Bautista vs. Sarmiento

Denial of a demurrer to evidence on a finding of a prima facie case does not entitle the accused to acquittal; it shifts the burden of evidence, not the burden of proof, and requires the accused to present evidence. The prosecution retains the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt throughout trial, while the accused must go forward with evidence sufficient to meet or equalize the prima facie case.

Petitioners Fe J. Bautista and Milagros J. Corpus stood accused together with Teresita Vergere in a consignment arrangement involving jewelries owned by private complainant Dr. Leticia C. Yap. The alleged arrangement was agency for sale on commission basis, with the obligation to deliver the proceeds if sold or return the jewelries if unsold.

Fe J. Bautista, Milagros J. Corpus and Teresita Vergere were charged with estafa before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch I, in Criminal Case No. 808. The information alleged that on April 19, 1975, Bautista and Corpus received jewelries from Dr. Leticia C. Yap on consignment, to be sold on commission basis with the obligation to pay or deliver the proceeds if sold and to return the jewelries if not sold. Despite demands, they allegedly failed and refused to return the jewelries or deliver the proceeds, to the damage of Yap in the total amount of P77,300.00. Teresita Vergere was granted a separate trial.

At trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Yap as its sole witness. According to her testimony, the accused acted as her agents for the sale of the jewelries. To establish prior demand, the prosecution offered Exhibits B and B-1, a letter of demand through Atty. Gorospe made after several previous oral demands by complainant. Petitioners, for their part, maintained that the jewelries were received by virtue of purchase and sale, not consignment, and that prior demand to prove misappropriation had not been established.

Believing guilt beyond reasonable doubt had not been proved, petitioners moved to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence. In its Order dated June 3, 1976, the trial court denied the motion, construing consignment as transmission of goods to be sold for and on account of the sender and crediting Yap's testimony on agency and the documentary and oral demands as establishing a prima facie case. The court ordered reception of defense evidence on July 9, 1976 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, prompting the present petition.

• Nature of Transaction: Petitioner argued that the information alleged receipt on consignment on April 19, 1975, but the jewelries were received by virtue of purchase and sale, negating the agency element of estafa.
• Prior Demand: Petitioner maintained that the prosecution failed to establish prior demand to prove misappropriation on their part.
• Prima Facie Case vs. Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Petitioner contended that respondent Judge lost jurisdiction to proceed and was duty-bound to acquit them, since conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt and not a mere prima facie case upon which denial of the demurrer was anchored.
• Order to Present Defense Evidence: Petitioner argued that directing them to present evidence after denial of the demurrer would in effect make resolution of guilt depend on the possible weakness of defense evidence rather than on the strength of prosecution evidence.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether certiorari lies against the interlocutory order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence.
• Prima Facie Case and Acquittal: Whether a finding of only a prima facie case upon denial of a demurrer entitles the accused to acquittal for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt and deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed.
• Presentation of Defense Evidence: Whether the accused may be ordered to present evidence after denial of the demurrer without making conviction depend on the weakness of the defense.

• Propriety of Certiorari: No. The denial order is merely interlocutory and not the proper subject of certiorari, the remedy being to continue trial and raise the issue on appeal from an adverse decision; no oppressive or arbitrary exercise of judicial authority bringing the case within the exception was shown.
• Prima Facie Case and Acquittal: No. Establishment of a prima facie case does not remove the presumption of innocence or shift the burden of proof, which remains with the prosecution, but shifts the burden of evidence requiring the accused to meet and nullify the case against them.
• Presentation of Defense Evidence: Yes. After denial of the motion, the court should proceed to hear defense evidence before judgment, pursuant to the accused's constitutional right to be heard, and decide on the prosecution evidence alone only if no defense evidence is presented or the right is waived.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Certiorari cannot substitute for appeal from an interlocutory denial of a demurrer; continuation of trial followed by appeal is the proper course. Although an oppressive exercise of judicial authority admits an exception, no arbitrary exercise attended the denial here because a prima facie case supported proceeding to defense evidence.
• Prima Facie Case and Acquittal: A prima facie case was defined as evidence sufficient to counterbalance the presumption of innocence and warrant conviction if uncontradicted or unrebutted. The information alleged sale on commission with duty to deliver proceeds or return jewelries worth P77,300.00 despite demands; Yap testified to agency, and Exhibits B and B-1 with prior oral demands proved demand. Upon such showing, the burden of proof remained with the prosecution throughout, while the burden of going forward shifted to petitioners to adduce equalizing evidence; their refusal or failure to do so justified an inference relevant to guilt, not an immediate acquittal.
• Presentation of Defense Evidence: Requiring defense evidence after denial is supported by the rule that dismissal for insufficiency after the prosecution rests terminates the case, but denial requires hearing the defense before judgment regardless of reservation of the right to present evidence. This protects the constitutional right to be heard before sentence; only where the accused has no evidence or expressly waives presentation may the case be decided on prosecution evidence alone.

• Interlocutory orders and certiorari — An order denying a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence is interlocutory and cannot ordinarily be assailed by certiorari; the accused should proceed to trial and assign the denial as error on appeal from an adverse judgment, except where the order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. Applied to reject petitioners' resort to certiorari absent grave abuse of discretion.
• Prima facie case in criminal cases — A prima facie case is evidence sufficient to counterbalance the presumption of innocence and warrant conviction if not met and controlled by contradictory evidence or proof of inconsistent facts; its establishment does not itself overcome the presumption of innocence. Applied to explain why denial based on Yap's testimony and demand evidence did not equate to conviction without proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• Burden of proof vs. burden of evidence — The burden of proof remains throughout trial on the prosecution, which must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt; what shifts upon a prima facie showing is the burden of evidence or burden of going forward, met by defense evidence that balances or equalizes the prosecution evidence and shifts the burden back. Applied to hold petitioners bound to present evidence to meet, nullify, or overthrow the prima facie estafa case, with equipoise operating against the party bearing the burden of proof.
• Effect of denial of demurrer to evidence — If the motion for dismissal for insufficiency is denied after the prosecution rests, the court should hear defense evidence before entering judgment, whether or not presentation was reserved, in observance of the accused's right to be heard; only if no evidence is offered or the right is waived is the case decided on prosecution evidence alone. Applied to sustain the order setting the case for reception of petitioners' evidence, following Arbriol vs. Homeres.

• "The Court believes that the prosecution established a prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the Information against said accused on the evidence presented so far on record." — States the trial court's basis for denying the demurrer, which petitioners claimed required acquittal but was held to merely shift the burden of evidence.
• "It becomes incumbent upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against them." — Defines the consequence of a prima facie showing as a shift in the burden of evidence while the burden of proof remains with the prosecution.
• "But if the motion for dismissal is denied, the court should proceed to hear the evidence for the defense before entering judgment regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its Tight to present evidence in the event its motion for dismissal be denied" — Articulates the controlling procedure after denial of a demurrer, grounded on the accused's right to be heard.

• Gamboa vs. Victoriano, 90 SCRA 40 — Cited for the rule that an order denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory and should be challenged on appeal after trial rather than by certiorari.
• Co Chuan Seng vs. CA, 128 SCRA 308 — Cited for the exception allowing certiorari where the questioned order is an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
• People vs. Upao Moro, 101 Phil. 1226 — Cited with Moran on the accused's burden to meet and nullify a prima facie case established by the prosecution.
• Arbriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 — Followed for the rule that denial of dismissal for insufficiency requires hearing defense evidence before judgment, and that dismissal after the prosecution rests terminates the case with double jeopardy barring government appeal.

• Section 2, Rule 118, Rules of Court — Cited in the quoted Arbriol vs. Homeres doctrine that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases where the defendant would thereby be placed in double jeopardy, explaining why a dismissal for insufficiency terminates the case while a denial requires continuation to defense evidence.

Concepcion, Jr., J., Abad Santos, J., Escolin, J., and Alampay, J., concur. Aquino, C.J. (Chairman), in the result.