Bautista vs. Poblete

An invalid donation of an immovable not made in a public document may still serve as the basis for acquisitive prescription where the donee takes possession adversely and in the concept of owner, and such possession, if open, continuous, peaceful, and uninterrupted for the statutory period, vests title in the possessor. Here, Socorro’s possession from 1934 and private respondents’ subsequent possession barred petitioners’ claim and negated any co-ownership over Lot 1243.

Marcelo Reyes Sr. had children by three marriages. Private respondents are the successors-in-interest of Socorro Reyes vda. de Poblete, Marcelo Sr.’s daughter by his second marriage, while petitioners are Marcelo Sr.’s children by his third marriage and his illegitimate children surnamed Sino. The case concerns Lot 1243, a 6.2556-hectare parcel in the Carmona Cadastre, and the legal effect of a donation of land that was not evidenced by a public document under the old Civil Code, as well as long possession under the Code of Civil Procedure.

Marcelo Reyes Sr. had children by three marriages. Private respondents are the successors-in-interest of Socorro Reyes vda. de Poblete, his daughter by the second marriage, and they filed an application to register Lot 1243, a 6.2556-hectare parcel in the Carmona Cadastre, in their names as co-owners. They claimed that Marcelo Sr. donated Lot 1243 to Socorro in 1932, that the cadastral survey of Lot 1243 had been undertaken primarily for and in Socorro’s name, that they purchased the land from Socorro and Juan Poblete, and that they and their predecessors in interest had been in open, continuous, peaceful, and notorious possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more than 50 years. Petitioners, Marcelo Sr.’s children by his third marriage and his illegitimate children surnamed Sino, opposed the application, alleging that Marcelo Sr. acquired Lot 1243 by purchase from Juan Aranda and that the lot should be awarded to them as his lawful heirs.

Socorro Reyes vda. de Poblete, then an octogenarian, testified that Lot 1243 was given to her by her father in 1932 through a deed of donation that was destroyed when her house was burned. She said she had the land planted to sugarcane and palay, caused it to be surveyed by the Bureau of Lands in her name, had it tax-declared in her name, and paid the taxes until she sold it to her children. She did not have the land registered at once because she thought it first had to be tax-declared. Pantaleon Garcia Ancero testified that he had worked on Lot 1243 since 1942 or 1943, first as Socorro’s tenant and later as Celia Poblete’s tenant; that Celia later sold the property to a Chinaman and he was paid ₱700,000; and that Dominador Seno went to the field he was cultivating twice to get a share of the harvest. Celia Poblete testified that on August 10, 1983, she and her sisters bought Lot 1243 for ₱39,000 from Socorro, who had acquired it more than fifty years earlier from Marcelo Sr.; that she had the tax declaration transferred to their names and they had been paying real estate tax; and that their mother and they had possessed the property for 60 years. She added that the oppositors knew of Socorro’s exclusive possession because they lived only some 150 meters away and saw her harvesting, and that although they sometimes asked for some of the harvest, they never made a claim on the land. The applicants sold the property to Winthrop Corporation for ₱20 million, of which ₱3 million had been paid, with the balance due upon registration.

To support their claim, private respondents sought to prove that Marcelo Sr. gave similar gifts of land to each of his families: a six-hectare lot to Candida and Carmen Reyes by the first marriage; Lot 1243, measuring 6.25 hectares, to Socorro by the second marriage; another six-hectare lot to Adoracion B. Bautista, Librada R. Ponciano, Estela R. Quiambao, and Marcelo Reyes, Jr. by the third marriage; and five carabaos and financial support to Jose, Leonila, and Dominador Sino, his illegitimate children. Private respondents did not present the deed of donation, claiming it was burned when fire razed their house sometime in 1980. The records showed that Socorro was in physical possession of Lot 1243 as early as 1934, before Marcelo Sr.’s death, and had the land planted to sugarcane and palay. She filed her application as claimant of Lot 1243 with the Bureau of Lands in 1940 during the cadastral survey and paid ₱4.24 as the owner’s proportionate cost, as shown by the Cadastral Cost Register. Her claim in Cad. 285, Carmona Cadastre, Case 2 was approved on August 5, 1941. The following year, she had the land tenanted by Pantaleon Ancero. In 1948, she registered Lot 1243 in her name under Tax Declaration No. 1430 and thereafter paid the real estate tax. Socorro later sold Lot 1243 to her children, private respondents; Celia Poblete testified that the sale took place on August 10, 1983 for ₱39,000. On October 27, 1983, private respondents obtained a Declaration of Real Property in their favor under PD 464. On August 28, 1991, private respondents filed a Petition for Registration of Title to Lot 1243 before the lower court to perfect the sale of the lot to Winthrop Realty Corporation for ₱20,694,600.

Petitioners insisted that Socorro expressly and impliedly recognized their rights as co-heirs when she was entrusted with the management of the land in 1934; that the harvest had always been divided among the heirs, with petitioner Dominador Sino representing the others in getting their respective shares; and that there was a demand for partition but it did not push through because the land was tenanted. They claimed a cestui que trust but presented no proof that Socorro managed Lot 1243 on behalf of Marcelo Sr.’s heirs, including petitioners. Petitioner Marcelo Reyes, Jr. admitted that Lot 1243 was the only property left by Marcelo Sr. when he died; that Marcelo Sr. gave a six-hectare lot to his mother, which they sold in 1951; that he was not sure whether petitioners were co-owners; that he did not know if Socorro inherited any property from their father; and that they were surprised when they learned the property was already in Socorro’s name. Felino Quiambao, petitioners’ attorney-in-fact, admitted that neither he nor any of petitioners, except Jose Sino, had ever been to the disputed land despite living only 150 meters from Socorro’s residence in Carmona, Cavite, and that they never filed any answer or objection to Socorro’s claim in the cadastral proceedings over Lot 1243.

The CA found that private respondents’ possession of Lot 1243 since 1934 was adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted, and in the concept of an owner; that Socorro exercised acts of dominion over the land by enjoying its fruits to the exclusion of all others, having it cadastrally surveyed in her name, and faithfully paying realty taxes in her name; and that the case was filed only in 1991. Private respondents failed to present the deed of donation, claiming it was burned when fire razed their house sometime in 1980.

• Ownership by Purchase: Petitioners opposed the application alleging that Lot 1243 had been acquired by Marcelo Reyes Sr. by purchase from Juan Aranda, and that the lot should therefore be awarded to them as Marcelo Sr.’s lawful heirs.
• Co-ownership and Cestui Que Trust: Petitioners argued that Socorro expressly and impliedly recognized their rights as co-heirs when she was entrusted with the management of the land in 1934; that the harvest had always been divided among the heirs, with petitioner Dominador Sino representing the others in getting their respective shares; and that there was a demand for partition but it did not push through because the land was tenanted. They alleged a cestui que trust.

• Donation and Long Possession: Private respondents claimed that Lot 1243 was donated by Marcelo Reyes Sr. to Socorro; that the cadastral survey of Lot 1243 had been undertaken primarily for and in Socorro’s name; that they purchased the land from Socorro and Juan Poblete; and that they and their predecessors in interest had been in open, continuous, peaceful, and notorious possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more than 50 years.
• Acquisitive Prescription Despite Invalid Donation: Private respondents contended that even if the donation was invalid, it could still serve as basis for acquisitive prescription.

• Co-ownership: Whether a co-ownership existed between petitioners and private respondents over Lot 1243.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Whether private respondents acquired title to Lot 1243 by acquisitive prescription through Socorro’s adverse possession since 1934, despite the absence or invalidity of the deed of donation.
• Successional Rights of Illegitimate Children: Whether petitioners Jose, Leonila, and Dominador Sino had successional rights to Lot 1243 as illegitimate children of Marcelo Reyes Sr., who died in 1932.
• Registration: Whether private respondents were entitled to a decree of registration over Lot 1243 in their names.

• Co-ownership: No. No co-ownership existed between petitioners and private respondents; Socorro obtained possession before Marcelo Sr. died and continued exclusive possession without objection, with the land cadastrally surveyed and tax-declared in her name.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Yes. An invalid donation may serve as basis for acquisitive prescription when the donee took possession adversely and in the concept of owner; Socorro’s possession since 1934 was adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and in the concept of owner, and the case was filed only in 1991.
• Successional Rights of Illegitimate Children: No. Marcelo Sr. died in 1932 under the old Civil Code, which granted no successional rights to illegitimate children; the new Civil Code’s inheritance rights for illegitimate children applied only where the parent died after August 30, 1950.
• Registration: Yes. Private respondents were entitled to registration because their predecessor’s possession ripened into title by prescription and the CA’s factual findings were binding.

• Co-ownership: The SC found no proof that Socorro managed Lot 1243 on behalf of Marcelo Sr.’s heirs, including petitioners; other than the bare allegation of cestui que trust, petitioners presented no evidence. Petitioner Marcelo Reyes, Jr. admitted that Lot 1243 was the only property left by Marcelo Sr. when he died; that Marcelo Sr. gave a six-hectare lot to Marcelo Jr.’s mother, which they sold in 1951; that he was not sure whether petitioners were co-owners; that he did not know if Socorro inherited any property from their father; and that they were surprised when they learned the property was already in Socorro’s name. Petitioners were not in actual possession; Felino Quiambao admitted that neither he nor any petitioner except Jose Sino had ever been to the disputed land despite living only 150 meters from Socorro’s residence in Carmona, Cavite, and that they never filed any answer or objection to Socorro’s claim in the cadastral proceedings. The SC held that no co-ownership existed: Socorro obtained possession even before Marcelo Sr. died, and after his death she continued to enjoy exclusive possession with no objection from petitioners; the land was cadastrally surveyed and tax-declared in her name, again without protestation. The fact that Dominador Sino allegedly got a share of the harvest twice did not disprove that the entire harvest belonged to Socorro; at most it proved her generosity to him as an illegitimate child who received almost nothing by way of inheritance.
• Acquisitive Prescription: The SC applied the rule that an invalid donation of an immovable not made in a public document under Article 633 of the old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328, may still serve as basis for acquisitive prescription when the donee has taken possession of the property adversely and in the concept of owner, as held in Espique vs. Espique. It also cited Pensader vs. Pensader for the principle that possession not shown to be in common with the plaintiffs, originating from a donation that explains its exclusive character, supports prescription. The SC found that Socorro was in physical possession of Lot 1243 as early as 1934, before Marcelo Sr.’s death, and had the land planted to sugarcane and palay. She filed her application as claimant with the Bureau of Lands in 1940, paid ₱4.24 as the owner’s proportionate cost for the cadastral survey, and her claim in Cad. 285, Carmona Cadastre, Case 2 was approved on August 5, 1941. The following year she had the land tenanted by Pantaleon Ancero; in 1948 she registered the land in her name under Tax Declaration No. 1430 and thereafter religiously paid the real estate tax. The CA found that private respondents’ possession since 1934 was adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted, and in the concept of an owner; the case was filed only in 1991. Even assuming an implied trust existed, Socorro’s acts of dominion—enjoying the fruits to the exclusion of all others, having the land cadastrally surveyed in her name, and faithfully paying realty taxes in her name—clearly repudiated such trust. Under the Code of Civil Procedure then in force, ten years of adverse possession by a person claiming to be the owner, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced, vested full and complete title in the actual possessor. The donation was made in 1932 and Socorro took possession immediately thereafter. Thus, petitioners’ claim was barred by prescription.
• Successional Rights of Illegitimate Children: The SC held that Marcelo Sr. died in 1932 under the old Civil Code, which granted no successional rights to illegitimate children. The inheritance rights established by the new Civil Code in favor of illegitimate children could be claimed only by those whose parents died after the new Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950. Because Marcelo Sr. died in 1932, petitioners Jose, Leonila, and Dominador Sino never had any cause of action against private respondents.
• Registration: The SC affirmed the CA because findings of fact of the CA are binding upon the SC if borne out by the evidence on record, and it found no reversible error in the appellate court’s decision. Since no co-ownership existed and private respondents’ predecessor acquired title by acquisitive prescription, the CA correctly ordered the issuance of a decree of registration over Lot 1243 in favor of private respondents.

• Invalid Donation as Basis for Acquisitive Prescription — An invalid donation of an immovable property, not made in a public document as required by Article 633 of the old Civil Code in relation to Article 1328, may still serve as basis for acquisitive prescription when the donee has taken possession of the property adversely and in the concept of owner. The SC applied this to Socorro’s possession of Lot 1243.
• Adverse Possession Repudiates Implied Trust — Even if an implied trust existed between the parties, acts of dominion by the possessor—enjoying the fruits to the exclusion of all others, having the land cadastrally surveyed in her name, and faithfully paying realty taxes in her name—clearly repudiate the trust. The SC held Socorro’s acts repudiated any implied trust.
• Ten-Year Adverse Possession Under the Code of Civil Procedure — Under the Code of Civil Procedure then in force, ten years of adverse possession by a person claiming to be the owner, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced, vests in the actual possessor a full and complete title. The SC applied this because the donation was made in 1932 and Socorro took possession immediately thereafter.
• No Co-ownership from Bare Cestui Que Trust Allegation — A claim of co-ownership based on an alleged cestui que trust requires proof that the possessor managed the property on behalf of the co-heirs; a bare allegation is insufficient. The SC found no proof and held no co-ownership existed.
• Successional Rights of Illegitimate Children Under the Old Civil Code — The old Civil Code granted no successional rights to illegitimate children; the new Civil Code’s inheritance rights for illegitimate children apply only where the parent died after August 30, 1950. Marcelo Sr. died in 1932, so petitioners Jose, Leonila, and Dominador Sino had no cause of action.
• CA Findings of Fact Binding on the SC — Findings of fact of the CA are binding upon the SC if borne out by the evidence on record. The SC found no reversible error in the CA’s findings and affirmed.

• “It was not shown that such possession was in common with the plaintiffs. As above stated, the origin of said possession is adverse to such community, namely, the donation, which although it is not established by a sufficient documentary evidence, stands in this case as a circumstance explaining the exclusive character of the possession of Maria Revelar and Alejandra Pensader and that of their common successor in interest Silverio P. Revelar.” — The SC quoted this from Pensader vs. Pensader to explain that possession originating from a donation, even if not sufficiently proven by documents, was adverse to the claimed community and exclusive in character.
• “There is no question that the donation in question is invalid because it involves an immovable property and the donation was not made in a public document as required by Article 633 of the old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of the same Code (concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not follow that said donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when on the strength thereof the donee has taken possession of the property adversely and in the concept of owner.” — The SC quoted this from Espique vs. Espique to hold that an invalid donation may still be the basis of acquisitive prescription when the donee possessed adversely and in the concept of owner.
• “It is the essence of the statute of limitations that, whether the party had the right to the possession or not, if he entered under the claim of such right and remained in possession for the period required for acquisitive prescription, the right of action of a party claiming title is barred by that adverse possession.” — The SC used this rule to bar petitioners’ claim after Socorro and private respondents had possessed Lot 1243 for the period required for acquisitive prescription.
• “Under the Code of Civil Procedure which was then in force, ten years of adverse possession by the person claiming to be the owner, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced, shall vest in the actual possessor of the land a full and complete title.” — The SC applied this rule because the donation was made in 1932 and Socorro took possession immediately thereafter, so ten years of adverse possession vested title in her.

• Pensader vs. Pensader, 47 Phil. 959 (1924) — Relied on; the SC found a close parallelism and used it to hold that possession originating from a donation, though not sufficiently proven by documentary evidence, explained the exclusive character of the possessor’s possession and was adverse to the claimed community.
• Espique vs. Espique, 99 Phil. 448 (1956) — Relied on; the SC used it to hold that an invalid donation of an immovable not made in a public document may still serve as basis for acquisitive prescription when the donee possessed adversely and in the concept of owner.
• Solis vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 467753-54, August 25, 1989, 176 SCRA 678 — Relied on; cited for the rule that the statute of limitations bars the action of a party claiming title when another has possessed under a claim of right for the period required for acquisitive prescription, regardless of the validity of the claim.
• Miraflor vs. Court of Appeals, 225 Phil. 504 (1986) — Relied on; cited for the rule under the Code of Civil Procedure then in force that ten years of adverse possession by a person claiming to be owner vests full and complete title in the actual possessor.

• Article 633, Old Civil Code — Required donations of immovable property to be made in a public document; the donation of Lot 1243 was invalid because it was not so documented. The SC held the invalidity did not prevent the donation from serving as basis for acquisitive prescription.
• Article 1328, Old Civil Code — Cited in connection with Article 633 concerning gifts propter nuptias; the SC referred to it in explaining why the donation was invalid for lack of a public document.
• Code of Civil Procedure (then in force) — Provided that ten years of adverse possession by a person claiming to be the owner, in whatever way occupancy commenced, vests full and complete title in the actual possessor; applied to Socorro’s possession from 1932/1934.
• Old Civil Code (successional rights) — Governed Marcelo Sr.’s succession because he died in 1932; it granted no successional rights to illegitimate children, so petitioners Jose, Leonila, and Dominador Sino had no cause of action.
• New Civil Code — Established inheritance rights in favor of illegitimate children, but only for those whose parents died after its effectivity on August 30, 1950; because Marcelo Sr. died in 1932, it did not apply.
• PD 464 (Real Property Tax Code) — Private respondents obtained a Declaration of Real Property in their favor under PD 464 on October 27, 1983; the SC included this in the chronology of possession and tax declaration.
• Cadastral Law — An application or answer constitutes public notice of a claim of exclusive and adverse possession and ownership over the lot; petitioners’ failure to file any answer or objection to Socorro’s cadastral claim supported her adverse possession.