Bautista vs. Court of Appeals

The 90-day presentment period under Section 2 of BP 22 is not an element of the offense under Section 1 but merely a condition for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds; consequently, prosecution for violation of BP 22 is not precluded by presentment beyond 90 days.

In April 1998, Ruth D. Bautista issued a Metrobank check dated May 8, 1998, for P1,500,000.00 to Susan Aloña. Aloña presented the check for payment on October 20, 1998, or 166 days after its date, resulting in its dishonor for being drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). Despite repeated demands, Bautista failed to make arrangements for payment within five banking days from notice of dishonor.

• Issuance and Dishonor: Petitioner issued Metrobank Check No. 005014037 dated May 8, 1998, for P1,500,000.00 to private respondent, assuring her of sufficient funds on the maturity date. Private respondent presented the check on October 20, 1998, 166 days after its date, prompting the drawee bank to dishonor it for insufficient funds.
• Demand and Defense: Private respondent made repeated demands for payment within five working days from notice of dishonor, which petitioner ignored. In her counter-affidavit, petitioner argued that presentment within 90 days was an essential element of BP 22, and since the check was presented after 166 days, no criminal liability attached. She also claimed that she had assigned her condominium unit to private respondent as full payment, thereby extinguishing her criminal liability.
• Prosecutorial Findings: The investigating prosecutor recommended filing an Information against petitioner, a resolution approved by the City Prosecutor. The ORSP denied petitioner's subsequent petition for review and motion for reconsideration, citing Department Order No. 223, which limits its review to resolutions dismissing criminal complaints.

• 90-Day Presentment as an Element: Petitioner argued that presentment of a check within 90 days from its date is an essential element of the offense under BP 22; because the subject check was presented 166 days after its date, no criminal liability attaches, leaving only a civil action for collection.
• Section 2 as Defining an Element: Petitioner maintained that Section 2 of BP 22 furnishes an additional element for the offense defined in the first paragraph of Section 1, otherwise Section 2 would be rendered nugatory.
• Extinguishment of Liability: Petitioner asserted that her criminal liability was extinguished when she assigned her condominium unit to private respondent as full payment for the bounced check.
• Quasi-Judicial Remedy: Petitioner contended that the prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial function, making the ORSP resolution appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43.

• Rule 43 Inapplicability: Respondent appellate court countered that a petition for review under Rule 43 applies only to quasi-judicial agencies, and the ORSP is not among them. The proper remedy for grave abuse of discretion is a petition for certiorari, but petitioner failed to allege its essential requirements and violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
• Probable Cause: Respondents maintained that the investigating prosecutor found probable cause to file the Information, a finding within the prosecutor's sound discretion.

• Appellate Remedy: Whether a resolution of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor approving the filing of a criminal Information is appealable to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43.
• 90-Day Presentment: Whether presentment of a check within 90 days from its date is an essential element of the offense under Section 1 of BP 22.

• Appellate Remedy: The Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body whose resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, intended to determine probable cause, and does not involve the adjudication of guilt or innocence that characterizes quasi-judicial functions.
• 90-Day Presentment: The 90-day presentment period is not an element of the offense under Section 1 of BP 22. Section 2 merely establishes a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds when the check is presented and dishonored within 90 days; failure to present within this period only removes the presumption, but the prosecution may still prove knowledge through other evidence.

• Prima Facie Evidence under BP 22 — The dishonor of a check presented within 90 days from its date creates a prima facie presumption of the maker's or drawer's knowledge of insufficient funds. This presumption is not conclusive and does not foreclose the presentation of other evidence to prove such knowledge if the check is presented beyond the 90-day period.
• Preliminary Investigation as Inquisitorial — A prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation does not exercise quasi-judicial functions. The investigation is inquisitorial, aimed solely at determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to charge the accused, without adjudicating guilt or innocence.

• "Thus, the only consequence of the failure to present the check for payment within ninety (90) days from the date stated is that there arises no prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But the prosecution may still prove such knowledge through other evidence."
• "While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal."

• People v. Laggui, G.R. Nos. 76262-63, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA 305 — Followed; enumerated the elements of the offense under BP 22, which do not include the 90-day presentment period.
• Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. 63419, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323 — Followed; established that the statute creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds from the fact of drawing a check that is subsequently dishonored.
• Luzon Development Bank v. Employees, G.R. No. 120319, 6 October 1995, 249 SCRA 162 — Distinguished; held that voluntary arbitrators are quasi-judicial agencies because their awards determine the rights of parties and become final and executory, unlike prosecutors who merely determine probable cause.

• Section 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — Penalizes two distinct acts: (1) issuing a check knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds, and (2) having sufficient funds at the time of issue but failing to keep sufficient funds within 90 days from the date appearing on the check. The 90-day period was clarified as an express element only of the second offense.
• Section 2, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — Provides that dishonor of a check presented within 90 days from its date constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. Applied as an evidentiary rule, not a definitional element of the offense.
• Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs appeals from judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. Held inapplicable to resolutions of the Office of the Prosecutor, which is not a quasi-judicial body.

Mendoza, Buena, De Leon, Jr.