Bayasen vs. Court of Appeals

A driver cannot be held criminally negligent when the proximate cause of an accident is the unforeseen skidding of the vehicle's wheels on a slippery road, absent evidence of unreasonable speed or other negligent conduct. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence, and it may occur without fault.

Saturnino Bayasen was the Rural Health Physician in Sagada, Mountain Province, and was driving the Rural Health Unit jeep assigned for his use. Elena Awichen and Dolores Balcita were nurses from Saint Theodore's Hospital in Sagada who requested rides from the petitioner. The petitioner was charged in December 1963 by the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province with Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence arising from the death of Elena Awichen.

On the morning of August 15, 1963, Saturnino Bayasen, the Rural Health Physician in Sagada, Mountain Province, went to barrio Ambasing to visit a patient. Two nurses from Saint Theodore's Hospital in Sagada, Elena Awichen and Dolores Balcita, rode with him in the jeep assigned for the use of the Rural Health Unit, as they had requested a ride to Ambasing. Later, at Ambasing, the girls, who wanted to gather flowers, again asked if they could ride with him up to a certain place on the way to barrio Suyo, which he intended to visit anyway. Dr. Bayasen again allowed them to ride, with Elena sitting between him and Dolores.

On the way, at barrio Langtiw, the jeep went over a precipice. About 8 feet below the road, it was blocked by a pine tree. The three were thrown out of the jeep. Elena was found lying in a creek further below. Among other injuries, she suffered a skull fracture which caused her death.

The prosecution's star witness, Dolores Balcita, testified that the accused was driving his jeep at moderate speed just before the accident and categorically stated that she did not know what caused the jeep to fall into the precipice. She testified that she did not feel any bump or jolt before the jeep fell, that she did not notice anything wrong with the jeep, that the road was fair enough to drive on but was moist or wet, that the weather was fair, and that the accused was not under the influence of liquor.

The petitioner testified that before reaching the portion of the road where the jeep fell, he noticed that the rear wheel skidded while he was driving from 8 to 10 kilometers per hour; that as a precautionary measure, he directed the jeep towards the side of the mountain, along the side of the mountain, but not touching the mountain; that while doing so, the late Elena Awichen suddenly held the steering wheel and he felt that her foot stepped on his right foot which was pressed then on the accelerator; and that immediately after, the jeep suddenly swerved to the right and went off. In rebuttal, Dolores Balcita testified that she did not see what Elena Awichen suddenly did and did not feel any movement from her side. Pablo Lizardo, then mayor of Sagada, Mountain Province, testified that he found the jeep at second gear when he examined it not long after the incident.

• Presumed Negligence / Res Inter Alios Acta: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that he was negligent in driving his jeep after taking into consideration alleged previous incidents in which he was allegedly involved, thereby deciding a question of substance — that of presumed negligence — not in accord with law or established rules of evidence, specifically the rule of res inter alios acta.
• Proximate Cause: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the proximate cause of the death of Awichen was his "negligence in driving at an unreasonable speed," which finding is openly contrary to the evidence of the prosecution.
• Right to Acquittal: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting him of the crime charged.

N/A — The decision does not recount the respondent's arguments.

• Negligence: Whether the petitioner was negligent in driving his jeep, such that he may be held criminally liable for Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence.
• Proximate Cause: Whether the proximate cause of the death of Elena Awichen was the petitioner's alleged "negligence in driving at an unreasonable speed."
• Entitlement to Acquittal: Whether the petitioner is entitled to acquittal on the ground that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the proximate cause of the death was the petitioner's "negligence in driving at an unreasonable speed" is openly contrary to the evidence of the prosecution.

• Negligence: No. The prosecution failed to present legally sufficient proof that the accused was negligent in driving his jeep, the prosecution's own star witness having testified that he was driving at moderate speed.
• Proximate Cause: No. The proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels of the jeep, an unforeseen event, and not the "unreasonable speed" of the petitioner, there being no evidence on record to support such a finding.
• Entitlement to Acquittal: Yes. The negligence of the petitioner not having been sufficiently established, his guilt of the crime charged was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he is therefore entitled to acquittal.

• Negligence: A careful examination of the evidence introduced by the prosecution showed no "legally sufficient" proof that the accused was negligent in driving his jeep. The star witness of the prosecution, Dolores Balcita, who was one of the passengers in the jeep, testified that the accused was driving his jeep moderately just before the accident and categorically stated that she did not know what caused the jeep to fall into the precipice. She also testified that there was no conversation between the passengers that could have distracted the accused's attention, that she did not notice anything wrong with the jeep, and that the accused was not under the influence of liquor. In the light of her testimony, there was absolutely no evidence on record to show that the accused was negligent in driving his jeep.

• Proximate Cause: The Court of Appeals concluded that the accident was due to the petitioner's "negligence in driving at an unreasonable speed on a narrow and slippery road." However, the statement of Dolores Balcita that the accused was driving at moderate speed and not at "an unreasonable speed" was bolstered by the testimony of Pablo Lizardo, then mayor of Sagada, Mountain Province, who found the jeep at second gear when he examined it not long after the incident. Such fact shows that the accused-petitioner could not have been driving the jeep at a fast rate of speed. It is a well-known physical fact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads, as in the instant case, without fault on account of the manner of handling the car. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. It may occur without fault. No negligence as a matter of law can, therefore, be charged to the petitioner. In fact, the moment he felt that the rear wheels of the jeep skidded, he promptly drove it to the left hand side of the road, parallel to the slope of the mountain, because he wanted to play safe and avoid the embankment.

• Entitlement to Acquittal: The petitioner testified that before reaching the portion of the road where the jeep fell, he noticed that the rear wheel skidded while driving from 8 to 10 kilometers per hour; that as a precautionary measure, he directed the jeep towards the side of the mountain; and that while doing so, Elena Awichen suddenly held the steering wheel and he felt that her foot stepped on his right foot which was pressed then on the accelerator. In rebuttal, Dolores Balcita testified that she "did not see" what Elena Awichen suddenly did and "did not feel any movement from (her) side." These answers of Dolores Balcita are all in the negative and equivocal. They do not deny or preclude the truth of the positive testimony of the accused. As held by this Court, the testimony of a credible witness that he saw or heard at a particular time and place is more reliable than that of an equally credible witness who with the same opportunities, testified that he did not see or hear the same thing at the same time and place. Hence, as to the relative weight to be given to the positive and consistent testimony of the accused and to the negative and equivocal answers of Dolores Balcita, the former is more worthy of credence. Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner-driver who skidded could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that the petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course. The negligence of the petitioner not having been sufficiently established, his guilt of the crime charged has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Skidding as an unforeseen event — Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence; it may occur without fault. A driver who skids on a greasy or slippery road cannot be regarded as negligent where the skidding is an unforeseen event, giving the driver a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course.
• Positive versus negative testimony — The testimony of a credible witness that he saw or heard at a particular time and place is more reliable than that of an equally credible witness who, with the same opportunities, testified that he did not see or hear the same thing at the same time and place. Negative and equivocal answers do not deny or preclude the truth of positive testimony.

• "It is a well known physical fact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads, as in the instant case, without fault on account of the manner of handling the car. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. It may occur without fault." — This passage articulates the controlling principle that skidding does not, by itself, imply negligence, forming the basis for the petitioner's acquittal.
• "The testimony of a credible witness that he saw or heard at a particular time and place is more reliable than that of an equally credible witness who with the same opportunities, testified that he did not see or hear the same thing at the same time and place." — This states the rule on the relative weight of positive versus negative testimony, which the Court applied to prefer the accused's positive testimony over the prosecution witness's negative and equivocal answers.
• "Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner-driver who skidded could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that the petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course." — This is the ratio decidendi: the skidding was an unforeseen event, and the driver had a valid excuse, so negligence was not established.

• People vs. Gonzales, et al., 76 Phil. 473 — Cited as the source of the rule that positive testimony is more reliable than negative testimony; applied to prefer the accused's positive testimony over the prosecution witness's negative and equivocal answers.

• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining the crime of Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence, under which the petitioner was charged and convicted by the trial court, and from which he was acquitted by the Supreme Court for failure to prove negligence beyond reasonable doubt.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concurred.

• Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan (Court of Appeals) — In voting to grant the motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, Justice Gatmaitan stated that the majority's position that appellant's negligence was his unreasonable speed had been refuted by the very evidence of the prosecution, for it could hardly be debated that the proximate cause was the skidding of the rear wheels, and there was absolutely nothing in the entire record which would pin upon the appellant the fault for that. He noted that prosecution witnesses conceded that he was driving moderately, and the skidding of the rear wheels was undisputably an unforeseen cause, so he could not rest easy on conviction and registered his final vote for acquittal.