Benares vs. Lim

A dismissal of a criminal case for failure to prosecute, made upon the accused's own motion or with his express consent, does not result in double jeopardy unless the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or was for violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.

Oscar Beñares and Josephine Lim were parties to two contracts of sale executed in 1976 covering two parcels of land. The criminal case against Beñares for estafa proceeded in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. Its resolution implicated the Rules of Court provisions on double jeopardy and the dismissal of criminal cases for failure to prosecute.

Oscar Beñares was accused of estafa arising from two contracts of sale executed in 1976, in which he sold two parcels of land to Josephine Lim. After Lim fully paid the amortizations and a deed of absolute sale was issued, Beñares mortgaged the same parcels of land to Bank of the Philippine Islands. When Lim demanded delivery of the properties, Beñares failed to comply, and Lim was compelled to file an estafa case against him.

Trial ensued. After the prosecution presented its last witness, the MeTC gave it 15 days to formally offer its evidence. The prosecution did not make any formal offer of evidence. Beñares filed a motion praying that the prosecution's submission of formal offer of evidence be deemed waived and the case dismissed for lack of evidence. Despite receipt of notice of the motion, Lim and her counsel failed to attend the hearing on the motion set on December 4, 2001.

On January 28, 2002, the MeTC issued an Order giving the prosecution another 15 days within which to formally offer its evidence, which Beñares opposed. On February 27, 2002, the MeTC issued an Order noting that counsel for the accused had manifested that the private prosecutor received the January 28, 2002 Order on February 7, 2002, giving another 15 days to file the formal offer, yet failed to do so. The MeTC found reason to deny the submission of formal offer of evidence. Acting on Beñares's motion for dismissal for failure of the prosecution to prosecute, the MeTC granted the motion and dismissed the case.

Lim moved to reconsider the order of dismissal and prayed for admission of her Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits, claiming that she had difficulty securing documents from the court which were marked during trial. Beñares opposed the motion invoking his right against double jeopardy. On June 11, 2002, the MeTC issued an Order finding merit in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Prosecution, setting aside the January 28, 2002 Order, reinstating the case in the dockets of the Court, admitting the Prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence, and giving the accused 15 days from receipt to file Comment or Opposition. Beñares's Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

The Court of Appeals found that the prosecution had failed twice to file the formal offer of evidence within the 15-day period set by the MeTC. One failure was due to the fault of the MeTC judge, who expressly admitted in his order that the documentary exhibits necessary for the formal offer of evidence were lost in his office. There was thus actually only one unjustified delay in the filing of the formal offer of evidence. The Court of Appeals also noted that testimonial evidence had been presented against Beñares and that he appeared to have admitted the genuineness and due execution of Lim's documentary evidence.

• Speedy Trial: Petitioner argued that the six months' delay by the prosecution to formally offer its evidence was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive; that the private prosecutor's claim that the documents could not be found was untrue because no manifestation was filed in court stating that fact; and that the documents were available as early as January 2002 but the prosecution never asked for an extension nor explained the delay despite two orders to do so.
• Dismissal on the Merits / Double Jeopardy: Petitioner argued that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, failure to comply with a court order without justifiable reason may cause dismissal of the case, which shall have the effect of an adjudication on the merits unless otherwise stated by the court; the dismissal therefore amounted to an acquittal and barred further prosecution.

• Delay Attributable to Petitioner: Respondent asserted that it was petitioner who delayed the proceedings when he questioned the finding of probable cause against him before the Department of Justice, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, all of which were denied.
• Justified Delay: Respondent asserted that the delay in filing the formal offer of evidence was justified because, as noted by the MeTC, the records were missing.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Respondent insisted that even without documentary evidence, testimonial evidence was presented against petitioner, and that petitioner admitted the documentary evidence formally offered.
• No Double Jeopardy / Express Consent: Respondent refuted petitioner's invocation of double jeopardy because the case was dismissed with his express consent.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the MeTC's Order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute amounted to an acquittal which gave petitioner the right to invoke double jeopardy.
• Speedy Trial: Whether the prosecution's delay in filing its formal offer of evidence violated petitioner's right to speedy trial.

• Double Jeopardy: No. The dismissal was upon petitioner's motion or with his express consent and did not fall under the exceptions of insufficiency of evidence or violation of the right to speedy trial; hence double jeopardy did not attach.
• Speedy Trial: No. The prosecution's delay in formally offering evidence was not vexatious, capricious, or oppressive because the documents marked during trial were misplaced, and the totality of circumstances excused the delay.

• Double Jeopardy: Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that when an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance and after plea, the conviction, acquittal, or dismissal bars another prosecution. Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The first four elements were present. The fifth was absent: there was no conviction or acquittal, and the dismissal was based on failure to prosecute. A dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy, except in two instances: (1) the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or (2) the case is dismissed for violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. Here, the dismissal was upon petitioner's motion for dismissal for failure to prosecute, so it was with his express consent. It was not based on insufficiency of evidence; testimonial evidence was presented, and petitioner appears to have admitted the genuineness and due execution of respondent's documentary evidence. Neither was it for violation of the right to speedy trial, as discussed below. The doctrine that a dismissal for failure to prosecute amounts to an acquittal because the prosecution will fail to prove the case when the time comes was not applicable: testimonial evidence had been presented, and guilt or innocence could be proven even without documentary evidence. The trial court also exceeded its authority when it dismissed the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, violating due process; failure to offer exhibits is not a ground to dismiss, and when the trial court reconsidered its order, it merely corrected itself. Accordingly, double jeopardy did not attach.
• Speedy Trial: The right to speedy trial is not violated by a mere mathematical computation of the time involved. Each case must be decided on its peculiar facts, balancing the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the assertion or failure to assert the right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The prosecution failed twice to file its formal offer of evidence within the 15-day period set by the MeTC. One failure was due to the fault of the MeTC judge, who expressly admitted that the documentary exhibits necessary for the formal offer were lost in his office. There was therefore only one unjustified delay, which could not be described as vexatious, capricious, or oppressive. No showing existed that the criminal case was unreasonably prolonged or that there was deliberate intent to cause delay resulting in serious and great prejudice affecting the substantial rights of the accused. The totality of the circumstances excused the delay. People vs. Cloribel was inapplicable because there trial commenced almost four years from the filing of the complaint, a delay that could not be ignored or disregarded by any fair standard. Since the delay was not vexatious or oppressive, the right to speedy trial was not violated, and petitioner could not properly invoke double jeopardy.

• Double Jeopardy — Requisites — Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. In this case, the first four requisites were present, but the fifth was absent because the dismissal was upon petitioner's motion and with his express consent.
• Dismissal with Express Consent — Exceptions — A dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy, except in two instances: (1) the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or (2) the case is dismissed for violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. The dismissal here was upon petitioner's motion and did not fall under either exception.
• Speedy Trial — Flexible Factors — Delay is not a mere mathematical computation of time; each case is decided on its peculiar facts, balancing the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the assertion or failure to assert the right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The prosecution's delay was excused because the marked documents were lost in the MeTC office, leaving only one unjustified delay that was not vexatious, capricious, or oppressive.
• Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute — Not Automatically Acquittal — The doctrine that a dismissal for failure to prosecute amounts to an acquittal because the prosecution will fail to prove the case when the time comes does not apply where testimonial evidence has been presented and the accused has admitted the documentary evidence, such that guilt or innocence may still be proven. The prosecution had testimonial evidence, and petitioner appeared to have admitted the genuineness and due execution of respondent's documentary evidence.
• Due Process in Dismissal — A trial court exceeds its authority when it dismisses a case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, violating due process. The failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case, and the trial court's reconsideration of its dismissal order merely corrected itself.

• "Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused." — States the canonical requisites of double jeopardy; the fifth requisite was decisive because the dismissal was upon petitioner's motion.
• "A dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy, except in two instances, to wit: (1) the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or (2) the case is dismissed for violation of the accused's right to speedy trial." — Defines the exceptions to the express-consent rule; neither exception applied.
• "Indeed, delay is not a mere mathematical computation of the time involved. Each case must be decided upon the facts peculiar to it. The following factors must be considered and balanced: the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay." — Sets out the flexible test for speedy trial; the Court applied it to excuse the prosecution's delay.
• "Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case. Even without any documentary exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case through the testimonies of its witnesses. Thus, we find that when the trial court reconsidered its order of dismissal, it merely corrected itself." — States the ratio on why the dismissal for failure to prosecute did not amount to acquittal and why reconsideration was proper.

• Almario vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127772, March 22, 2001, 355 SCRA 1 — Cited for the requisites of double jeopardy and for the proposition that where the delay is not vexatious or oppressive, the right to speedy trial is not violated and double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
• Philippine Savings Bank vs. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 94 — Cited for the rule that a dismissal with express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy except for insufficiency of evidence or violation of the right to speedy trial.
• Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan, 424 Phil. 945 (2002) — Cited for the factors to be considered and balanced in determining whether the right to speedy trial was violated.
• People vs. Cloribel, 120 Phil. 775 (1964) — Distinguished; in that case trial commenced almost four years from the filing of the complaint, a delay that could not be ignored or disregarded by any fair standard.
• People vs. Alberto, 436 Phil. 434 (2002) — Cited for the rule that failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case and that the trial court merely corrected itself when it reconsidered its dismissal order.
• Malanyaon vs. Lising, 193 Phil. 425 (1981) — Cited for the proposition that there was no acquittal where the accused's guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Section 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. It provides that when an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal or dismissal bars another prosecution for the offense charged or any attempt or frustration thereof, or for any offense necessarily included therein. The provision was applied to hold that the dismissal, having been made upon petitioner's motion and with his express consent, did not bar further prosecution because neither exception applied.

Justice Austria-Martinez, Justice Callejo, Sr., and Justice Chico-Nazario concurred. Chief Justice Panganiban (Chairperson) had retired as of December 7, 2006.