Bautista vs. Peralta

Where a Civil Service Board of Appeals decision imposes a two-month suspension without pay chargeable to preventive suspension, the employee is entitled to back salaries for the remainder of the preventive suspension, and mandamus lies to enforce that clear legal duty.

Petitioner Eduardo G. Bautista was an employee of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NWSA), while respondents were members of its Board of Directors. Civil service laws then governed preventive suspension and reinstatement, including Section 35 of Republic Act No. 2260, which provides for restoration to the position with full pay upon exoneration. Section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, was also invoked in the administrative indorsements concerning back salaries.

Petitioner Eduardo G. Bautista was employed by the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NWSA) as Capataz-Timekeeper in its Engineering Department, and respondents were members of the NWSA Board of Directors. He was charged administratively with dishonesty and violation of office regulations and was suspended pending investigation on May 30, 1958. On October 8, 1958, the Civil Service Commission found him guilty of the charge and ordered his dismissal, effective as of the date of his suspension.

Bautista appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals. On May 13, 1963, the Board rendered its decision modifying the appealed decision: it imposed on him suspension for two months without pay, chargeable to his preventive suspension. The NWSA filed a motion for reconsideration on June 3, 1963, but the motion was denied on June 30, 1963. By that time, his preventive suspension had already lasted almost five years.

After the motion for reconsideration was denied, the General Manager of the NWSA consulted the Government Corporate Counsel, who rendered an opinion dated July 19, 1963 advising implementation of the decision, which had already become final. On September 3, 1963, the NWSA reinstated Bautista but without back wages, and three days later he reported for duty. He made representations with NWSA officials for payment of back salaries and other rights and privileges during the entire period of his suspension.

In successive indorsements signed respectively by the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications on February 20, 1964, by the Commissioner of Civil Service on May 6, 1964, and by the Deputy Auditor General on June 11, 1964, these officials ruled that under the Board’s decision Bautista was entitled to back salaries pursuant to Section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended. The final (8th) indorsement of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications dated June 18, 1964 approved the claim for payment of his salary during the period he was out of the service from May 30, 1958 to September 15, 1963, minus the two-month punitive suspension imposed by the Board, in view of the 6th indorsement of the Commissioner of Civil Service and the next preceding indorsement by the Deputy Auditor General. Receiving no favorable action on his representations, Bautista filed the instant petition for mandamus directly with the SC, praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondents, as members of the NWSA Board of Directors, to pay him (a) P14,708.56 as back wages, less P458.00 representing the two-month suspension without pay, leaving a balance of P14,250.56; (b) P1,500.00 as living allowance; (c) P20,000.00 as damages; (d) P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees; (e) legal interest from May 13, 1963 until fully paid; and (f) costs.

• Propriety of Mandamus: Respondents countered that mandamus is not the proper remedy even with respect to the claim for back salaries, arguing that a money claim ordinarily does not lend itself to this kind of action, particularly if the claim is contractual.

• Mandamus for Back Salaries: Whether payment of back salaries under the Civil Service Board of Appeals decision is a duty specifically enjoined by law enforceable by mandamus, despite the claim being a money claim.
• Living Allowance, Damages, and Attorney’s Fees: Whether mandamus lies to recover living allowance, damages, and attorney’s fees.

• Mandamus for Back Salaries: Yes. The obligation to pay back salaries is implicit in the Board’s decision, and the subsequent administrative indorsements established a clear legal duty enforceable by mandamus despite the claim being a money claim.
• Living Allowance, Damages, and Attorney’s Fees: No. The petition and the Board’s decision do not show a clear legal entitlement to these items, so an ordinary civil action is the appropriate remedy.

• Mandamus for Back Salaries: Mandamus lies to enforce a duty specifically enjoined by law. The Board’s decision imposed only two months’ suspension without pay and made it chargeable to the preventive suspension, which had already lasted almost five years. Preventive suspension is not a penalty but a precautionary measure; under Section 35 of R.A. No. 2260, an exonerated employee is restored with full pay, and the penalty of suspension for a fixed period contemplates the same result after the penalty has been served. Since the two-month penalty was in effect served during the first two months of preventive suspension, Bautista was entitled to back salaries for the remainder; denying them would amend the Board’s decision, increase the suspension, and convert preventive suspension into the penalty itself. Although a money claim ordinarily does not lend itself to mandamus, this claim did not arise from contract, and the Government Corporate Counsel opinion and successive indorsements—including the final June 18, 1964 indorsement of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications approving the claim under Section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended—removed doubt as to the clear legal duty and the propriety of mandamus.
• Living Allowance, Damages, and Attorney’s Fees: The SC ruled out living allowance, damages, and attorney’s fees from the scope of mandamus. Nothing in the petition or in the Board’s decision showed that Bautista was so clearly entitled to these items that mandamus should issue for their payment. An ordinary civil action was the appropriate remedy, where both the right and the extent of recovery could be litigated and proved.

• Preventive Suspension Is Not a Penalty — Preventive suspension in administrative cases is a precautionary measure separating the employee from the scene of alleged misfeasance during investigation, not a penalty. If exonerated, the law provides restoration to the position with full pay for the suspension period under Section 35 of R.A. No. 2260. In this case, the two-month suspension without pay was chargeable to preventive suspension, which had lasted almost five years.
• Penalty Served During Preventive Suspension — Where the penalty imposed is suspension for a fixed period and is made chargeable to preventive suspension, the penalty is deemed served during that preventive suspension. The employee is entitled to back salaries for the remainder of the preventive suspension; denying them would amend the decision and convert preventive suspension into the penalty itself.
• Mandamus to Enforce a Clear Legal Duty — Mandamus lies to enforce a duty specifically enjoined by law. A money claim ordinarily does not lend itself to mandamus, especially if contractual, but the SC allowed it here because the claim did not arise from contract and supervening administrative indorsements established a clear legal right to back salaries.

• “Preventive suspension in administrative cases is not a penalty in itself. It is designed merely as measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated.” — This defines preventive suspension and distinguishes it from the penalty of suspension.
• “In the particular case of petitioner herein, the penalty imposed by the Civil Service Board of Appeals, was in effect served by him during the first two months of his preventive suspension.” — This is the factual and legal pivot for awarding back salaries for the remaining period.
• “Denial of the back salaries would amount to an amendment of the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals, in effect increasing the two-month suspension meted out to him and converting the preventive suspension into the penalty itself.” — This explains why back salaries must be paid without altering the Board’s decision.
• “This last directive of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications removes any doubt as to the character of the duty of respondents in the premises and as to the propriety of the remedy pursued by petitioner in this case.” — This supports the availability of mandamus despite the claim being for money.

• Section 35, Republic Act No. 2260 — The SC cited it for the rule that an employee exonerated after preventive suspension shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of suspension. It used the provision to explain that preventive suspension is not a penalty and that the two-month penalty was served during the first two months.
• Section 260, Revised Administrative Code, as amended — The administrative indorsements ruled that under the Board’s decision petitioner was entitled to back salaries pursuant to this section. The SC noted the final indorsement approving the claim under this provision, which removed doubt as to the duty to pay back salaries.