Beluso vs. Municipality of Panay

A local government unit cannot exercise the power of eminent domain through a mere resolution of its legislative body; an ordinance enacted by the local legislative council is required.

Petitioners are the owners of parcels of land totaling approximately 20,424 square meters, covered by Free Patent Nos. 7265 to 7270. On November 8, 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued Resolution No. 95-29, authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings over the property for the benefit of the poor and the landless. The municipality subsequently filed a complaint for expropriation, prompting petitioners to oppose the action on the grounds that the taking was politically motivated, not for public use, and supported by forged beneficiary signatures.

• Property and Expropriation Attempt: Petitioners own approximately 20,424 square meters of land covered by Free Patents. The Sangguniang Bayan of Panay issued Resolution No. 95-29 authorizing the mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings. The municipality filed the expropriation complaint on April 14, 1997.
• Petitioners' Opposition: Petitioners moved to dismiss the expropriation complaint, alleging the taking was not for public use but for the benefit of certain individuals, was politically motivated due to petitioners' voting records, and was supported by forged or misleadingly obtained signatures of supposed beneficiaries.
• Lower Court Actions: The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, finding the expropriation for public use. The RTC then appointed commissioners to determine just compensation and denied petitioners' subsequent motions to hold the hearings in abeyance.
• Appellate Proceedings: Petitioners sought certiorari from the CA, arguing denial of due process and grave abuse of discretion. During the CA proceedings, petitioners filed a memorandum raising the new argument that the expropriation was initiated via a resolution rather than an ordinance, and that the prior offer to buy was invalid for being unconscionably low. The CA dismissed the petition, holding that petitioners were not denied due process and the taking constituted public use.

• Exercise of Eminent Domain via Resolution: Petitioners argued that the municipality lacked the lawful power to expropriate because it acted through a mere resolution, contrary to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly requires an ordinance. Although not raised in the motion to dismiss or answer, the defect was apparent from the face of the expropriation petition and could be considered at any stage.
• Invalid Prior Offer: Petitioners maintained that no valid and definite prior offer to buy the property was made, the offered price of ₱10.00 per square meter being unconscionably low for residential land.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioners contended they were denied due process when the RTC declared the taking for public purpose without receiving evidence regarding the alleged political motivation and forged signatures. Furthermore, the CA committed serious error by failing to discuss or rule upon the resolution-versus-ordinance and invalid-offer arguments raised in petitioners' memorandum.

• Validity of Expropriation: Respondent contended that its power to acquire private property for public use upon payment of just compensation was correctly upheld by the trial court.
• No Due Process Violation: Respondent argued that petitioners were not denied due process because they were able to file an answer and adduce their objections and defenses therein, even without a separate evidentiary hearing.
• Merits Previously Passed Upon: Respondent maintained that petitioners' arguments had already been passed upon and denied by both the trial court and the CA for lack of substantial merit.

• Authority to Expropriate: Whether a municipality can exercise the power of eminent domain through a resolution of its Sangguniang Bayan instead of an ordinance.
• Prior Valid Offer: Whether the municipality made a valid and definite prior offer to buy the property as required by law.
• Due Process: Whether petitioners were denied procedural due process when the RTC declared the taking for public purpose without receiving evidence on the alleged political motivation.

• Authority to Expropriate: Expropriation via a mere resolution is invalid. Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 expressly requires the local chief executive to act pursuant to an ordinance. An ordinance is a law of general and permanent character requiring three readings, whereas a resolution is merely a temporary declaration of sentiment. Because the municipality initiated expropriation based on Resolution No. 95-29, the exercise of eminent domain was fatally defective. The issue was considered despite being raised late, the statutory violation being apparent on the face of the petition and clearly meritorious.
• Prior Valid Offer: Resolving this issue was deemed unnecessary in light of the ruling on the ordinance requirement.
• Due Process: Resolving this issue was deemed unnecessary in light of the ruling on the ordinance requirement.

• Delegated Power of Eminent Domain of LGUs — Local government units possess no inherent power of eminent domain; the power is delegated by the national legislature and is "inferior" rather than absolute. The exercise of this delegated power must conform strictly to the limits and requisites imposed by the delegating law, and courts have a duty to scrutinize whether the power is exercised in accordance with the statute.
• Ordinance vs. Resolution in Expropriation — A municipal ordinance is distinct from a resolution. An ordinance is a law of general and permanent character requiring a third reading for enactment. A resolution is merely a declaration of sentiment or opinion on a specific matter and is temporary in nature. Because the exercise of eminent domain derogates a fundamental right, the statutory mandate requiring an ordinance cannot be satisfied by a mere resolution.

• "A local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body."
• "A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members."

• Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, 354 Phil. 684 (1998) — Followed. Established that LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain, the delegated power is "inferior," and an ordinance—not a resolution—is required to authorize expropriation.
• Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 384 Phil. 676 (2000) — Followed. Reiterated the requirement of an ordinance for LGU expropriation and the narrow scope of delegated eminent domain.
• Antonio v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 124779 (2005) — Followed. Enumerated the four requisites for an LGU to validly exercise the power of eminent domain under R.A. No. 7160.
• Lagcao v. Labra, G.R. No. 155746 (2004) — Followed. Discussed the strict scrutiny required when the power of eminent domain is exercised, given its derogation of the constitutionally protected right to property.
• Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286 (2004) — Followed. Justified the consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal in clearly meritorious situations.

• Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Enumerates the requisites for LGUs to exercise eminent domain. Expressly mandates that the local chief executive must act "pursuant to an ordinance" and requires a "valid and definite offer" previously made to the owner. Applied to invalidate the expropriation proceedings initiated via a mere resolution.
• Section 9, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Requires the payment of just compensation when private property is taken for public use. Cited as a constitutional prerequisite for the exercise of eminent domain.

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario.