Benancillo vs. Amila

A judge who uses derogatory, irreverent, or intemperate language against a litigant, and who conducts a private meeting with parties regarding pending incidents, commits conduct unbecoming a judge in violation of the duty to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety under Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Such conduct betrays the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and falls short of the higher ethical standards to which judges are held.

Complainant Lydia Benancillo was the petitioner in a civil case for a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) and Permanent Protection Order under Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act) against her live-in partner, Paul John Belot. The case, originally before the designated Family Court in Tagbilaran City, was transferred to Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court presided by respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila after he was designated the new Family Court judge. A TPO had previously been issued, along with a directive to turn over personal effects and business properties to the complainant. Business associates sought to intervene concerning corporate properties.

• Nature of the action: Complainant Lydia Benancillo filed an administrative complaint against Judge Venancio J. Amila of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, who presided over her civil case for issuance of a Temporary Protection Order and Permanent Protection Order under Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-VAWC Act) against her live-in partner, Paul John Belot.

• The Temporary Protection Order Case: A Temporary Protection Order (TPO) had been issued by the previous Family Court, directing Belot to turn over to complainant personal effects and properties of their diving business, Underworld Diver’s Panglao, Inc. Belot moved for reconsideration. Business associates Paz Mandin Trotin and Christopher Mandin moved for intervention regarding the corporate properties.

• Judge Amila’s successive orders: Upon the case’s transfer to his court, respondent judge denied both Belot’s motion for reconsideration and the motion for intervention in an Order dated July 16, 2007, and incorporated a cease-and-desist order against the intervenors. He reiterated this Order on August 14, 2007, and denied the intervenors’ motion for reconsideration on October 2, 2007. Complainant alleged that despite these rulings in her favor, the respondent judge refused to enforce the TPO.

• The chambers meeting: Complainant alleged that on October 8, 2007, respondent judge called her and her counsel to a meeting in his chambers for October 9, 2007. They agreed but did not proceed upon learning that the intervenors would also be present. Respondent judge subsequently met with the intervenors alone.

• Revocation of the October 2, 2007 Order: After that meeting, respondent judge issued an Order dated October 18, 2007 rescinding his October 2, 2007 Order. He cited as ground a petition for certiorari supposedly filed by Belot with the Court of Appeals, which complainant contended had not yet been filed at the time. Complainant’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated October 25, 2007.

• Derogatory language in the judge’s Comment: In his February 8, 2008 Comment to the administrative complaint, respondent judge depicted complainant as motivated by “insatiable greed,” characterized her as “only a live-in partner” and a “mistress” in an “illegitimate relationship,” and quoted Belot’s description of her as a “prostitute” who was “only after his money.” The judge further stated he rescinded the order because complainant had no right to shares she merely held as a dummy for Belot, and he feared she would “stealthily dispose of or abscond” with the properties due to the “illegitimate status of their relationship.”

• OCA findings and recommendation: The OCA found that calling the intervenors to a chambers meeting was inappropriate and that the judge’s language was derogatory and irreverent. The OCA recommended dismissing the substantive charges (grave abuse of discretion, gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment) as premature because complainant had separately challenged the orders in a petition before the Supreme Court. The OCA recommended a fine of ₱10,000 for impropriety.

• Prior administrative record: Respondent judge was previously found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2071, for which he was fined ₱20,000 and warned that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

• Authority to motu proprio correct error: Respondent judge maintained he had authority to rectify his own error motu proprio and restore the status quo to prevent damage or loss, asserting that complainant had no right to the corporate shares as a mere dummy for Belot.

• Legitimate concern over property: The judge argued that because of the “illegitimate status” of the parties’ relationship and the arrival of Belot’s legitimate wife and son, complainant might abscond with contested corporate properties.

• Complainant’s bad faith: Respondent accused complainant of “masterminding all legal manipulations” and of filing the administrative charge and a petition for certiorari with offensive language solely to obtain exclusive possession of Belot’s properties.

• Chambers meeting as explanatory: The judge explained that he called the meeting to advise the parties in advance that he would rescind the October 2, 2007 Order, and that complainant refused to attend.

• Good-faith reliance on certiorari filing: Respondent claimed he set aside his order because Belot’s certiorari petition placed the court’s jurisdiction under question.

• Propriety of Language in Judicial Order/Comment: Whether the respondent judge’s use of derogatory, irreverent, and intemperate language against complainant in his administrative Comment constituted conduct unbecoming a judge under the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

• Propriety of the Chambers Meeting: Whether the respondent judge’s act of calling the complainant and the intervenors to a meeting in his chambers, after having ruled that the intervenors had no legal personality, was improper and created an appearance of bias.

• Prematurity of Substantive Charges: Whether the charges of grave abuse of discretion, gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment were correctly dismissed as premature.

• Propriety of Language: The use of derogatory and irreverent language was held to be reprehensible and constituted conduct unbecoming a judge. Judicial officers, as models of propriety under Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, must be temperate in their language and avoid humiliating litigants. The judge’s depiction of complainant as a prostitute, an illegitimate mistress motivated by greed, and likely to abscond with property—echoing the very abuse she claimed in the TPO case—displayed bias and a lack of the patience, prudence, and restraint required by the judicial office. Such language violated Sections 1 and 6 of Canon 4, which mandate that judges avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety and that they always conduct themselves so as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality of the Judiciary.

• Propriety of the Chambers Meeting: The chambers meeting was found improper. The explanation that the judge merely wished to give advance notice of an impending rescission of his own order was unacceptable; a judge should not privately convene parties to preview a judicial order, especially where one party—the intervenors—had been declared without legal personality. The act created an impression that the meeting with the intervenors influenced the revocation of the October 2, 2007 Order, thereby eroding the appearance of impartiality.

• Prematurity of Substantive Charges: The dismissal of the charges of grave abuse of discretion, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment was proper. Those charges involved the substantive and procedural correctness of the October 18, 2007 and October 25, 2007 Orders, which were concurrently the subject of a judicial challenge before the Supreme Court. The administrative forum was therefore an inappropriate venue for their resolution at that juncture.

• Judicial Propriety under Canon 4, New Code of Judicial Conduct — Sections 1 and 6 of Canon 4 require judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities, and to exercise freedom of expression in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. The standard encompasses acts that are not inherently improper but may reasonably be perceived as such. The Court applied this canon both to the respondent’s intemperate language and to his irregular chambers meeting.

• Higher Ethical Standards for Judges — Members of the judiciary are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys and private individuals not vested with public trust. This was the controlling principle in evaluating respondent’s conduct.

• Temperate Language Requirement — A judge must at all times be temperate in language, choosing words with utmost care and sufficient control. Humiliating a litigant, witness, or lawyer betrays a lack of patience, prudence, and restraint. The Court cited Dela Cruz v. Carretas to affirm that pleasing speech increases a judge’s persuasiveness and that the wise man is esteemed for his discernment.

• Conduct Unbecoming as a Light Offense — Conduct unbecoming a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, punishable by fine, censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning. The fine range is ₱1,000 to ₱10,000, but the Court may consider prior infractions in calibrating the penalty.

• “Be it stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys and other persons not [vested] with public trust.” (Applying Office of the Court Administrator v. Estacion Jr., 317 Phil 600 (1995))

• “It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.” (Citing Dela Cruz v. Carretas, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 218, 229)

• “Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.” — Canon 4, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

• Office of the Court Administrator v. Estacion Jr., 317 Phil. 600 (1995) — Cited for the principle that judges are subject to higher ethical standards than attorneys and private individuals; applied to underscore the gravity of respondent’s intemperate language.

• Dela Cruz v. Carretas, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 218 — Cited for the precept that a judge must be temperate in language and that humiliating a litigant or witness is reprehensible; supplied the controlling standard for evaluating verbal impropriety.

• Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, effective June 1, 2004) — Section 1 mandates that judges avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities; Section 6 requires that in exercising freedom of expression, judges always conduct themselves to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality of the Judiciary. Both provisions were violated by respondent’s chambers meeting and derogatory language.

• Section 10, Rule 140, Rules of Court — Classifies “vulgar and unbecoming conduct” as a light charge. Respondent’s conduct fell within this classification.

• Section 11(C), Rule 140, Rules of Court — Prescribes the sanctions for light charges: fine of not less than ₱1,000 but not exceeding ₱10,000, censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning. The penalty imposed was calibrated under this provision, with the upper limit exceeded due to a recidivist circumstance.

Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chairperson), Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, and Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno concurred in full.

N/A — The resolution was unanimous without separate opinions.