Bellosillo vs. Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

A disbarment complaint may be dismissed for lack of prima facie case when the complainant fails to present sufficient evidence to counterbalance the presumption of innocence and warrant further investigation. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the Bar.

Petitioner Sally V. Bellosillo filed a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr., a member of the Philippine Bar, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The complaint alleged gross professional misconduct and malpractice arising from various transactions between the parties, who had personal and financial dealings with each other. The IBP Board of Governors had earlier been directed by the Supreme Court in a Resolution dated October 13, 1992 to determine whether a prima facie case existed against the respondent or whether circumstances warranted outright dismissal of the case.

Petitioner Sally V. Bellosillo filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. on January 31, 1989, charging him with gross professional misconduct and malpractice. The complaint alleged that respondent pocketed settlement money in the Philippine Plaza bombing incident, engaged in improper financial dealings through borrowings of cash and post-dated checks, and made unwarranted solicitations in the form of gifts, pianos, lechon, and wallpapering of his house.

In his Answer dated May 31, 1989, respondent denied all charges and dismissed them as deliberate falsehoods, asserting that it was he, not the petitioner, who was the lender of money. Petitioner filed a Reply on August 4, 1989, after which respondent filed a motion to dismiss for failure to show a prima facie case. Respondent argued that petitioner could not produce any document or evidence that he settled the claims of the Philippine Plaza bombing victims and misappropriated the proceeds; that petitioner had changed her theory regarding the post-dated checks; and that assuming the change in theory to be true, the parties' transactions were ordinary business transactions that do not provide grounds for disbarment.

The Hearing Commissioner denied respondent's motion to dismiss and his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Respondent then filed a petition for review with the IBP Board of Governors, which was likewise denied, with the Board ordering the investigation to proceed. Respondent went to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for certiorari and prohibition, and on October 13, 1992, the Court dismissed the petition but directed the IBP Board to look into whether a prima facie case existed or whether circumstances warranted outright dismissal.

On March 30, 1996, the IBP Board of Governors issued the assailed Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation dated November 22, 1995, which found no prima facie case against respondent and recommended dismissal. The Investigating Commissioner found that petitioner's actuations were motivated by vengeance, hatred, and ill-will, acting as she did only after civil cases were filed against her. The Commissioner noted that petitioner had a history of issuing bouncing checks, citing the Court of Appeals' finding in Philippine National Bank vs. Sally Bellosillo that "Sally V. Bellosillo was deliberately lying."

The Investigating Commissioner found that the comparative analysis of checks issued by both parties showed that petitioner actually owed respondent the sum of ₱1,936,161.50, contrary to petitioner's allegations that respondent was borrowing from her. The Commissioner found it unbelievable that petitioner continued lending money to respondent after 1981 if he had stopped being proper in his financial dealings with her. The records showed that petitioner received checks in huge amounts from respondent and gave respondent several checks in small, identical amounts with consecutive check numbers and in intervals of fixed periods, which are features of installment payments, indicating that it was respondent who was lending money to petitioner in her money market operations.

The charge that respondent pocketed settlement money due to Nonoy Zuñiga and Sammy Villarin from the Philippine Plaza bombing incident was dismissed on findings that petitioner's complaint statement was plainly hearsay, that the joint affidavit of Zuñiga and Villarin never imputed the alleged appropriation, and that the unexplained delay of nine years before filing the complaint cast suspicion on petitioner's motive. The charge of unwarranted solicitations was negated by petitioner's own admission that she gave those gifts in appreciation of respondent's concerns for her interests, and the charge regarding the two pianos was belied by checks dated 1980, 1981, and 1982 evidencing respondent's payment therefor.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board of Governors for allegedly not ruling on her several charges against the respondent, demanding that a full-dress investigation and hearing be conducted.
• Bias of Investigating Commissioner: Petitioner alleged that the challenged Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors was biased for the reason alone that the Investigating Commissioner and the respondent are both members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity.
• Mutually Exclusive Remedies: Petitioner invoked the theory that her petition could be treated both as a petition for review under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
• Lack of Prima Facie Case Finding: Petitioner contended that the finding of no prima facie case against the respondent was contrary to the facts and circumstances disclosed by the records, particularly regarding the charge of massive borrowing of post-dated checks, which she claimed was derived solely from speculations and averments unsubstantiated by documentary proof.

• Denial of Charges: Respondent denied all charges and dismissed them as deliberate falsehoods, asserting that it was he, not the petitioner, who was the lender of money.
• Lack of Prima Facie Case: Respondent argued that despite the challenge to produce receipts and documents, petitioner could not produce any document or evidence that he settled the claims of the Philippine Plaza bombing victims and misappropriated the proceeds thereof for his benefit.
• Changed Theory: Respondent argued that with respect to the post-dated checks, petitioner changed her theory by alleging that it was she who was lending money to respondent, and assuming arguendo the change in theory to be true, the parties' transactions were ordinary business transactions where conflicts do not provide grounds for disbarment.

• Prima Facie Case: Whether the IBP Board of Governors committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the disbarment complaint for lack of prima facie case.
• Bias of Investigating Commissioner: Whether the Investigating Commissioner should have been disqualified from participating in the case on the ground that he and the respondent were both members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity.
• Scope of Issues: Whether the IBP Board of Governors should have ruled on charges not originally pleaded in the complaint.
• Full-Dress Hearing: Whether petitioner was entitled to a full-dress investigation and hearing of the disbarment complaint.

• Prima Facie Case: No. The IBP Board of Governors did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint, as the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case against the respondent, and the findings were fully supported by the evidence on record.
• Bias of Investigating Commissioner: No. Membership in a college fraternity, by itself, does not constitute a ground to disqualify an investigator, prosecutor, or judge from acting on the case of a respondent who happens to be a member of the same fraternity.
• Scope of Issues: No. Only issues originally pleaded in the complaint, there having been no amendment to it, are the issues to be tried; the alleged other misdeeds of the respondent need not be inquired into.
• Full-Dress Hearing: No. It is only when the complaint bears merit, or when the answer fails to show that the complaint indeed lacks merit, or when the respondent fails to file an answer that an investigation shall proceed.

• Prima Facie Case: A prima facie case consists of that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counterbalance the general presumption of innocence and warrant a conviction, if not countered and contradicted by evidence tending to contradict it and render it improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it. The Investigating Commissioner found telling circumstances that fully and correctly supported the contested findings: petitioner's claim that it took her two years to discover that respondent had not been funding the checks was unbelievable considering she claimed to be a business woman; the comparative analysis of checks showed that petitioner owed respondent ₱1,936,161.50; and the pattern of checks issued by petitioner in small, identical amounts with consecutive check numbers and in intervals of fixed periods were features of installment payments, showing that it was respondent who was lending money to petitioner. The transactions involving post-dated checks arose from the parties' personal dealings and relationship, not from an attorney-client relationship, and involved purely personal interest, a civil transaction.

• Bias of Investigating Commissioner: The Court had earlier rejected the erroneous perception that membership in a college fraternity constitutes a ground for disqualification. A member in good standing of any reputable organization is expected all the more to maintain the highest standards of probity, integrity, and honor and to faithfully comply with the ethics of the legal profession.

• Scope of Issues: The Court had already stated in its Resolution of October 13, 1992 that only issues originally pleaded in the complaint, there having been no amendment to it, are the issues to be tried. Accordingly, the alleged other misdeeds of the respondent need not be inquired into nor may the Court re-examine and re-evaluate whatever evidence, if any, has been presented by the petitioner before the IBP Board of Governors.

• Full-Dress Hearing: The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the Bar. To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer's conduct must not only be immoral but grossly immoral — so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or as unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. The case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof, and clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. In the absence of any showing that the findings of the IBP are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand.

• Prima facie case in disbarment proceedings — A prima facie case consists of that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counterbalance the general presumption of innocence and warrant a conviction, if not countered and contradicted by evidence tending to contradict it and render it improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it. The Court applied this doctrine in affirming the IBP Board of Governors' dismissal of the disbarment complaint, finding that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case against respondent.

• Standard of proof in disbarment cases — For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.

• Disqualification based on fraternity membership — Membership in a college fraternity, by itself, does not constitute a ground to disqualify an investigator, prosecutor, or judge from acting on the case of a respondent who happens to be a member of the same fraternity. A member in good standing of any reputable organization is expected to maintain the highest standards of probity, integrity, and honor.

• Scope of issues in disbarment proceedings — Only issues originally pleaded in the complaint, there having been no amendment to it, are the issues to be tried. Alleged misdeeds not originally pleaded need not be inquired into.

• Dismissal without full-dress investigation — It is only when the complaint bears merit, or when the answer fails to show that the complaint indeed lacks merit, or when the respondent fails to file an answer that an investigation shall proceed. If the complaint is bereft of merit, either on its face or as proven by respondent's answer, it will be unjust to mandate the Investigator to conduct a full-dress investigation.

• "Membership in a college fraternity, by itself, does not constitute a ground to disqualify an investigator, prosecutor or judge from acting on the case of a respondent who happens to be a member of the same fraternity." — This passage articulates the Court's rejection of petitioner's claim of bias based on fraternity membership, establishing the doctrine that fraternity membership alone does not warrant disqualification.

• "The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the Bar." — This passage states the controlling standard for the exercise of the Court's disciplinary power over members of the Bar, emphasizing the need for caution in disbarment proceedings.

• "To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer's conduct must not only be immoral but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or as unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency." — This passage defines the threshold for disciplinary action against lawyers, requiring grossly immoral conduct rather than mere impropriety.

• "In the absence of any showing that the findings of the IBP are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand." — This passage establishes the standard of review applicable to IBP findings in disbarment cases, requiring a showing of grave abuse of discretion before the Court will disturb such findings.

• Uy vs. Gonzales, Adm. Case No. 5280, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 422 — Cited for the doctrine that a proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action; it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private grievance, being undertaken and prosecuted solely for public welfare.

• Bautista vs. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-45137, September 23, 1985, 138 SCRA 592 — Cited for the definition of prima facie case as that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counterbalance the general presumption of innocence and warrant a conviction.

• Dante vs. Dante, A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 582 — Cited for the doctrine that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer.

• Lilia Tabang and Concepcion Tabang vs. Atty. Glenn C. Gacott, Adm. Case No. 6490, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA 307 — Cited for the requirement of clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof in disbarment cases.

• Estrella Real Estate Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128862, September 30, 1999, 315 SCRA 650 — Cited for the doctrine that in the absence of any showing that the findings of the IBP are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand.

• Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr. vs. Atty. Isidro C. Ilao, A.C. No. 6086, January 26, 2005, 449 SCRA 269 — Cited for the doctrine that it is only when the complaint bears merit, or when the answer fails to show that the complaint indeed lacks merit, or when the respondent fails to file an answer that an investigation shall proceed.

• Banco Filipino and Mortgage and Savings Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132703, June 23, 2000, 334 SCRA 305 — Cited for the doctrine that the remedies of petition for review under Rule 45 and petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive; when the first is available, the second cannot be resorted to.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The Court treated the petition as one filed under Rule 45, which governs appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court, and required the respondent to file his Comment thereon.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Petitioner invoked this provision as an alternative remedy, but the Court held that the remedies under Rule 45 and Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
• Article VIII, Section 13, Constitution — Cited in the Certification portion of the Resolution, pursuant to which the Chief Justice certified that the conclusions in the resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Puno, J. (Chairperson)
• Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
• Corona, J.
• Azcuna, J.