Bayona vs. Basa-Diviva

Judges are not administratively liable for acts performed in a judicial capacity absent fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice; errors in adjudicative functions must be challenged through judicial remedies, and administrative complaints require substantial evidence. The Court also held that an MCTC judge has no authority to issue a hold-departure order, that MCTC judges no longer conduct preliminary investigations, and that unjust vexation does not require one; the judge was admonished for lack of prudence in granting postponements.

Editha M. Bayona was the accused in Criminal Case No. 5672 for maltreatment/slight physical injuries by ill treatment, while Josefina Medida-House was the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 5644 and 5645 for alarm and scandal and violation of Section 48(3) of Republic Act No. 9003, all pending before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Sta. Cruz-Candelaria, Zambales, presided over by Judge Aida Theresita B. Basa-Diviva. The administrative complaint implicated the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Republic Act No. 3019, Administrative Matter No. 05-8-26-SC on preliminary investigations, and OCA Circular No. 39-97 on hold-departure orders.

Bayona filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagrereklamo dated February 5, 2020, charging Judge Basa-Diviva, Presiding Judge of the MCTC, Sta. Cruz-Candelaria, Zambales, with dishonesty, violation of Republic Act No. 3019, and gross ignorance of the law/procedure relative to Criminal Case No. 5644 (Republic of the Philippines vs. Josefina Medida-House, for alarm and scandal), Criminal Case No. 5645 (People of the Philippines vs. Josefina Medida-House, for violation of Section 48(3) of Republic Act No. 9003), and Criminal Case No. 5672 (People of the Philippines vs. Editha M. Bayona, for maltreatment/slight physical injuries by ill treatment). She claimed she was constrained to file the complaint because of the way Judge Basa-Diviva handled the cases and accused the judge of bullying and harassing her.

On September 13, 2018, Judge Basa-Diviva accepted and acted on a handwritten and un-notarized manifestation filed by House, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 5644 and 5645, seeking the court's permission to leave the country on September 24, 2018. Bayona argued that the manifestation partook of a counter-affidavit and should have complied with Rule 112, Section 3(c) of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires the counter-affidavit to be subscribed and sworn to and a copy sent to her. Bayona also averred that she was deprived of due process when Judge Basa-Diviva failed to provide her a copy of the Order dated January 25, 2019, setting the arraignment and pre-trial conference in Criminal Case No. 5672 on February 4, 2019, and when the judge did not give her, the accused in that case, a chance to file a counter-affidavit, unlike House, who was given copies of the informations in the two criminal cases against her and an opportunity to file a counter-affidavit. Bayona added that the criminal complaint against her for unjust vexation did not undergo preliminary investigation.

On February 14, 2019, Judge Basa-Diviva issued an order directing both parties to engage a lawyer of their own choice because the public prosecutor could not legally represent them due to conflict of interest. Bayona averred that the judge should not have issued the order because she was denied due process, there was no preliminary investigation, House submitted a forged document, and House left the country without authority from the court, thus violating the rules on bail; she added that the public prosecutor failed to move for cancellation of House's bail bond and for issuance of a warrant of arrest. Bayona also accused Judge Basa-Diviva of violating the February 14, 2019 Order when Bayona was arraigned on March 14, 2019 despite the absence of the private complainant House and her counsel. Bayona further alleged that the judge failed to implement her March 14, 2019 Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of House if she again failed to appear at the next hearing; during the next hearing on July 11, 2019, despite House's absence, the judge did not issue a warrant of arrest and merely rescheduled the hearing. Finally, Bayona lamented the numerous postponements in Criminal Case Nos. 5644 and 5645, which she claimed were devoid of any valid reason. The final paragraph of the complaint referred to alleged errors committed by Atty. Domingo A. Doctor, Jr., Bayona's counsel, during the proceedings.

In her Comment dated November 16, 2020, Judge Basa-Diviva dismissed the charges as baseless. She denied committing any act of dishonesty in handling the cases and pointed out that Bayona even admitted that the case against her had been dismissed. She averred that there was nothing erroneous with her order allowing House to travel outside the country because the request was just and within the bounds of the law, and that issuing a Hold-Departure Order, an act within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, would have reeked of ignorance of the law. She held as baseless the claim that she did not conduct a preliminary investigation, stressing that the duty falls under the responsibility of the Provincial/City Prosecutor, and citing Administrative Matter No. 05-8-26-SC dated August 30, 2005, which provides that the jurisdiction of judges of first level courts, insofar as preliminary investigations are concerned, has been transferred to the Provincial/City Prosecutor. She attributed the reasons for the postponement of hearings to the absence of either the accused or the public prosecutor.

The JIB observed that there was no clear showing that the postponements were whimsical or capricious and noted that one postponement was caused by the absence of the complainant's witness. It also took into consideration the respondent judge's untarnished reputation for 38 years, she having compulsorily retired on December 28, 2021.

• Dishonesty, Graft, and Gross Ignorance: Bayona charged Judge Basa-Diviva with dishonesty, violation of Republic Act No. 3019, and gross ignorance of the law/procedure in handling Criminal Case Nos. 5644, 5645, and 5672.
• Due Process and Preliminary Investigation: Bayona argued that she was deprived of due process when the judge failed to furnish her a copy of the January 25, 2019 Order setting arraignment and pre-trial in Criminal Case No. 5672, did not allow her to file a counter-affidavit unlike House, and did not conduct a preliminary investigation on the unjust vexation complaint against her.
• Improper Acceptance of House's Manifestation and Travel: Bayona maintained that the judge improperly accepted and acted on House's handwritten and un-notarized manifestation seeking permission to leave the country, because it partook of a counter-affidavit that should have been subscribed and sworn to under Rule 112, Section 3(c), with a copy sent to her; she also alleged that House left the country without court authority, violating the rules on bail, and that the public prosecutor failed to seek cancellation of the bail bond and issuance of a warrant of arrest.
• Order to Engage Counsel: Bayona averred that the judge should not have issued the February 14, 2019 Order directing the parties to engage their own lawyers due to conflict of interest, because she was denied due process, there was no preliminary investigation, House submitted a forged document, and House left the country without authority.
• Arraignment, Warrant, and Postponements: Bayona accused the judge of violating the February 14, 2019 Order by arraigning her on March 14, 2019 despite the absence of House and her counsel; of failing to implement the March 14, 2019 Order directing issuance of a warrant of arrest if House again failed to appear; of not issuing a warrant during the July 11, 2019 hearing despite House's absence; and of granting numerous postponements in Criminal Case Nos. 5644 and 5645 without valid reason.
• Counsel's Errors: The final paragraph of the complaint referred to alleged errors committed by Atty. Domingo A. Doctor, Jr., Bayona's counsel, during the proceedings.

• Baseless Charges: Judge Basa-Diviva dismissed the charges as baseless and denied committing any act of dishonesty, pointing out that Bayona admitted the case against her had been dismissed.
• Travel Permission: She argued that her order allowing House to travel outside the country was not erroneous because the request was just and within the bounds of the law, and that issuing a Hold-Departure Order, an act within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, would have reeked of ignorance of the law.
• Preliminary Investigation: She maintained that the claim she did not conduct a preliminary investigation was baseless because the duty falls under the Provincial/City Prosecutor, citing Administrative Matter No. 05-8-26-SC dated August 30, 2005, which transferred the jurisdiction of first level court judges over preliminary investigations to the Provincial/City Prosecutor.
• Postponements: She attributed the postponements of hearings to the absence of either the accused or the public prosecutor.

• Administrative Liability for Judicial Acts: Whether Judge Basa-Diviva may be held administratively liable for dishonesty, violation of Republic Act No. 3019, and gross ignorance of the law/procedure based on her acts in handling the criminal cases.
• Hold-Departure Order and Travel Permission: Whether the judge acted improperly in allowing House to travel abroad without issuing a hold-departure order.
• Preliminary Investigation: Whether the judge failed to conduct a preliminary investigation on the unjust vexation complaint against Bayona.
• Due Process and Arraignment: Whether the judge violated Bayona's right to due process in the arraignment and proceedings, including by arraigning her in the absence of the private complainant.
• Postponements: Whether the judge should be penalized for postponing scheduled hearings.
• Referral of Counsel Complaint: Whether the complaint against Atty. Domingo A. Doctor, Jr. should be referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant.

• Administrative Liability for Judicial Acts: No. The complaint was dismissed for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit; absent fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice, judges are not administratively liable for official acts.
• Hold-Departure Order and Travel Permission: No. The judge acted in the exercise of her judicial function; a hold-departure order is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, and issuing one would have been ignorance of the law.
• Preliminary Investigation: No. Under Administrative Matter No. 05-8-26-SC, MCTC judges no longer conduct preliminary investigations, and unjust vexation, a light offense, does not require one.
• Due Process and Arraignment: No. No evidence supported the due process violation; arraignment may proceed in the absence of the private complainant unless required by the court.
• Postponements: Admonition only. There was no clear showing that the postponements were whimsical or capricious; the judge was admonished for lack of prudence in granting them.
• Referral of Counsel Complaint: Yes. The complaint against Atty. Domingo A. Doctor, Jr. was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.

• Administrative Liability for Judicial Acts: The Court found no iota of evidence to prove dishonesty, violation of Republic Act No. 3019, or gross ignorance; Bayona failed to specify acts constituting these charges. Citing Pitney vs. Judge Abrogar, acts of a judge in judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action; judges cannot be liable civil, criminal, or administrative for official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as they act in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice are administratively sanctioned. Errors in adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but must be assailed through judicial remedies; disciplinary proceedings do not complement, supplement, or substitute judicial remedies, and administrative liability from judicial acts may be inquired into only after other remedies have been settled. Assuming error, the matter remained judicial in nature; absent fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, judicial acts are not disciplinable even if erroneous. Arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before a judge may be branded biased or partial. In administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments by substantial evidence, defined as relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion; the standard is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe the person responsible, even if the evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant. The rationale is to protect magistrates from flimsy and unsubstantiated charges. Bayona failed to prove her allegations; the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions prevailed, and bare allegations could not overcome it. The bullying and harassment claims and due process violation were unsupported by evidence.
• Hold-Departure Order and Travel Permission: The respondent acted in the exercise of her judicial function and limited her action to House's request to travel abroad. Issuing a hold-departure order is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under OCA Circular No. 39-97; issuing one would have reeked of ignorance of the law. In Re: Occiano, the Court held that a judge had no authority to issue a hold-departure order where the cases did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Thus, the judge's failure to issue one was not improper.
• Preliminary Investigation: Administrative Matter No. 05-8-26-SC transferred the jurisdiction or power of First Level Courts to conduct preliminary investigations to the Office of the Provincial or City Prosecutor. MCTC judges, like respondent, are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. Moreover, unjust vexation, being a light offense, does not require preliminary investigation under Rule 112, Section 2. The claim therefore failed.
• Due Process and Arraignment: There was no evidence that respondent violated Bayona's right to due process; the allegations were bare and unsupported. In criminal cases, there is nothing irregular with the arraignment of an accused in the absence of the private complainant; the private complainant need not be present unless required by the court under Rule 116, Section 1(f). Thus, the arraignment on March 14, 2019 despite House's absence was not irregular.
• Postponements: The Court agreed with the JIB that there was no clear showing the postponements were whimsical or capricious; one postponement was caused by the absence of the complainant's witness. Considering the respondent judge's untarnished reputation for 38 years, having compulsorily retired on December 28, 2021, she should be merely admonished for failing to exercise more caution in granting postponements, not penalized.
• Referral of Counsel Complaint: The complaint against Atty. Domingo A. Doctor, Jr. should be referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.

• Judicial Immunity from Administrative Liability for Judicial Acts — Acts of a judge in judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action; judges cannot be subjected to civil, criminal, or administrative liability for official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as they act in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice are administratively sanctioned. Errors in adjudicative functions must be corrected through judicial remedies, not administrative proceedings. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the charges against Judge Basa-Diviva.
• Substantial Evidence in Administrative Proceedings — The complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of the complaint by substantial evidence, defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The standard is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that a person is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if the evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant. The Court applied this standard to find Bayona's allegations unproven and to uphold the presumption of regularity in the judge's performance of official functions.
• Preliminary Investigation by First Level Courts — Under Administrative Matter No. 05-8-26-SC, the jurisdiction or power of First Level Courts to conduct preliminary investigations was transferred to the Office of the Provincial or City Prosecutor. MCTC judges are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. A light offense such as unjust vexation does not require preliminary investigation. The Court applied this rule to reject the charge that the judge failed to conduct a preliminary investigation.
• Hold-Departure Orders — Under OCA Circular No. 39-97, the issuance of a hold-departure order is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. A first-level court judge has no authority to issue such an order. The Court applied this rule to hold that the judge's failure to issue a hold-departure order was proper and that issuing one would have been ignorance of the law.
• Arraignment in the Absence of the Private Complainant — In criminal cases, there is nothing irregular with the arraignment of an accused in the absence of the private complainant; the private complainant need not be present unless required by the court. The Court applied this rule to reject Bayona's due process claim arising from her arraignment without House.
• Admonition for Grant of Postponements — Judges must exercise prudence in granting postponements of scheduled hearings. Even where postponements are not shown to be whimsical or capricious, a judge may be admonished for failing to exercise necessary caution. The Court applied this principle in admonishing Judge Basa-Diviva.

• "As a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in [their] judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. [They] cannot be subjected to liability—civil, criminal[,] or administrative—for any of [their] official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as [they act] in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice will be administratively sanctioned." — This passage states the judicial immunity doctrine applied to dismiss the administrative charges; it is the ratio for holding that the judge's challenged acts were not administratively actionable.
• "Well settled is the rule that errors, if any, committed by judges in the exercise of their adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement, or substitute judicial remedies, and an inquiry into their administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies have been settled." — This defines the proper remedy for judicial errors and explains why the complaint could not substitute for judicial review.
• "In administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of the complaint by substantial evidence." — This states the burden of proof applied to Bayona's charges.
• "Substantial evidence is defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." — This defines the quantum of proof used to evaluate the administrative complaint.

• Pitney vs. Judge Abrogar, 461 Phil. 28 (2003) — Controlling precedent quoted for the rule that acts of a judge in judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action absent fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice.
• Re: Occiano, 431 Phil. 408 (2002) — Held that a judge had no authority to issue a hold-departure order where the cases did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court; cited to support the respondent's non-issuance of a hold-departure order.
• Salcedo vs. Judge Caguioa, 467 Phil. 20 (2004) — Cited for the rule that errors in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should be assailed through judicial remedies.
• Lorenzana vs. Judge Austria, 731 Phil. 82 (2014) — Cited for the rule that the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of the complaint by substantial evidence in administrative cases.
• Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sidro, 860 Phil. 256 (2019) — Cited for the standard that substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that a person is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if the evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant.
• Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan vs. Judge Villalon-Pornillos, 609 Phil. 504 (2009) — Cited for the rule that bare allegations cannot prevail over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.

• Section 5, Canon 6, New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary — Cited in the OED-JIB recommendation as the basis for a proposed PHP 1,000.00 fine; the JIB and the Court instead adopted only an admonition for lack of prudence in granting postponements.
• Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Charged by Bayona; dismissed for lack of evidence and because the challenged acts were judicial in nature.
• Republic Act No. 9003, Section 48(3) (Ecological Solid Waste Management Act) — Subject of Criminal Case No. 5645 against House; one of the cases from which the administrative complaint arose.
• Administrative Matter No. 05-8-26-SC (August 30, 2005) — Transferred the jurisdiction or power of First Level Courts to conduct preliminary investigations to the Office of the Provincial or City Prosecutor; applied to hold that MCTC judges are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.
• OCA Circular No. 39-97 (June 19, 1997) — Guidelines in the Issuance of Hold-Departure Orders; applied to hold that issuance of a hold-departure order is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, so the MCTC judge had no authority to issue one.
• Rules of Court, Rule 112, Section 2 — Cited to support that unjust vexation, a light offense, does not require preliminary investigation.
• Rules of Court, Rule 112, Section 3(c) — Invoked by Bayona to argue that House's manifestation should have been subscribed and sworn to and a copy sent to her; the Court found no evidence of due process violation.
• Rules of Court, Rule 116, Section 1(f) — Cited to support that arraignment may proceed in the absence of the private complainant unless required by the court.
• Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 5 — Defines substantial evidence as relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion; applied to the administrative complaint.
• SC Administrative Matter No. 18-01-05-SC (December 15, 2020), Internal Rules of the Judicial Integrity Board — Basis for the OCA's transmittal of the complaint to the JIB.

Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Hernando, J., and Zalameda, J., concurred. Singh, J., was on leave.