Benasa vs. Mahor

Properties acquired during adulterous cohabitation are owned in common in proportion to the parties' respective actual contributions under Article 148 of the Family Code, and cohabitation is determined by intent and circumstances to live together as husband and wife rather than by uninterrupted physical presence. Retroactive application of Article 148 to a relationship begun in 1974 was sustained, and substantial salary remittances proven by slips, passbooks, and acknowledgment letters were deemed sufficient proof of contribution to require accounting, inventory, and reconveyance of shares in the real properties.

Bernard B. Benasa remained single and became a seafarer, while Presentacion R. Mahor, his childhood sweetheart, married Pablo Mahor. In 1974, while Mahor's marriage subsisted, the two resumed an adulterous relationship that continued while Benasa worked overseas. At that time Article 144 of the Old Civil Code governed property of unmarried cohabitants, later supplemented by Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code for cohabitation with and without legal impediment to marry.

Bernard B. Benasa and Presentacion R. Mahor were childhood sweethearts. Mahor later married Pablo Mahor, while Benasa remained single and worked as a seafarer spending most of his time overseas. Sometime in 1974, while Mahor's marriage subsisted, they reunited and engaged in an adulterous relationship that lasted until 1999.

During that 25-year period, Benasa regularly remitted monthly allotments from his salaries and benefits to Mahor. He alleged that Mahor used those funds to purchase lots in Quezon City, Tagaytay City, and Baliuag, Bulacan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. N-223267, T-17493, and T-306188, but registered them solely in her name contrary to his instruction to register them in his name. To prove remittances, he presented slips and passbooks covering 1974 to 1999 aggregating US$585,755.89 plus P200,927.00, with Mahor added as alternative party in passbooks. He also presented photographs of them displaying intimacy, some taken in the shared properties with visible dates, love letters exchanged from 1974 to 1999, a photograph of Mahor pointing to the Quezon City house bearing a handwritten note stating it was bought from allotment, and a letter reporting a savings balance of P67,318.34 as of July and the opening of a dollar account. His brother Valerio Benasa testified that the two lived together as husband and wife and that acquisitions came from Benasa's seafarer earnings. He further inventoried personal properties in the Quezon City home with encircled photographs, claiming he was later barred from the premises.

Upon retirement in 1999, Benasa requested inventory and accounting of cash and properties entrusted from 1974 to 1999, but Mahor did not comply, straining the relationship to separation. A decade later, through counsel's demand letter dated July 25, 2009, he reiterated the request, and upon continued non-compliance filed the petition for complete accounting, inventory, and reconveyance of all money and properties, real and personal. The trial court found the relationship a simple love affair rather than marital cohabitation, the slips and passbooks proof only of remittance without trust instruction, the terms honey and daddy generic, the real properties presumptively conjugal of Mahor and Pablo having been acquired during their marriage, and the personal-property photographs insufficient against presumptions of possession.

• Co-ownership under Article 147 or 148: Petitioner argued that his salaries and benefits remitted to Mahor during their cohabitation funded the acquisition of the real properties, and that without those remittances Mahor, then unemployed, could not have acquired them, giving rise to co-ownership entitling him to accounting, inventory, and reconveyance.
• Cohabitation despite overseas work: Petitioner maintained that he had no intention of abandoning respondent and that absence was only by nature of his work as a seafarer, which did not negate cohabiting with her, with continued support for their family constituting contribution.
• Proof of remittances and acknowledgments: Petitioner argued that slips and passbooks aggregating US$585,755.89 plus P200,927.00, photographs with handwritten notes, and letters acknowledging deposits established his contributions and Mahor's receipt thereof.
• Personal properties: Petitioner contended that inventory and photographs encircling objects in the Quezon City home proved personal properties he purchased and was prevented from recovering.

• Applicable Law and Cohabitation: Whether the CA erred in refusing to apply Article 148 of the Family Code for lack of cohabitation where petitioner worked overseas as a seafarer.
• Real Properties – Co-ownership, Accounting and Reconveyance: Whether petitioner established co-ownership by actual contribution entitling him to accounting, inventory, and reconveyance of the Quezon City, Tagaytay City, and Baliuag properties covered by TCT Nos. N-223267, T-17493, and T-306188.
• Personal Properties: Whether petitioner proved ownership of the personal properties claimed inside the Quezon City property so as to order their surrender.

• Applicable Law and Cohabitation: Yes. Article 148 governs adulterous cohabitation and was satisfied, intermittent overseas work not negating intent and conduct showing dwelling together as husband and wife from 1974 to 1999.
• Real Properties – Co-ownership, Accounting and Reconveyance: Yes. Substantial proven remittances constituted actual contribution to co-owned properties, overcoming sole registration in respondent's name and requiring remand for accounting and determination of shares.
• Personal Properties: No. Encircled photographs and inventory were self-serving and inadequate to prove purchase and legal right, and unemployment of respondent was an unsupported assumption.

• Applicable Law and Cohabitation: Article 144 of the Old Civil Code in effect in 1974 was clarified not to apply to adulterous or concubinage relations, while Article 148 filled the hiatus and applies retroactively where vested rights are unimpaired to bigamous, adulterous, and similar alliances. Cohabitation was construed as dwelling together as husband and wife for some period, with duration dependent on circumstances rather than a fixed period. Petitioner's intent to return to the Quezon City dwelling, continued reciprocal letters from 1974 to 1999, dated affectionate photographs including in shared properties, large remittances, and residence in the Quezon City property upon return established cohabitation despite secrecy from the legal husband and absence due to seafaring contracts.
• Real Properties – Co-ownership, Accounting and Reconveyance: Petitioner did not claim exclusive ownership but contribution to payments before the 1999 separation, invoking limited co-ownership in proportion to actual contributions. Sole registration in respondent's name was not conclusive, though title in the concept of owner still had to be proved. Detailed allotment and deposit records totaling US$585,755.89 and P200,927.00, designation of respondent as alternative party with access, her letter referring to allotments deposited and a joint dollar account, and her note that the Quezon City house was bought from allotment proved receipt and contribution that could hardly be considered meager. Because the Court is not a trier of facts, remand for accounting, reception of evidence, and evaluation of ownership and shares under Article 148 was required, with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees awarded.
• Personal Properties: Identification through photographs without evidence of actual purchase by petitioner or exclusion from respondent's possession failed to establish legal right. Mere labeling could not prevail over disputable presumptions of ownership from actual possession and possession of movables in real property under Articles 433 and 542 of the Civil Code.

• Limited co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code — In cohabitation not falling under Article 147, only properties acquired by both parties through actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry are owned in common in proportion to respective contributions, with equal contributions and shares presumed absent proof to the contrary, the same rule applying to joint deposits and evidences of credit; if one party is validly married to another, his or her share accrues to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, with forfeiture rules for bad faith. Applied to treat Benasa's proven salary remittances as contributions to properties acquired during 25-year adulterous cohabitation, requiring accounting and proportionate ownership.
• Non-applicability of Article 144 of the Old Civil Code to adulterous relations — Article 144 applies only to a man and woman not incapacitated to marry or whose marriage is void from the beginning, not to adultery or concubinage, whose property regime is governed by Article 148 which filled the hiatus and applies retroactively so long as vested rights remain unimpaired. Applied to hold Article 148, not Article 144, controlling although the relationship began in 1974.
• Cohabitation as dwelling as husband and wife — Cohabit means to dwell together in the manner of husband and wife for some period, as distinguished from occasional transient interviews for unlawful intercourse, with existence and extent left to court appreciation of circumstances and without a fixed statutory period. Applied to find cohabitation despite seafarer's intermittent absence, based on intent to return, correspondence, photographs, remittances, and shared residence.
• Torrens title not conclusive against co-ownership claim — Issuance of title solely in one person's name does not foreclose co-ownership by persons not named therein, but the claimant must still prove title in the concept of an owner. Applied to allow Benasa's contribution evidence to support co-ownership despite registration solely in Mahor's name.
• Conjugal presumption and possession presumptions — Properties acquired during a subsisting marriage are presumed conjugal or community property, while actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership and possession of real property presumes possession of movables therein unless exclusion is shown. Applied by the lower courts to deny relief, but overcome as to real properties by proof of actual contribution, and retained as to personal properties for lack of proof.

• "only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal." — States the controlling Article 148 rule of limited co-ownership applied to determine Benasa's proportionate share upon proof of remittance contributions.
• "The term 'cohabit' means to dwell together, in the manner of husband and wife, for some period of time, as distinguished from occasional, transient interviews for unlawful intercourse." — Defines the cohabitation standard used to reject the requirement of continuous dwelling under one roof for a seafarer.
• "However, the fact that the properties were solely registered under the name of respondent alone, is not conclusive proof of ownership as its issuance does not foreclose the possibility that such property may be co-owned by persons not named therein, the claimant must nonetheless prove his/her title in the concept of an owner." — Explains why sole registration did not defeat the co-ownership claim while still requiring proof of contribution.
• "And the total amount of our S/A now is P67,318.34 as of July. I think your $190.00 dollars increase is already added in my allotment daddy coz last June I got only P 12,471.88 while this July I got P15,439.45 with a difference of P2,967.57." — Cited as acknowledgment of receipt and deposit of Benasa's allotments supporting actual contribution.

• Tumlos vs. Spouses Fernandez, 386 Phil. 936 (2000) — Followed as controlling that Article 144 of the Old Civil Code does not apply to adulterous or concubinage cohabitation and that Article 148 filled the hiatus with retroactive application if vested rights are unimpaired.
• People vs. Pitoc and Del Basco, 43 Phil. 758 (1922) — Followed for the meaning of cohabit as dwelling or living together as husband and wife, including in a state of adultery over a continued period.
• Ocampo vs. People of the Philippines, 72 Phil. 268 (1941) — Followed that cohabitation is dwelling together as husband and wife for some period and a question of fact for court appreciation.
• Cariño vs. Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001) — Cited with Aguilar-Mendoza vs. Mendoza to settle that Article 148 governs bigamous, adulterous, and multiple alliances with co-ownership based on actual joint contribution.
• Aguilar-Mendoza vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 251402, September 16, 2020 — Cited as supporting that Article 148 governs the listed incapacitated cohabitations.
• Dultra Vda. de Canada vs. Baclot, G.R. No. 221874, July 7, 2020 — Followed for the principle that sole registration does not foreclose co-ownership but requires proof of title as owner.

• Article 144, Old Civil Code — Provided that property acquired through work, industry, wages, and salaries by a man and woman living together as husband and wife without marriage or with void marriage is governed by co-ownership; held inapplicable to adulterous relations.
• Article 148, Family Code — Provides limited co-ownership based on actual joint contribution for cohabitation not under Article 147, with equal-share presumption, accrual to marital community if a party is validly married, and forfeiture for bad faith; applied to recognize Benasa's proportionate co-ownership and order accounting.
• Article 433, Civil Code — Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable presumption of ownership; relied upon by RTC to reject personal-property claim based on mere photographic identification.
• Article 542, Civil Code — Possession of real property presumes possession of movables therein absent proof of exclusion; similarly relied upon to deny surrender of personal properties.
• Articles 2217 and 2218, Civil Code — Define moral damages and allow consideration of sentimental value of property; cited as basis for awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

Lazaro-Javier, J., M. Lopez, J., and Kho, Jr., J., concur. Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), see separate concurring opinion elaborating that no fixed period establishes cohabitation, that intent to openly live as husband and wife controls, and detailing allotment, passbook, photographic, and testimonial indicia of shared dwelling and actual contribution while agreeing to remand for accounting, inventory, and return.