Bautista vs. Sula

A sheriff commits simple misconduct by prematurely delivering property seized under a writ of replevin to the plaintiff without awaiting the court's instructions on a manifestation seeking guidance, as sheriffs exercise ministerial functions and cannot unilaterally determine who is entitled to possession of the property.

Ruth Bautista obtained a loan from Ceniza Glor secured by a chattel mortgage over her vehicle. Upon default and refusal to pay or surrender the vehicle, Glor filed a civil case for judicial foreclosure with a prayer for a writ of replevin. The trial court issued the writ, directing Sheriff Ernesto Sula to seize and keep the vehicle for five days. Before the expiration of the five-day period, the Bautistas filed motions and a counter-bond to require the return of the vehicle, while Glor demanded its delivery. Sula filed a manifestation seeking the court's guidance but, without waiting for a response, delivered the vehicle to Glor the following morning. The Bautistas also alleged that Sula demanded and received money from them in exchange for favoring them.

• The Loan and Replevin: Ruth Bautista borrowed money from Ceniza Glor, secured by a chattel mortgage on a Honda CRV. Upon default, Glor filed for judicial foreclosure and replevin. The trial court issued a writ of replevin on May 14, 2004, directing Sheriff Sula to seize and keep the vehicle for five days, subject to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60. Sula seized the vehicle on May 17, 2004.
• Conflicting Demands: On May 20 and 21, 2004, the Bautistas filed an omnibus motion and a counter-bond to require the return of the vehicle pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 60. Glor demanded delivery on May 24, 2004, threatening legal action against Sula. The Bautistas countered on May 26, 2004, asking Sula not to deliver the vehicle, citing their filed counter-bond and the lack of a court order.
• The Alleged Extortion: The Bautistas alleged that on May 26, 2004, Sula demanded ₱20,000 to ignore Glor's request. They gave him ₱3,000 and promised the balance the next day, which they failed to produce.
• Premature Delivery: On May 26, 2004, Sula filed a manifestation seeking the trial court's guidance on whether to release the vehicle. Without waiting for the court's instructions, Sula delivered the vehicle to Glor on May 27, 2004, and filed his sheriff's return on May 28, 2004.

• Extortion: Petitioners alleged that respondent demanded and received ₱3,000 in exchange for favoring them in the disposition of the replevied vehicle.
• Premature Disposition: Petitioners argued that respondent had no authority to deliver the vehicle to Glor because they had already filed a counter-bond within the five-day period and there was no court order directing the delivery.
• Administrative Liability: Petitioners maintained that respondent violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, was grossly ignorant of the law, and committed conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

• Malicious Accusations: Respondent argued that the extortion allegations were malicious, unfounded lies, and that complainants had no evidence because they failed to entrap him.
• Compliance with Rules: Respondent maintained that he was guided by the court's orders and Rule 60; delivery to Glor followed as a matter of course because her bond was approved while the complainants' counter-bond had not yet been approved at the time of delivery.
• Presumption of Regularity: Respondent invoked the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties.

• Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Gross Ignorance, and Conduct Prejudicial: Whether respondent is administratively liable for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross ignorance of the law, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
• Simple Misconduct: Whether respondent is guilty of simple misconduct for prematurely releasing the replevied vehicle.

• Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Gross Ignorance, and Conduct Prejudicial: The charges were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Complainants failed to present substantial evidence of extortion, relying solely on bare allegations and an unnamed witness who refused to testify unless respondent was suspended. Respondent's admission of approaching complainants did not prove extortion. Gross ignorance and conduct prejudicial charges likewise failed, as any fault was merely overzealousness in performing his duty.
• Simple Misconduct: Respondent was found guilty of simple misconduct. By filing a manifestation seeking guidance and then releasing the vehicle the next morning without a court order, respondent acted with unusual zeal, abusing his authority. Sheriffs exercise ministerial functions and cannot unilaterally determine who is entitled to possession. The five-day period in Rule 60 is mandatory to give defendants a chance to post a counter-bond. Premature delivery circumvented this right and destroyed the presumption of regularity.

• Ministerial Duty of Sheriffs — Sheriffs are charged with ministerial duties which must be performed faithfully to the letter; their prerogatives do not give them discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to possession of property. When faced with conflicting claims, the appropriate course is to inform the judge and wait for instructions.
• Five-Day Period in Replevin — The property seized under a writ of replevin must be retained by the sheriff for five days and cannot be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. The purpose of this period is to give the defendant a chance to object to the sufficiency of the bond or require the return of the property by filing a counter-bond.

• "The prerogatives of sheriffs do not give them any discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to possession of the subject properties."
• "While the expeditious and efficient execution of court orders and writs is commendable, it should not, under any circumstances, be done by departing from the Rules governing the same."

• Pardo v. Velasco, A.M. No. P-90-408, 7 August 1992 — Followed. Held that a sheriff is charged with ministerial duties and the five-day period in replevin gives the defendant a chance to object to the bond or file a counter-bond.
• Sebastian v. Valino, A.M. No. P-91-549, 5 July 1993 — Followed. Held that property seized under replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff; the sheriff must retain it for five days and return it to the defendant if the latter files a counter-bond.
• Cruz v. Villar, 427 Phil. 229 (2002) — Followed. Held that a sheriff's functions are essentially ministerial and do not include discretion to determine entitled possession; the sheriff should inform the judge and wait for instructions.
• Mamanteo v. Magumun, 370 Phil. 278 (1999) — Followed. Held that a sheriff's predicament does not call for the use of discretion without waiting for instructions from the judge.

• Rule 60, Section 5, Rules of Court — Requires the adverse party to file a counter-bond in double the value of the property and serve a copy on the applicant before the delivery of the property to require its return. Complainants complied with this provision.
• Rule 60, Section 6, Rules of Court — Enumerates the instances when the sheriff shall deliver the property to the applicant, emphasizing the five-day period. Respondent violated this by delivering the property without a court order and before the five-day period lapsed without compliance with the rule's conditions.
• Section 52(B)(2), Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense. Applied to impose the penalty of six months suspension.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.