Benedicto vs. De la Rama

A divorce a mensa et thoro is not available to a spouse who has himself or herself committed adultery; the guilt of each party is a bar to the other's suit for divorce. The Court held that under the applicable law, neither party to a divorce action could obtain a decree where both had committed adultery, as the sin of each was a bar to an accusation against the other.

Agueda Benedicto and Esteban de la Rama were married in July 1891. The action arose in the context of the legal regime governing divorce in the Philippines at the turn of the century, following the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States. The Court was required to determine which body of law governed divorce — the Civil Code provisions, the canon law, or the Laws of the Partidas — and whether the Courts of First Instance had jurisdiction over such actions under Act No. 136.

Agueda Benedicto and Esteban de la Rama were married in July 1891 and lived happily together until August 1892, when the defendant suddenly, without warning, took his wife to the house of her parents, left her there, and never lived with her afterward. The plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on October 29, 1901, alleging abandonment and adultery as grounds. The defendant answered by charging the plaintiff with adultery, denying the adultery imputed to him, and asking for a divorce by way of cross-demand.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant committed adultery with Gregoria Bermejo in 1892, but produced no evidence to support this allegation as to the time; no witness fixed any date prior to 1894. The other two charges related to 1899 and 1901. The defendant, for his part, testified that on his return from an inspection of one of his estates, his wife's maid gave him a letter in the handwriting of his wife directed to her lover, a Spanish corporal of the civil guard named Zabal. According to the defendant, the plaintiff admitted the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees, and implored him to pardon her; that same day he took her to the home of her parents, told what had occurred, and left her there.

The most important evidence against the plaintiff was a letter she wrote to the defendant on March 6, 1899, in which she stated, among other things, "I am unworthy of your presence" and asked him to "wipe out the past." The plaintiff's mother testified that about a year after her daughter was returned to her, she heard that the defendant believed that illicit relations existed between Zabal and the plaintiff on account of a certain letter. The trial court found the defendant guilty of adultery but found that the plaintiff had not committed adultery, and granted the plaintiff a divorce with ₱1,042.76 as her share of the conjugal property.

• Adultery of the Plaintiff: The defendant-appellant argued that the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had not committed adultery was plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence, particularly in light of the plaintiff's letter of March 6, 1899, which constituted a confession of guilt.
• Inadequacy of the Trial Court's Theory: The defendant-appellant contended that the trial court's theory that the defendant had tired of his wife was unsupported by the evidence, and that the sudden separation could only be explained by the defendant's testimony regarding the plaintiff's adultery with Zabal.

• Letter as Confession: The plaintiff-appellee contended that the wrong for which she sought pardon in her letter was that of having asked for an allowance, not adultery.
• Condonation: The plaintiff-appellee argued that even if she had committed adultery, the defendant had condoned the offense, and that condonation would entitle her to a divorce against him.

• Jurisdiction over Divorce Cases: Whether the Courts of First Instance had jurisdiction over divorce cases, and if so, on what law that jurisdiction was based.
• Review of Factual Findings: Whether the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had not committed adultery was plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence.
• Effect of Mutual Guilt: Whether either party was entitled to a divorce where both parties had committed adultery.

• Jurisdiction over Divorce Cases: Yes. Courts of First Instance had jurisdiction to entertain suits for divorce, the only ground therefor was adultery, an action on that ground could be maintained by either spouse, and the decree did not dissolve the marriage bond.
• Review of Factual Findings: Yes. The finding that the plaintiff had not committed adultery was plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence, the letter of March 6, 1899, being practically conclusive against her.
• Effect of Mutual Guilt: No. Neither party was entitled to a divorce, as the guilt of each party was a bar to an accusation against the other under Law 8, title 2, partida 4.

• Jurisdiction over Divorce Cases: The Court held that the provisions of the Civil Code relating to divorce, contained in title 4 of book 1, were not in force in the Philippines. By the royal decree of July 31, 1889, the Civil Code was extended to the Islands, but on December 31, 1889, an order was published suspending titles 4 and 12 of the Code. The Court found that the order of suspension referred to titles 4 and 12 of book 1, and that articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code were therefore not in force on August 13, 1898. General Orders, No. 68, promulgated on December 18, 1899, treated of marriage and nullity of marriage but said nothing about divorce. The Court then examined the Laws of the Partidas, which contained provisions relating to divorce. Law 1, title 10, of the fourth partida defined divorce as a separation, and Law 2 of the same title provided that adultery was a ground for divorce. The Court held that these provisions of the Partidas were in force in the Islands prior to 1889 by operation of Law 2, title 1, book 2 of the Recopilacion de las Leyes Indias, which directed that the laws of Castile be followed in cases not provided for by the compilation. Being in force on August 13, 1898, they continued in force after the change of sovereignty. The complete separation of church and state under the American Government changed the tribunal in which the right to divorce should be enforced but could not affect the right itself. The jurisdiction formerly possessed by the ecclesiastical courts was vested in Courts of First Instance by virtue of Act No. 136, Section 56, which granted original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of litigation was not capable of pecuniary estimation.

• Review of Factual Findings: The Court examined the evidence and found that the adultery of the defendant was duly proved. However, the finding that the plaintiff had not committed adultery was plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. The Court relied chiefly on the letter written by the plaintiff to the defendant on March 6, 1899, which contained the significant words "I am unworthy of your presence." The Court rejected the appellee's contention that the wrong for which the plaintiff sought pardon was that of having asked for an allowance, reasoning that a woman does not ask her husband to blot out the past and say that she is unworthy of his presence simply because she asked for an allowance. The Court found the letter to be a confession of guilt. The Court also found that the trial court's theory that the defendant had tired of his wife was unsupported by the evidence, and that the separation and the letter could only be explained by the defendant's testimony that the plaintiff had committed adultery with Zabal. The Court noted that the testimony regarding the letter was corroborated by the evidence of the plaintiff's mother, who testified that she had heard that the defendant believed that illicit relations existed between Zabal and the plaintiff.

• Effect of Mutual Guilt: The Court held that even if the defendant had condoned the plaintiff's offense, this would not have entitled the plaintiff to a divorce. While Law 6, title 9, partida 4 provided that the wife could defeat the husband's suit for divorce by proving that he had pardoned her, the Court found no law in the Partidas which said that the effect of that pardon would be so far-reaching as to entitle her to a divorce against him. On the contrary, Law 8, title 2, partida 4 expressly provided: "For the sin of each one of them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other." The Court concluded that neither party was entitled to a divorce, making it unnecessary to consider that part of the judgment relating to the settlement of the conjugal partnership.

• Recrimination in Divorce Actions — Under Law 8, title 2, partida 4, the sin of each spouse is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that where both parties to a divorce action had committed adultery, neither was entitled to a decree of divorce against the other. The doctrine operates as a complete bar to relief, regardless of the merits of either party's claim.

• Applicable Law on Divorce in the Philippines — The provisions of the Civil Code relating to divorce (title 4, book 1) were suspended in the Philippines by order of December 29, 1889, and were not in force on August 13, 1898. The applicable law on divorce was found in the Laws of the Partidas, which recognized adultery as the only ground for divorce and provided that the decree did not dissolve the marriage bond. These laws continued in force after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States.

• Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over Divorce — By virtue of Act No. 136, Section 56, Courts of First Instance had original jurisdiction over divorce cases as civil actions in which the subject of litigation was not capable of pecuniary estimation. The jurisdiction formerly possessed by the ecclesiastical courts was vested in the Courts of First Instance, the separation of church and state having changed the tribunal but not the substantive right.

• Appellate Review of Factual Findings — Under Section 497 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court may review the evidence where the excepting party filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the findings of fact were plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence. The Court applied this standard in reversing the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had not committed adultery.

• "For the sin of each one of them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other." — This quotation from Law 8, title 2, partida 4 states the controlling doctrine of recrimination, which the Court applied to bar both parties from obtaining a divorce where both had committed adultery.

• "The letter is a confession of guilt." — This passage states the Court's conclusion regarding the plaintiff's letter of March 6, 1899, which the Court found to be practically conclusive evidence of the plaintiff's adultery.

• "The complete separation under the American Government of church and state, while it changed the tribunal in which this right should be enforced, could not affect the right itself." — This passage articulates the principle that a change in sovereignty does not abolish substantive rights, but only changes the forum in which they are enforced.

• Am. Ins. Co. vs. Canter, 1 Pet., 511 — Cited as authority for the proposition that laws in force at the time of the change of sovereignty continue in force until changed by the new sovereign.
• Hallett vs. Collins, 10 How., 175 — Distinguished; the Court noted that the case assumed the law of the Partidas regarding matrimony was in force in Louisiana, but reached that conclusion without considering the Law of the Indies.

• Act No. 136, Section 56 — Granted Courts of First Instance original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of litigation was not capable of pecuniary estimation, and in all such special cases and proceedings as were not otherwise provided for. The Court applied this provision to vest jurisdiction over divorce cases in the Courts of First Instance.
• Section 497, Code of Civil Procedure — Authorized the Supreme Court to review the evidence and make findings upon the facts and render such final judgment as justice and equity require, where a motion for a new trial was filed on the ground that the findings of fact were plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence.
• Law 1 and Law 2, title 10, partida 4 — Defined divorce as a separation and provided that adultery was a ground for divorce.
• Law 8, title 2, partida 4 — Provided that the sin of each spouse is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other, which the Court applied as the doctrine of recrimination.
• Law 6, title 9, partida 4 — Provided that the wife could defeat the husband's suit for divorce by proving that he had pardoned her, but the Court held this did not entitle the wife to a divorce against the husband.
• Law 2, title 1, book 2, Recopilacion de las Leyes Indias — Directed that the laws of Castile be followed in cases not provided for by the compilation, which the Court applied to hold that the Partidas were in force in the Philippines.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Mapa, JJ., concurred. Johnson, J., took no part.

• Justice McDonough — Dissented without a written opinion.
• Justice Cooper — Dissented, arguing that the trial court's findings of fact were not plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal. Justice Cooper contended that the letter of March 6, 1899, upon which the majority placed so much stress, rather indicated that the writer was in a morbid state of mind and in great distress, and showed a willingness to confess any manner of misdoings to appease her husband's wrath without regard to innocence or guilt. Justice Cooper also argued that the doctrine of condonation should have been applied, citing American authorities for the proposition that a condoned offense is not a bar to divorce in favor of the plaintiff, and that the case should have been reversed to allow the lower court to make findings on the question of condonation.