Belgado vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Under Section 23 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, the perfection of appeal is reckoned from the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party — meaning the latest among all parties' respective appeal periods — not merely from the expiration of the appealing party's own period. A motion for execution pending appeal filed before that latest deadline is within the trial court's jurisdiction.

Petitioner Tomasa L. Belgado, as administratrix of the estate of the late Amada T. Laiz, filed an action for annulment with damages against private respondents Francisco Laiz, Remedios Laiz, and Laiz Development Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. The action sought to nullify a Deed of Absolute Sale and a Deed of Conveyance of Real Properties. The dispute required resolution of the procedural question of when an appeal is deemed perfected under the Interim Rules and Guidelines promulgated by the Supreme Court, specifically Section 23 thereof, in relation to the timeliness of a motion for immediate partial execution pending appeal.

On September 1, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch XXIII, rendered a decision in an action for annulment with damages filed by petitioner Tomasa L. Belgado against private respondents Francisco Laiz, Remedios Laiz, and Laiz Development Corporation. The decision declared the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Deed of Conveyance of Real Properties null and void and, among other dispositions, ordered the defendants to deposit with the court the rentals and/or income due on the subject properties from the date of filing.

Private respondents received a copy of the decision on September 25, 1984, giving them until October 10, 1984 to appeal. On October 2, 1984, the seventh day from receipt, they filed a Notice of Appeal. Petitioner, on the other hand, was served with a copy of the decision on October 1, 1984, making her last day to appeal October 16, 1984. On October 11, 1984 — the tenth day after her receipt of the judgment — petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Partial Execution pending appeal, seeking immediate implementation of the portion of the judgment requiring the deposit of rentals in court. Private respondents opposed the motion, arguing that it was filed after the perfection of their appeal and that no good reason had been stated to warrant execution pending appeal.

The trial court initially denied execution pending appeal on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of private respondents' appeal. Subsequently, however, it reconsidered — not by granting execution pending appeal as such, but by treating the dispositive portion directing the deposit of rentals as, in effect, an order of accounting, so that pursuant to Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution could not be stayed by the perfection of an appeal. On January 11, 1985, the trial court issued an Order requiring the lessees of the subject properties to deposit the rentals in court.

On certiorari, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court found the trial court's orders devoid of legal justification. It ruled that the judgment directing the deposit of rentals was not an order of accounting within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 39. It further held that the appeal was perfected on October 10, 1984, so that when petitioner filed her motion for immediate partial execution on October 11, the trial court had lost jurisdiction pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules. The appellate court accordingly authorized private respondents to withdraw whatever rentals had been deposited in court, a authorization reiterated in a Resolution dated October 23, 1985. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on June 13, 1986.

• Timeliness of Motion for Execution: Petitioner maintained that her Motion for Immediate Partial Execution, filed on October 11, 1984, was timely because the appeal had not yet been perfected under Section 23 of the Interim Rules, the "last day to appeal by any party" being October 16, 1984 — her own deadline — which was later than private respondents' deadline of October 10, 1984.

• Perfection of Appeal: Private respondents argued that the Motion for Partial Execution was filed after the perfection of their appeal, which occurred on October 10, 1984, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules.
• Absence of Good Reason: Private respondents contended that no mention was made of any good reason to warrant execution pending appeal.
• Not an Order of Accounting: The appellate court agreed that the judgment directing the deposit of rentals was not an order of accounting within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

• Perfection of Appeal: Whether, under Section 23 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, the appeal was perfected on October 10, 1984 (the last day for private respondents to appeal) or on October 16, 1984 (the last day for any party, including petitioner, to appeal).
• Jurisdiction of Trial Court: Whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to act on petitioner's Motion for Immediate Partial Execution filed on October 11, 1984.

• Perfection of Appeal: No — the appeal was not perfected on October 10, 1984. Under Section 23 of the Interim Rules, the "last day to appeal by any party" means the latest among all parties' respective appeal periods, which in this case was October 16, 1984.
• Jurisdiction of Trial Court: Yes — the trial court retained jurisdiction when petitioner filed her motion on October 11, 1984, because the appeal had not yet been perfected as of that date.

• Perfection of Appeal: Section 23 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines provides that "the perfection of the appeal shall be upon expiration of the last day to appeal by any party." The appellate court misread this provision by equating "any party" with the appealing party alone. The period to perfect an appeal must be reckoned not only from the date one party receives a copy of the decision but also from the date the other party had notice thereof. In this case, private respondents received the decision on September 25, 1984, giving them until October 10, 1984 to appeal, while petitioner received it on October 1, 1984, giving her until October 16, 1984. The "last day to appeal by any party" was therefore October 16, 1984. The appeal could be deemed perfected only upon the expiration of that latest date, which was later than private respondents' own appeal period. This interpretation is supported by Yabut vs. IAC and Montelibano vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc.

• Jurisdiction of Trial Court: Because the appeal was not yet perfected on October 11, 1984 — the date petitioner filed her Motion for Immediate Partial Execution — the trial court still retained jurisdiction over the case. To rule otherwise would allow a party litigant to deprive the adverse party of the right to move for new trial, for reconsideration, or even for execution pending appeal, by the simple expedient of immediately perfecting an appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal. Such a result would be inconsistent with the purpose of Section 23, which fixes perfection at the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party.

• Perfection of Appeal Under Section 23 of the Interim Rules — The perfection of an appeal is reckoned from the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party, meaning the latest among the respective appeal periods of all parties who received copies of the judgment. The filing of a notice of appeal by one party does not immediately perfect the appeal as to all; the appeal is perfected only when the last party's period to appeal has expired. This prevents a party from prematurely divesting the trial court of jurisdiction and depriving the adverse party of remedies such as motions for new trial, reconsideration, or execution pending appeal.

• "The period to perfect an appeal should be reckoned not only from the date one party receives a copy of the Decision but also from the date the other party had notice hereof." — This passage states the ratio decidendi, clarifying that "last day to appeal by any party" under Section 23 means the latest deadline among all parties, not merely the appealing party's deadline.

• "To rule otherwise would be to allow a party litigant to deprive the adverse party of the latter's right to move for new trial or for reconsideration or even for execution pending appeal by the simple expedient of immediately perfecting his appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal." — This articulates the policy rationale behind the rule, explaining why premature perfection by one party cannot divest the trial court of jurisdiction before all parties' appeal periods have lapsed.

• Yabut vs. IAC, 142 SCRA 124 (1986) — Cited as supporting authority for the rule that perfection of appeal under Section 23 of the Interim Rules is reckoned from the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party, not merely the appealing party.
• Montelibano vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., 136 SCRA 295 (1985) — Cited alongside Yabut as authority for the same proposition regarding the reckoning of the perfection of appeal.

• Section 23, Interim Rules and Guidelines — Provides that "the perfection of the appeal shall be upon expiration of the last day to appeal by any party." The Court interpreted "any party" to mean the party with the latest appeal deadline, ensuring the trial court retains jurisdiction until all parties' appeal periods have expired.
• Section 4, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Provides that a judgment or order directing an accounting in an action shall not be stayed by the perfection of an appeal. The appellate court had relied on this provision to deny the trial court's characterization of the deposit-of-rentals order as an order of accounting; the Supreme Court did not reach this issue, remanding the case for determination on the merits instead.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Cruz, and Feliciano, JJ., concurred.