Benedicto vs. Court of Appeals

An easement of way constituted by grant for all time and all the needs of both estates, and annotated on the transfer certificates of title, is perpetual and binding on successors-in-interest; it is not extinguished by nonuser absent indubitable proof and before the statutory prescriptive period has elapsed, nor by the cessation of necessity where it also qualifies as an easement of necessity.

The dispute concerns adjoining parcels in Manila that were originally part of a single parcel owned by Miriam R. Hedrick and later transferred through separate chains to Vicente A. Heras and Salvador Benedicto. The governing statute is Article 631 of the Civil Code, which provides for extinguishment of easements by nonuser and by the condition of the estates; it was taken from Article 546 of the Civil Code of 1889, with the period of nonuser reduced from 20 to 10 years. The parcels were subject to a reciprocal vehicular passageway created in a 1917 sale to Claro M. Recto, which the parties agreed would bind all subsequent acquirers.

The adjoining properties of Vicente A. Heras and Salvador Benedicto formerly belonged to one owner, Miriam R. Hedrick, consisting of Lots Nos. 8, 9, 10, 22, 23, and 24 of Survey Plan RS-219, G.L.R.O. Record No. 662, with an area of 1,307.3 square meters covered by TCT No. 3623 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. On September 29, 1917, Hedrick sold Lots Nos. 8, 9, 22, and 23 to Claro M. Recto and retained Lots Nos. 10 and 24. The deed of sale provided that between the sold and retained portions there was a vehicular passage about three to four meters wide, constituted in equal halves on each portion, and both parties obligated themselves to respect each other's right to use the entire passage for all time and all the needs of both properties, binding on all subsequent acquirers. The deed also provided for a new survey to fix the dividing line in the middle of the passage, perpendicular to San Marcelino street, and these stipulations were annotated on the respective titles.

Before the new survey was undertaken, Recto obtained a separate title, TCT No. 7755, on October 2, 1917. To carry out the new survey, Recto filed a motion dated July 19, 1920, later amended on September 30, 1921, in the Court of Land Registration of Manila, Record No. 662, for a new title based on the new survey; the amendment stated that he did not claim Lots 9b and 23b but only Lots A, B, C, and D. On January 30, 1922, before the motions were acted upon, Recto filed a motion to withdraw them on the ground that the Chief Surveyor's report showed that plan S.W.O. 3753 did not agree with the September 21, 1917 instrument and that TCT No. 7755 was in accord with that instrument. The court granted the withdrawal on January 31, 1922.

Recto's property passed through a series of transfers: to Emmanuel Conty, with TCT No. 7755 cancelled by TCT No. 31334 dated September 1, 1928; and then to Salvador Benedicto, with TCT No. 31334 cancelled by TCT No. 45990 dated December 1, 1934. Hedrick, for her part, obtained a new separate title, TCT No. 22760 dated September 20, 1924, based on a cadastral survey that consolidated Lots Nos. 10 and 24 as Lot No. 12 of Block No. 372, with a technical description and area different from those in Survey Plan RS-219. Her property then passed to Chow Kwo Hsien, with TCT No. 22760 cancelled by TCT No. 22766 dated September 23, 1924; to General Security and Investment Co., with TCT No. 22766 cancelled by TCT No. 49798 dated August 26, 1936; and finally to Vicente A. Heras, with TCT No. 49798 cancelled by TCT No. 62769 dated September 19, 1941.

In 1941, Heras demolished the entire building on his property. Benedicto testified that it was only in 1946 that he had the passageway walled in by constructing a fence. Heras started construction of an apartment building on his land after the 1941 demolition; construction was interrupted by World War II and continued in 1955. In 1955, Heras filed the action to recover the portion of land he claimed Benedicto had enclosed and walled and to demand the reopening of the easement of way.

The trial court found that after selling Lots 8, 9, 22, and 23 with an area of 766.90 square meters, Hedrick obtained a separate title for the remaining Lots 10 and 24, whose total area was only 540.4 square meters; in the new title TCT No. 22760, however, their total area appeared to be 681.30 square meters because the technical description was based on a cadastral survey. Since Heras, as Hedrick's successor-in-interest, owned no more than 540.4 square meters, the trial court held that no portion of his property had been encroached upon by Benedicto. The trial court likewise found that the easement of way was located entirely within Benedicto's property, contrary to the deed's stipulation that it should be between the properties with each contributing an equal portion; according to the court, this was why Recto, Benedicto's predecessor-in-interest, withdrew his motion for a resurvey after finding that the passageway was entirely within his property.

• Extinguishment by Nonuser: Petitioner argued that the easement was originally constituted because the buildings on the respective properties of Hedrick and Recto so adjoined each other that the only way the rear portions could be reached from San Marcelino street was through the passageway; when Heras demolished his building in 1941, his property gained direct access to San Marcelino street, so the passageway was no longer needed.
• Cessation of Necessity: Petitioner maintained that since 1941 the passageway ceased to be used, assuming that Heras could not be expected to make detours to reach San Marcelino street when the frontage of his property was open in its entirety to the street.
• Article 631 and Prescription: Petitioner argued that Article 631 of the Civil Code governed and that, since 14 years had elapsed from the 1941 demolition to the 1955 filing of the action, the easement must be deemed extinguished by nonuser.

• Cessation of Necessity: Respondent Heras claimed that he demolished his house precisely in order to build an apartment building in its place, traversing the petitioner's assertion that the necessity for the passageway had ceased.

• Extinguishment by Nonuser: Whether the easement of way was extinguished by nonuser under Article 631 of the Civil Code, considering the alleged nonuse from 1941 to 1955.
• Prescriptive Period: Whether the prescriptive period for nonuser had elapsed, given that Benedicto walled the passageway only in 1946 and the action was filed in 1955.
• Presumptive Renunciation: Whether Heras's alleged nonuse gave rise to a presumptive renunciation of the easement.
• Cessation of Necessity and Perpetual Easement: Whether the easement, even if also one of necessity, was extinguished by the cessation of necessity when Heras demolished his building in 1941.

• Extinguishment by Nonuser: No. The easement was not extinguished by nonuser because there was no indubitable proof of nonuser and the prescriptive period had not elapsed under Article 631 of the Civil Code.
• Prescriptive Period: No. Even assuming a ten-year period, Benedicto's testimony showed that he walled the passageway only in 1946, and the action was filed in 1955, so ten years had not elapsed.
• Presumptive Renunciation: No. Heras's construction of an apartment building after 1941, interrupted by World War II and continued in 1955, negated any presumptive renunciation because the vehicular passageway was needed for the rear portion of the projected building.
• Cessation of Necessity and Perpetual Easement: No. The easement was perpetual and annotated on the titles; even if it also qualified as an easement of necessity, it survived the termination of the necessity as a property right.

• Extinguishment by Nonuser: Article 631 of the Civil Code provides that easements are extinguished by nonuser for ten years, computed from the day the discontinuous easement ceased to be used or from the day an act contrary to a continuous easement took place, and when either or both estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be used, subject to revival if the condition later permits use unless prescription has elapsed. The provision was taken from Article 546 of the Civil Code of 1889, with the nonuser period reduced from 20 to 10 years. The Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the applicable period was 20 or 10 years because there was no indubitable proof of nonuser; the petitioner merely assumed that the passageway had not been used since 1941 because Heras's property had gained direct access to San Marcelino street after the demolition of his house.
• Prescriptive Period: Even assuming a ten-year prescriptive period, the petitioner's own testimony showed that it was only in 1946 that he had the passageway walled in by constructing a fence. Since the action was filed in 1955, the ten-year period had not yet elapsed, assuming Article 631 of the Civil Code applied.
• Presumptive Renunciation: Presumptive renunciation by Heras could not be inferred. The record showed that Heras started constructing an apartment building on his land after the demolition of his house in 1941; although interrupted by World War II, construction continued in 1955. Because the stipulation of facts showed that the easement was mainly a vehicular passageway, the obvious need for such passageway to the rear portion of the projected apartment building negated any presumptive renunciation.
• Cessation of Necessity and Perpetual Easement: The easement was perpetual in character, as the deed provided that it was for all time and all the needs of both properties, binding on all who subsequently acquired the properties. It was annotated on all transfer certificates of title in the chain from Hedrick to Heras and in the chain from Recto to Benedicto. Nothing in the record pointed to a mutual agreement between any predecessors-in-interest, or between the petitioner and respondent themselves, to discontinue or obliterate the annotated easement; thus its continued existence had to be upheld and respected. The fact that the easement was also one of necessity did not detract from this conclusion. Even assuming that the necessity ceased when Heras demolished his house—a point Heras traversed by claiming he demolished it to build an apartment building—the Court held, citing Valicenti vs. Schuultz, that an easement by grant that may also qualify as an easement of necessity does not lose its permanency as a property right and survives the termination of the necessity. When the easement was established, the parties unequivocally provided for its observance by all future successors, which was why its permanent character was annotated on all the transfer certificates of title.

• Extinguishment of easements by nonuser — Under Article 631 of the Civil Code, an easement is extinguished by nonuser for ten years, computed from the day the discontinuous easement ceased to be used or from the day an act contrary to a continuous easement took place; it is also extinguished when either or both estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be used, but it revives if the condition later permits use unless prescription has elapsed. The Court applied this provision but found no indubitable proof of nonuser and, even assuming a ten-year period, found that the period had not elapsed because Benedicto walled the passageway only in 1946 and the action was filed in 1955.
• Perpetual easement by grant survives cessation of necessity — An easement constituted by grant for all time and all the needs of both estates, and annotated on the transfer certificates of title, is perpetual and binding on successors-in-interest. Even if the easement also qualifies as an easement of necessity, it does not lose its permanency as a property right and survives the termination of the necessity. The Court applied this doctrine because the 1917 deed created the passageway for all time, the easement was annotated on all titles in both chains, and no mutual agreement to discontinue it existed.
• Presumptive renunciation of an easement — Presumptive renunciation of an easement cannot be inferred where the dominant owner's acts show a continued need for the easement. The Court found that Heras's construction of an apartment building after 1941, interrupted by World War II and continued in 1955, and the need for vehicular access to the rear of the projected building, negated any presumptive renunciation.
• No indubitable proof of nonuser — Nonuser must be established by indubitable proof, not by mere assumption. The petitioner's assumption that the passageway had not been used since 1941 because Heras's property had direct access to San Marcelino street was insufficient to extinguish the easement.

• "For the purposes of this decision we do not find it necessary to determine whether the appropriate period of nonuser in this case is 20 or 10 years. For one thing, there is no indubitable proof of nonuser. The petitioner merely assumes that the passageway in question had not been in use since 1941 because the property of Heras has since gained direct access to San Marcelino street with the demolition of his house. For another, even if we assume that the period of prescription based on nonuser is 10 years, the very testimony of the petitioner Benedicto shows that it was only in 1946 that he had the passageway walled in by constructing a fence, and since the present action was filed in 1955, granting that article 631 of the Civil Code is applicable, the prescriptive period has not yet elapsed." — This passage states the ratio for rejecting extinguishment by nonuser, emphasizing the absence of indubitable proof and the non-elapse of the prescriptive period.
• "Nor can presumptive renunciation by Heras of the use of the said passageway be inferred. It would appear from the record that Heras started the construction of an apartment building on his parcel of land after the demolition of his house in 1941, and that although interrupted by World War II, construction was continued in 1955. Since it is patent from the stipuation of facts that the easement in question is mainly a vehicular passageway, the obvious need for such passageway to the rear portion of the projected apartment building negates any presumptive renunciation on the part of Heras." — This passage explains why Heras's conduct did not amount to presumptive renunciation.
• "Since there is nothing in the record that would point to a mutual agreement between any of the predecessors-in-interest not between the petitioner and the respondent themselves with respect to the discontinuance or obliteration of the easement annotated on the titles, the continued existence of the easement must be upheld and respected." — This passage establishes that absent mutual agreement to discontinue, the annotated easement remains binding.
• "the fact that an easement [by grant] may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity." — This passage states the rule that an easement by grant survives the termination of necessity, even if it also qualified as an easement of necessity.

• Valicenti vs. Schuultz, 209 N.Y.S. 2d 33 (1960) — Cited by the Court for the rule that the fact that an easement by grant may also qualify as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity.

• Article 631, Civil Code — Provides for extinguishment of easements by nonuser for ten years, with the period computed from the day the discontinuous easement ceased to be used or from the day an act contrary to a continuous easement took place, and by the condition of the estates preventing use, subject to revival unless prescription has elapsed. The Court applied it to reject the claim that the easement was extinguished by nonuser.
• Article 546, Civil Code of 1889 — Identified as the source of Article 631, with the modification that the period of nonuser was reduced from 20 to 10 years. The Court noted it did not need to determine whether the 20-year or 10-year period applied.

Concepcion, C.J.; Reyes, J.B.L.; Makalintal; Zaldivar; Sanchez; Angeles; and Fernando, JJ., concur. Dizon, J., took no part.