Belen vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands

When a testator designates "descendants" as substitutes for a legatee, all living descendants take per capita as a class; the rule that relatives nearest in degree exclude farther ones (Art. 959) and the right of representation do not apply to relatives of the legatee.

The case involves the interpretation of a codicil executed by Benigno Diaz, specifically a clause providing for the distribution of his estate to named legatees who are still living, or to their "legitimate descendants" if the legatees have died.

• Original Filing: Special Proceedings No. 894 and Special Proceedings No. 9226, Court of First Instance of Manila
• Lower Court Decision: May 23, 1958 — Denied Onesima Belen's petition, ruling that the share pertains to all legitimate descendants (children and grandchildren), not just the children nearest in degree.
• Appeal: Direct appeal to the SC via G.R. No. L-14474.
• SC Action: Review of the CFI order.

• The Codicil: Benigno Diaz executed a codicil on September 29, 1944. Clause 10 directed that 10-15 years after his death, his properties be sold and the proceeds distributed to named living persons, "o a sus descendientes legitimos" (or their legitimate descendants). Filomena Diaz was allotted 10%.
• Death of the Testator and Legatee: Benigno Diaz died on November 7, 1944. His estate was probated and placed under the administration of the Bank of the Philippine Islands as trustee. Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954.
• The Surviving Descendants: Filomena Diaz left two legitimate children: Milagros Belen de Olaguera (who had 7 legitimate children) and Onesima D. Belen (single).
• The Dispute: Onesima filed a petition claiming she and Milagros should divide Filomena's 10% share equally, to the exclusion of Milagros's 7 children. She argued "descendants" means those nearest in degree to the original legatee.

• The lower court erred in holding that its prior resolution had been affirmed by the SC in Arguelles vs. Belen de Olaguera.
• The phrase "sus descendientes legitimos" should be interpreted to mean descendants nearest in degree to the original legatee (Filomena Diaz), which would be her two daughters, excluding the grandchildren.
• Invoked Article 959 of the Civil Code: A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree.

• (Implicit from the lower court's ruling and SC's discussion) The share of Filomena Diaz pertains to all her legitimate descendants, which includes both children and grandchildren, as "descendientes" encompasses more than just "hijos" (children).

• Procedural Issues: Whether the lower court's interpretation of the codicil was already affirmed with finality by the SC in the prior Arguelles case.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer conjointly to all living descendants (children and grandchildren) as a class, or only to the descendants nearest in degree.

• Procedural: The SC clarified that the prior Arguelles decision did not affirm the lower court's interpretation of clause 10; the SC left the issue open at the time because the then-appellant administrator was not the proper party to raise it.
• Substantive: The words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer to all living descendants as a class taking per capita.
• Article 959 (nearest in degree rule) is specifically limited to relatives of the testator, not relatives of the legatee. The ratio legis (closest relatives are dearest) fails when the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee), as the testator's affections toward the legatee's relatives are not presumed to favor proximity.
• Applying Art. 959 by analogy would suppress the right of representation, meaning the nearest descendants would exclude farther ones entirely. This contradicts the testator's clear distinction in the codicil between "hijos" (children) and "descendientes" (descendants).
• Applying the right of representation would require presuming the testator intended to reject the rules on accretion (Arts. 1016, 1019), equal partition (Art. 846), and vacancies (Art. 1022). Without explicit proof of this intent, these codal rules must prevail.
• Absent contrary intent, designating a class or group of legatees means all members succeed per capita in equal parts under Article 846.

• Simple Substitution (Sustitucion Vulgar) — Authorized by Article 860 of the Civil Code, where two or more persons may be substituted for one heir. The SC found the testator ordained a simple substitution with a plurality of substitutes for each legatee.
• Right of Representation in Testamentary Succession — The right of representation generally does not apply in testamentary succession (only in intestate succession and legitimes). Applying it requires a clear intent by the testator to reject the rules of accretion and equal partition, which cannot be presumed.
• Per Capita Distribution in a Designated Class — When a testator designates a class or group of legatees (e.g., "descendants") without specifying shares, all members of the class succeed per capita in equal parts, pursuant to Article 846.

• Article 959, Civil Code — A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree. The SC held this applies strictly to the testator's relatives, not the legatee's.
• Article 860, Civil Code — Two or more persons may be substituted for one and one person for two or more heirs. Applied to recognize the testator's simple substitution.
• Article 846, Civil Code — Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts. Applied to mandate per capita distribution among all living descendants of the legatee.
• Articles 1016 and 1019, Civil Code — Rules on the right of accretion in testamentary succession. The SC noted that applying representation would require rejecting accretion, which cannot be presumed.
• Article 1022, Civil Code — Vacancies in the free part pass to legal heirs if no substitution/accretion applies. The SC noted applying representation would circumvent this rule without clear testator intent.