (1912) — Cited both by the majority (via the historical definition of natural-born citizens as those who become citizens at the moment of birth) and by the concurrence (for the rule that doubts in citizenship are resolved in favor of the claimant).

• Garcia v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 312 SCRA 353 (1999) — Relied upon to state the standard of review: the Court’s power over HRET decisions is limited to checking for grave abuse of discretion.

• Article VI, Section 6, 1987 Constitution — “No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.” This provision framed the qualification dispute.

• Article IV, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — Enumeration of citizens of the Philippines. The Court used the list to demonstrate that repatriated citizens are not in a separate class and that only two categories exist.

• Article IV, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Defines natural-born citizens as “those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.” The Court interpreted “from birth” to refer to the origin of citizenship, not continuous possession, and held that repatriation does not constitute an “act to acquire” citizenship in the naturalization sense.

• Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4) — Provides that a Filipino citizen loses citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country, absent Philippine consent. This was the ground for Cruz’s loss of citizenship.

• Republic Act No. 2630 (1960) — An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service to, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States. Section 1 allows reacquisition by taking an oath of allegiance and registering it. The Court ruled that this mode does not constitute naturalization and restores the original status.

• Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Law) — Distinguished from repatriation to show that naturalization is a judicial process involving rigid qualifications and disqualifications. Repatriation, lacking such requirements, does not produce a naturalized citizen.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, and JJ., concurred. Justice Panganiban filed a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justices Pardo and Gonzaga-Reyes, who also concurred in the majority opinion. Justice Ynares-Santiago certified the majority opinion of Justice Kapunan. Justices Melo, Vitug, and Mendoza took no part. Justices Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., were on leave.

• Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez — Dissented on the ground that respondent Cruz could not be considered a natural-born citizen after having lost and subsequently reacquired his Philippine citizenship. The constitutional definition requires that one be a citizen “from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect” such citizenship. Cruz’s need to undergo repatriation—taking an oath, renouncing other citizenship—constituted an act to reacquire citizenship, thereby breaking the continuity of his natural-born status. The dissent traced the historical tightening of the natural-born requirement and stressed that the plain language of the Constitution must be given effect. It concluded that the HRET gravely abused its discretion by disregarding the clear textual mandate. The dissent would have granted the petition and disqualified Cruz.