Bautista vs. Court of Appeals

The denial of a motion for postponement filed on the very date of the scheduled hearing, and the consequent declaration that the movant has waived the presentation of evidence, does not amount to grave abuse of discretion or a denial of due process where the party was afforded, but failed to avail of, the opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard, and the grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, reviewable only for clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice.

On August 12, 1999, petitioners Natividad E. Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and Socorro L. Angeles filed a complaint for quieting of title against Manila Papermills, International, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22, docketed as Civil Case No. 1948-99. The complaint was later amended to implead Adelfa Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo and Nelly Javellana. Petitioners alleged that they had been in actual and uninterrupted possession of Lot 5753 of the Imus Estate; that they discovered the land was covered by a reconstituted title in the name of respondents; and that the said title and the derivatives thereof were spurious. They accordingly prayed that they be declared the absolute owners of the land in dispute.

After several delays spanning more than two years, the case was finally set for trial. On May 2, 2002, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement to cancel the hearing, on the ground that Atty. Michael Macaraeg, the lawyer assigned to the case, was in the United States attending to an important matter. The trial court denied the motion and considered petitioners as having waived the presentation of their evidence.

The record of the postponements thereafter became material to the resolution of the petition. In its Order dated July 2, 2002, the trial court stated that petitioners' motions for postponement on three previous occasions had been granted, a fact never refuted by petitioners; their last motion was denied because it was filed on the very date of the hearing sought to be rescheduled. Of the two postponements prayed for by respondents, one was for the cancellation of a court date unilaterally requested by petitioners which had not been approved by the trial court.

• Partiality and Prejudice of the Trial Court: Petitioners claimed that the trial judge displayed "noticeable partiality and prejudice" in dealing with their case, citing four instances wherein respondents were granted extensions to file responsive pleadings and two instances wherein respondents' requests for postponement were granted, while petitioners' Urgent Motion for Postponement was denied.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioners maintained that the arbitrary acts of the trial court resulted in the denial of their right to due process, invoking Padua vs. Ericta, 161 SCRA 458.
• Denial of the Chance to Present Evidence: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals denied them the chance to present evidence even after they had satisfactorily explained the failure of their counsel to attend the scheduled hearing, thereby violating the due process guarantee, citing Continental Leaf Tobacco (Phil.), Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 269.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners averred that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged Orders.

• Partiality and Prejudice of the Trial Court: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider the partiality and prejudice of the trial court against the petitioners since the inception of the case, thereby depriving them of their constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
• Denial of the Chance to Present Evidence: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petitioners their chance to present evidence despite their satisfactory explanation of their counsel's failure to attend the scheduled hearing, in violation of the due process guarantee.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for postponement and in declaring petitioners to have waived the presentation of their evidence.

• Partiality and Prejudice of the Trial Court: No. The instances cited by petitioners do not establish bias or prejudice, an extension to file a responsive pleading being clearly different from a request for postponement of trial, and the trial court having in fact granted petitioners' motions for postponement on three previous occasions.
• Denial of the Chance to Present Evidence: No. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process; the opportunity to be heard having been accorded, its non-availment is deemed a waiver or forfeiture of the constitutional guarantee.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and the refusal to postpone must be characterized by arbitrariness or capriciousness to constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Partiality and Prejudice of the Trial Court: The claim of bias was tested against the procedural record rather than against the bare assertion of prejudice. An extension to file a responsive pleading is clearly different from a request for a postponement of trial; the former is less likely to waste the time of the court, the litigants, their counsels and witnesses who may have already prepared for the trial and traveled to the courthouse to attend the hearing. Of the two postponements prayed for by respondents, one was for the cancellation of a court date unilaterally requested by petitioners which had not been approved by the trial court. Against this, the trial court's Order dated July 2, 2002 stated that petitioners' motions for postponement on three previous occasions were granted, a fact never refuted by petitioners. The denial of petitioners' last motion was explained by the circumstance that it was filed on the very date of the hearing sought to be rescheduled. The disparity in treatment therefore did not exist, and the charge of partiality and prejudice was not supported by the record.

• Denial of the Chance to Present Evidence: The due process objection was resolved against petitioners on the distinction between the opportunity to be heard and the actual exercise of that opportunity. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard; if it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee. Petitioners were given the opportunity to present their evidence, and their non-appearance on the scheduled date, attributable to the absence of their assigned counsel abroad, was their own responsibility; the explanation offered did not restore a right already waived.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The denial of the postponement was measured against the standard governing continuances. The grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right; it is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice. A finding of grave abuse of discretion cannot be made simply because a court decides to proceed with the trial of a case rather than postpone the hearing to another day because of the absence of a party. The absence of a party during trial constitutes a waiver of his right to present evidence and to cross-examine the opponent's witnesses, a rule firmly supported by jurisprudence. To constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to postpone the hearing must be characterized by arbitrariness or capriciousness. The trial court's order declaring petitioners to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions, far from being tainted with bias and prejudice, upheld the court's duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party. A careful review of the evidence on record showed that the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed.

• Due process is satisfied by the opportunity to be heard — Due process does not require that a party actually be heard; it requires only that the party be accorded an opportunity to be heard. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process, and the non-availment of the opportunity is deemed a waiver or forfeiture of the constitutional guarantee without violating it. The Court applied this rule to reject petitioners' claim that the denial of their motion for postponement deprived them of due process.
• Waiver of the right to present evidence by absence at trial — The absence of a party during trial constitutes a waiver of his right to present evidence and to cross-examine the opponent's witnesses. This rule, described in the decision as firmly supported by jurisprudence, supplied the basis for holding that the trial court's declaration of waiver did not violate petitioners' rights.
• Postponement is not a matter of right — The grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of right. Action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice. The Court applied this doctrine to the trial court's denial of the Urgent Motion for Postponement.
• Grave abuse of discretion in the denial of postponement — To constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to postpone the hearing must be characterized by arbitrariness or capriciousness. A finding of grave abuse of discretion cannot be made simply because a court decides to proceed with the trial rather than postpone the hearing because of the absence of a party.
• Dilatory actions and the court's duty to proceed — An order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the court's duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party; such an order is far from being tainted with bias and prejudice.
• Distinction between extension to plead and postponement of trial — An extension to file a responsive pleading is clearly different from a request for a postponement of trial, the former being less likely to waste the time of the court, the litigants, their counsels and witnesses who may have already prepared for the trial and traveled to the courthouse to attend the hearing. The Court used this distinction to reject the claim of partiality based on the comparative treatment of the parties' requests.

• "Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the due process issue and supplies the canonical formulation of the rule that the opportunity to be heard, not its actual exercise, is what the Constitution guarantees.
• "Moreover, the grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right. It is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice." — This passage defines the standard of review governing motions for postponement and explains why the Court of Appeals correctly declined to disturb the trial court's denial.
• "In other words, we cannot make a finding of grave abuse of discretion simply because a court decides to proceed with the trial of a case rather than postpone the hearing to another day, because of the absence of a party. That the absence of a party during trial constitutes a waiver of his right to present evidence and cross-examine the opponent's witnesses is firmly supported by jurisprudence. To constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to postpone the hearing must be characterized by arbitrariness or capriciousness." — This passage links the waiver rule to the grave abuse of discretion standard and states the arbitrariness-or-capriciousness test that the challenged orders failed to satisfy.
• "far from being tainted with bias and prejudice, an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the court's duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party." — This passage, drawn from the Court's citation of Gohu vs. Spouses Gohu, disposes of the charge of judicial partiality and reframes the trial court's order as an exercise of its duty to expedite proceedings.

• Gohu vs. Spouses Gohu, G.R. No. 128230, 13 October 2000, 343 SCRA 114 — The controlling precedent relied upon by the Court for the proposition that an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions, far from being tainted with bias and prejudice, upholds the court's duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.
• Tiomico vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122539, 4 March 1999, 304 SCRA 216 — Cited as authority for the due process rule that a party who was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so cannot complain of deprivation of due process, and for the rule that the grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
• Adorable vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119466, 25 November 1999, 319 SCRA 200, 209 — Cited as authority for the standard that the refusal of the court to postpone the hearing, to constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, must be characterized by arbitrariness or capriciousness.
• Padua vs. Ericta, 161 SCRA 458 — Cited by petitioners in their first assignment of error as authority for the due process claim arising from the alleged partiality and prejudice of the trial court; the citation did not persuade the Court.
• Continental Leaf Tobacco (Phil.), Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 269 — Cited by petitioners in their second assignment of error as authority for the claim that the denial of the chance to present evidence, notwithstanding a satisfactory explanation for counsel's failure to attend, violated the due process guarantee; the citation did not persuade the Court.

• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — The procedural vehicle for the petition, which sought reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72307 dated February 17, 2003. The Court entertained and resolved the petition on the merits, ultimately denying it and affirming the assailed decision.
• Constitutional guarantee of due process — Petitioners anchored their petition on the "constitutionally guaranteed right to due process," which they claimed was violated by the trial court's alleged partiality and by the denial of their chance to present evidence. The Court applied the guarantee by holding that due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard, and that its non-availment is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.

Justice Davide, Jr. (noted as on official leave); Justice Panganiban (Working Chairman); Justice Carpio; and Justice Azcuna.